United States v. Sampson, 4th Cir. (1998)
United States v. Sampson, 4th Cir. (1998)
No. 96-4446
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Noell Peter Tin, FERGUSON, STEIN, WALLAS,
ADKINS, GRESHAM & SUMTER, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina;
Sharon Dunigan Jumper, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants.
Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stephen Luke Largess,
FERGUSON, STEIN, WALLAS, ADKINS, GRESHAM & SUMTER, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants. Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
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OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Eric Creighton Sampson and Cedric Lamont
Dean of various narcotics and firearms offenses. The district court
sentenced Sampson to life imprisonment and Dean to life imprisonment plus five years. Sampson and Dean appeal, asserting several trial
and sentencing errors. We affirm the convictions and Sampson's sentence; however, we vacate Dean's sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
I.
The government produced evidence at trial that Sampson, Dean,
and numerous other persons engaged in a three-year conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and cocaine base (crack). The conspiracy took
place from 1992 to 1995. The co-conspirators sold drugs in the home
of Mack Hopper, which is located within one thousand feet of a playground, the Boulevard Homes and Southside Homes, both of which
are public housing facilities, and at the Little Rock Apartments.
Two of the defendants' co-conspirators, Mack Hopper and Marcus
Massey, testified at length as to the multiple illegal activities of
Sampson and Dean. Hopper related that he frequently sold crack for
Sampson and with Dean, and that Dean carried and brandished a gun
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during robberies of other drug dealers. Massey corroborated this testimony and explained that he, Hopper, Dean, Sampson, and others
engaged in a wide-ranging drug conspiracy in which six or more persons worked for Sampson and Dean.
In addition, both Hopper and Massey testified that, along with
Dean and Sampson, they sold "flex" (counterfeit cocaine) to unsuspecting purchasers. Massey recounted a botched sting operation in
which he and Dean attempted to sell to undercover officers $8,000
worth of flex, but instead were arrested. Several other drug dealers
and users corroborated Hopper and Massey's damaging testimony.
On the basis of this evidence, the jury convicted Sampson and
Dean of conspiring to distribute cocaine and cocaine base within one
thousand feet of a playground or public housing facility in violation
of 21 U.S.C.A. 841(a)(1), 846 and 860 (West 1981 & Supp. 1997).
In addition, the jury found Dean guilty of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. 841(a)(1), of
using or carrying a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 924(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997), and
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
On appeal, Sampson and Dean contest their convictions and their
sentences. We turn first to the challenges to their convictions.
II.
A.
One count of the indictment charged Sampson and Dean with conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C.A. 841(a)(1) which prohibits distribution of crack cocaine. Sampson and Dean maintain that the
government constructively amended this count, effectively prosecuting them for conspiracy to distribute counterfeit cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C.A. 841(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997), in addition to conspiracy to distribute genuine cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
841(a)(1). Their contention is meritless.
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stance is cocaine, does not make the mere distribution of that substance a violation of the federal narcotics laws.
Sampson and Dean nonetheless maintain that "whether flex sales
are an indictable offense or not," the government improperly broadened the basis on which to convict them beyond that contained in the
indictment. Reply Brief at 3. This argument misunderstands what is
necessary for a court to find that an indictment was constructively
amended. We must find that "either the government (usually during
its presentation of evidence and/or its argument),[or] the court (usually through its instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible
bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury."
United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
For a constructive amendment to have occurred, therefore, the government's presentation at trial, must expose defendant to criminal
"charges that are not made in the indictment against him." Id. at 711
(quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)). In this
case, Sampson and Dean could not be, and were not, convicted of a
crime based on selling flex. The government did not urge the jury to
convict Sampson and Dean because they sold flex; the district court
did not instruct the jury that it could convict them of selling flex; and
selling flex is not illegal under federal law.
True, the government did introduce evidence of flex sales, but
merely as one of many "overt acts" undertaken by the co-conspirators
that demonstrated the existence of the conspiracy. Defendants' only
real challenge, therefore, is apparently one of relevancy. Sampson and
Dean were charged with unlawfully conspiring to distribute illegal
narcotics. To prove this charge, the government must demonstrate:
"(1) an agreement between two or more persons (not including government agents), (2) to commit in concert an unlawful act," which in
this case is to distribute illegal narcotics. United States v. Giunta, 925
F.2d 758, 764 (4th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996). Proof of the first prong
-- that the co-conspirators agreed to commit an unlawful act -- is
often established through indirect evidence. See United States v.
Morsely, 64 F.3d 907, 919 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the government can introduce a wide variety of lawful conduct to demonstrate
that co-conspirators maintained the trust and comfort necessary to
conspire to commit unlawful acts. Here, two witnesses, Hopper and
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Because Dean did not object at trial, however, our review is for
plain error as defined in United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 731
(1993). See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, No. 955331, 1998 WL 63816 (4th Cir. Feb. 18, 1998). Dean must demonstrate that the instruction constituted (1) error, (2) which is plain, and
(3) which "affects substantial rights," i.e. that it was prejudicial.
Martinez, 1998 WL 63816, at *3. We retain discretion to correct the
error only "if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (internal brackets and quotations
omitted).
Clearly, the instruction here is erroneous and the error is plain.
However, Dean cannot demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights. This is so because the only evidence the government
offered that Dean had violated 924(c)(1) demonstrates that he carried or brandished firearms in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. The
government presented no evidence of pre-Bailey passive "use" by
Dean, e.g., a gun nearby during Dean's participation in a drug deal.
Of course, the jury could have chosen to disbelieve the government's
evidence and acquit Dean of violating 924(c). But the jurors did not
do this. Instead, they found Dean guilty of violating 924(c). In
doing so, they must necessarily have found that Dean brandished or
carried the firearms, given that this evidence of"active" use was the
only kind of "use" evidence before them. Accordingly, the erroneous
jury instruction did not affect Dean's substantial rights.
C.
Dean, who had represented himself during the two days of trial
with Sampson's attorney acting as his standby counsel, also contends
that the district court erred in denying his motion for a continuance
when he fell ill. Because Dean expressly agreed to have his standby
counsel replace him not only during his illness but for the remainder
of the trial, and because the district court ensured that Dean's right to
competent counsel was not jeopardized by the replacement, this
claim, too, lacks merit.
We review the district court's decision to deny a continuance for
abuse of discretion. See Franken v. United States, 248 F.2d 789 (4th
Cir. 1957). However, because a defendant maintains a Sixth Amend7
accounts of drug robberies in which Dean directly participated. Moreover, on the few occasions where the witnesses provided the court
with a range of drug amounts, the district court attributed the lowest
amount to Dean. Similarly, with respect to Sampson, the district court
specifically credited the testimony of Charles Guy who testified that
he observed Sampson dealing about $2,000 of crack per week for an
entire year, which could total as much as 78 ounces of crack. The district court, however, only attributed one ounce of crack for 45 weeks,
or 45 ounces, to Sampson.
In addition to these amounts, the district court attributed to Sampson and Dean nine ounces of crack cocaine, equaling the $8,000 proceeds that they obtained from the flex sale made to undercover agents.
Sampson and Dean maintain that the court erred because the government presented insufficient evidence to determine whether the $8,000
procured from the flex sale would have been reinvested into their
drug operation. The district court reasoned that while it could not
count the amount of flex directly into the quantities of narcotics
attributable to defendants, it could count the drug-equivalent of the
proceeds from the flex sale based on evidence that defendants generally used such proceeds to buy "drugs, and other things."
Because flex is not a controlled substance, the district court properly recognized that the sale, standing alone, could not be attributed
to defendants as if it were a drug sale. The court also correctly concluded that it could count the proceeds from the flex sale to the extent
those proceeds were used to purchase illegal drugs . See United States
v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 882 n.4 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming district
court's conversion of cash seized from defendant's home to drug
equivalent because "there was ample evidence on which the district
court could have found that all the money was the proceeds of drug
transactions") (emphasis added); United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez,
953 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding district court clearly
erred in attributing drug-equivalent of cash seized at defendant's
home where no evidence "of a connection between the money seized
and a drug transaction" was before the court). The difficulty here is
that no evidence before the district court specifically linked the entire
$8,000 of flex proceeds to the defendants' purchase or sale of narcotics. Rather, the only pertinent evidence demonstrates that defendants
customarily invested a portion of flex sale proceeds to buy drugs,
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with the remainder used for lawful purchases such as"clothes [and]
cars." To be sure, this evidence demonstrates that some portion of the
flex transaction is linked to defendants' drug transactions, and thus
supports the district court's attribution of that portion to defendants.
This evidence, however, does not adequately support attributing the
entire $8,000 to Sampson and Dean. Accordingly, the district court
erred in converting all $8,000 into its equivalent drug amount.
Although the evidence before the district court did not adequately
support attributing all the proceeds of the flex sale to Dean and Sampson, this error is harmless.1 Even if the nine ounces of crack related
to the flex sale proceeds is subtracted from the total amount of narcotics attributable to defendants, they remain at the same base offense
levels. The district court attributed 35 1/4 ounces of crack (roughly
equal to one kilogram of cocaine) to Dean and assigned him a base
offense level of 36 for dealing between 1/2 and 1 1/2 kilograms of
cocaine. Even without the nine ounces of crack associated with the
flex proceeds, Dean's total amount nonetheless falls between 1/2 and
1 1/2 kilograms, placing him at level 36. Similarly, based on the testimony of Charles Guy alone, Sampson is responsible for distributing
45 ounces of crack. This amount, combined with other testimony linking Sampson to numerous other deals, brings his total narcotics level
to well above 1 1/2 kilograms, even without attribution of the nine
ounces of crack associated with the flex proceeds, leaving his base
offense level of 38 unchanged.
B.
Sampson and Dean next assert that the district court calculated
their sentences contrary to the dictates of 2D1.2(a)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, they argue that 2D1.2(a)(1) only
permits a court to consider an enhancement as to those controlled substances directly involved in a protected location, here within one
thousand feet of a playground or public housing project. Accordingly,
because the district court calculated the defendants' sentences under
2D1.2(a)(1) based on the total amount of narcotics transacted dur_________________________________________________________________
1 Our holding as to U.S.S.G. 2D1.2(a) infra does not affect the harmlessness of the district court's errror in light of the district court's obligation, under 2D1.2(a), to "apply the greatest" sentence to defendants.
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ing the conspiracy, and not only those transacted near a playground
or in public housing, the sentencing calculations were in error.
Section 2D1.2, entitled "Drug Offenses Occurring Near Protected
Locations or Involving Underage or Pregnant Individuals; Attempt or
Conspiracy," provides:
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest):
(1) 2 plus the offense level from 2D1.1 applicable to the quantity of controlled substances directly
involving a protected location . . .; or
(2) 1 plus the offense level from 2D1.1 applicable to the total quantity of controlled substances
involved in the offense . . .
U.S.S.G. 2D1.2 (emphasis added). Thus, the Guidelines require a
sentencing court to determine what portion of the total amount of controlled substances were directly involved in a "protected location."
Importantly, the Sentencing Commission's Application Note 1 further highlights the district court's task. It provides:
Where only part of the relevant offense conduct directly
involved a protected location . . . subsections (a)(1) and
(a)(2) may result in different offense levels . For example, if
the defendant, as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, sold 5 grams of heroin near a protected
location and 10 grams of heroin elsewhere, the offense level
from subsection (a)(1) would be level 16 (2 plus the offense
level for the sale of 5 grams of heroin, the amount sold near
the protected location); the offense level from subsection
(a)(2) would be level 17 (1 plus the level for the sale of 15
grams of heroin, the total amount of heroin involved in the
offense).
U.S.S.G. 2D1.2, comment. (n.1) (emphasis added). See also United
States v. Walker, 993 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he distinction drawn by the Guidelines is between drugs actually sold or possessed near the location and those drugs that are part of the same
course of conduct but are sold or possessed outside the protected area.
. . . [T]he drugs [must be] present within 1,000 feet of the school.").
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We therefore vacate and remand Dean's sentence to give the district court the opportunity to address the status of the Little Rock
Apartments. On remand, the district court must calculate Dean's sentence under 2D1.2(a)(1) and 2D2.2(a)(2) and impose the greater
sentence. In determining the sentence under subsection (a)(1), the
court must address whether the Little Rock Apartments are in fact a
protected area, or if not, make proper findings regarding the amount
of narcotics dealt in the clearly established protected areas -- Hopper's home and the Southside and Boulevard Homes. When the court
has calculated Dean's sentence under both subsections, it must then
sentence Dean, employing the higher of the offense levels calculated.
U.S.S.G. 2D1.2(a).
We need not remand Sampson's case for resentencing because the
greatest possible benefit he could receive from a resentence (if, for
example, he was resentenced under 2D1.2(a)(2), instead of (a)(1)),
would simply reduce his total offense level by one point. In that case,
Sampson's offense level would be reduced to 44 from 45, rendering
his life sentence unaffected under Chapter 5, Part A of the Sentencing
Guidelines.
C.
Finally, Sampson and Dean argue that the district court erred in
imposing a three-level enhancement for their managerial roles in the
offense under 3B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. That section provides:
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or a playground." The indictment even alleges that defendants conspired
not only to distribute drugs within a protected area, but also to conspired
to distribute controlled substances generally in violation of 18 U.S.C.
841(a)(1). Moreover, evidence at trial demonstrated that defendants
sold drugs both in areas known to the jury as protected -- e.g., Southside
and Boulevard Homes -- as well as areas which the government did not
affirmatively prove at trial were protected, namely the Little Rock Apartments. Thus, we cannot infer, based on the jury's special verdict alone,
that all narcotics attributable to defendants were in fact distributed only
in protected areas.
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