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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4868

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
ABDULMALIK ABDULLA,
Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4877

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
AHMED MOHSSEN,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:14-cr-00050-RDB-1; 1:14-cr-00050-RDB-2)

Submitted:

November 30, 2015

Before WILKINSON and


Senior Circuit Judge.

GREGORY,

Decided:

Circuit

December 3, 2015

Judges,

and

HAMILTON,

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gerald C. Ruter, LAW OFFICES OF GERALD C. RUTER, P.C., Towson,


Maryland, Warren E. Gorman, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, David I. Sharfstein,
Leo J. Wise, Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Abdulmalik

Abdulla

and

Ahmed

Mohssen

appeal

their

convictions and respective 48-month sentences for four counts of


food stamp fraud, in violation of 7 U.S.C.A. 2024(b)(1) (West
Supp. 2015), and seven counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 1343 (2012).

They argue that the district court erred

in striking a juror for cause, determining that each Defendant


was responsible for over $1 million in losses, and rejecting
Mohssens

request

for

minor

or

minimal

role

adjustment.

Finding no error, we affirm.


The Defendants contend that they were denied due process
under

the

Fifth

Amendment

when

the

district

Prospective Juror Number 58 (Juror 58) for cause.

court

struck

During voir

dire follow up questioning, Juror 58 stated that she believed


that food stamp fraud was an everyday and common occurrence in
the Baltimore area.

However, Juror 58 also answered that she

could be a fair and impartial juror.

Defendants contend that

the strike created a jury that was biased in violation of the


Sixth

Amendment

invalid reasons.

because

Juror

58

was

excused

for

allegedly

Defendants argue that because Juror 58 stated

that she had not personally seen food stamps traded for cash,
she was not closely familiar with anyone who had, and she could
be a fair and impartial juror, the court abused its discretion
in striking her for cause.
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We

review

district

court's

determination

whether

to

remove a juror for cause for an abuse of discretion.

United

States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 190 (4th Cir. 2013).

It is

well-settled, of course, that an accused is entitled under the


Sixth Amendment to trial by a jury composed of those who will
adhere

to

the

law

and

fairly

judge

the

evidence.

United

States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 219 (4th Cir. 2006).

The trial

judge

to

is

best

impartially.

situated

to

determine

competency

serve

Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 (1984); see

United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 749 (4th Cir.


2011).
in

Thus, the trial judge possesses very broad discretion

deciding

whether

to

excuse

juror

for

cause.

Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749.


This court will recognize an abuse of such discretion and
will reverse if the court demonstrates a clear disregard for
the actual bias of an individual venireman.
Turner,

389

F.3d

111,

115

(4th

Cir.

United States v.

2004).

The

appellate

courts role is to determine whether the trial judge [was]


very

careful

impartial,

to
and

see

that

permitted

the

jury

sufficient

obtained

is

information

fair
to

and
come

forward so that he could exercise his discretion in an informed


way.

Id. at 118 (quoting Neal v. United States, 22 F.2d 52, 53

(4th Cir. 1927)).

To this end, the court is bound either to

make or to permit such inquiries to be made as will enable him


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in

the

exercise

of

his

discretion

to

exclude

from

the

jury

persons who have formed fixed opinions about the case and are
not fair and impartial jurors within the contemplation of the
law.

Neal, 22 F.2d at 53.

While the Defendants observations are not wholly lacking


in

merit,

they

do

considered

that

the

Government

or

the

not

entitle

jurors

them

response

defense.

Because

to

relief.

could
the

cut

juror

The

court

against
stated

the
that

trading food stamps for cash is an everyday occurrence and that


it

happens

all

the

time,

she

could

presume

that

the

facts

alleged were true based on her perception that food stamp fraud
is rampant in Baltimore.

Juror 58s statements were based on

her outside sources rather than any evidence received during


trial.

The

strike

could

have

preserved

the

Defendants

due

process rights because Juror 58s statements could easily have


led her to believe that the allegations must be true since such
acts are so frequently done in Baltimore.

On the other hand,

the court was also concerned that Juror 58s knowledge of the
widespread

food

likely

convict

to

stamp

fraud

because

may
food

have
stamp

caused
fraud

her

to

be

less

is

an

everyday

occurrence and potentially not deserving of criminal prosecution


despite the statutory requirement.
The district courts decision to strike Juror 58 for cause
was not an abuse of its wide discretion.
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Although the juror

stated that she could be fair and impartial, there was a real
possibility of partiality based on her preconceived impression
and opinion.

Further, although the Defendants complain that the

court violated their due process rights, their counsel did not
take the opportunity to question Juror 58.

The trial judge is

in

potential

the

best

position

to

evaluate

jurors

impartiality and credibility based on the jurors answers to


questions presented.

Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749.

We have

reviewed the record and find that the court did not abuse its
discretion.
Next, the Defendants contend that the district court erred
in determining the amount of loss at sentencing at nearly $1.2
million.

They contend that the cost of goods determined by

expert witness David Rutledge should be reduced because several


items were left out of the calculation; they, however, do not
identify these items.

An increase in the cost of goods sold

would reduce the amount of the fraudulent funds received.


Defendants

also

do

not

address

the

district

The

courts

determination that the reduction that they sought would require


a finding of a 39 percent addition in the cost of goods sold
also unsupported by the trial evidence or any materials in their
sentencing memoranda.
Mohssen also argued that he should be held responsible for
less than the $1,185,583 loss amount because there were some
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missing invoicesagain with no further specific information


that would increase the cost of goods.

Mohssen further contends

that he should only be responsible for the funds deposited in


the Wells Fargo account because he was not a signor on the M&T
account.1
In

assessing

challenge

to

the

district

courts

application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review the district


courts

factual

findings

conclusions de novo.

for

clear

error

and

its

legal

United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d

609, 612 (4th Cir. 2010).

The amount of loss for sentencing

purposes is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.

U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3(A) (2013).


When

calculating

district
loss,

court

given

the

need

the

loss
only

available

attributable
make

to

reasonable

information.

Miller, 316 F.3d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 2003).


goods

and

loss

calculation

methodologies

defendant,

estimate

United

of

States

a
the
v.

Here, the cost of


were

thoroughly

explained by FBI Forensic Accountant, and expert witness, David

Defendants also briefly alternatively argue that they


should only be held responsible for the amounts specified in the
counts in the superseding indictment (resulting in an offense
level of 7 for $772.04), or that they should split the amount
deposited in the Wells Fargo because they were each a signor,
instead of both being responsible for the full amount. For the
reasons stated below, the district court did not err in
determining the loss to be over $1,183,000 for each Defendant.

Rutledge,

and

U.S.

Department

Stanley Wojtkonski.
reasoning.
items

that

of

Agriculture

Special

Agent

These witnesses adequately supported their

Moreover, the Defendants did not point to specific


would

have

changed

the

cost

of

goods

sold

and

subsequently the total estimated loss related to the food stamp


fraud.

We

appropriately

therefore

conclude

determined

that

that

the

the

district

estimated

loss

court

from

the

Defendants scheme was over $1 million and did not clearly err
in determining the loss amount.
The court also did not err in rejecting Mohssens request
to

split

the

conspiracy

or

sentencing

for

loss

between

scheme
the

to

471,

498

(4th

defraud

entire

conspiracy or scheme.
Cir.

the

Defendants.
can

be

foreseeable

Members

held
loss

of

responsible
caused

by

a
at

the

See United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d


2003)

(In

calculating

fraud

loss,

sentencing court must first apply the principles of relevant


conduct.) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1993) (one participant
in a multi-participant . . . conspiracy may be held accountable,
for sentencing purposes, for a greater or lesser [amount] than
other coparticipants).

[T]he fraud loss properly attributable

to a defendant[] must be determined on the basis of (1) the acts


and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced,

procured,

or

willfully
8

caused

by

defendant;

and

(2) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all


reasonably

foreseeable

furtherance

of

the

acts

and

jointly

omissions

undertaken

of

criminal

others

in

activity.

Bolden, 325 F.3d at 499; see USSG 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).


There was testimony at trial by three witnesses that the
Defendants

jointly

operated

Sams,

thus

the

Defendants

quite

clearly participated in jointly undertaken criminal activity.


The court did not clearly err in determining that the same loss
amount should apply to both Defendants.
Finally, Mohssen argues that the district court erred in
determining that he did not play a minor or minimal role in the
fraud.

See USSG 3B1.2.

Mohssen contends that he was entitled

to the offense level reduction because he was not an owner or


supervisor of Sams, was not listed as an owner on the property
bill of sale, was not a signor on the M&T account, only received
a disbursement of $23,592.50 to his personal bank account, and
did not sign or submit the application to become a food stamp
retailer.
A
role

district

in

the

courts

offense

determination

is

reviewed

regarding

for

clear

defendants

error.

United

States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2012).

To

establish eligibility for a reduced offense level under 3B1.2,


[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance
of

the

evidence,

that

he

is

entitled
9

to

mitigating

role

adjustment in sentencing.
quotation

marks

Powell, 680 F.3d at 358-59 (internal

omitted).

The

court

examines

whether

the

defendants conduct is material or essential to committing the


offense.

United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 202 (4th

Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).


Mohssen

was

certainly

more

than

participant in the food stamp fraud scheme.


other

witnesses

approximately

testified

half

testified

that

co-owners

of

of

the

Mohssen

Sams.

that
time.

told

her

Further,

minor

ran

Mohssens

although

minimal

His girlfriend and

Mohssen

that

or

he

the

store

girlfriend

and

Mohssen

Abdulla

also
were

attempts

to

characterize his financial benefit from the scheme as minimal


because

he

only

had

approximately

$23,000

disbursed

to

his

personal checking account, he used the Wells Fargo Sams account


as his own personal piggybank and withdrew funds regularly.
He also recruited at least one food stamp participant to sell
his benefits for cash.

These are not circumstances signifying

decreased culpability.

We therefore conclude that the district

court did not clearly err in determining that Mohssen was not
entitled to the role in the offense reduction.2

Defendants briefly argue that their 48-month sentences are


substantively
unreasonable
in
consideration
of
18
U.S.C.
3553(a)(2) (2012) because there is no need for deterrence as
they are subject to deportation after they have served their
sentences.
They
also
claim
that
their
sentences
are
(Continued)
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately


presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

substantively unreasonable, without any specific supporting


argument. As the Defendants sentences are within the properly
calculated Guidelines range and they have not rebutted the
presumption that their sentences are reasonable balanced against
the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2012) factors, we conclude the court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences.
See
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.)
(citation omitted) ([A]ny sentence that is within or below a
properly
calculated
Guidelines
range
is
presumptively
[substantively] reasonable.
Such a presumption can only be
rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).

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