Perneller L.C. Wilson v. Roanoke Memorial Hospital, 935 F.2d 1289, 4th Cir. (1991)
Perneller L.C. Wilson v. Roanoke Memorial Hospital, 935 F.2d 1289, 4th Cir. (1991)
2d 1289
Unpublished Disposition
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, District Judge. (CA-83-777-R)
Perneller L.C. Wilson, appellant pro se.
Frank K. Friedman, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, Roanoke, Va., for
appellee.
W.D.Va.
AFFIRMED.
Before MURNAGHAN, SPROUSE and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wilson's firing arose from her alleged failure to take and graphically chart a
patient's vital signs prior to surgery. When Wilson's supervisor confronted her
about her failure to chart the patient's signs, Wilson maintained that she took
the patient's vital signs while the patient remained asleep and that she (Wilson)
had the vital signs information on a slip of paper in her pocket and that she was
preparing to reduce the information to chart form when other duties called her
away. The supervisor concluded that Wilson did not take the patient's vital
signs and charged Wilson with falsifying patient information, an action the
hospital's employees handbook treats as serious misconduct which may result
in immediate termination. Thus Wilson was fired. Wilson charged the hospital
with a racially discriminatory firing.
In order to make out a prima facie case Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq.,
plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that she is a member of
a protected class; that she was qualified for her job; that she was discharged;
and that the position remained open to similarly qualified applicants.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Though Wilson
has arguably shown all of these elements of a prima facie case, raising an
inference of discrimination, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981), that inference has been successfully rebutted by
defendants.
In Burdine, supra, the Supreme Court held that a prima facie case may be
successfully rebutted by "articulat[ing] a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection." Id. at 253. Roanoke Memorial has met this
burden by showing that Wilson's falsification of vital records was cause for her
discharge. The de bene esse deposition of Ms. Weaver, a supervising nurse the
day in question, which was introduced at trial, provides support for the
hospital's contention that Wilson had shirked her responsibilities on the day in
question.
Wilson attempts to show pretext by pointing to several nurses, all of whom are
white, who committed serious medical errors but who were not discharged from
Roanoke Memorial. She successfully identifies several employees of the
hospital who had drug problems. However, defendant differentiates those cases
from Wilson's. For example, in the case of one employee whom Wilson
identified as having had drug problems which caused her to make medical
errors, the hospital first attempted rehabilitation. When that did not work, she
was in fact terminated. Another employee was thought to have had mental
problems which affected her work. Ms. Speese, a former L.P.N. at Roanoke
Memorial, testified at a hearing on defendant's summary judgment motion that
this person, too, was given assistance by the hospital before she eventually left
her job. The record supports a finding that, although there were other
employees who made various medical errors, they were either terminated, quit,
or were assisted by the hospital to combat the cause of their errors. There is no
reason appearing in the record for Wilson's error in failing to chart the vital
signs and, later, falsifying them.
Wilson has not come forward with any direct evidence that her discharge was
motivated by discrimination or that the incident involving the falsification of
records was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Therefore, the decision of the
district court is affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.2
AFFIRMED.
Wilson also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. On defendant's motion
for summary judgment, that part of her claim was dismissed. (Vol. I, R. 20;
Vol. II, transcript of hearing on motion for summary judgment). The Sec. 1981
claim is not at issue on appeal
We note that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were stated by the
district court from the bench and no transcript has been submitted on appeal.
Wilson does not, however, in her informal brief, take issue with the findings of
the district court, and, hence, we do not believe that a transcript is necessary.
There is sufficient evidence in the record now before us to support a finding for
defendant in this case