Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Edward Spannaus v. U.S. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 1285, 4th Cir. (1987)
Edward Spannaus v. U.S. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 1285, 4th Cir. (1987)
2d 1285
John Peter Schnitker, Appellate Staff, Civil Div., Dept. of Justice (Richard K.
Willard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Henry E. Hudson, U.S. Atty., Leonard Schaitman,
Washington, D.C., on brief), for defendant-appellee.
I.
5
activist, and to the 1984 indictment of other Iranians for illegal arms sales
during the Iranian hostage crisis.1
6
Special Agent Cook explained that the FBI had not prepared a Vaughn 3 index
because such an index would also jeopardize enforcement proceedings and
defeat the purpose of the exemption.
12
13
Information
contained in the foregoing categories of documents represents the FBI's
investigation of criminal activity involving the subjects of plaintiff's request.
Included in these documents are details regarding initial allegations giving rise to
this investigation; notification of [FBI Headquarters] of the allegations and ensuing
investigation; interviews with witnesses and subjects; investigative reports furnished
to the prosecuting attorneys; contacts with prosecuting attorneys regarding
15
The district court found the Government had adequately established the
applicability of the subsection (b)(7)(A) exemption through the declaration of
Special Agent Cook and granted summary judgment to the Government.
II.
16
17
Section 552(b)(7) of the FOIA was amended on October 27, 1986. It now
exempts from disclosure "records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings...." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(A) (1982), as amended.5
The agency bears the burden of demonstrating that requested information
comes within an FOIA exemption. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622, 102
S.Ct. 2054, 2059, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982). The agency's showing under the
On appeal, Spannaus contends that the FBI failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that all of the records sought were exempt from disclosure under
Section 552(b)(7)(A). Alternatively, Spannaus argues that, even if the FBI
initially met the burden, his own affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact
and therefore precluded summary judgment. Finally, Spannaus challenges the
sufficiency of Special Agent Cook's declaration.
19
20
21
Here, the Government has categorized the kinds of documents at issue and has
specifically identified the type of information they contain and the harms their
release could have in pending proceedings, including (1) destruction or
alteration of evidence; (2) identification of knowledgeable individuals, leading
to their intimidation or harm; and (3) fabrication of fraudulent alibis. These
types of harm have been found to warrant an exemption under subsection (b)(7)
(A). See Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 239, 98 S.Ct. at 2325; Willard
v. Internal Revenue Service, 776 F.2d at 103. The Government therefore has
fully met its burden of demonstrating that production of the requested
documents "could reasonably be expected to interfere" with law enforcement
proceedings, as the amended statute requires. The district court correctly
upheld the Government's position.
22the Government fairly describes the content of the material withheld and
If
adequately states its grounds for nondisclosure, and if those grounds are reasonable
and consistent with the applicable law, the district court should uphold the
Government's position. The court is entitled to accept the credibility of the
affidavits, so long as it has no reason to question the good faith of the agency.
23
Barney v. Internal Revenue Service, 618 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir.1980),
quoting Cox v. United States Department of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1311 (8th
Cir.1978).
24
25
26
27
In conclusion, we emphasize that this court has a "limited role [in] reviewing
the findings of a district court in an FOIA case." Willard, 776 F.2d at 104. The
declaration of Special Agent Cook provides an adequate factual basis for the
district court's determination and the decision reached is not clearly erroneous.
Therefore, the order granting the Government's motion for summary judgment
is
28
AFFIRMED.
Any and all documents pertaining to the FIRST GULF BANK AND TRUST
(West Indies) LIMITED, previously known as the FIRST ARABIAN BANK
AND TRUST before October 5, 1979. The above bank was incorporated in
Anguilla, West Indies on February 9, 1979 and is headquartered at The
Continental Building, The Valley, Anguilla, West Indies. Within the United
States, it has maintained representative offices at 9 West 57th Street, 38th
Floor, New York, New York 10019
Any and all documents, from October 12, 1979 to January 20, 1981, pertaining
to the taking of 53 American hostages in Iran as well as the negotiations to
secure their release, which refer to CYRUS HASHEMI and/or ABOLFAZL
"BAHRAM" NAHIDIAN
Any and all documents, from 1979 to the present, referring to actual or potential
violations of law regarding the export of weapons and military spare parts to
Iran, which refer to CYRUS HASHEMI, REZA HASHEMI, CYRUS
DAVARI, and/or JOHN STANLEY POTTINGER
5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(A) (1982) was amended on October 27, 1986, by Sec.
1802(a) of the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99570, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News (100 Stat. 3207) 10A. See text at n. 5
infra
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94
The words "clearly erroneous" as used in Willard do not refer to the standard of
review set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
52(a) provides that findings of fact in actions tried before the district court
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous...." Any findings of fact made on
a summary judgment motion, however, are not "entitled to the protection of the
'clearly erroneous' rule on review." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil Sec. 2575 (1971); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)
Section 1804(a) of the Freedom of Information Reform Act provides that the
amendment applies to any civil action pending on the date of enactment and,
accordingly, the amendment applies here