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  • Vaughn v. Danzig, Secretary, 4th Cir. (2001)

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    1) The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. It found that Vaughn's due process rights were not violated by his discharge from the Navy because he was not discharged prior to the expiration of his enlistment contract and he did not demonstrate that any statements made by the Navy about his discharge were false. 2) The court also found that Vaughn's discharge did not violate Navy personnel regulations requiring consideration of rehabilitation because the record showed Vaughn received counseling and treatment for his issues. The court deferred to the Navy's discretion in making personnel decisions. 3) The court concluded that the Navy did not violate the Privacy Act by destroying records of Vaughn's disciplinary proceedings according to its records

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    Filed: 2001-09-07 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Docket: 00-2562

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    1) The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. It found that Vaughn's due process rights were not violated by his discharge from the Navy because he was not discharged prior to the expiration of his enlistment contract and he did not demonstrate that any statements made by the Navy about his discharge were false. 2) The court also found that Vaughn's discharge did not violate Navy personnel regulations requiring consideration of rehabilitation because the record showed Vaughn received counseling and treatment for his issues. The court deferred to the Navy's discretion in making personnel decisions. 3) The court concluded that the Navy did not violate the Privacy Act by destroying records of Vaughn's disciplinary proceedings according to its records

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    34 views4 pages

    Vaughn v. Danzig, Secretary, 4th Cir. (2001)

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    1) The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. It found that Vaughn's due process rights were not violated by his discharge from the Navy because he was not discharged prior to the expiration of his enlistment contract and he did not demonstrate that any statements made by the Navy about his discharge were false. 2) The court also found that Vaughn's discharge did not violate Navy personnel regulations requiring consideration of rehabilitation because the record showed Vaughn received counseling and treatment for his issues. The court deferred to the Navy's discretion in making personnel decisions. 3) The court concluded that the Navy did not violate the Privacy Act by destroying records of Vaughn's disciplinary proceedings according to its records

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    of 4

    UNPUBLISHED

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    PHILLIP A. VAUGHN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    RICHARD DANZIG, SECRETARY OF THE
    NAVY,
    Defendant-Appellee.

    No. 00-2562

    Appeal from the United States District Court


    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.
    Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge.
    (CA-99-150, CA-00-40)
    Submitted: July 31, 2001
    Decided: September 7, 2001
    Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

    COUNSEL
    Chester L. Smith, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Kenneth E.
    Melson, United States Attorney, Lawrence R. Leonard, Managing
    Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

    VAUGHN v. DANZIG

    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See


    Local Rule 36(c).

    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Philip A. Vaughn appeals the district courts order granting summary judgment to Defendant on his claims that he was wrongfully
    discharged from the United States Navy, and that the destruction of
    disciplinary records violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 552a
    (West 1996 & Supp. 2001). Finding no error, we affirm.
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I.
    DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988).
    Summary judgment is properly granted when there are no genuine
    issues of material fact and when the record taken as a whole could not
    lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52
    (1986). In determining whether the moving party has shown that there
    is no genuine issue of material fact, a court must assess the factual
    evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
    favorable to the non-moving party. Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth
    Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
    Vaughn first claims that the district court erred in concluding that
    his due process rights were not violated because no property or liberty
    interests were violated by his discharge. Our review of the record convinces us that, because Vaughn was not discharged prior to the expiration of his enlistment contract, he had no valid property interest in
    continued service in the Navy. Vaughn has also not demonstrated that
    any statements made by the Navy in connection with his discharge
    were false, and therefore has not shown a violation of his liberty interests. See Guerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 278-79 (4th Cir. 1991).
    Vaughn also argues that the district court erred in concluding that
    his discharge did not violate Navy personnel regulations. He specifically contends that the Navy failed to consider rehabilitation, as

    VAUGHN v. DANZIG

    required by the regulation, and thus improperly decided to discharge


    him. Assuming, without deciding, that the regulation in question
    requires such consideration, we find no error in the district courts
    conclusion. A review of Vaughns service record for the period of his
    last enlistment reflects several instances of counseling, alcohol rehabilitation treatment, advice that his conduct was unacceptable, and
    offers of assistance in correcting his deficiencies. Moreover, as correctly noted by the district court, according appropriate weight to an
    internal Navy regulation in evaluating whether a particular member
    will be permitted to continue in the service inherently requires that
    discretion be exercised by military commanders. The Supreme Court
    has clearly circumscribed the role of courts called upon to review
    such discretionary decisions. Thus, judgments required in the unique
    context of the military are entitled to a high degree of deference. See
    Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-08 (1986); Chappell v.
    Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-05 (1982). We discern no abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case.
    Vaughns final argument on appeal is that the district court erred
    in concluding that the Navy did not violate federal law by destroying
    the record of his disciplinary proceedings held in October 1996.
    Vaughn specifically cites a provision of the Privacy Act that provides
    for civil remedies if an agency fails to maintain an accurate record
    where such record may be used to determine the rights, benefits,
    opportunities, or fitness of the individual. Vaughns reliance on this
    provision is misplaced. The record indicates that, at the time of the
    adverse action in this case, Vaughns discharge from the Navy in February 1997, the record of his nonjudicial punishment was maintained
    in the files of his unit. The record was destroyed in May 1999, pursuant to Navy records retention policy. Accordingly, the provision of
    the Privacy Act Vaughn relies upon on appeal was not violated by the
    destruction of his record. Although Vaughn seems to argue that the
    Privacy Act requires that records be maintained in perpetuity, he has
    cited no authority for that position.
    Moreover, as noted by the Government in its brief, Vaughns telephonic request for the record before it was destroyed did not comply
    with the requirement for submitting a request under the Freedom of
    Information Act, Privacy Act, or Navy regulations implementing
    those statutes. When he complied with these procedures by submitting

    VAUGHN v. DANZIG

    a written request for the record, it no longer existed, having been


    destroyed in accordance with Navy policy. That destruction did not
    violate federal law, as agencies are not required to retain records on
    the possibility that a FOIA or Privacy Act request may be submitted.
    See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S.
    136, 155 n.9 (1980) (no obligation to retain records prior to a FOIA
    request).
    We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED

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