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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4293

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDUARDO CASTELLANOS-LOYA, a/k/a Heriberto Rivera-Malave,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News.
Arenda Wright Allen,
District Judge. (4:11-cr-00068-AWA-FBS)

Submitted:

December 20, 2012

Before WYNN and


Circuit Judge.

DIAZ,

Circuit

Decided:

Judges,

and

January 8, 2013

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff,
Pratt, Larry M. Dash,
Norfolk, Virginia, for
States Attorney, Andrew
States Attorney, Newport

Federal Public Defender, Frances H.


Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Appellant.
Neil H. MacBride, United
L. Creighton, Special Assistant United
News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Eduardo Castellanos-Loya appeals his convictions and
twenty-five month sentence for false representation as a United
States citizen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 911 (2006), and for
aggravated

identity

theft,

in

1028A(a)(1) and (c) (2006).


Castellanos-Loya
produced
identity

insufficient
theft

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

We affirm.

first

contends

evidence

conviction.

to

When

that

the

support

his

defendant

Government
aggravated

challenges

the

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we view the evidence and


all reasonable inferences in favor of the government and will
uphold the jurys verdict if it is supported by substantial
evidence.
Cir.

United States v. Cameron, 573 F.3d 179, 183 (4th

2009).

reasonable

[S]ubstantial
finder

of

fact

evidence
could

is

accept

evidence
as

that

adequate

a
and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendants guilt beyond


a reasonable doubt.
Where

the

record

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

supports

conflicting

inferences,

we

must

presume that the factfinder resolved any such conflicts in favor


of the prosecution.

McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673

(2010).
To win a conviction for aggravated identity theft, the
government must show that the defendant has committed one of
certain

enumerated

predicate

offenses
2

and,

during

and

in

relation

to

that

crime,

knowingly

transfers,

possesses,

or

uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of


another person.
States v.

18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1) (2006); see United

Castillo-Pena,

674

F.3d

318,

323

(4th

Cir.

2012);

United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010).
Castellanos-Loya does not dispute that he committed a
qualifying predicate offense by falsely representing himself as
an American citizen to the agent who detained him, violating
911, see Castillo-Pena, 674 F.3d at 323, nor does he dispute
that

social

identification

security
for

number

purposes

(SSN)

of

is

1028A(a)(1).

means

of

Instead,

Castellanos-Loya argues that the Government failed to prove (1)


that the SSN belonged to a real person, (2) that CastellanosLoya knew that it did, and (3) that his possession of the SSN
was in relation to his lie that he was an American citizen.
We

cannot

agree.

The

Government

adequately

proved

that the SSN in question belonged to a real person simply by


demonstrating that the number was valid i.e., that the Social
Security Administrations records reflected that the number had
been issued to an individual.

See United States v. Mitchell,

518 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Melendrez,
389 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 2004).
argues

that

the

Governments

Although Castellanos-Loya

evidence

in

this

case

was

insufficient because it failed to rule out the possibility that


3

the SSN could have been fraudulently obtained in the name of a


person

who

concluding

never
that

the

actually
jury

existed,

could

we

have

properly

have

no

difficulty

found

that

the

Governments evidence sufficed to prove this element of 1028A


beyond a reasonable doubt.

Cameron, 573 F.3d at 183.

Castellanos-Loyas

assertion

that

the

Government

failed to prove that he knew that the SSN belonged to a real


person, see Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647
(2009), suffers from a similar ailment: it demands of defendants
a degree of certainty that is foreign to long-accepted notions
pertaining to a mens rea of knowledge.

See, e.g., Model Penal

Code 2.02(7) (Thompson Reuters, Westlaw through 2011) (When


knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of
an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware
of

high

probability

of

its

existence,

believes that it does not exist.).

unless

he

actually

Castellanos-Loya admitted

that the person who sold him the SSN effectively told him that
the SSN belonged to a real person.

But he now asserts that,

despite his subjective belief that the SSN was authentic, he did
not actually know that the SSN belonged to a real person because
he

did

not

verify

that

the

seller

was

not

lying

to

him.

Although we are mindful of the difficulty in many circumstances


of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has the
necessary knowledge, we have no doubt that a jury could have
4

found

the

requisite

knowledge

on

Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 655.

the

facts

of

this

case.

See, e.g., id. at 656; United

States v. Valerio, 676 F.3d 237, 244-46 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States

v.

Clark,

668

F.3d

568,

574

(8th

Cir.

2012);

United

States v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550, 561-65 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1648 (2012); United States v. GomezCastro,
605 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2010).
As
Government

for
failed

Castellanos-Loyas
to

prove

that

he

assertion
possessed

that
the

the

SSN

in

relation to his false representation offense, he has waived any


such argument on appeal by failing to raise it in his Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29 motion before the district court.

United States v.

Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2012).


Castellanos-Loya

next

urges

that

the

district

court

abused its discretion in declining to prohibit testimony about


the

date

of

birth

to

the

Governments late disclosure of the pertinent information.

We

have

of

reviewed

whether

the

the

associated

record

district

and

court

with

the

conclude

properly

SSN,

that,

due

regardless

considered

the

factors

enumerated in United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 317 (4th


Cir. 1997), any error was harmless.

United States v. Johnson,

617

(holding

F.3d

286,

292

(4th

Cir.

2010)

rulings are subject to harmless error renew).

that

evidentiary

Finally,

Castellanos-Loya

attacks

his

sentence,

contending that he was improperly assigned an obstruction of


justice

enhancement

(USSG)
court

3C1.1

properly

factual

under

U.S.

(2011).

applied

findings

are

In
the

Sentencing

assessing

Guidelines,

reviewed

for

conclusions are reviewed de novo.

Guidelines

whether
the

clear

Manual

sentencing

district

error

and

courts

its

legal

United States v. Osborne, 514

F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008).


A defendant merits a two-level obstruction of justice
enhancement

where

he

willfully

obstructed

or

impeded,

or

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice


with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of
the

instant

offense

of

conviction,

and

(2)

the

obstructive

conduct related to (A) the defendants offense of conviction and


any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.
3C1.1.

As

the

applies to perjury.
As

application

notes

is

conviction

and

inapplicable

representation

the

enhancement

USSG 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(B).

Castellanos-Loya

enhancement

specify,

USSG

to

therefore

conviction

observes,

the

his

aggravated

applies

only

under

911.

See

obstruction

identity

theft

to

his

false

USSG

2B1.6(a).

But at trial, Castellanos-Loya admitted his guilt on the false


representation
testimony

could

charge;
have

thus,

he

obstructed
6

argues,

only

his

his

false

aggravated

trial

identity

theft conviction, not his 911 conviction.


related

only

to

the

former

offense,

he

Because his perjury


claims,

the

district

court erred in applying the enhancement to the Guidelines range


pertaining to the latter.
But

Castellanos-Loyas

position

underappreciates

broad reading that must be given to 3C1.1.


Jones,

308

F.3d

425,

429

(4th

Cir.

the

United States v.

2002).

In

fact,

the

defendants perjurious statements need not be about the offense


of

conviction

[to

support

application

of

the

3C1.1

enhancement]; it is enough if the perjurious statements were


given during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of
the

instant

offense.

omitted).

Id.

Moreover,

at

the

428

(internal

enhancement

quotation

applies

where

marks
the

obstructive conduct related to an offense closely related to


the

defendants

offense

of

conviction.

USSG

3C1.1.

See

United States v. Mollner, 643 F.3d 713, 715-19 (10th Cir. 2011)
(collecting cases and describing how the term closely related
was chosen to increase the breadth of 3C1.1s scope).

Given

that Castellanos-Loya perjured himself during the trial on his


false representation charge and that the statements related to
the

dependent

1028A

charge,

we

conclude

that

the

district

court did not err in assigning him an enhancement under 3C1.1.


See Mollner, 643 F.3d at 716-17; Jones, 308 F.3d at 429; Doe,
661 F.3d at 566.
7

Castellanos-Loyas complaint that the district court


failed to specifically find that his false testimony concerned
a material matter fails for the same reason.
Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 2011).

United States v.

The district courts

findings clearly establishe[d] that Castellanos-Loyas false


trial testimony went to the heart of his 1028A charge.

Id. at

193 (emphasis omitted); United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666,


681 (4th Cir. 2004).

And because his false testimony on the

1028A charge was sufficiently related to his 911 offense,


the district court made all the findings of materiality that
were necessary to support the application of the enhancement.
See

Mollner,

643

F.3d

at

Killingsworth,

413

F.3d

760,

enhancement

applies

to

717;
765

perjury

that

cf.

United

(8th
was

Cir.

States
2005)

immaterial

to

v.
(the
the

defendants own sentence and conviction because it was made


during

his

testimony

in

closely

related

case)

(internal

quotation marks, alteration, and emphasis omitted).


Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
legal
before

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and


contentions
this

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
8

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