Coleman v. Talbot County Detention, 4th Cir. (2007)

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2024
LINDA L. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
TALBOT COUNTY DETENTION CENTER; TALBOT COUNTY,
MARYLAND,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.
(1:04-cv-02295-BEL)
Argued:
May 24, 2007
Decided:
July 12, 2007
Before MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge, and

David C. NORTON, United States District Judge for the District of
South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leizer Zalman Goldsmith, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

John
Francis Breads, Jr., LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSURANCE TRUST, Columbia,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Linda L. Coleman appeals an order of the district court
dismissing her complaint, which alleged discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C.A.
2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2003).
Coleman concedes that her complaint
was filed outside of the applicable limitations period.
She
maintains, however, that she is entitled to equitable tolling of

the limitations period.
We agree and accordingly reverse and
remand for reinstatement of Colemans complaint.

I.
A.
Before turning to the facts of this case, we will briefly
review the relevant aspects of the statutory scheme.
Prior to
filing a civil action in federal district court, an individual must

file
charge
of
discrimination
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

(West 2003).
with
the
Equal
Employment
See 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(b), (e)
In Maryland, such charges are referred to the
Maryland Commission on Human Relations (MCHR), a designated fair

employment practice agency.
(2006).
See 29 C.F.R. 1601.70, .74(a)
Pursuant to a work-sharing agreement between the MCHR and
the EEOC, the MCHR investigates the charge and reports its findings
to the EEOC.
action.
Upon receiving these findings, the EEOC may take
If--as
occurred
here--the
EEOC
concludes
that
the
discrimination charge is without merit, it will issue a right-to2
sue letter to the charging party, who then has 90 days to file a
civil complaint.
See 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 2003).

B.
Coleman was employed as a corrections officer by the Talbot

County Department of Corrections (the County) between 1999 and
February
2001.
On
February
14,
2000,
Coleman
filed
sex
discrimination charge with the EEOC, which referred the matter to

the MCHR. This initial charge was pro se, but Coleman subsequently
obtained counsel, who notified the EEOC and the MCHR that he
represented Coleman.
Counsel explicitly requested that copies of
all correspondence be forwarded to him.

In August 2001, while Colemans complaint was still pending
before the MCHR, Coleman moved to Delaware.
Although she had
promised, when filing her complaint, to inform the EEOC of any

address change, she failed to notify either the MCHR or the EEOC
that she had moved.
In December 2003, the MCHR sent its findings--concluding that
there
was
no
probable
cause
to
support
Colemans
discrimination--to the EEOC, with a copy to counsel.
charge
Thereafter,
on February 11, 2004, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter.

this
point,
complaint.
Coleman
had
90
days--until
May
of
11--to
file
At
her
The EEOC mailed the letter to Coleman at her previous
address in Maryland.
No copy of the letter was sent to counsel,
although the EEOCs internal operations manual directed that a copy
be sent to a partys attorney if an appropriate request had been

made.
On March 29, 2004, counsel wrote to the EEOC requesting a
right-to-sue letter.
He received no response.
On April 20,
counsel telephoned the EEOC and was informed of the issuance of the
On counsels request, the next day the EEOC
purported to rescind the initial letter and replace it with a newly

issued one.
Counsel filed Colemans complaint in the federal district
court on July 19, 2004, which was 90 days after the date of the
reissued right-to-sue letter.
The district court granted summary
judgment to the County, first concluding that the EEOC had no

authority to reissue the right-to-sue letter.
The court further
ruled that Coleman was not entitled to equitable tolling of the

limitations period because the delay in notification was caused by
her own failure to notify the EEOC of her change of address.
Coleman now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in
refusing to grant equitable tolling.
II.
The
parties
do
not
dispute
that
the
EEOC
had
no
legal
authority to reissue the right-to-sue letter and that Colemans

complaint was therefore untimely.
Accordingly, the only issue is
whether Coleman was entitled to equitable tolling. See Watts-Means

v. Prince Georges Family Crisis Ctr., 7 F.3d 40, 42 (4th Cir.
4
1993) (noting that 90-day time limit in discrimination actions is

subject to equitable tolling).
A decision regarding equitable
tolling is reviewed for abuse of discretion except when, as here,

the facts are undisputed and the district court denies tolling as
a matter of law.
See Smith v. Pennington, 352 F.3d 884, 892 (4th
Cir. 2003).
Equitable
tolling
is
reserved
for
those
rare
instances
where--due to circumstances external to the partys own conduct--it

would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against
the party and gross injustice would result.
Rouse v. Lee, 339
F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
[E]quitable tolling must be guarded and infrequent,
lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the rules of

clearly drafted statutes.
Cir.
2005)
(internal
Gayle v. UPS, 401 F.3d 222, 226 (4th
quotation
marks
omitted).
In
order
to
demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling, Coleman must present

(1)
extraordinary
circumstances,
(2)
beyond
[her]
control
or
external to [her] own conduct, (3) that prevented [her] from filing
on time.
United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

In support of her claim to equitable tolling, Coleman relies
on Stallworth v. Wells Fargo Armored Services Corp., 936 F.2d 522
(11th Cir. 1991).
Stallworth filed a discrimination charge with
the
Stallworth,
EEOC.
See
936
F.2d
at
523.
While
the
investigation was ongoing, she moved to a temporary residence

without notifying the EEOC of her change of address.
See id.
However, during her absence she regularly checked for mail at her
permanent residence.
an
established
location.
See id. at 523-24.
practice
See id.
of
leaving
Moreover, the family had
all
mail
in
designated
The EEOC sent a right-to-sue letter by
certified mail to the permanent address, and it was received by

Stallworths nephew.
See id. at 523.
Although Stallworth checked
her mail six times during the month the letter arrived, she never
actually received it.
See id. at 524.
The Eleventh Circuit ruled
that Stallworth was entitled to equitable tolling, holding that she

had been reasonably diligent in attempting to ensure receipt of the
See id. at 524-25.
The court also noted that
the error would have been avoided had the EEOC complied with
counsels request to provide copies of all correspondence to him:
We conclude that the primary fault for the failed delivery in this
case rests upon the EEOC because of its failure to mail a copy of
the right-to-sue letter to Stallworths attorney.
Id. at 525.
Coleman cannot claim the kind of diligence demonstrated by

Stallworth--Colemans address change was permanent, and she made no
effort whatsoever to ensure receipt of the right-to-sue letter.
Nevertheless, Stallworth supports Colemans claim for equitable
tolling. Although we do not excuse Colemans failure to notify the
EEOC of her change of address, it is not at all unreasonable for a
layperson who has retained counsel to assume that all further

matters will be handled by her attorney.
We therefore conclude
that, as in Stallworth, the primary fault is that of the EEOC for

not--as both counsel and Coleman reasonably expected--sending a
copy of the right-to-sue letter to counsel.
In this vein, we note
with approval counsels diligence in pursuing the matter, first

with the MHRC and then with the EEOC.*
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the denial of
equitable
tolling
by
the
district
court
and
remand
for
reinstatement of the complaint.

REVERSED AND REMANDED
Alternatively, Coleman maintains that she and counsel were

entitled to rely on the reissuance of the right-to-sue letter by
the EEOC. She argues that the reissuance amounts to deliberate
conduct by the EEOC that misled her into believing that she had 90
days from the date of the reissued letter to file her complaint.
Cf. Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458-59 & n.3
(8th Cir. 1998) (granting equitable tolling when complaint was
filed late due to incorrect advice by the EEOC; noting that
counsel could not have anticipated the error made by the EEOC);
Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 80-81 (7th Cir.
1992) (indicating that pro se complainant, who was incorrectly
told by EEOC that intake questionnaire was sufficient to preserve
rights, might be entitled to equitable tolling). In light of our
decision to grant equitable tolling on the basis of Stallworth, we
do not address this claim.
7

Coleman v. Talbot County Detention, 4th Cir. (2007)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

May 24, 2007

July 12, 2007

Before MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge, and

Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leizer Zalman Goldsmith, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Coleman concedes that her complaint

was filed outside of the applicable limitations period.

maintains, however, that she is entitled to equitable tolling of

We agree and accordingly reverse and

remand for reinstatement of Colemans complaint.

filing a civil action in federal district court, an individual must

Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

See 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(b), (e)

In Maryland, such charges are referred to the

Maryland Commission on Human Relations (MCHR), a designated fair

See 29 C.F.R. 1601.70, .74(a)

Pursuant to a work-sharing agreement between the MCHR and

Upon receiving these findings, the EEOC may take

discrimination charge is without merit, it will issue a right-to2

See 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 2003).

Coleman was employed as a corrections officer by the Talbot

discrimination charge with the EEOC, which referred the matter to

Counsel explicitly requested that copies of

all correspondence be forwarded to him.

Although she had

promised, when filing her complaint, to inform the EEOC of any

discrimination--to the EEOC, with a copy to counsel.

on February 11, 2004, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter.

The EEOC mailed the letter to Coleman at her previous

No copy of the letter was sent to counsel,

although the EEOCs internal operations manual directed that a copy

be sent to a partys attorney if an appropriate request had been

On counsels request, the next day the EEOC

purported to rescind the initial letter and replace it with a newly

The district court granted summary

judgment to the County, first concluding that the EEOC had no

The court further

ruled that Coleman was not entitled to equitable tolling of the

authority to reissue the right-to-sue letter and that Colemans

Accordingly, the only issue is

whether Coleman was entitled to equitable tolling. See Watts-Means

1993) (noting that 90-day time limit in discrimination actions is

A decision regarding equitable

tolling is reviewed for abuse of discretion except when, as here,

See Smith v. Pennington, 352 F.3d 884, 892 (4th

where--due to circumstances external to the partys own conduct--it

Rouse v. Lee, 339

[E]quitable tolling must be guarded and infrequent,

lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the rules of

Gayle v. UPS, 401 F.3d 222, 226 (4th

demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling, Coleman must present

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Stallworth filed a discrimination charge with

investigation was ongoing, she moved to a temporary residence

See id. at 523-24.

Moreover, the family had

The EEOC sent a right-to-sue letter by

certified mail to the permanent address, and it was received by

See id. at 523.

Although Stallworth checked