G.R. No.

115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND
No. 94-040.
I
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994
respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo,
p. 14).
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition
in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File
Statement. Every candidateand treasurer of the political party shall, within
thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the

offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures
herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the
winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the
period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the
statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and
expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense
for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging
from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such
failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by
the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in
writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from
the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section,
the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to
hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures,
the COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and
Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the
National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to
candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the
election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election
director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors
and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or
registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with
them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions

and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar

shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the
statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the
winning candidates fails to file the statement required within the period
prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file
statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and
expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense
for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging
from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000),
in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such
failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by
the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section,
the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In
addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold
public office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn
his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear
from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have
either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British
Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v.
Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate"
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to
one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]),
issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of
Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of
the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty
which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where
public interest is involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately
expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to
pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling
the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the
purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution
No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are
prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg.
881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No.
7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of
several states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of
candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by
limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also
regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 287).
These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the
statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted by
candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 289). These
statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates
by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of
elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W.
649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement
of filing (State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W.
2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v.
Saylor, supra.)

It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The
evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a
candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a
candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a
statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f
a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure,
or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not
extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELO, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions
and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent
portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word
"shall" in the main statute as well as the implementing rules generally suggest
mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.
But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still
considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus
not bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the

term 'candidate' is used to designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted
for at our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch,
125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84)
Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof,
can not be voted for at an election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3
days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be
accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for
purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the
withdrawal.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
Padilla, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions
MELO, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions
and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent
portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word
"shall" in the main statute as well as the implementing rules generally suggest
mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.
But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still
considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus
not bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the
term 'candidate' is used to designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted
for at our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch,
125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84)
Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof,
can not be voted for at an election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3
days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be
accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for
purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the
withdrawal.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
Padilla, J., concurs.

G.R. No. 110898

20, 1996

February

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th
Judicial Region, RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, and GRILDO S.
TUGONON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21), the information against him
alleging
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1988, at more or less 9:00 o'clock in the
evening at Barangay Publican+.3, Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis
Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a knife,
which he was then conveniently provided of, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab Roque T. Bade thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
Stab wound, right iliac area,
0.5 cm. penetrating non
perforating lacerating posterior
peritoneum, 0,5 cm.
thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by timely medical
attendance which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.
After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision correccional in its
minimum period and ordered to pay to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical
expense, without subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The RTC appreciated in his
favor the privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondent's conviction but modified
his sentence by imposing on him an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum.1
On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C. Evangelista of the RTC set the
case for repromulgation on January 4, 1993.
On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probation,2 alleging that
(1) he possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for probation
under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in fact reduced the
penalty imposed on him by the trial court; (3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals took
no action on a petition for probation which he had earlier filed with it so that the petition
could be filed with the trial court; (4) in the trial court's decision, two mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntarily surrender were appreciated in
his favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Pao,3 the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed from his conviction
by the trial court.
On February 2, 1993, the RTC ordered private respondent to report for interview to the
Provincial Probation Officer. The Provincial Probation Officer on the other hand was
required to submit his report with recommendation to the court within 60 days.4
On February 18, 1993, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza
recommended denial of private respondent's application for probation on the ground
that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could have then applied for
probation, private respondent waived the right to make his application. The Probation
Officer thought the present case to be distinguishable from Santos To v. Pao in the
sense that in this case the original sentence imposed on private respondent by the trial
court (1 year of imprisonment) was probationable and there was no reason for private
respondent not to have filed his application for probation then, whereas inSantos To
v. Pao the penalty only became probationable after it had been reduced as a result of
the appeal.
On April 16, 1993 Valdehueza reiterated5 his "respectful recommendation that private
respondent's application for probation be denied and that a warrant of arrest be issued
for him to serve his sentence in jail."
The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and granted private
respondent's application for probation in its order of April 23, 1993,6 Hence this petition
by the prosecution.
The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by
granting private respondent's application for probation despite the fact that he had
appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.
The Court holds that it did.

Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible under P.D. No. 986,
otherwise known as the Probation Law, for the accused to take his chances on appeal
by allowing probation to be granted even after an accused had appealed his sentence
and failed to obtain an acquittal, just so long as he had not yet started to serve the
sentence.7 Accordingly, in Santos To v. Pao, it was held that the fact that the accused
had appealed did not bar him from applying for probation especially because it was as a
result of the appeal that his sentence was reduced and made the probationable limit.
The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took effect on January 15,
19868 precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction
even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and
applying for probation only if the accused fails in his bid. Thus, as amended by P.D. No,
1990, 4 of the Probation Law now reads:
4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided,
That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment
or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The
filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis
added).
Since private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after
P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect,9 it is covered by the prohibition that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal," Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and
having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction,
private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between
meritorious appeals (like his appeal notwithstanding the appellate court's affirmance of
his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not make any distinction
and so neither should the Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused
would be set free and not only given probation. Private respondent's original sentence
(1 year of prision correccional in its minimum period) and the modified sentence
imposed by the Court of Appeals (2 months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years
and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum) are probationable. Thus the fact that
he appealed meant that private respondent was taking his chances which the law

precisely frowns upon. This is precisely the evil that the amendment in P.D. No. 1990
sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law, "probation
was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the
administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders
who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated."
The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of
Appeals decision, [private respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the amendment in]
P.D. 1990" is an obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the appeal referred in
the law refers to the .appeal taken from a judgment of conviction by the trial court and
not that of the appellate court, since under the law an application for probation is filed
with the trial court which can only grant the same "after it shall have convicted and
sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal. "Accordingly, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 10 it was held that
the petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for
probation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23, 1993 of the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private respondent
Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Decision dated January 23, 1992, per Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombods-dela
Fuente and concurred in by Associate Justices Alfredo M. Marigomen and Jainal
D. Rasul, Petition Annex D, Rollo, pp. 44-49.
2

Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 51-53.

120 SCRA 8 (1983).

Petition, Annex I, Rollo, p. 56.

Petition, Annex N, Rollo, pp. 66-67.

Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 28-33.

P.D. No. 968, 4; as amended by P.D. No. 1287 provided:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the

court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but
before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend
the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing
of the application for probation and he may submit his comment on such
application within ten days from receipt of the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in ease of in
solvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with
notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction.The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending
appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after the
date of the judgment of the appellate court, said application shall be acted
upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis
added).
8

P.D. No. 1990 was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and was published in the
Official Gazette on December 30, 1985. Under its effectivity clause it shall take
effect "after 15 days following its publication in the Official Gazette."
9

P.D. No. 1990, 3 provides that the "provisions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as
above amended, shall not apply to those who have already filed their respective
applications for probation at the time of the effectivity of this Decree."
10

174 SCRA 566 (1989).

G.R. No. 87416

April 8, 1991

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision* of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled
"Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes," dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed therein.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145)
with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to
apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company Check No.
3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the total
amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT
FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed
to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said
check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct
examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following
grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and

(b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in
dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act
No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:
Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided
they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside
thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn
and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law
likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign
currency.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by
respondent court in its order dated September 6, 1988, and which reads:
Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was
opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.1wphi1
The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current
accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa,
February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City
Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing
Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22).
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders
dated July 19, 1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the
Court of Appeals wherein he contended:
(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account
of petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over
the same or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not
contemplated extending its coverage over dollar accounts;
(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a
private transaction between petitioner and private respondent, the
payment could not be legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic
Act No. 529; and
(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is
null and void and is not enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or
criminal suit. Upon such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor

of the questioned check cannot be said to have violated the provisions of

Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on
February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati
has jurisdiction over the case in question.
The petition is without merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice,
that is, for hearing and deciding cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157
SCRA 147 [1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject
matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the issues framed in the
pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the
time of commencement of the action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538
[1988]).
The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be
questioned.
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:
Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense
was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occured at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place

wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense

or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws,
in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the
case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that
jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information."
The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was
committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the
filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action
(Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154
SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988])
that "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance
of the check."
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of
Justice, citing the case of People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the
following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed
and delivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed or dated
does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential
to its consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex
Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980)." (See The Law on
Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law
Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14).
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the
petitioner to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the
dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by
the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the
case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided
they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside
thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish.1wphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that
where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something
unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs.
IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).
More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the
actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil.
125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or
discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA
318 [1978]).
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this
view, as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.

MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the
Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be involved, like U.S.
dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our country. There are
U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our currency, and many others.
THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check
may be a check in whatever currency. This would not even be limited to
U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen
or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply.

MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Penned by Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo and concurred in by Associate
Justices Manuel C. Herrera and Jorge S. Imperial.

G.R. No. L-14787

28, 1961

January

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR
OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and
household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials
such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium
carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental
cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner
paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident
thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the
Exchange Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99.
The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that
"foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges
incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be
refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual
importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section
seven thereof." After the applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the
Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner
that of the total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13
representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish
moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been approved.
The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund
even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax
Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt
under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958 affirmed
the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and
flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in

the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for review.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by
petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the
17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so
as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof, which reads as follows:
SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used
for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to
importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned
fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors,
vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and
supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established
public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers
for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book
paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers
(approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under
contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be
certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones,
x-ray films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical
drugs necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies
listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the Director of
Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and
medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as
may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and
protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any
importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation
under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven
thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law
refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food
and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that
"general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general
language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and
purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule,
however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general term,
all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at
bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles
that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other
items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer"
and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food products because they
are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate"
appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of fact,
vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in

the appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those
listed preceding the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but
also those for breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No.
814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch",
which does not always refer to food for human consumption, was added among the
items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the
articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as
used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used
in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle
"Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not
distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector
of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not
distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those
used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make
any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of
construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular
recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general
terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the
legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction. (See
Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)
Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other
questions raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby
ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund which were approved by the Officerin-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28,

1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of
Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private
prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol
Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO
CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes
squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect
on August 20, 1975) provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat,
or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner,
succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his
will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished
by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not
less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2nd paragraph is omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower
court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which
is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at
barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate
a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant
Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's
entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended
party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and
cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a
nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use

thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing
applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de
la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici,
Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B.
Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839,
respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an
omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds
(1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy",
whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to
the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth
and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the
ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the
dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in
the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not
mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No.
5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture
lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by wellto-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter
of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of
National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare
and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the
Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors,
City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an
illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river
banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on

public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban

communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully
occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive
against this illegal and nefarious practice.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on
public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which
provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace
and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the
grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it
unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public
agricultural lands. That law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association
to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to
private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other
laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are
duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding
standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for
any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to
commit such acts.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People
vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court
does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended
to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule
of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when
the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-30793-94 July 30, 1979

MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE
BOARD, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED PHILIPPINES, INC., GENERAL MILK
COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:1wph1.t
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to set
aside the writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos 52276 and 52383 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk
Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc., et al., plaintiffs vs. Jose B. Lingad, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, defendant", and "Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk
Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc., et al., petitioners vs. The Fair Trade Board,
respondents. "
The first case is an action for injunction to restrain the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue from requiring the respondent Filled Milk Companies to print on the labels of
their products the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than
one year of age" or other equivalent words, as required in Section 169 of the Tax Code.
The second case is an action to enjoin proceedings in the Fair Trade Board on the
complaints against Filled Milk Companies for mislabelling and/or misbranding of milk
products.
No writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order having been issued in the instant
petition against the Court of First Instance of Manila, the latter went on with the hearing
of the aforecited cases and thereafter rendered its decision disposing as
follows:t.hqw
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
In Civil Case No. 52276:
(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant, Commissioner of internal
Revenue, his agents, or employees from requiring plaintiffs to print on the
labels of their filled milk products the words: "This milk is not suitable for
nourishrrent for infants less than one year of age" or words with equivalent
import and declaring as null and void and without authority in law, the

order of said defendant dated September 28, 1961, Annex "A" of the
complaint, and the Ruling of the Secretary of Finance, dated November
12, 1962, Annex "G" of the complaint; and
In Special Civil Action No. 52383:
(b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board, its agents or
employees from continuing in the investigation of the complaints against
petitioners docketed as FTB I.S. No. 2, or any charges related to the
manufacture or sale by the petitioners of their filled milk products and
declaring as null the proceedings so far undertaken by the respondent
Board on said complaints.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila was raised to this Court for review
by a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, 1 in which this Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The present petition has, therefore,
been rendered moot and academic.
ACCORDINGLY, tills petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t

#Footnotest.hqw
1 Misael Vera, et al., vs. Hon. Serafin Cuevas, et al., G. R. No. L-3369394, May 31, 1979.

G.R. No. 169435

27, 2008

February

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal

Mayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal
Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes
between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a
municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the
Congress can do.1
For Our review on certiorari is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a
certain extent that3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte
about the boundary dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in
Ilocos Norte.
The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to
the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao."4 By this
extension of Marcos' eastern boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva
Era's territory.
The Facts
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong,
Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which
were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent
control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution
passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and
created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated
September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in
the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas
and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby
separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate
municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following
boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the
barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on
the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary;
on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary
between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest,
by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of
Biding.
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that
Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan,
Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or
any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is
clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras
as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of
Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on
the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary."
It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase refers to the
present adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and
Apayao, which were then a single province.
Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
and Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was enacted on June 18, 1966.
On February 14, 1995, the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the subprovinces of Kalinga and Apayao, was further converted into the regular provinces of
Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.
The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of
Apayao. Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the second paragraph of Section 1
of R.A. No. 3753 is the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.

On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos
claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part
of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between
Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded
on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would
consequently be obtained by it.6
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30
years,7 or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No.
93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original
Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the
Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval.
The SP, on the other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper.9
In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries
under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province
boundary, respectively, its eastern boundary should not be limited to the former
Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was coterminous and aligned with the eastern
boundary of Dingras. According to Marcos, its eastern boundary should extend further
to the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant to the description
of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753.10
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era
was cut into two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality
must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer
be considered as its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was
entitled not only to the middle portion11 of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated
northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Nio,
Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993.
It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of
the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the
land being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved
as part of Nueva Era.12
According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And
since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become
Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of
said barrios.13
From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered
to be aligned and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of
Dingras. However, based on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the

second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva
Era was alleged to form part of Marcos.14 This was the area of Barangay Sto. Nio,
Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its position paper.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision15 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to
dismiss, as it hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed
area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and
portion of the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.16
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none
of Nueva Era's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A.
No. 3753 in creating Marcos.17
The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would
encroach upon a portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of
Marcos is indeed Mountain Province, Marcos will then be claiming a portion of
Abra because the province, specifically Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is
actually bounded on the East by the Province of Abra. Abra is situated between
and separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province.
This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed
in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress
the mischief and secure the benefits intended.18 (Citations omitted)
The SP further explained:
Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the
legislature that is important. When the interpretation of the statute according to
the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should be
construed according to the spirit and reason, disregarding if necessary the letters
of the law. It is believed that congress did not intend to have this absurd situation
to be created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This body, by the
mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise known Local Government Code,
so believes that respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been excluded
from the ambit of RA 3753. Under the principle of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est
exclusio alterius," by expressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town
of Marcos, those not mentioned are deemed excluded. In Republic Act 4354,
where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao
excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said City, the court held that

there arose a prima facie conclusion that the said law abolished Barrio Central as
part of Davao City.
Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our
brothers and sisters belonging to peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants
with their own rich customs and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that
the inhabitants of Nueva Era have proudly claimed to be a part of this rich
culture. With this common ancestral heritage which unfortunately is absent with
Marcos, let it not be disturbed.19 (Emphasis ours and citations omitted)
RTC Decision
On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision20 of March
19, 2001. The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC reasoned out in this wise:
The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as
regards its boundary on the East which is the "Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province" should
prevail.
On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the
barrios of the Municipality of Dingras as stated in R.A. 3753 should be included in
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan agreed with the position of Nueva Era.
xxxx
An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the
R.A. 3753 (House Bill No. 3721) shows the Explanatory Note of Congressman
Simeon M. Valdez, 2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:
EXPLANATORY NOTE
This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality
to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised by the present
barrios of Capariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit, all in the Municipality of Dingras of the same province. The seat of

government will be in the sitio of San Magro in the present barrio of

Ragas.
xxxx
On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely
affected too much because its finances will still be sound and stable. Its
capacity to comply with its obligations, especially to its employees and
personnel, will not be diminished nor its operations paralyzed. On the
contrary, economic development in both the mother and the proposed
municipalities will be accelerated.
In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ
Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte22
Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios (barangays) of the
Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte only. Hence, the Municipality of
Marcos cannot add any area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion might have been
different only if the area being claimed by the Municipality of Marcos is
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not the
Municipality of Nueva Era. In such case, the two conflicting provisions may
be harmonized by including such area within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Dingras as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Marcos.23 (Emphasis ours)
CA Disposition
Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for
review24 of the RTC decision before the CA. The issues raised by Marcos before the CA
were:
1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a
Government Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto. Nio, formerly of Nueva Era, is
a part of the newly created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio on the East which is
separated from Nueva Era as a result of the full implementation of the
boundaries of the new Municipality of Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to
Nueva Era.25

The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where
Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of Nueva Era, which,
according to Marcos, was isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos
of said middle portion.
Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as
part of its own territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era
in view of the description of Marcos' eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos
likewise contended that it was entitled to the northern portion of Nueva Era which was
allegedly isolated from Nueva Era when Marcos was created. It posited that such
isolation of territory was contrary to law because the law required that a municipality
must have a compact and contiguous territory.26
In a Decision27 dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one
for certiorari. The Decisions of both the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDEinsofar
as they made the eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos co-terminous
with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another is rendered extending
the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos
Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisions are AFFIRMEDwith respect
to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion
of barangay Sto. Nio which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the
municipality of Nueva Era. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between
Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following explanation:
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary
of Marcos is only coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of
Dingras and refused to extend it up to the boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos
Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating
Marcos, is very explicit and leaves no room for equivocation that the boundaries of
Marcos town are:
"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to
the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder
road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common
boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos
Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South by the Padsan River, which
is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and

Dingras; on the West and Southwest by the boundary between the

municipalities of Batac and Dingras."
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of
Marcos and refusing to go farther to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which
Congress alone can do. Both the SP and RTC have no competence to undo a
valid act of Congress.
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of
Nueva Era and merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with conclusive
knowledge that when it provided that the eastern boundary of Marcos is the
boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province, (by the time of both
the SB and RTC Decision was already Kalinga-Apayao), it would be cutting
through a portion of Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be applied. Dura
lex sed lex!29
The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and
Kalinga-Apayao; and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of Abra for it to be
bounded by Kalinga-Apayao, to wit:
Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the
boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao)
would mean annexing part of the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos
as Abra is between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province is geographically
erroneous. From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1, which also depicts the
locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and Nueva
Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into the provinces of
Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is
situated far to the south of Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter and the
present Mountain Province, which is farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the
eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-Apayao is the eastern boundary of
Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary of the municipality of
Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra.30
However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was
denied. The CA ruled:
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio that is
separated from its mother town Nueva Era and now lies east of the municipalities
of Solsona and Dingras and north of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not
included within the area of Marcos as defined by law. But since it is already
detached from Sto. Nio, Marcos is laying claim to it to be integrated into its
territory by the SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.

We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will
necessarily substantially alter the north eastern and southern boundaries of
Marcos from that defined by law and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can
do that. True, the SP may substantially alter the boundary of a barangay within
its jurisdiction. But this means the alteration of the boundary of a barangay in
relation to another barangaywithin the same municipality for as long as that will
not result in any change in the boundary of that municipality. The area in dispute
therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva Era although
separated by the newly created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the
1991 Local Government Code which states:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be
based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities
to meet the requirements of its populace.31
The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in
bringing the case to it. The case, according to the CA, was appealable only to the RTC.
Nonetheless, despite its pronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took
cognizance of the same by treating it as one for certiorari, to wit:
A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between
dismissing outright the petition at bar or entertaining it. This is for the simple
reason that a petition for review is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the
Local Government Code provides for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes
only to the Regional Trial Court but not any further appeal to this Court. Appeal is
a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by
law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting authority.
xxxx
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant
the right of further appeal from decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes
between or among local government units, Marcos town cannot exercise that
right from the adverse decision of the RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because
of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our
inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action
for certiorari.32

Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues
Nueva Era now raises the following issues:
a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for
Review on Appeal, since Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code, which
provides that "An appeal to the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is
exclusively vested to the Regional Trial Court, without further Appeal to the Court
of Appeals";
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating
the Petition for Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court,
as a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in
declaring that MARCOS East is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its
mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS
territory beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and
to go further East, by traversing and disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing
parallel lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or KalingaApayao.33
Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of
appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and (2) whether or
not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
Our Ruling
Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule
42.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving
two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement
to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the
said sanggunian in case the disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable
settlement.34
The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal
of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos before the RTC.
The problem, however, lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed
to the CA.

The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable
to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the RTC decision may be made pursuant to
Section 119 of the Local Government Code35 which provides:
SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of
Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The
Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing
thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be
maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case
may no longer be further appealed to it. The CA stated that "(a)ppeal is a purely
statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too
basic to require the citation of supporting authority."36
The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: "because
of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive
dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari."37
The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment
of the SP.
True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly
granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely
because the law allows it.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by R.A. No. 7902,38vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg.
129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA
in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a
petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the
authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the creation of a local
government unit is not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.40
The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court
through Justice Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,41 where it was held that:
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more
reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in
the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable
practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished,
merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of
the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly
affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the
boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their
sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the
people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting
more autonomy to local government units.42
Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory43 plebiscite requirement for the
creation of a local government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the claim of
Marcos to its territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.
We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory is not
tenable. However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987
and 1973 constitutions and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as
will be discussed below.
At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local
government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As
a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.44 It is the basic norm
that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only,
unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.45
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the City of
Mandaue, the Court has this to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not
having been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is
untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio

should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into
being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore
cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on
June 21, 1969.47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).
Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the
law that created it. Its creation was already a fait accompli. Therefore, there is no
reason for Us to further require a plebiscite.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be
given only a prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were
the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or
withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within
the scope of the Constitution.48
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A.
No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory
are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas
and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby
separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate
municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following
boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory,
Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon
which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded
from its operation and effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is
based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.50
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of
Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms
are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be
extended to other matters.51 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.52

Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration
of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be
held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.53
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the
explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said
explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the
explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the
statute.54
Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the
latter still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the
description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the
barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on
the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary;
on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary
between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest,
by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it,
Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos
posits that in order for its eastern side to reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary,
it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva Era.
Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but
also to its northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of
Nueva Era.
We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.
Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said
description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of
Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.
Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753
is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its

application.55 We thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory
of Dingras only.
Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is
unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the
whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.56 Every
section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law, and every part of the act is
to be taken into view.57
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which
defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases
involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a
statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislature and stressed that it is of the essence
of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice
or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be
unjust or lead to absurd results."58
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
sought to be remedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.59
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is
Reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

**

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

On official leave per Special Order No. 485 dated February 14, 2008.

**

On leave per Special Order No. 486 dated February 15, 2008.

Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, 333 Phil. 1, 18 (1996).

Rollo, pp. 31-46. Dated June 6, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64147, entitled
"Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos
Norte." Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate
Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Magdangal M. de Leon, concurring.
3

Id. at 123-129; records, pp. 437-443. Dated March 19, 2001 in Sp. Civil Action
No. 12073. Penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin.

Id. at 45-46.

E.O. No. 66 signed by Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison reads: Upon

the recommendation of the Honorable, Secretary of the Interior and the
Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte, and pursuant to the provisions of section
twenty-three hundred and ninety-one of the Administrative Code, the settlements
of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paor-patoc,
Tibangran, and Uguis in the Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby consolidated
and organized in to a township to be known as the township of Nueva Era. The
seat of the township government of the township of Nueva Era shall be at the
settlement of Bugayong.
6

Rollo, pp. 256-258.

Id. at 32.

Id.; records, pp. 2-3.

Id.

10

Id. at 33.

11

Id. at 33-34.

12

Records, p. 13; id.

13

Id. at 14-15.

14

Rollo, pp. 35-36.

15

Records, pp. 341-344.

16

Id. at 344.

17

Id. at 342-344.

18

Id. at 343.

19

Id. at 343-344.

20

Id. at 437-443; rollo, pp. 123-129.

21

Id. at 443.

22

Rollo, p. 128; id. at 442. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates

(1963), Vol. II, Part I, p. 1474.

23

Id. at 127-129.

24

CA rollo, pp. 2-12.

25

Id. at 5-6.

26

Id. at 9.

27

Rollo, pp. 31-46.

28

Id. at 45-46.

29

Id. at 41-42.

30

Id. at 42-43.

31

Id. at 43-44.

32

Id. at 44-45.

33

Id. at 9.

34

Local Government Code (1991), Sec. 118(e).

35

Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).

36

Rollo, p. 44.

37

Id. at 45.

38

Effective March 18, 1995, entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, Amending for the Purpose Section Nine of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, As Amended, Known As the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."
39

Keswani v. Republic, G.R. No. 153986, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 145, 150.

40

A similar provision is likewise provided in Section 3, Article XI of the 1973

Constitution, thus:
SECTION 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected.
41

373 Phil. 386 (1999).

42

Miranda v. Aguirre, id. at 400.

43

The constitutional requirement of a plebiscite is incorporated in the Local

Government Code of 1991, particularly in Section 10, Chapter II, Title I of its
Book I, to wit:
SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said
law or ordinance fixes another date.
44

Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274
SCRA 481, 493.
45

Union Carbide Labor Union v. Union Carbide Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. L41314, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 554, 558.
46

G.R. No. L-52304, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 763.

47

Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, id. at 774.

48

Cruz, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 10.

49

Tolentino v. Paqueo, G.R. No. 150606, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 377,
387; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The Philippine American Accident
Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 141658, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 668,
688; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.,
G.R. No. 150947, July 15, 2003, 406 SCRA 178, 186, citing Vera v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 199, 203.
50

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc., supra,

citing Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA
651, 656.
51

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 642 (2000),
citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA
549.
52

Romualdez v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 497 SCRA 89,
108; Canet v. Decena, 465 Phil. 325, 333 (2004); Centeno v. VillalonPornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 197,
203; Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48886-88,

July 21, 1993, 224 SCRA 665, 670, citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd
ed., 1990, pp. 160-161.
53

La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 932

(2004); Chua v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992,
206 SCRA 65, 76, citing People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657, 664 (1962).
54

Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 1995, p. 73.

55

Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA
702, 715.
56

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 73, 93,
citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 83736,
January 15, 1992, 205 SCRA 184, 188.
57

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., supra.

58

Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation, G.R. No. 78409,

September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 513, 519, citing Bello v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-38161, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 509.
59

In re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity

Pay, A.M. No. 02-1-12-SC, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 263, 267; Ursua v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 147, 152.