Cases HR Law
Cases HR Law
Cases HR Law
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-342
May 4, 1946
(3) That petitioner also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which
the prosecution presented certain papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition was denied;
(4) That at the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again
presented said papers and documents, which were admitted as part of
its evidence, and were marked as exhibits, as described in the petition
for certiorari, filed in this court;
(5) That herein petitioner had failed to object properly to the admission
of said papers and documents at the hearing on said petition for bail,
and at the trial of the case on the merits, in not having insisted that the
question of the legality of the search and seizure of the papers and
documents taken from his house should have been litigated and finally
decided first, and thus practically waived his objection to their
admissibility, as evidence for the prosecution;
(6) That at the hearing on his petition for the return of the papers taken
from his house, held after they had been admitted as part of the
evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on the petition for bail and
at the trial of the case on the merits, herein petitioner had failed to
identify satisfactorily the documents now in question, and his
ownership thereof; and
(7) That petitioner himself in his petition for reconsideration, dated
February 26, 1946, admitted the legality the legality of the seizure of
the documents taken from his house, and at the hearing on his petition
for bail, he himself called for some of the documents in question.
The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein
petitioner, as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal
papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations,
is unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section
I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military
papers in the possession of prisoners of war (Wilson, International
Law, 3d ed., 1939, p.524); and also under the proclamation, dated
December 29, 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as
Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring his
purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had
voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the
allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended, from any
position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to
hold them in restraint for the duration of the war. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 2,
pp. 148, 149.) As a matter of fact, petitioner himself, in his motion for
reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946, expressly admitted the
legality of the seizure of his personal papers and documents at the
time of his arrest.
The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is
the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful
arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its
commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of
searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed. (Agnello vs. United States, 269 U. S., 20.)
When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his
possession or in his control may be seized and used in evidence
against him; and an officer has the right to make an arrest without a
warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable grounds to
have committed a felony. (Carroll vs. United States, 267 U. S., 132.).
The majority of the states have held that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, which is also guaranteed by state
constitutional provisions is not violated by the use in evidence of
articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure. (People
vs. Defore, 242 N. Y., 13; 150 N. E., 585.)
Separate Opinions
It is true that on December 1, 1945, herein petitioner filed a petition,
demanding the return of certain papers and documents allegedly
seized and taken from his house at the time of his arrest; but when he
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal
Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting
accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to
Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the
appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to
the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in
the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968])
where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain
the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and
participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in
prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that
where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific
request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the
owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the
constitutional meaning of the term.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was
held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People
v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v.
Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938
(1957).
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X)
which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and
consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting
of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized
for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and
papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the
xxx
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Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts
to no more than a declaration that his use of the documents and
papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the
injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that
case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the
charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and
papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily
restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually
lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other.
And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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4
5
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without
legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed
respondent de Leons application for search warrant and respondent
Logronios deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by
respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN,
Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA,
in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO
LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR
DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN
DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the
BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners at the offices of
petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners
lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint
or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents
nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of
documents.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable
Judge requested or instructed them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise
his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and
without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The
Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts
contained in his deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr.
Rodolfo de Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct
offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a),
Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are
interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of
income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208
(unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the
violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales,
business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax
due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned
provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and
73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under
Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the
major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general
warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to
include all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if
seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this
Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97)
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches
and seizures may not be made, that abuses may not be
committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional
provision is borne out by American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be
defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law
by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules
of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the
foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct
relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense;
and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy
merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description
contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at
least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding
the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities,
contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and
communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of
foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judges order
of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first place,
when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those
which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below,
the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari
can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc.,
Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule
requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an
application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never
intended to be applied without considering the circumstances.
(Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of
the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by
respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against
petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct
action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26
SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
deprivation of petitioners fundamental right to due process taints the
proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity
but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to
protection against unreasonable search and seizures. Again, we find
no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an
officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 99050. September 2, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONWAY B.
OMAWENG, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
DECISION
SYLLABUS
This section penalizes the pusher, who need not be the owner of the
prohibited drug. The law defines pusher as "any person who sells,
administers, delivers, or gives away to another, on any terms
whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in transit or transports any
dangerous drug or who acts as a broker in any of such transactions, in
violation of this Act. 10
much too asinine to be true and do not affect the credibilities of the
witnesses affiants and the truth of their affirmations on the stand.
As gleaned from parts of the record of the reinvestigation of this case
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal (Exhs "G" and "D" ; pp. 158 and
161, Record), it appears that Layong and Fomocod were prevailed
upon to affix their signatures to (sic) the document styled as Joint
Clarificatory Sworn Statement by interested persons in a vain ploy to
extricate the accused from the morass he got himself into. Testifying in
open court, the same witnesses maintained the tenor of their original
affidavit supporting the filing of the criminal complaint in the lower
court (Exh. "C" ; p. 2, Record) No additional information was elicited
from said witnesses during their examination from which it can
reasonably be deduced that a third person instead of the accused is
the culprit and that the suspect is being framed-up for a crime he did
not commit. Nonetheless, granting arguendo that the declarations of
Layong and Fomocod now the bone of contention, are on the level,
the same are but mere opinions and conclusions without bases. Any
which way, to believe that any person in his right mind owning several
kilos of hot hashish worth tens of thousands of pesos would simply
stash it away in the travelling bag of someone he has no previous
agreement with is a mockery of common sense. And to think further
that the PC/INP agents know of such fact yet they kept the vital
information under confidential Status (whatever that means in police
parlance) while an innocent person is being prosecuted and practically
in the shadow of the gallows for the offense would be stretching
human credulity to the snapping point. By and large, the fact remains
as the circumstances logically indicate that the accused Conway
Omaweng has knowledge of the existence of the contraband inside
his vehicle and he was caught red-handed transporting the hot stuff."
13
Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you
do?
Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
A He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).