Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rule 6 Compiled
Rule 6 Compiled
Plaintiff Calo ordered 1200 ft of a Josh Shaw wire rope from Ajax International Inc. Upon delivery, subject
matter was short of 300ft. Calo sued defendant Ajax International Inc to either complete the delivery or
account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope.
Complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila (Civil Case No. IV- 93062) by one Adolfo Benavides
who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax International,
Inc.
Judgment by default was entered, and a writ of execution issued, against plaintiff Calo.
Calo appealed via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the SC.
Court set aside judgment of default and writ of execution issued against Calo and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
Later, plaintiff Calo assisted by husband Marcos Calo, filed before the CFI of Agusan a complaint (Civil Case
No. 860.) to compel Ajax Intl Inc to either effect complete delivery of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she
be relieved from paying P855.00 and that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as attorneys fees, damages
and expenses of litigation.
Instead of filing an answer, Ajax Intl Inc. moved for the dismissal of Civil Case 860 that the subject was
involved and intimately related to that case filed the Municipal Court of Manila.
Court sustained the motion and dismissed the case.
Calo moved for reconsideration and new trial which was likewise denied by Court. Hence, the present
appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in dismissing the plaintiffs complaint
RULING:
YES. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 860 because of the pendency of Civil Case No. IV-93062 in the municipal court
of Manila is predicated on the supposition that plaintiffs claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in
the latter case. There is no question that it arises out of the same transaction which is the basis of the complaint in
Civil Case No. IV-93062 and does not require the presence of third parties over whom the municipal court of Manila
could not acquire jurisdiction.
However, plaintiffs claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. IV-93062 for the simple reason that the
amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up
is barred, when applied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount involved is within the said courts
jurisdiction. Otherwise, we would come to the absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the municipal court
which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of, being beyond its jurisdiction.
Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only, does not
obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the
defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from
recovering from him. This means that should the court find both plaintiffs complaint and defendants counterclaim
(for an amount exceeding said courts jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground
that defendant has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining
balance of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all related controversies.
Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. VI-93062, it need not be
filed there. The pendency then of said civil case could not be pleaded in abatement of Civil Case No. 860.
Sharp, Inc. filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA), E. Razon, DOTC Secretary and International Container Terminal Services Inc., (ICTSI)
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
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On the same day, the petitioner filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim against Sharp for its
"unfounded and frivolous action." and claimed damages in the amount of P100M.cralaw virtua1aw library
PPA
filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint. Motion was adopted by petitioner CCTSI in a
manifestation.
RTC Judge Edilberto G. Sandoval dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
CCTSI filed a motion for reconsideration of the order insofar as it dismissed its counterclaim. MR denied.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal of the counterclaim was proper
RULING:
YES. The counterclaim for damages alleged that the delay in the award of the MICT contract caused by Sharps
complaint and writ of preliminary injunction jeopardized the petitioners timetable to attain the projected volumes
in its winning bid and, as well, caused it to incur litigation expenses, including attorneys fees.
Court held that a counterclaim is compulsory where:
(1) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing partys claim;
(2) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and (3) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
In the case at bar, petitioners counterclaim was clearly compulsory. The petitioner itself so denominated it. There
is no doubt that the same evidence needed to sustain it would also refute the cause of action alleged in the private
respondents complaint; in other words, the counterclaim would succeed only if the complaint did not.
Rule 17, Sec. 2 of the ROC provides:
SECTION 2. Dismissal by order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court may deem proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to
the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without
prejudice.
The petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of the complaint. Secondly, the compulsory
counterclaim was so interwined with the complaint that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication
by the court after the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the counterclaim in the first place. As a
consequence, the dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioners own motion) also dismissed the counterclaim
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that
complaint.
Thus, the petitioner caused the dismissal of its counterclaim when it not only did not object to, but actually moved
for, the dismissal of the complaint. If it wanted the counterclaim to subsist, it should have objected to the dismissal
of the complaint or at least reserved its right to prosecute it, assuming this would still be possible. It did neither of
these. The petitioner claims that there is no law requiring that reservation, but there is no law presuming it either.
Also, the counterclaim was not permissive. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of nor is it
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. It is not barred even if not set up in
the action. The petitioners counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Most importantly, it had no
independent existence, being merely ancillary to the main action. The petitioner knew all this and did not object to
the dismissal of the complaint. On the contrary, it actually moved to dismiss that main action, and in so doing also
moved,
in
effect,
for
the
dismissal
of
its
counterclaim.
Metals filed a case private respondent Plaridel Jose, for the annulment of an agreement to buy and sell
executed between the parties, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, the
complaint alleging, inter alia, that the agreement is imperfect and incomplete.
Jose filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging a compulsory counterclaim; that due to the adamant and
unreasonable posture of Star, Joses timetable to generate funds and profits was severely stalled and placed at
a standstill to the damage and prejudice of his investment and financial projection, among others. She prayed
that she be awarded exemplary and moral damages, among others.
Before the case could be heard on pre-trial, Jose filed a Motion to Expunge the Complaint on the ground that
the same did not specify the amount of damages sought either in the body or in the prayer of the complaint.
Trial court required petitioner to amend its complaint by specifying the amount of damages prayed for. Metals
complied with.
Jose moved for the reconsideration of the trial court's order with respect to the portion allowing petitioner to
file an amended complaint, stating that the court did not acquire jurisdiction when the wrong docket fee was
paid, hence the amendment of the complaint did not vest jurisdiction upon the court. Motion granted.
Jose filed a Motion to Set Case for Presentation of Evidence in support of his counterclaim. In its Opposition,
Metals averred that since Joses counterclaim is compulsory in nature because it is necessarily connected with
and arose out of the same transaction subject of the complaint, with the dismissal of petitioner's complaint the
compulsory counterclaim can no longer remain pending for independent adjudication. Trial court granted Joses
motion. Metals filed an MR, which was denied.
Metals filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or TRO
with CA. CA dismissed stating that since the order is merely interlocutory in nature, it cannot be corrected by
certiorari. MR denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose should be allowed to present evidence in support of his compulsory counterclaim despite the
dismissal of the complaint
HELD:
No.
Joses counterclaim is compulsory in nature since (1) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; 2) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and 3) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. And the rule is that a compulsory counterclaim not set up shall be barred if not
raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation on the ground of res
judicata, the theory being that what are barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and
litigated upon, but also such matters as could have been raised but were not. In other words, a compulsory
counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving
the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit,
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Lualhati Cojuangco is the widow of Don Juan Cojuangco, the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land in
Bulacan.
Many years back, the parents of Purificacion Villegas, with the acquiescence of Don Juan Cojuangco,
constructed a residential house and a bakery on the lot. It was understood that they would vacate the premises
when needed by the owner.
After her parent's death, Villegas remained in the property, renovating the same. She leased out a portion of
the land without the knowledge and consent of Don Juan, who later on demanded that she leave the property.
Villegas refused. Don Juan instituted ejectment proceedings.
Don Juan died intestate. His wife Lualhati, herein petitioner, together with nephews and nieces, were subconstituted as parties-plaintiffs.
MTC dismissed the action for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction. As Villegas asserted an adverse claim of
ownership, the suit was transformed into an accion publiciana which is properly cognizable by CFIs.
On appeal to the CFI, decision was reversed. Villegas was ordered to vacate the premises and to surrender
possession thereof to herein petitioner Cojuangco.
CA and SC upheld Cojuangco's right of possession. Petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Branch XV, where she filed a motion for execution of the judgment, which the court granted. A writ of
demolition was issued against Villegas, who did not oppose the ordered demolition but instead asked the lower
court to give her more time to which the court acceded.
Before the lapse of the grace period, Villegas filed a separate civil action docketed against petitioner Cojuangco
and the provincial sheriff "for specific performance with urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction." This case, instead of being referred to Branch XV which had earlier issued
the writ of demolition, was raffled to another Malolos branch of the Bulacan Trial Court, specifically Branch XVII
which issued on the same day a TRO enjoining Cojuangco and particularly the sheriff "from enforcing or
implementing the Order of Demolition. This was followed by another order granting a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The twin orders are now the subject of the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
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Whether or not the assailed orders constituted an undue interference by the respondent court with a final and
executory decision of a co-equal court
Whether or not Villegas can still legally institute a separate action on the ground that she is a builder in good
faith
HELD:
1.
Yes. The argument is impressed with merit. As early as 1922 in the case of Cabigao v. Del Rosario, this Court
laid down the doctrine that "no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction."
The various branches of the court of first instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule
would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.
2.
No.
Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim provides the answer.
A counterclaim or cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's or
co-party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the land is essentially in the nature of a
counterclaim since it is inter-woven with the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been
presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not raised on time and the party in error is
precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation.
According to Villegas, the reason why the counterclaim for indemnification was not made in the original action was
because it became a "ripe issue" only after the ejectment proceedings.
The argument is untenable. Villegas repeatedly stressed that the residential house which her parents had
constructed was already there on the questioned lot for as long as she could remember. She completely negate her
absurd claim that the factual basis for her subsequent action arose after the ejectment suit became final.
Thus, Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that she was entitled to the parcel of land
by right of inheritance, the alternative claim that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot, at least
as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value of the buildings and improvements which she and her
parents had introduced on the land.
Since Villegas failed to set up such alternative defense (i.e. a builder in good faith is entitled to recover the value of
improvements) and instead relied on the sole defense that she inherited the land from her parents, the rejection
thereof was a complete resolution of the controversy between the parties which bars a later case based upon the
unpleaded defense.
FACTS:
Complaint
-
A complaint for rescission and damages by Sps. Mongao (petitioner: Pesane Mongao only) against Pryce
Properties (respondent) before RTC General Santos alleging that both parties executed a MOA wherein Sps.
Mongao agreed to sell to Pryce a parcel of land in S. Cotabato for P5M (registered in the name of
petitioner).
Pryce paid P550,000 as earnest money. After considerable delay, it offered to pay balance by check to
Mongao and her mother, which was rejected. Pryce refused to pay balance solely to Mongao.
Mongao did not execute a Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS)
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Pedro Animas IV approached Mole, a Pryce officer, and negotiated the sale of properties belonging to the
Animas family, which were to be foreclosed
Subject property was one of the two parcels it purchased, allegedly belonging to Mongaos parents but was
registered in Mongaos name as trustee
Pryce did not pay earnest money directly to Mongao but to Development Bank of the Philippines, to
redeem certain properties of the Animas family
Both Mongao and Pedro Animas, registered owner of subject properties, executed DOS and MOA after
delivery of checks to the bank
However, Mongao demanded that payment be made to her alone excluding the Animas family
Pryce issued P3.3M check to Mongao and her mother but was refused by Mongao
Pryce therefore was constrained to deposit the payment with Clerk of Court of RTC Davao City
By way of a compulsory counterclaim, Pryce prayed that petitioner be adjudged liable for attorneys fees for
their hasty and unjustified institution of the case
Petitioner
-
Moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Answer admitted the material allegations of
the complaint- Pryce admitting the existence of COS and its refusal to satisfy the unpaid balance of the
purchase price despite demand, and thus failed to tender an issue
Respondent
-
Opposed Motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that material allegations, that Mongao did not
execute DOS and that Mongao was owner of the subject property, were disputed in the answer
RTC Decision
Granted Motion for judgment on the pleadings
Rescinded DAS
Pryce directed to execute Deed of reconveyance
CA Decision
-
Reversed RTC
Judgment on the pleadings not proper as there were actual issues raised in the answer requiring
presentation and assessment of evidence
The genuineness of DOS and nature of Mongaos title to the subject of property were also put in issue
Sec. 1, Rule 19: Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
Answer fails to tender an issue when:
o It does not comply with the requirements for a specific denial
o It would admit material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings not only where it expressly
confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all
Nothing from the allegations in Pryce;s answer makes out a proper joinder of issues (where the answer
makes a specific denial of the material allegations or asserts affirmative defenses which would bar
recovery from by the plaintiff)
o Allegations in answer do not make out a specific denial that a COS was perfected between the
parties
o Does not contest the due execution and/or genuineness of MOA
The answer implied admission by Pryce that it effected payment contrary to the express terms of the COS
thereby admitting its breach of contractual obligation and supports petitioners cause of action for
rescission
In July 1980, 6 parcels of land in Calayad were transferred, ceded, conveyed to Phil. Tourism Authority (PTA)
pursuant to PD 1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort was erected in the area.
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In 1992, Bungcayao and other DSierto members applied for a foreshore lease with the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and was granted provisional permit
Fort Ilocandia however filed also for a foreshore application including the 5-he portion applied for by
DSierto members
DENR Regional Executive Director Ancheta denied foreshore lease applications of DSierto members on the
ground that the subject area fell either within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for
by Fort Ilocandia
Dsierto appealed the denial of their applications
In a Resolution, DENR Sec. Gozun denied the appeal on the ground that the area encroached on the titled
property of Fort Ilocandia based on the final verification plan
In 2003, DSierto and Fort Ilocandia had a meeting to settle the dispute wherein Atty Marcos was present,
as a mediator.
Atty Marcos offered P300k to DSierto as financial settlement in consideration of the improvements
introduced on the condition that they vacate the area
A DSierto member made a counter-offer of P400k, to which the other DSierto members agreed
o Bungcayao alleged that his son, who attended the meeting, manifested that he had to consult his
parents about the offer but upon undue pressure exerted by Atty Marcos, he accepted payment
and signed the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of Fort Ilocandia
o Thus, Bungcayao filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before RTC Laoag City, alleging
his son had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him
Fort Ilocandia countered that the area upon which Dsierto members constructed their improvements was
part of its titled property
o That Bungcayaos sons attended the meeting on their own volition and they were able to talk to
their parents through a cellular phone before they accepted the offer
o As counterclaim, Fort Ilocandia prayed that Bungcayao return the P400k and vacate the area
RTC
-
Confirmed agreement of parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim, and
return P400k
Both parties agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution on summary judgment
o Court then considered the case submitted for Resolution
Bungcayao filed a MR alleging that he manifested in open court that he was withdrawing his earlier
manifestation submitting the case for resolution
Fort Ilocandia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in which the RTC rendered
o That the alleged pressure on Bungcayaos sons could not constitute force, violence or intimidation
that could vitiate consent
o That the established property occupied by Bungcayao/DSierto was within the titled property of Fort
Ilocandia
CA
-
ISSUE: WON respondents counterclaim is compulsory; won summary judgment is appropriate in this case
HELD: NO, JUST A PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM; YES, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY RENDERED
-
Criteria
o
o
o
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The remaining counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic controversy between the parties, it is very
clear that it will not be barred if not set up in the answer to the complaint; thus, it is only permissive
Rule in permissive counterclaim is that for RTC to acquire jurisdiction, counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees
o Any jurisdiction rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time,
even on appeal before SC; CC is considered null and void, with Fort Ilocandia not disputing the nonpayment of docket fees
A Complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff
relies for his claim.
Non-appearance in the Preliminary Conference on cases filed for Summary Procedure places the case
under Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure: it will be decided according to the material
allegations of the complaint.
FACTS:
Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari of CA decision awarding amount sought by respondents because their
complaints, in the words of Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the judgment warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint.
Original Action (2005): Collection case filed by Brewmaster International (Asia Brewery distributor) against Prescillo
Lazaro and Victoria Lazaro in the MeTC of Makati for the collection of Php 180,502.00 worth of goods unpaid by the
Lazaros.
Brewmaster attached Sales Invoice in their complaint as proof. Said Sales Invoice states Total as purchaser of the
goods and Daniel Limuco (spouses employee) as the one who accepted the goods.
Prescillo filed an answer with counterclaim stating that he and petitioner had lived separately since January 2002
and he never authorized to purchase anything from respondent.
Victoria filed her answer with a counterclaim denying she transacted with Brewmaster and that the documents
show that it was not she but Total who purchased goods from the respondent.
During the scheduled preliminary conference, petitioner and co-defendant did not appear. MeTC submitted the
case for decision consequently. MeTC dismissed the case stating that Brewmaster were not able to establish the
required burden of proof to establish its claim by preponderance of evidence. They noted that Brewmaster was not
able to prove that any of the spouse received the goods.
RTC: Elevasted to RTC through notice of appeal, Brewmaster attached its memorandum as additional evidence
showing it transacted with petitioner and husband who owned a Total Gas Station where Daniel Limuco was their
employee. RTC agreed with MeTC and affirmed the decision in toto.
Court of Appeals: Via petition for review, CA reversed the decision and granted the petitioners prayers applying
Section 7 and Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure stating that judgment should have been
rendered as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint considering that both defendants failed to
appear during the preliminary conference.
MR denied.
ISSUE:
WoN the Court of Appeals erred in applying the provisions of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the Rules of Summary Procedure in this case. Since this is a collection
case under the MeTC, it should be under Summary Procedure hence the CA was correct in using the ff rules:
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be
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A Complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff
relies for his claim.
Non-appearance in the Preliminary Conference on cases filed for Summary Procedure places the case
under Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure: it will be decided according to the material
allegations of the complaint.
FACTS:
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Answer: Petitioner GSIS filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim stating that Fernando lost his
right of redemption when it was not able to do so during the period he was given. GSIS also denies all irregularities
averred by Fernando. They are also asking for Php 130,365.81 for back rentals and interests plus additional Php
249,800.00 excluding interests for rentals Fernando illegally collected from Carmelita Ang Hao (who used to lease
the land, owner of CMTC) from 1973 to 1988.
RTC: Ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed complaint, granting petitioners motion to dismiss and granting
GSIS counterclaim, compelling Fernando to pay the petitioner rentals collected and the said back-rentals. MR
denied.
Court of Appeals: Affirmed decision of RTC with modification, but deleted the grant of paying the rentals collected
amounting to Php 249k. CA denied reasoning that the said counterclaim for 249k is permissive and GSIS failed to
pay docket fees, thus the courts never gained jurisdiction over said counterclaim. GSIS files MR, denied.
Fernando died. Exparte motion for Substitution of Party with his daughter replacing him.
ISSUE:
WoN the Court of Appeals erred in removing the grant of Php 249,800.00 counterclaim by GSIS for the
rentals collected illegally by Fernando
HELD:
NO. The Court of Appeals decision is correct. GSIS counterclaim over the 249k for backrentals allegedly
erroneously collected by respondents is a permissive counterclaim, thus GSIS was required to pay docket fees.
Their failure to do so means that RTC never gained jurisdiction over the counterclaim and thus the RTC decision is
void.
From Bungcayao v Fort Ilocandia (not cited, but provides a good definition):
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may
have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case.
[14] Any other counterclaim is permissive.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the RTC Malolos decision recalling its previous Order
to dismiss the counterclaim of B. Serrano as against the original plaintiff Agana.
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Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of title with preliminary injunction with the RTC Malolos. She
avers that she is the only heir of her fathers land (subject property), and that the land was fraudulently
sold to Lopez, who sold the same to B. Serrano.
B. Serrano seasonably filed its Answer with a compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner filed MTD the counterclaim on the ground of no certification of non-forum shopping.
RTC initially granted the counterclaim considering it as compulsory and therefore excluded from such
requirement per Rule 7 Sec 5. Petitioner filed a MR, alleging that per Admin Circular 04-94, the certification
is needed. RTC granted MR and dismissed the counterclaim.
B. Serrano now files an MR with the RTC, averring that Admin Circular 04-94 does not apply to compulsory
counterclaims per the case of Santo Tomas vs Surla. RTC again granted MR, and recalled the dismissal of
the counterclaim.
ISSUE:
WON the compulsory counterclaim must include a certification of non-forum shopping
RULING:
NO. PETITION DENIED.
Santo Tomas clarified the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 with respect to counterclaims. The Court
pointed out that this circular is intended primarily to cover "an initiatory pleading or an incipient application
of a party asserting a claim for relief." The distinction between a compulsory and a permissive counterclaim is
vital in the application of the circular.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular applies to initiatory
and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an "initiatory" or similar pleading.
The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff's complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory
counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise, respondent waives the compulsory
counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to
an initiatory pleading which is the complaint. A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of
non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.
In the case at bar, B. Serranos counterclaim is for DAMAGES. As set up in its Answer, because of the
unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified acts of the plaintiff, herein defendant has suffered and continue to suffer
actual damages in the sum of at least P400,000,000.00 which the law, equity, and justice require that to be paid by
the plaintiff and further to reimburse the attorney's fees of P2,000,000.00.
Clearly, it arose from the filing of Aganas complaint, and is so intertwined with the plaintiffs case that it is
incapable of proceeding independently.
This is a petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the CA decision affirming the RTC decision.
Parties: Paras passenger, a bus operated by Philtranco, and another bus operated by Inland.
Paras is on Inland bus. Philtranco bus rear-ended the Inland bus, causing Inland bus to hit a cargo truck,
causing multiple injuries, and death of the Inland bus driver. Paras incurred medical expenses to heal his
fractures.
Unable to obtain sufficient financial assistance from Inland, Paras filed the suit for damages based on
breach of contract of carriage against Inland with RTC Rizal.
Inland filed an Answer denying the allegations, insisting on its exercise of extraordinary diligence and upon
leave of court, filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and the Philtranco bus driver. Inland averred
that the cause of action should be directed against Philtranco.
All parties appealed to the CA. CA modified, increasing the amount of damages to Paras by Philtranco, and
ALSO ordering Philtranco to pay damages to Inland. Philtranco MR denied.
ISSUE:
WON moral damages can be awarded to Paras against Philtranco when the cause of action is the breach of contract
of carriage.
RULING:
YES. CA affirmed.
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SINGAPORE AIRLINES VS CA
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the Arabian American Oil
Company (Aramco). As part of Aramco's policy, its employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are
allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is
properly supported by receipt. Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, with a
50-kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said amount upon presentation of
the excess baggage ticket.
Rayos was being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked his wife Beatriz in Manila to
seek a written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess baggage of 50 kilograms. SIA's manager
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