1) Petitioners were charged with four counts of introducing falsified documents under Article 172 of the RPC for attaching certain documents to a motion to dismiss in a civil case.
2) The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the complaint of the opposing party in the civil case. However, the Supreme Court found this insufficient as the complaint was not based on personal knowledge and petitioners were not given a chance to rebut.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals and lower courts gravely erred in finding probable cause, as the documents did not clearly show the elements of falsification. The criminal cases against petitioners were ordered dismissed.
1) Petitioners were charged with four counts of introducing falsified documents under Article 172 of the RPC for attaching certain documents to a motion to dismiss in a civil case.
2) The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the complaint of the opposing party in the civil case. However, the Supreme Court found this insufficient as the complaint was not based on personal knowledge and petitioners were not given a chance to rebut.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals and lower courts gravely erred in finding probable cause, as the documents did not clearly show the elements of falsification. The criminal cases against petitioners were ordered dismissed.
1) Petitioners were charged with four counts of introducing falsified documents under Article 172 of the RPC for attaching certain documents to a motion to dismiss in a civil case.
2) The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the complaint of the opposing party in the civil case. However, the Supreme Court found this insufficient as the complaint was not based on personal knowledge and petitioners were not given a chance to rebut.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals and lower courts gravely erred in finding probable cause, as the documents did not clearly show the elements of falsification. The criminal cases against petitioners were ordered dismissed.
ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners vs MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., As Judge designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010 NATURE OF CASE: Crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172 RPC BRIEF: Instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court FACTS: 1) Respondent Atty. Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees against Urban Bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract of Agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas Blvd., Pasay City. 2) Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the following documents:
a) A Letter dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; b) An unsigned Letter dated 7 December 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; c) A Letter dated 9 December 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and d) A Memorandum dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners. 3) Atty. Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. 4) In a Resolution dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172 of the RPC and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686. Informations were filed at MTCC, Bago City and thereafter Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. 5) October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation. They insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. MTCC denied the omnibus motion. 6) In an Order dated 13 november 1998, the MTCC denied the Omnibus Motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level. The Court, likewise,
upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it
was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. 7) Petitioners instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals. On June 20, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Thus, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners and ruled that the MTCC, Bago City did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686. 2) Whether or not there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial. COURT ACTIONS: 1) Resolution dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172 of the RPC. 2) MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court.
3) Supreme Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the finds of the prosecutor as well as the court a quo as to the existence of probable cause. 4) Criminal Law issue: WON the petitioners guilty of Falsification under Art 172, par. 2? SUPREME COURT RATIONALE: Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Art. 172 of the RPC or Introduction of Falsified Document in a judicial proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows: 1) That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person. 2) That the false document is embraced in Art. 171 or in any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Art. 172. 3) That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding. The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the offense. The office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Pea. Based on these documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City Prosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of probable cause. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents
mentioned by respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified. There is no indication that the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence. Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied considering that herein petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut the complainants allegation through counter-affidavits. The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutors function
without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error
in his findings. Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court a quo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings. SUPREME COURT RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686.