Role of China in Pakistan - India 1971 War
Role of China in Pakistan - India 1971 War
Role of China in Pakistan - India 1971 War
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to China had already altered Chinas perception of its role in the region and China
was working towards normalizing its relations with the US. The Chinese foreign
Minister suggested that the issue between two nations should be resolved through
negotiations rather than aggression. The Pakistani delegation was unsuccessful in
getting solid support from China. China did promise to support Pakistan if India
attacked.
The Indo-Pakistan war began on December 3, 1971, when Indian army
crossed the international border into East Pakistan. China declared its support for
Pakistan, while the Soviet Union backed India, a collusion that intensified throughout the duration of the war. Beijing vehemently accused Moscow of supporting Indian military provocation and subversive activities towards Pakistan. The Soviets,
on the other hand, were described by Deng Xiansheng and other Chinese leaders
as the power that both occupied the Soviet Unions alleged ally Czechoslovakia
and instigated the war to dismember Pakistan. The UNs General Assembly was
transformed into the hub of Chinese protest on behalf of Pakistan. Clearly the hard
SinoSoviet dialogue in the UN during the period of War showed the significant
influence of the traditional Sino-Soviet dispute regarding the PRCs assistance to
Pakistan. The Soviets usage of Veto Power in the UN that encouraged New Delhi
to capture the territory of another state was described as tactic designed to permit
India the necessary time to present to the world of a fait accompli that is as an occupied East Pakistan.5
In 1970, Yahya Khan helped the US establish relations with China that resulted in a 1971 visit to China by then US National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Pakistan played key role as a bridge between the US and China. Pakistan
provided crucial support in Chinas membership of the UN as Peoples Republic of
China which resulted in PRCs inclusion as a full member on October 25, 1971.
The Chinese, in turn, showed support for Pakistan by raising a draft resolution at
the United Nations. In this resolution, China strongly condemned
the Indian Governments acts of creating so called Bangla Desh and subverting, dismembering and committing aggression against Pakistan and
raised a plea that all nations support Pakistan in their just struggle to resist
Indian aggression and mutual troops disengagement and withdrawal.6
On December 7, 1971, a resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and on
December 21, 1971, another resolution (NO: 307) adopted by the Security Council
called for the immediate end to the war and troops withdrawal on the both sides.7
Huang Hua, the PRC representative at the UN Security Council, expressed the
dissatisfaction of China over the failure of the resolution to make anyone note of
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dispatched 200 military instructors to Pakistan for the purpose of the training of
Pakistani troops for guerilla warfare.16 Moreover, according to a US observer, in
the final week of the Indo Pak. War, China supplied 200,000 rounds of anti-craft
and tank ammunition for Pakistan.17 Indian Institute for Defense Studies (I. I. D.
S.) estimated that the free Chinese arms assistance of Pakistan in 1971-72 consisted
of 225 T-59 tanks, one squadron of II-28 bombers, and four squadrons of MIG-19
interceptors, along with an unspecified number of river boats and coasters and
Chinese assistance in the construction of two major ordinance factories.18
However, since the Soviets had signed a treaty with India, openly supporting Pakistan could have provoked war between China and the Soviet Union. The
PRC would not endorse the Bangladesh movement, which they did not regard as
the war of liberation. Chou En Lai stated that it was a separatist movement perpetrated by a small group of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan.
Beijing issued the following statement about the nature of the war: The Chinese
government and people consistently oppose imperialism, expansionism, colonialism and neocolonialism and firmly support the people of all countries in their just
struggle in defense of their state sovereignty and territorial integrity and against
foreign aggression, subversive, interference control and bullying. The war between
India and Pakistan is a struggle between aggression and anti-aggression between
division and anti-division between subversion and anti-subversion.19
These international developments also affected the geo-strategic situation
of Pakistan. These were clear-cut factors in shaping and determining Pakistans
foreign policy in the 1970s. Pakistan secured independence in 1947 and from the
outset its foreign policy was shaped by security issues relating to India, the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, and the acquisition of aid from the developed world.
As Liaquat Ali Khan told the National Press Club in Washington during his official
visit to the United States in May 1950, Our strongest interests, therefore, are firstly
the integrity of Pakistan.20
According to Keith Callard, the primary object of Pakistans foreign policy
since its independence had to be to show the world that Pakistan was a reality and
was capable of maintaining its independence.21President Ayub Khan wrote that,
We have an enemy, an implacable enemy in India, and referred to Indias ambition to absorb Pakistan and turn her into a satellite. The Indian leaders made no
secret of their political designs. Mr. Acharya Kripalani, who was President of the
Indian National Congress in 1947, declared that neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of United India.22 On March 19, 1966, Bhutto asserted
that India could not tolerate the existence of Pakistan and that in the destruction
of Pakistan lay Indias most sublime and finest dream.23 On December 21, 1973,
Bhutto defined the objectives of his foreign policy: The object of a foreign policy
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of the Government and leaders of various quarter in Pakistan, the situation will remain peaceful;
(v) taking note of the gross interference by India in the affairs of Pakistan,
China understood the US and the USSR collusion with India. In the protests
note of 6 April also China accused India of flagrantly interfering in the
internal affairs of Pakistan;
(vi) that Chinas support to Pakistan was assured if the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan.
During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, China adopted the non-intervention policy
that it had suggested in the previous April. China repeatedly reminded Pakistan of
its support. Bhutto, along with an eight-man delegation, visited Peking as the personal representative of the President. The reasons for this visit were manifold and
included both the expansion of Indian troops on the East Pakistan border and the
increase of activity of guerrillas trained by India, as the shelling of border towns
between India and Pakistani troops in East Wing increased the danger of a fight
between the two. Additionally, on August 9 1971, India signed the Twenty Years
treaty of peace with USSR, who correspondingly increased military aid to India.
Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, had visited European countries
to encourage a favorable world opinion of India, while the US stopped military aid
from March 25th 1971, and cancelled licenses for the exports of 3,600,000 dollars
worth of military equipment to Pakistan. India, in contrast, received arms supply
from the USSR, further widening the military disequilibrium in the South Asia. In
this crisis, Pakistan sought strong military and diplomatic aid and China was the
only country that was able to provide support. Although no joint communiqu was
issued at the end of Bhuttos visits, it may have been because he was not holding an
official governmental post at the time.
Minister Chi Peng fei stated Chinas stance on the crisis in a speech, the
message of which was later reiterated by Premier Chou En lai: should Pakistan
be subjected to foreign aggression,27 China would play a positive role in favor
of Pakistan, resolutely support[ing] the Pakistan Government and People in their
just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence28 Mr.
Chi Peng fei expressed the view that secessionists were a handful of persons and
broad masses of Pakistan are patriotic and want to safeguard the national unity
and oppose internal split and outside interference.29 China stressed that disputes
between states should always be settled through consultation and not by resorting
to force.30 Indian interference activities in East Pakistan were criticized on the
basis of Chinas support for the principle of non-intervention. It is also important to
note that China did not reiterate its previous allegation that the US was collaborat-
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1971. Chinas stance was that the world should not pardon the serious crimes that
India had committed against Pakistan. China opposed flagrant aggression, interference and subversive activities of Indian imperialism and colonialism towards other
countries. The Peoples Republic of China also supported the Pakistani people in
their struggle against aggression and subversion. The Chinese were optimistic that
Pakistan would achieve a victory. The Chinese showed their complete solidarity
with Pakistan by opposing the proposal of the Soviet Union to invite a Bangla
Desh representative to participate in debate of the United Nations and by voting
against the Soviet resolution that called for a ceasefire without withdrawal. The
Soviet resolution of 5 December secured two votes of Poland, and the Soviet resolution with 12 abstentions passed. The Peoples Republic of Chinas representative
Huang Hua voted against the Soviet draft resolution due to reasons such as Indian
direct interference and aggression in Pakistan, an endeavor which was supported by
the Soviet governments provision of large quantities of arms to the Indian expansionists. China saw that the main aim of the Soviet Union was to compete with the
US for world hegemony and that the Soviets assistance of India was in service of
this goal: the control over India, fostered by Indias dependence on the Soviets for
military support, could lead to Soviet dominance of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent
and the Indian Ocean, allowing the USSR to spread its sphere of influence. Due
to these reasons China voted against the Soviet draft resolution. Peking Review
commented, India launched a large scale of war of aggression against Pakistan
on November 21,1971 with an active encouragement and energetic support of the
government of the Soviet Union. They wanted not only to swallow up East Pakistan
but also to destroy Pakistan as a whole. If a timely stop is not put to such aggression
committed by the Indian Government, Pakistan will not be the only country to fall
victim, inevitably other countries neighbouring on India will also be endangered.33
The Chinese Government thus firmly supported the Pakistani Government
and its people in their struggle against aggression, division, and subversion: they
not only were doing this politically, but will continue to give them material assistance. China said that there can be no neutrality on the question of aggression
versus anti aggression, of division versus division, and of subversion versus antisubversion. Certain big powers making no distinction between right and wrong and
remaining inactive and silent have all along allowed the aggressor to grow through
appeasement.34
It is noteworthy that, after the outbreak of the war, Pakistan played the role
of a bridge between China and the United States, fostering cooperation between the
two powers. As a result, in 1971 China visited the United States and vice versa,
resolving previous misunderstandings. Like China, the US also accused India of
aggression35 and Moscow of blocking international action until the capture of East
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worth of arms, remaining Pakistans main arms supplier between 1966 and 1971,
during which the US and European countries had suspended arms trade with the
country.
At the end of the War, China also provided all the weapons and ammunition that Pakistan wanted, and some were supplied for free. The US Defense Department revealed on 4 November that Pakistan received arms via shipments from
China and Romania. Moreover, excluding arms supply, China supported Pakistan
in other ways as well. An Indonesian military spokesman disclosed that China had
sent two hundred instructors to Pakistan to train Pakistani troops in counter-guerrilla warfare.43 China also suggested reestablishing two divisions trained in West
Pakistan to replace those sent to East Pakistan. In the field of naval and air forces,
Pakistan faced difficulties. During the last days of war in East Pakistan, Chinese
rescue ships were assembled in the Ganga Delta for the evacuation of the Pakistani
army in East Pakistan. Whether these ships were stationed in the Ganga Delta for
a possible evacuation was uncertain. The Chinese were ready to help Pakistan, and
press reports reveal Moscows advice that India keep from attacking Chinese ships.
The Chinese armada was in the Bay of Bengal during the War.
China made a friendly gesture when ceasefire occurred in the West and
Pakistani forces surrendered in the East. In spite of this, Bhashani urged Chairman
Mao Tse Tung and Premier Chou En Lai, by means of letters, to recognize Bangla
Desh.
Examining the role that Chinas support played in Pakistani history sets the
events in Pakistan in a historical analytical framework that enables us to look beyond the day-to-day events. China sought to pursue an independent foreign policy
line from both that of the US and the USSR. This was explicitly mentioned by Mao
in a speech in September 1982, but it had been present during the previous decades:
Our general task is to unite the whole people and win the support of all our friends
abroad in the struggle to build a great socialist country, defend world peace and
advance the cause of human progress.44 Chinas foreign policy had been traditionally influenced by The Five Principles (in handling international relations, China
has consistently taken The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the guide
instead of using social system, ideology or the concept of values as the criterion.
These principles were first put forward by the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai)
of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression,
non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence. Theoretically, Chinas solidarity with Pakistan was a result
of the five principles of peaceful coexistence; these principles went directly against
foreign aggression. China reiterated this stance in various speeches and statements
during the time.
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governments pro-Soviet elements and initial economic agreements. Chinas stance
is also linked to its longstanding cordial relations with Pakistan and lack of border
tensions with the country. According to the 1963 agreement, Pakistan yielded some
1,300 square miles of Kashmir to China. Since then, China has linked up the old
Silk Route Highway where it runs from Sinking to Gilgit in close proximity to the
northern region of Ladakh near the ceasefire line. Therefore, Indian occupation of
Pakistan Kashmir would make Chinas position insecure. The threat of Chinese aggression in 1971 prevented India from launching any mass offensive in Azad Kashmir. China also helped Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. But China did not embark
on any divisionary moves because of the threat that the Soviet Union could also become involved. The Soviet Union in fact assured India that it would take action in
Sinkiang in the event of a Chinese international attack. Bhutto responded by rejecting the possibility of Chinese diversionary moves. India, in response, predicted that
China would not intervene on Pakistans behalf. Following this prediction, India
moved her forces from its border with China to East Pakistan. However, protests
from China did not effectively prevent India from violating Chinas border with
Sikkam. The first intrusion of Indian forces into Chinese territory was made on December 10, 1971, and the first protest in response was occurred on December 16th.
The second protest note was lodged on December 27th, just after the second border
violation on December 15th. The suggestion made in the first note to immediately
stop the activities of intrusion into Chinese territory was reiterated in the second
protest note. This time, however, China did not give an ultimatum as it had given
during the War of 1965. Chinas response was lukewarm this time around, the main
reason being that China was not directly involved in the War of 1971 as it had been
in 1965, since article nine of the treaty of Indo-Soviet cooperation made mutual
consultations imperative in the case that any party is attacked or threatened with
attack. As a result, China could not help in Indo Pak war 1971 as China helped in
the Indo-Pak War 1965.
The Twenty Years Defence Pact between India and Russia confirmed that
the Soviet Union would participate in any war on the side of India, India could
not have liberated Bangladesh (without) the treaty of friendship with the Soviet
Union.46 Premier Chou En-Lai on 31 January 1971 admitted that Chinas assistance in the past has remained limited and that China could not do more.47 On
December 14, Pakistan urgently appealed to China and the US for practical aid.
It should be kept in mind that Chinas lack of military involvement in the IndoPakistani War was in line with its previous statements; at no time did China ever
indicate the possibility of involving itself in the conflict. As for Chinas relations
with Taiwan, China did not resort to use of force. Therefore, it seemed inconsistent for China to assist Pakistan against Indian military aggression that had Soviet
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10. Ibid.,
11. Peking Review, December 17, 1971.
12. Ibid.
13. Peking Review, December 24, 1971, p. 9.
14. A talk with Pakistans President Yahya Khan, Newsweek, November 8, 1971,
p. 53.
15. United States Information Service News, Karachi, February 9, 1972, p. 1.
16. Dawn, November 25, 1971, p. 1.
17. Moscow January 1972, p. 10.
18. Major General D. K. Palit, The Lightening Campaign, Thompson press, (India)
ltd., New Delhi, 1972, pp. 162-163.
19. Statement of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China, December
16, 1971,op. cit.
20. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan, The Heart of Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1950), p.11
21. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1957), p. 303
22. M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University press, 1967),
pp. 52, 115.
23. National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, March 15, 1966, p. 496
24. Address to the Parliament of Pakistan, speeches and Statements, December 21,
1973,. p. 251.
25. G. W. Choudhury, The Major Powers and the Indian Subcontinent, Unpublished manuscript, n.d., Chap, 9, pp. 3-4.
26. Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, Second Quarter, 1971, pp. 153-154.
27. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, April 12, 1971.
28. Mr. Chi Peng feis Speech in Beijing Review, Beijing, November 12, 1971, p. 5.
29. Ibid., p. 5.
30. Ibid., p. 5.
31. Peking Review, Peking, December 10, 1971, p. 10.
32. Peking Review, December 31, 1971. p. 4.
33. Peking Review, December 17, 1971.
34. Ibid., 17 December.
35. See the US ambassador, Mr. George Bushs speeches on 5 and 7 December in
the Security Council in Dawn, Karachi, December 7,1971.
36. Nixons Foreign Policy Report, USIS News Text in Dawn Karachi, February 9,
1971, p.11.
37. Ibid., p.14.
38. Ibid., p. 14.
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