9.16.2016 Feds Motion To Dismiss
9.16.2016 Feds Motion To Dismiss
BENJAMIN C. MIZER
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
CARLOTTA P. WELLS
Assistant Branch Director
ARJUN GARG (DC Bar No. 975335)
Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530
Tel: (202) 305-8613
Fax: (202) 616-8470
Email: [email protected]
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No. 15-CV-02654-PHX-DLR
MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS SECOND CLAIM;
TO DISMISS IMPROPER
DEFENDANTS; TO DISMISS
REQUEST FOR IMPROPER
RELIEF; AND TO TRANSFER
VENUE
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
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Plaintiff brings two claims, against five defendants, requesting multiple items of
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and Stephanie Jones, Acting Director of DOTs Departmental Office of Civil Rights,
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Plaintiffs second claim under constitutional equal protection, to dismiss all but Secretary
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Foxx from the case as improper defendants, and to dismiss a request for relief that conflicts
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with a federal statute. Defendants further seek transfer of this action to the U.S. District
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Court for the District of Columbia. This motion is supported by the accompanying
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs lawsuit concerns changes the FAA made to its process for hiring air
traffic control specialists that, according to Plaintiff, unlawfully discriminated against him
and a putative class he seeks to represent. Historically, the FAA has hired candidates to
become air traffic controllers from various categories of applicants, including among
others: (1) veterans with air traffic control experience attained during military service, (2)
graduates of programs accredited under the FAAs Collegiate Training Initiative (CTI)
program, and (3) members of the general public who may have no prior training or
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experience in air traffic control. See Second Am. Compl. [Dkt. No. 26] 32-33, 35.1
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In advance of an air traffic controller hiring round in 2014, the FAA advised that,
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rather than using separate hiring processes predicated on distinguishing among categories
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of applicants, a single vacancy announcement will be used for all applicant sources and
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[a]ll applicants will be evaluated against the same set of qualification standards. Second
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Am. Compl., Exh. 2 at 3 [Dkt. No. 26-2]. In addition to instituting uniform qualification
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standards, the FAA advised it was implementing a revised testing process that applicants
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must pass in order to be further considered for selection. Id. Previously, certain applicants
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were required to pass the FAAs AT-SAT test in order to be eligible for hiring as a trainee
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controller. See Second Am. Compl. 26, 29. Under the 2014 vacancy announcement, all
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be eligible then to take the cognitive portion of the AT-SAT exam. Second Am. Compl.,
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Exh. 2 at 3. The FAA advised that, based on the uniform qualification standards and
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uniform testing process, a single nationwide referral list will be generated containing all
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candidates who meet the qualification standards and pass the assessments, from which
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For purposes of this motion to dismiss, Defendants accept as true all of Plaintiffs
well-pled factual allegations.
Plaintiff, who concedes that the FAAs actions were perhaps laudable, Second
Am. Compl. 106, nevertheless claims he suffered unlawful discrimination due to the
FAAs standardization of its process for hiring air traffic control specialists. Plaintiff
asserts that, prior to the FAAs 2014 vacancy announcement, he had graduated from a CTI
program and had passed the AT-SAT test. See id. 76-77. He further contends that, prior
to the 2014 vacancy announcement, the FAA had accorded a hiring preference to CTI
graduates who had passed the AT-SAT test. See id. 31. Plaintiffs application under the
2014 vacancy announcement, however, was unsuccessful. See id. 80, 82. Plaintiff now
alleges that, via the 2014 vacancy announcement, the FAA impermissibly adopted a new
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hiring practice for Air Traffic Controllers with the intent and purpose of increasing the
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racial diversity of Air Traffic Controller applicants. See id. 98, 105. On a theory of
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reverse discrimination, Plaintiff brings claims for relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights
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Act of 1964, see id. 9-13, 97-103, and under the Equal Protection Component of the
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see id. 14-20, 104-114. On behalf of a
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putative class, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the FAA acted unlawfully, an injunction
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directing the FAA to give hiring preference to him and the putative class, and damages.
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As Plaintiff recognizes, a statute enacted in July 2016 binds the FAA to various
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requirements in structuring the process for future hiring of air traffic control specialists.
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See id. 67-73. In section 2106 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016
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(Pub. L. No. 114-190), codified at 49 U.S.C. 44506(f), Congress specified that the FAA
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serving at an FAA air traffic control facility (as in a prior employment stint), a Department
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After giving preferential consideration to [that group of] applicants, the FAA shall
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individuals for appointment among two applicant pools consisting of (i) eligible CTI
graduates and military veterans, and (ii) members of the general public who apply under
the FAA from using a biographical assessment when hiring experienced controllers, CTI
graduates, and military veterans. See 49 U.S.C. 44506(f)(2)(A). Also, to the extent an
experienced controller, CTI graduate, or military veteran was disqualified under the
FAAs 2014 hiring round as the result of a biographical assessment, the FAA is directed
to provide the applicant an opportunity to reapply for the position as soon as practicable
under the revised hiring practices and, subject to conditions, shall waive any maximum
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49 U.S.C.
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A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Cook v. Brewer,
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637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). When analyzing a complaint
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for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken
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as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. JDA Software
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Inc. v. Berumen, 2015 WL 8003210, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2015). Legal conclusions
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couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and therefore are
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insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See id. (citation
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omitted). Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection claim because Title VII is an exclusive
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remedy that preempts this alternative theory of relief. See infra Part I. Because all that
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remains is Plaintiffs Title VII claim, all defendants other than Secretary Foxx are improper
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and should be dismissed from the case. See infra Part II. The Court also should dismiss,
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or in the alternative strike pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), Plaintiffs
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improper request for an order requiring the FAA to give Plaintiff and the putative class
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hiring preferencerelief that would contravene the statute that now governs hiring
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preference for air traffic controllers. See infra Part III. Finally, the remainder of this action
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should be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See infra Part
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IV.
I.
It is black-letter law that 42 U.S.C. 2000e16, 717 of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which extends Title VII protection to federal employees, is the exclusive judicial
remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment. Smith v. Lujan, 780 F. Supp.
1275, 1279 (D. Ariz. 1991) (quoting Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835
(1976)). Following the Supreme Courts guidance in Brown, [t]he Ninth Circuit has found
that Title VII (or 717) is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims, whether based upon a
statute or the Constitution, whose factual predicate is the discrimination involved in the
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Directly pertinent here, courts in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere do not permit Title
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VII plaintiffs suing a federal employer to maintain tag-along claims asserted on the basis
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of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dept of Navy, 66
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F.3d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1995) (In the alternative to his Title VII claim, Brazil asserts a
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direct constitutional challengea Bivens claimto the Navys action; he claims that the
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Navys decision to revoke his clearance denied him equal protection as guaranteed by the
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Fifth Amendment. Bivens-type actions, however, are unavailable where the claim involves
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Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding, where federal
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employee sued under Title VII, that district court was correct to reject plaintiffs
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assertion that he is also entitled to assert a claim directly under constitutional equal
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protection principles based on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); Carter v.
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ONeill, 78 F. Appx 978, 979 (5th Cir. 2003) (The court properly dismissed Carters Fifth
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Amendment claim because Title VII is the exclusive vehicle available to federal employees
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claiming employment discrimination.); Belhomme v. Widnall, 127 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th
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Cir. 1997) (Title VII preempts any constitutional cause of action that a court might find
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under the First or Fifth Amendments for discrimination in federal employment.); Owens
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v. United States, 822 F.2d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 1987) (Interpretation of Title VII has shown
that Title VII provides federal employees a remedy that precludes actions against federal
officials for alleged constitutional violations as well as actions under other federal
legislation.) (quotation omitted); Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
([A] federal employee who is covered by section 717 may not sue under . . . the Fifth
Amendment.).
These authorities dictate that Plaintiffs second claim, based on equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment, must be dismissed as a matter of law. Plaintiff alleges
air traffic controller. See Second Am. Compl. 98-101. For such an alleged harm,
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Plaintiff may only seek relief under his first claim invoking Title VII, which provides the
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discrimination. Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2001).
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II.
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If the Court dismisses Plaintiffs second claim, Plaintiffs only remaining claim will
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be for an alleged violation of Title VII. Under that statute, in a civil action alleging
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unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant. Vinieratos v. U.S. Dept of Air Force, 939
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F.2d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)). Courts thus hold that
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when a federal employee alleges employment discrimination, the only proper defendant
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is the head of the agency which employs them. Ardalan v. McHugh, 2013 WL 6212710,
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at *20 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (quotation and alteration omitted).
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Accordingly, with only a Title VII claim remaining, the Court should dismiss from
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Michael Huerta, and Stephanie Jones as improper defendants. See, e.g., Graves v. Clinton,
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2011 WL 5024500, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011) (ruling that Title VII claim should be
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Steinberg is not the head of the Department of State and is thus not a proper defendant in
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this action.).
III.
[A] fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence is that equity follows the law.
In re Shoreline Concrete Co., 831 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hedges v. Dixon
County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)). That maxim means that a court in equity may not do
that which the law forbids. Estate of Strickland v. Strickland, 2013 WL 673513, at *4 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 25, 2013) (quoting Petersen v. E.F. Johnson Co., 366 F.3d 676, 680 (8th Cir.
considerations must yield to explicit, controlling statutory provisions. Paul Revere Life
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Ins. Co. v. Brock, 28 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff nevertheless asks this Court
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to impose equitable relief that would unwind a statute that Plaintiff does not challenge.
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A goal of Plaintiffs suit is to restore a hiring preference that he alleges used to exist
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for CTI graduates. According to Plaintiff, [p]rior to 2014 . . . graduates from CTI
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programs that passed the validated AT-SAT assessment entered a direct hire pool of
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applicants, were placed on a Qualified Applicant Register List, and were given hiring
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preference for [air traffic control specialist] positions. Second Am. Compl. 31. Plaintiff
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alleges that on or around December 30, 2013, the FAA eliminated the CTI Applicant
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Register, which resulted in Plaintiff Brigida, and other putative Class Members, losing their
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relief in this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks an order directing the FAA to reinstate the purged
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Qualified Applicant Register and give hiring preference to Plaintiff Brigida and other
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Plaintiffs request to restore the alleged hiring preference that previously existed
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cannot be squared with Congresss recently-enacted law that sets out the hiring preferences
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that the FAA must apply in hiring air traffic controllers. See FAA Extension, Safety, and
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Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-190, 2106, 130 Stat. 615, 620 (July 15, 2016)
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68, that statute requires the FAA to give hiring preference first and foremost to experienced
controllers.
consideration to [that group of] applicants is the FAA permitted to consider additional
applicants for the position of air traffic controller. 49 U.S.C. 44506(f)(1)(B)(i). Even
at that point, the FAA is restricted from giving hiring preference solely to CTI graduates,
because the statute requires the FAA to hire approximately equally from two pools
consisting respectively of (i) eligible CTI graduates and military veterans, and (ii) the
general public. See 49 U.S.C. 44506(f)(1)(B). As Plaintiff recognizes, because the FAA
is . . . required to hire equally from these two applicant pools, the statutes revised
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hiring practices restricts [sic] the number of CTI graduates that can be appointed to [air
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traffic controller] positions. See Second Am. Compl. 69, 73. In sum, the hiring
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preference that Plaintiff contends the FAA should have applied is now superseded by
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statute.
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enacted law prescribing how the FAA is to accord hiring preference among various classes
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of applicants. Nevertheless, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant equitable relief ordering the
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FAA to give hiring preference to him and the putative class that differs from what the
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statute provides. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, however, [c]ourts of equity
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can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than can
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courts of law. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015)
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(quotation omitted); see also In re Shoreline, 831 F.2d at 905 (Courts of equity are bound
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to follow express statutory commands to the same extent as are courts of law.). In framing
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equitable relief, [c]ourts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem
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its effects susceptible of improvement. Id. (quoting Badaracco v. Commr, 464 U.S. 386,
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398 (1984)). Rather, [a]n equitable doctrine must of necessity comport to and remain
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compatible with the prevailing legislative intent. Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver
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Drescher, 761 F.2d 855, 863 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Fulghum Constr. Corp., 706
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graduates whose applications the FAA rejected in the 2014 hiring round on the basis of the
acted affirmatively to (1) bar the FAA from using any biographical assessment in future
hiring of CTI graduates, see 49 U.S.C. 44506(f)(2)(A), and (2) direct the FAA to provide
the 2014 hiring round to reapply, with relaxed age restrictions, see 49 U.S.C.
44506(f)(2)(B). Congress specified that such opportunity to reapply would be under the
revised hiring practices set forth in the statute. 49 U.S.C. 44506(f)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis
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added). Those revised hiring practices do not encompass the hiring preference that
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Plaintiff asks this Court to impose as equitable relief. Plaintiffs requested equitable relief
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is therefore unavailable because a district courts remedial powers are necessarily limited
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by a clear and valid legislative command counseling against the contemplated judicial
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action. LaShawn A. by Moore v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quotation
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omitted).
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Equity follows the law and when the law determines the rights of the respective
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parties, a court of equity is without power to decree relief which the law denies. Charles
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Schwab & Co. v. Bank of Am., 2011 WL 1753805, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011).
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Plaintiffs claim for equitable relief ordering the FAA to give a different hiring preference
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to Plaintiff and the putative class. Dismissing this request, or in the alternative striking it
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), at the outset of litigation will
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significantly narrow the dispute by clarifying that it does not implicate any prospective
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IV.
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Plaintiff has the burden of proving that venue is proper in the district in which the
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suit was initiated. Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Bar & Grill, 596 F. Supp. 2d
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1282, 1286 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quotation omitted). Here, venue is improper in this district
under Title VII (which is the only cause of action that should survive Defendants motion
to dismiss) and would alternatively be proper in the District of Columbia. Even if venue
were proper in this district, in the interest of justice the remainder of this action should be
transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for the convenience of
A.
Venue for a Title VII claim is proper in any judicial district in the State in which
the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district
in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and
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administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked
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but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3).2 As part
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interpretation. Phillips v. Rubin, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082 (D. Nev. 1999). None of
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these prongs authorizes venue in the District of Arizona over Plaintiffs Title VII claim.
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First, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Arizona is where he would have worked
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but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3). Plaintiff
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does not and cannot allege that, even if he had been hired as a trainee air traffic controller,
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his place of employment would have been Arizona. To the contrary, the FAA places
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trainees at air traffic control facilities nationwide, and Mr. Brigida could not have dictated
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assignment in Arizona. See Cannon Decl. 8. It is therefore not possible for the Court
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to conclude that, but for the alleged unlawful employment practices, Plaintiff would work
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(S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2011). Accordingly, this prong does not support venue in Arizona.
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The Title VII venue statute further provides that if the respondent is not found
within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which
the respondent has his principal office. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3). This provision is
inapplicable here.
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Second, Arizona is not where the employment records relevant to such practice are
FAAs alleged single decision to purge the Qualified Applicant Register and adopt a new
hiring practice for Air Traffic Controllers, Second Am. Compl. 90, are primarily located,
and would primarily be collected, in Washington, D.C., where the FAA is headquartered.
See Cannon Decl. 12-13. Records of the FAAs work in this respect are not maintained
and administered in Arizona, and records relating to FAAs decisions regarding hiring
policies and procedures generally are not maintained and administered in Arizona. See id.
12-13, 15. This prong therefore does not support venue in Arizona.
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Third, Arizona is not where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have
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been committed. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3). The decision to adopt a new hiring practice
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for Air Traffic Controllers, Second Am. Compl. 90, was made in Washington, D.C. See
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Cannon Decl. 12-13, 15. Defendants recognize that the Ninth Circuit has, under certain
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circumstances, construed this prong of Title VIIs venue provision to mean that venue is
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proper in both the forum where the employment decision is made and the forum in which
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that decision is implemented or its effects are felt. Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson
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Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000). However, Passantino stands in
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tension with this Courts reasoning that [m]erely being the situs of plaintiffs injury is
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impact of the injury will almost always be there. Mach 1 Air Servs. Inc. v. Bustillos, 2013
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WL 1222567, at *10 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2013) (interpreting venue under 28 U.S.C.
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employeeemphasizes that venue should be found . . . where the plaintiff works, 212
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F.3d at 505; in the failure-to-hire context of this case, by contrast, Plaintiff was never
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Defendants employee and does not allege that Arizona is where he works or would have
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worked. Cf. Berry v. Potter, 2006 WL 335841, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2006) (observing
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that Ninth Circuits Passantino holding applies in failure-to-promote cases under Title
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VII). In view of those distinguishable facts, Passantino fails to support [an] argument
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that venue for [Plaintiffs] claim is proper in this district, where Plaintiff live[d] at one
Rather than proceeding in the District of Arizona, venue would be proper under
Title VII in the District of Columbiawhere the unlawful employment practice is alleged
to have been committed and where employment records relevant to such practice are
maintained and administered. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3). The Court may transfer this
case to the District of Columbia federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a).3
B.
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
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court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
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brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented. 28 U.S.C.
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1404(a). This venue transfer statute has two requirements on its face: (1) that the district
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to which defendant seeks to have the action transferred is one in which the action might
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have been brought, and (2) that the transfer be for the convenience of parties and
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witnesses, and in the interest of justice. Koval v. United States, 2013 WL 6385595, at *1
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(D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2013) (alterations omitted). The first requirement is met here, because
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Defendants seek transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, where this
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case properly might have been brought under Title VIIs venue provision, as explained
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above. As to the second requirement, the district court has discretion under 1404(a) to
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of convenience and fairness. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir.
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2000) (quotation omitted). In addition to considering the convenience to the parties and
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(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed;
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(2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law;
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28 U.S.C. 1406(a) states: The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.
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(5) the contacts relating to the plaintiffs cause of action in the chosen forum;
Koval, 2013 WL 6385595, at *2 (citing Jones, 211 F.3d at 49899). Here, these factors
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Convenience of the Parties: This factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer to the
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District of Columbia. Plaintiff himself resides not in Arizona, but rather in Arlington,
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Virginia. See Second Am. Compl. 3. The Court may take judicial notice that Arlington,
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Virginia is situated on the south bank of the Potomac River directly across from and in
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close proximity to Washington, D.C. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1008
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n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). As for Defendants, the principal duty station of Secretary Foxx,
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Administrator Huerta, and Acting Director Jones is Washington, D.C., which is where the
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FAA and U.S. Department of Transportation are headquartered. See Cannon Decl. 2-3.
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expressly identified in the complaint work in or around Washington, D.C. See Cannon
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Decl. 4-6; see also Second Am. Compl. 42 (naming Terry Craft), 47-50 (naming
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Joseph Teixeira), 61-62 (naming Carrolyn Bostick). As to other FAA officials who might
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become witnesses in this suit, there is ample reason to expect that they would be located
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primarily in Washington, D.C. or perhaps in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, but not in Arizona.
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Location Where Relevant Agreements Were Negotiated and Executed: This factor
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weighs in favor of the District of Columbia. The challenged decision to revise the hiring
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process for air traffic controllers was made in Washington, D.C. See Cannon Decl. 15.
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The decision to use a single vacancy announcement to fill entry-level air traffic control
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specialist positions was made in Washington, D.C. See id. The decision to close all air
traffic control specialist applicant inventories was made in Washington, D.C. See id. No
decisions related to the air traffic control specialist hiring process changes were made in
Arizona. See id. Meetings that preceded those decisions took place in Washington, D.C.
State Most Familiar with Governing Law: This factor does not weigh in either
direction, as this case is governed by federal law with which federal courts in both the
Plaintiffs Choice of Forum: This factor does not weigh against transfer, because
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Plaintiffs suit is on behalf of a putative nationwide class and is not brought in his home
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forum. See Park v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal.
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2013). Plaintiffs are entitled to some deference to their choice of forum, but that deference
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is relatively minimal in class action suits. Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2009 WL
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1936790, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 2, 2009) (citing Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.
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1987)); see also Mann v. Liberty League Intl, LLC, 2010 WL 94114, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan.
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6, 2010) (observing that although great weight is generally accorded plaintiffs choice of
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forum, the . . . Plaintiffs choice of Arizona is given less weight because the named
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plaintiffs have brought a class action, rather than an individual lawsuit) (quotations and
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alteration omitted). Moreover, the degree to which courts defer to the plaintiffs chosen
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venue is substantially reduced when the plaintiffs choice is not its residence. Koval, 2013
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WL 6385595, at *3 (quotation omitted); cf. Texmo Oil Co. Jobbers Inc. v. Y Travel LLC,
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2014 WL 2617248, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 12, 2014) (A plaintiffs choice of forum is to be
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given substantial deference where the plaintiff has chosen his home forum.) (emphasis
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added). This factor thus does not weigh against transfer in light of Plaintiff bringing a class
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action suit in a state where he does not reside, and this conclusion is significant because
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to upset the plaintiffs choice of forum also decreases. Koval, 2013 WL 6385595, at *4
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Respective Parties Contacts with the Forum: This factor does not significantly
influence the analysis in class action cases. Gomez, 2009 WL 1936790, at *5. To the
extent this factor applies here, it does not weigh meaningfully against transfer because
D.C.
Contacts Relating to Plaintiffs Cause of Action in Chosen Forum: This factor does
not weigh in either direction because although Plaintiff alleges he resided in Arizona when
the FAA revised its hiring process, the pertinent decisions were not made in Arizona;
rather, the District of Columbia was the primary locus of the decisions about which Plaintiff
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complains. See Cannon Decl. 11-13, 15. Moreover, the impact of the complained-of
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suggest that Arizona was impacted relatively minimally in comparison to the rest of the
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country; Plaintiff alleges that the putative class contains approximately 2,000 to 3,500
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individuals, yet his own assertion is that [a]pproximately 34 potential class members
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graduated from CTI Institutions in Arizona and/or reside in Arizona, Second Am. Compl.
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89, 93meaning that, per Plaintiffs accounting, only 1% to 1.7% of the putative class
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of Proof: These factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer. Generally, litigation costs are
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reduced when venue is located near most of the witnesses expected to testify or give
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depositions and when the action is pursued near the location of documents likely to be
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at issue in the case. Gomez, 2009 WL 1936790, at *3 (quotation omitted). Because both
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Plaintiff and Defendants reside in or around the District of Columbia, as do many or all of
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the likely witnesses, holding proceedings in that location can be expected to reduce travel
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costs during litigation. Counsel for Defendants also works in Washington, D.C., whereas
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lead counsel for Plaintiffs are in Colorado and would be required to undertake long-
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relevant records would primarily be located and collected in Washington, D.C., where the
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FAA is headquartered. See Cannon Decl. 12-13. Such records of the FAAs decision
are not maintained and administered in Arizona. See id. Plaintiff is the only Arizona
connection to this putative nationwide class action (and he does not even live there
anymore), whereas [i]t is [the District of Columbia] that appears to be the center of
discovery in this case, and thus pursuing this action in [the District of Columbia] will ease
access to sources of proof, lessen the relative financial burdens of litigation, and reduce the
where non-party witnesses will fall under the courts subpoena power. Chodock v. Am.
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Econ. Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2994451, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2005). At least two of the FAA
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officials expressly identified in the complaint no longer work for Defendants, but continue
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to be found in the Washington, D.C. area. See Cannon Decl. 4-5. To the extent that
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these and other potential witnesses are no longer Defendants employees, venue in the
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testimony. Venue in Arizona, by contrast, would put those individuals beyond the reach
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In sum, with several factors weighing strongly in favor of transfer and none
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weighing significantly against it, the interest of justice supports transfer to the District of
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CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court (i) dismiss
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Plaintiffs second claim, (ii) dismiss all defendants other than Secretary Foxx, (iii) dismiss
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Plaintiffs request for equitable relief giving hiring preference to Plaintiff and the putative
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class, and (iv) transfer the remainder of this case to the U.S. District Court for the District
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of Columbia.
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//
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//
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Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN C. MIZER
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
CARLOTTA P. WELLS
Assistant Branch Director
/s/ Arjun Garg
ARJUN GARG (DC Bar No. 975335)
Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530
Tel: (202) 305-8613
Fax: (202) 616-8470
Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on September 16, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing
document using the Courts CM/ECF System, which will send notice of this filing to all
counsel of record.
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