Professional Documents
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STATCON Case Digests
STATCON Case Digests
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ROUND 1
2
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3
Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.
14
FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Re
spondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no jurisdictio
n to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-filing ther
eof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years o
lds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 6
03 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as thos
e over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the
regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of
the case. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code and defines a youth offender as one who is over 9 years of age but under 21
at the time of the commission of the offense did not by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years
of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35
FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was ch
arged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overta
king a truck. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and
prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent fro
m enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by t
he Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is s
aid to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act
No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportatio
n Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails o
ver an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that i
t must not contravene the statute for it is fundamental principle that municipal o
rdinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN
MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49
16 Taada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote N
o.159
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Gutierrez v. Carpio
Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)
FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of
a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as r
equired by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISS
UE: W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the n
ecessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the dat
e of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot
in any event be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable. Without su
ch notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the max
im ignorantia Legis non excusat. The court, therefore, declares that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no for
ce and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published i
n the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a
FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing th
at if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a
certain land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintif
fs duly tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 1
3, 1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed perio
d had already elapsed. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of t
endering. HELD: No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated pe
riod. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties,
and on the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had
been modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which month now
means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed
period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or c
ontract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time i
s reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherw
ise provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM
: 2a, 39a
17 Guzman v. Lichauco
Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)
FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of
certain properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff
. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to t
he Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provi
sions of Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to
avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Pla
intiff, or to deposit in court, on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month,
the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such di
latory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth
day of the month. As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the jud
gments. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N th
e payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.
FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting a
side the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal
on February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the the
reof their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendants bond be fo
rfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the
amount thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defend
ant. By various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, a
nd finally occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 1
0, 1912, the principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application
of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sh
eriff to annul the sale. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date dire
cted by the court. HELD: Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: unless o
therwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to
be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if
the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded. This section is on
ly applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. However, in this case
, there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the
act be performed. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named
future date. The sale here of the property must stand. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
HELD: The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term month must no
w be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administra
tive Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes th
e length of a month at thirty days. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c
18 PNB v. CA
Case No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19
FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudici
ally foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction
sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Prope
rty in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third part
y. The notices of sale of Appellants foreclosed properties were published on Marc
h 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record. The date
March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Frid
ay and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notic
e of auction sale shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive w
eeks. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly pub
lication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. HELD: It must be c
onceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what i
s week. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term week was interpreted to mean as a period
of time consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed
to comply with the legal requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b
FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to red
eem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was prev
iously given to them by the vendor of the latters intention to sell the property
and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Ag
ricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agraria
n Court dismissed petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec
. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, c
laiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of
the code that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobo
dy else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to exten
d the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation, the sec
tion would have expressly said so. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption grante
d by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not sha
re tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and pre
mises, reducing agricultural lessee to only leasehold tenants. The purpose of the Ag
ricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The
policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the lette
r would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the p
lain and vital purpose of the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 4
0a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43
19 U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote
No.22
FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddi
g (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909)
that they owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the A
ppellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property o
f the assessed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said statutes true test of property
qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the as
sessed value thereof.
FACTS: Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required refe
rendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliat
ion with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no sta
tutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that
Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a statut
e authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of the
Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction.
Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive de
partments original and exclusive authority to act. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a
HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of th
e immediate context of provisions of the statute defining property qualifications
of a voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualificatio
n is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualific
ations are under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two
in the mind of the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies peopl
e who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898
, from voting. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the pay
ment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an ele
ction law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. If the property quali
fication is actual/market value, it would be highly improbable to enforce the st
atute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. LATIN
MAXIM: 10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37
20 Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote
No.25
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.
27
FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931,
Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved.
A few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided
by Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shor
tly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the
place of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office. ISSUE: W/N und
er the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended
by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to
the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65.
HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected
by said amendment (Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a
FACTS: On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuel
a against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of
land in said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was
covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect
tenants from unjust eviction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesu
s in upholding her rights as a lessee. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Je
sus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD
1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landown
ers from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as unjust eviction. LATIN
MAXIM: 12a, 25a
21 Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.
29
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote N
o.33
FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency Pow
ers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Conventio
n of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders a
re valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the
Congress to function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said pr
oclamations were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a
FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be cons
idered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a d
iminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitu
tion states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the l
egality of RA 590. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that the
taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is
a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a task mus
t be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salar
y not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his indepen
dence of judicial thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a
27 Manikad v. Tanodbayan
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No
.65
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote
No.74
FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) P
olice Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of A
ntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that
the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon t
he EPZA and is not in the Respondents jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A stat
es: The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export process
ing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by th
e Authority ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from inve
stigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of sole
in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is the
only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may in
vestigate complaints, especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the ch
arges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibong
a and investigated by a police committee composed of 3 councilors created by Resol
ution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with an a
dverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was appe
aled to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Servi
ce Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chie
f of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police of
ficers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof.
Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senaril
los. RA No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a commi
ttee council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in
by the rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Counc
il was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the actio
n of the police committee. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the
subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil s
ervice authorities could not validate the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a
29 Co v. CA
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.
91
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento
Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)
FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check d
rawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely
-stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A criminal complaint for v
iolation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Pe
titioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a rubber or bou
ncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offe
nse, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISS
UE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them, Que v. Peo
ple should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity pri
nciple of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que
should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similar
ly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 2a, 46a
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the C
ity of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail
dealers for purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of th
e City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the
alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flou
r to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of r
esale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be ma
nufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeri
es to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence
of any express provision of law on the matter, should be treated as a sale at re
tail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 2
4a, 37, 43
31 Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote N
o.20
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76, Foot
note No.16
FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lo
ts. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondeve
lopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Rel
evo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulme
nt of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commiss
ion ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents
purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (inclu
ding interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that t
he Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given re
troactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of th
e amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of di
scretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Re
spondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D.
957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed
prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroact
ivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable in
tent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defend
ant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree N
o. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which con
stitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential el
ement of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accu
sed of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion o
f, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organize
d lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No.
9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities an
d that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public pol
icy. ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpret
ation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spi
rit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the pro
blem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire
into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in
the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify
the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. LATIN MAX
IM: 9a, b2
34 US. v. Hart
Case No. 159 G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In re: Estate of Johnson
Case No. 131 G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918) Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote N
o.38
FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No.
519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or g
ambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible mean
s of support. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by
the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying throug
h the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the o
ther Defendants had visible means of support, it was under the first part of the p
ortion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that t
he phrase without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of
the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How
should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should
be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuat
ion gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legisl
ative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning
of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuatio
ns alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctua
tion when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disr
egarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when n
ecessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, visible means of support and that the absence
of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons
and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 11e, 33
FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Pr
ocedure states Will made here by an alienwill made within the Philippine Islands b
y a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accorda
nce with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, an
d which might be proved, allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same e
ffect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. The will of Johnson
was probated and allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 6
36 is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is d
irected to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will ma
de here by an alien and to further fact that the word state in the body of the sec
tion is not capitalized. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S
and therefore an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. HELD: The fact that the words st
ate and country are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is exclude
d from the phrase another state or country. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punc
tuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language o
f a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the writte
n words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothing more than a conven
ient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting
the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner, being a US ci
tizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probated. LATIN MAXI
M: 24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48
41 US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.
95
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Basiana v. Luna
Case no. 31 G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981) Chapter III, Page 95, Footn
ote No.102
FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesi
nato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged befor
e he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witnes
s for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand, De
fendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that
implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fea
r of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Re
spondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless
, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. IS
SUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional
. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the
agreement with the State. However, looking at the legislative history of the st
atute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the
bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to fait
hfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell t
he truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his f
ormal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acq
uittal since it was made prior to his trial. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 22a, b2
FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospec
t with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected
183 claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disre
gard of their agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the decla
ration of location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of
clearing claim names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent
. Consequently, Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of
claims overlapping Petitioners claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were va
lid, and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE: W/N Pe
titioners mining claims are valid. HELD: Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. N
o. 137) provides: For the purpose of this section, a permanent and prominent obje
ct used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads; a junction of know
n rivers or creeks, a known public or private structure; a corner of approved pu
blic, private or mineral land survey; a kilometer post of public road; or locati
on monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau
of Mines, Army Corps of engineers, Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other
government agencies. An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Peti
tioners contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since
it goes against the legislators intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping
claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 30a, 33, 36b
42 Baga v. PNB
Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote
No.103
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110
FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian
under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the
intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a guardian
ship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner allege
s that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New Civi
l Code thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE: W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code
shall prevail over RA 390. HELD: No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the
clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. Insert
ing provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. RA 390
is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the gener
al law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 applies notwithstanding any other
provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50, b2
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) fo
r issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn again
st a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the sa
id law. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the cas
e in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The deter
minative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check
. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court a
cquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the f
iling of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action.
With regard to Petitioners allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it
will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the cas
e. Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably s
how that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency
may be the subject thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2
48 Ossorio v. Posadas
Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix
Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-6884 (March 21, 1956)
FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collect
or of Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to
the complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have col
lected by way of income tax. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintif
fs wife constitutes her separate estate within the scope and meaning of this phrase
for the purposes of the additional income tax. HELD: Yes. It is ordered that th
e Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax, one agai
nst the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property, r
eturning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice to his levyi
ng against and collecting from said Plaintiffs wife upon her own separate individ
ual declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income tax for the incom
e from her paraphernal property. LATIN MAXIM: b2
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner ag
ainst Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of
P1,125 and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two notes constit
ute two separate causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Cour
t likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for
collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action, on the grou
nd that the amount of two notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a singl
e cause of action, was in excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal C
ourt of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellants complaint.
HELD: No. The jurisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in e
ach single case of action contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of t
he demand in all the causes of action. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Case No. 8 G.R. No. 33637 (December 31, 1931)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pando v. Kette and Sellner
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930)
FACTS: Petitioners warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out wit
h Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has
appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. IS
SUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void b
ecause it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. HELD: Yes. A rider
attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of
insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act
as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which s
tates, The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty ma
y be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to
in the policy as forming a part thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, b2
FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on Ja
nuary 30, 1929, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public
places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal buildi
ng of Pasay. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publica
tion, and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutiv
e weeks, more particularly on the 2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the s
ale took place on February 19, 1929. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale i
n 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive we
eks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in qu
estion. HELD: Yes. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adop
ted from Sec. 692 of the California Code, the requirements of the law regarding
the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with. LATIN
MAXIM: b2
50 Reyes v. Wells
Case No. 135 G.R. No. 30587 (December 4, 1929)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Phil. Educ. Co. v. Soriano
Case No. 235 G.R. No. L-22405 (June 30, 1971) Chapter III, Page 107, Footnote No
.156
FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping ma
chine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23,000. However, Plaintiff G
uerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machin
e. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would
need. Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of th
e mortgage. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on
June 29, 1922, the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said
amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero, or to any of hi
s co-Plaintiffs. Due to the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said
amount of P12,000, the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of
the instalments due. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not
been paid, are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of t
he testimony of Guerrero. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory
notes in question. These are also in line with Sec. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. T
he prohibition contained in said law against a witness testifying upon any transa
ction or communication between himself and a deceased person, is substantially t
he same as that contained in Sec. 383(7) of our Code of Civil Procedure, as amen
ded by Act No. 2252. Therefore, we believe that the construction placed upon it
by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar. LATIN MAXIM: 1
, b2
FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. He man
aged to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Palomar received one
money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the
Bank of America. Respondent, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Po
st Office notified the Bank of irregularity, and deducted from the banks clearing
account the said amount, in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioners
account with the same amount. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but
was denied. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instr
ument. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in th
e US. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construct
ion of USs own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying d
eparture from the policy or practice. US held that postal money orders are not n
egotiable instruments. LATIN MAXIM: 2b, 9a, b2
51 Cruz v. Pahati
Case No. 28 G.R. No. L-8257 (April 13, 1956)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Republic v. Workmens Compensation Commission
Case No. 132 G.R. No. L-29019 (May 18, 1972)
FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan, for P4,900 which he paid in
check. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundme
nt and as a result, he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendere
d the check for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorney s fees. Bula
han claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledg
e of any defect in the title. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter th
at enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. The court rendered judgmen
t declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered
the Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to
pay him the sum of P4,900, with legal interest from the date of the decision. T
he claim for damages and attorney s fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo
was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay
the sum of P5,000 as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for
lack of evidence. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. HELD:
Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover t
he said car. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of
the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6,000.00 plus attorneys fee of P600
.00 under the WCC, without deducting the P3,000.00 as death benefit which they h
ad been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610. ISSUE: W/N the be
neficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA
610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. HELD: The resolut
ion of the WCC is modified; the P3,000.00 received under RA 610 should be deduct
ed from the full grant received under the WCC. It is difficult to construe that
the legislature intended to double the compensations received, considering that
at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not ha
ve conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. Furthermore, Sec. 9
of RA 610 and Sec. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. It was also contended
that the phrase or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employ
ees, generally, of the national, provincial or municipal government in Sec. 9 is
highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compe
nsation benefits under other laws. LATIN MAXIM: 17, 19b, 29, 38b, 39, 40b
54 Orencia v. Enrile
Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-28997 (February 22, 1974)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernandez
Case No. 107 G.R. Nos. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)
FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks
of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has been performi
ng functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and rec
ognized as such until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Di
visions, among others, was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant
chief of the nine other divisions of the Land Registration Commission were so re
cognized and extended increased compensation. Respondents filed their answer, an
d after usual admissions and denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is un
qualified for the position of Assistant Chief, and being a new position created
under RA 4040, the same can only be filed by a qualified person; that Respondent
, being a lawyer, is more qualified than Petitioner, who is only a high school g
raduate with second grade civil service eligibility, and praying that the petiti
on be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy cle
rk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission.
HELD: For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Since there was a
new legal provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approac
h of counsel for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the p
rinciple that a public office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneo
us construction, one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate,
is entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on Octo
ber 16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for lan
d taxes to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, t
he municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. Th
e Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of E
xecutive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September,
1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violat
ing Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived t
he right to suffrage and public office. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to r
efrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. HELD: No. S
ec. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected with
out possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by
law. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assumi
ng a public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes, th
is does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these circumstances, we
should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. Rafferty: long
continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not conclusive, shou
ld be followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it was not. LATIN MAX
IM: 2a, 32, 42b
58 Salaria v. Buenviaje
Case No. 267 G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnot
e No.193
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
University of the Philippines v. CA
Case No. 305 G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote
No.195
FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold th
e said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate
the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unla
wful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial,
the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the
CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior co
urt. Thus, a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. HELD: No. Memorandum C
ircular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that except for the causes fo
r judicial ejectment of lessees bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by
said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of actio
n thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families. Constr
uction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not bindin
g upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch ca
lled upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this cas
e, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is
not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 30a,
38b
FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Responden
t from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they shoul
d not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but
by the Civil Service Commissioner. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitio
ners in the case by the Board of Regents is final, or requires further action by
the Civil Service Commission. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospit
al was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Under RA
51 and E.O. 94, the President transferred them under herein Respondent. Thus, th
e Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U.P. posses
s full and final authority in disciplining, suspension, and removal of the civil
service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General
Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil S
ervice Board of Appeals. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9b, 20c, 38b
70 Taada v. Cuenco, et al
Case No. 286 G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957) Chapter XI, Page No. 451, Foot
note No.55
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Aratuc v. COMELEC
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979) Chapter XI, Page 452, Footnot
e No.62
FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel
, Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon
nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as me
mber of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. Peti
tioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel, Lopez
, and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other Senat
ors must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that
six members of the Electoral Tribunal shall be members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, is mandatory. The word shall is imperative in nature relative
to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opin
ion of the Secretary of Justice. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as membe
rs of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. HELD: No. The application of th
e doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted except as to matte
rs committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other departme
nt, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the c
ourts, even in a doubtful case. Hence, if the judgment of the court, such construc
tion is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any para
mount considerations of public policy, it may be rejected. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9
b, 11a
FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed t
o address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batas
ang Pambansa. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions mad
e by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the
Petitioners. HELD: No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out wit
h grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Sup
reme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to t
he Supreme Courts power over COMELEC decisions in 1935, the Supreme Court may rev
iew Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respondents decis
ions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the 1
973 Constitutions intent to strengthen Respondents independence. Consequently, err
ors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in ce
rtiorari. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9a, 25a
72 Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan
Case No. 106 G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No
.80
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of Representatives
Case No. 66 G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991) Chapter XI, Page 457
, Footnote No.82
FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery
of a postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed ou
t as the mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in th
e crime and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed
sworn statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a coun
sel. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused can
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner cla
ims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him r
etroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. ISSUE:
1. W/N the Petitioners extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the
presence of a counsel. 2. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be ap
plied retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation wit
hout the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution shou
ld, by such argumentation, be admissible. 2. No. The specific provision of the 1
987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel d
uring custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may
not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confessi
on was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5
a, 46a
FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern Sam
ar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 19
87 Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1
935 Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having b
een born to a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.
ISSUE: 1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Con
stitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 2. W/N this provi
sion should be applied retroactively. HELD: Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 o
f the Constitution, children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 sh
all be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon re
aching the age of majority. They need not perform any act of election granted that
his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when he was
only 9 years old. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since
it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherei
n people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born
while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. LATIN MAXIM
: 8a, 9a, 42a
73 Sarmiento v. Mison
Case No. 277 G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 458, Footno
te No.84
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Domingo v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 37 G.R. No. 112371 (October 7, 1998)
FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commiss
ioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Co
mmission on Appointments. The Court favored the Respondent based on express prov
isions of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 16, Art. 7 provides for officer
s other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. HELD: No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only provides for the appointment, by
the President of heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public minist
ers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constit
ution with the requirement of CA approval. Deliberations of the Constitutional Co
mmission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded
the position heads of bureaus from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling
the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for horse-trading,
and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in
the President. The word also in the second sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be
construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed i
n a like manner as that of the first group. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b
FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of t
he personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to
the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement ac
counts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collec
ting transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that
even if she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportati
on allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. ISSUE: W/N a comm
utable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official pr
ovided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use
the vehicle. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearl
y provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who ar
e assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. LATIN MAXI
M: 6c, 7a, 24a
75
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ROUND 2
77 Baranda v. Gustillo
Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 125, Footnote
No.5
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
Case No. G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Cour
t, after discovering that private respondents TCT was fraudulently acquired, orde
red a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with final
ity a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another group fil
ed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the
TCT of said lot, which the court found out to be privies of the Private Responde
nts tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. ISSU
E: 1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of
Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certi
ficate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting
by this Court. 2. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to an
notate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HEL
D: 1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register o
f Deeds stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Canc
ellation of lis pendens Before the final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that it is necessary to
protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. 2. Sec 10 of PD 1529
states that, It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately registe
r an instrument presented for registration . If the instrument cannot be register
ed, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of suc
h denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and advising him of his right
s to appeal by consulta. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
FACTS: RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustl
y accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama w
ere charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his
wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to
the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and h
is son-inlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the
crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his so
n-in-law. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensat
ion. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD
: No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused from t
he very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately r
endered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for jud
gment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the
prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guil
ty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11a, 25a
78 Segovia v. Sandiganbayan
Case No. G.R. No. 124067 (March 27, 1998)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Tanada v. Yulo
Case No. 288 No. 43575 (May 31, 1935) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11
FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee
for NPCs Mindanao project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified afte
r the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban C
onsolidated Constructors, were downgraded thereby ineligible as bidders. Since all
other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the commi
ttee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board approved
, but for reasons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled. Petitione
rs were charged under RA 3019 for in one way or the other, extending undue advant
age to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross in
excusable negligence. For this, petitioners were suspended from office. ISSUE: W/
N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive s
uspension public officers who stand accused before it. HELD: Yes, it is mandator
y. Under the act, one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government pub
lic funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex, regardless of stag
e of execution and mode of participation, shall be suspended from office. Jurisp
rudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information, a c
ourt must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, Luciano,
et al. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 7a Petitioner
is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philip
pine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was trans
ferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35, 1934, sub
sequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of
all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect
on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of th
e Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office p
ursuant to Act No. 3899. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. 2
. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires confirmation by the P
hilippine Commission. HELD: No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Ac
t No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65
yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petition
er shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or
does not become incapacitated. No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence,
no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction gr
ounded on original appointment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
81 People v. Amigo
Case No. 201 G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote N
o.16
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Santayana
Case No. 115 No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty b
eyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of r
eclusion perpetua. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the tria
l court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him
despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already i
n effect when the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under t
he 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty
had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the
crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in
its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 19 (1), Art
icle 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in
the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. HEL
D: In People vs. Muoz, the Court held that A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article
III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly decla
res the abolition of the death penalty. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7b
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms a
nd sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years,
and to pay the costs. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special
agent of the CIS, which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms,
exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. HELD: Yes.
At the time of appellants apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was enuncia
ted in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointme
nt of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a
peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly cover
ed by Section 879. LATIN MAXIM: 46a
83 Villanueva v. COMELEC
Case No. 170 No. L 54718 (December 4, 1986)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Mario R. Melchor v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 177 G.R. No. 95398 (August 16, 1991) Chapter IV. Page 133, Footnote No.
35
FACTS: On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice
Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion
Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitione
r won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclai
med Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioners candid
acy was not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the ann
ulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the gro
unds that Mendozas unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it w
as effective, Petitioners candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw
after January 4. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of f
ormal or technical defects. HELD: No. The fact that Mendozas withdrawal was not s
worn is a technicality, which should not be used to frustrate the peoples will in
favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on
the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having bee
n made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal
reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather
than its literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving t
he issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidat
es. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 39c
FACTS: On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang AgroIndustrial School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Constructi
on for the construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant is
sued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but f
ailed to sign as a witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister o
f Education. During construction, the contractor sought additional charges due t
o labor cost increase, but eventually gave up the project to save itself from lo
sses. Consequently, the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallo
wed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void f
or lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. For
this reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to th
e contractor. ISSUE: 1. W/N the contract was null and void. 2. W/N the petitione
r should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. HELD:
No. The chief accountants issuance of a certificate of fund availability served a
s substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of th
e contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore
the approval of the Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for t
he Court to compel the Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the manda
te of LOI 968, to shoulder the construction cost of the building, which was bein
g utilized by the school when he was not reaping benefits from it. LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 9a, 12a
89 Matabuena v. Cervantes
Case No. 172 G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971) Chapter IV, Page 143, Footnote No
.69
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 151 G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957) Chapter IV, Page 144, Footnote N
o.76
FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Ma
tabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. Afte
r the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification
of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spou
ses during the marriage shall be void. The trial court ruled that this case was n
ot covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the dece
ased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. ISSUE: W/
N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. HELD: Yes. It i
s a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spir
it of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the p
ossibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse
on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to co
mmon-law relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation m
ade by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner
will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship bet
ween Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 9c
FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs Collec
tor assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The dutie
s were paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector
reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation an
d imposed additional duties. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court bu
t they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating s
aid Tax Court. Provision says that the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions
of Commissioner of Customs. However, under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has j
urisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by person
s affected thereby. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the d
ecisions of the Collector of Customs. HELD: Yes, there is indeed a disparity bet
ween Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of
the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. 11 and the wo
rd Collector should read Commissioner. To support this, the Supreme Court cited
that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Admin
istrative Code, the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commission
er of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. In this ruling, the cour
t did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified an apparent cleric
al error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention o
f the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is not the lette
r, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important
. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 16a, 16c, 36a
90 Lamb v. Phipps
Case No. 143 G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912) Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Com. of Internal Revenue v. ESSO
Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)
FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the fund
s of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwah
ig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Petitioner thus filed
an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue
a clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot pros
per since there is no showing that, as provided by law, there is no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. ISSUE: W/N the legislature in
tended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and s
peedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. HELD: There appears to be a typographi
cal error in the wording of Sec. 222 of Act No. 190 which reads in part: When the
complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior t
ribunal, it may if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the or
dinary courts of law. The phrase courts of law should read as course of law. Copied ve
batim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the said section in the Ca
lifornia Code reads course of law instead of courts of law. Spanish translation of s
aid Sec. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish, t
he other remedy is not limited to the ordinary courts of law. On its face, this ev
ident typographical error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensic
al. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible constru
ction, such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or
an absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37
FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax
credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. However, Respondents payment for 1960 wa
s found to be short. Thus, Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax tog
ether with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On Augus
t 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It prote
sted the computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properl
y due, claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount o
f the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondents overpayment. ISSUE: 1
. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest. 2. W/N
Respondent is entitled to a refund. HELD: The government already had in its han
ds the sum of P221, 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. Having be
en paid and received by mistake, the sum belonged to Respondent and the governme
nt had the obligation to return such amount, which arises from the moment that p
ayment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to re
imburse. Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the governmen
t as of July, 1960, whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in f
avor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which
no interest could be charged. It is well established that to interpret words of
the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and shou
ld not be countenanced. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are
not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable conseque
nces. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust
or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, suc
h as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust
or absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 8b, 11a, 11d, 11e, 12a, 12b
91 People v. Villanueva
Case No. 116 G. R. L-15014 (April 29, 1961)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Duque
Case No. 106
G. R. 100285 (August 13, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 149, Footnote No.97
FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injur
ies with damage to property in amount of P2,362 through reckless imprudence in t
he Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. The case was considered beyond the co
urts jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. The case was fo
rwarded to the Court of First Instance, which also declared itself without juris
diction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries th
rough reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period
s, and even applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdict
ion of the Justice of Peace. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance h
as jurisdiction.
FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed
nor authorized by the proper government agency, POEA. The Labor Code provides th
at the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of
how to compute it. Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that prescription shall begin
to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the sa
me be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judic
ial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. According to Accused, a lit
eral reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. ISS
UE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Presc
ription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by th
e complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or a
uthority from the government. There is absurdity in Sec. 2 but Accused does not
benefit from a literal reading. It must be construed in such a way as to give ef
fect to the intention and avoid absurd results. Institution of judicial proceedin
gs for its investigation and punishment may be either disregarded as surplusage o
r should be deemed preceded by the word until. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 11a, 11d, 12, 15, 3
8
HELD: Yes. Angeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that jurisdiction was wi
th the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. Also, since the Cour
t of First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage
of property, it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and le
ss serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless i
mprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. Moreover, there is the pos
sibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of
the case and establish only the damage to property. The Justice of Peace, if gi
ven jurisdiction, would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2,636 fi
ne for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot be less than the
amount of the damage. LATIN MAXIM: 5, 11
105 Chang Yung Fa, et al. v. Gianzon, etc. and De la Cruz, etc.
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-7785 (November 25, 1955)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Garcia v. COMELEC
Case No. 109 G.R. No. 111511 (October 5, 1993) Chapter V, Footnote No.67, Page N
o. 192
FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment a
s immigrants under C.A. No. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall
be limited to two years. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the cl
assification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants. Petiti
oners contend that having been classified as non-quota immigrants, they should hav
e been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word immigran
t is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. I
SSUE: W/N the word immigrant only refers to a person who comes into a country for
a permanent residence. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "i
mmigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destin
ed for the Philippines, other than a nonimmigrant." The law gives no definition
to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is
merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent reside
nce as now contended by appellants. A review of the whole law would disclose no
such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power
to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of imm
igrants into the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 36b
FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of
the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. Responden
t Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and refe
rendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinanc
e. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local
Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiativ
e. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. ISS
UE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initi
ative and referendum.
HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is gra
nted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum
(Sec. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution). Also, RA 6735, the law providing for a
system on initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the subjects
of initiative. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word res
olution in its definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit th
e coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolutions are still prope
r subjects of an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. LATIN MAX
IM: 6a, 9c, 11a, 50
106
Motoomull v. dela Paz Case No. 180 G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990) Chapter V, F
ootnote No.73, Page No. 195
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Nazario
Case No. 218 G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988) Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page
No. 197
FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sar
kara Trading Corporation. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the is
suance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. The reso
lution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on
a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner s
ought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the e
nforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. The Court howev
er held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal sha
ll not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or
body rendering the same or the court, on motion, after hearing, and on such ter
ms as it may deem just, should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay grante
d by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or judgmen
t may be raised only by motion in the main case. ISSUE: 1. W/N the word court refe
rs to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. W/N the Court of Appeals can
grant a stay in the execution of the decision. HELD: Yes, the word court refers
to the trial court. The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that app
eal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order. The exception is given wh
ere the officer or body rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearin
g should provide otherwise. The law provides further that the propriety of a sta
y granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling
may be raised only by motion in the main case. More importantly where a particul
ar word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various me
anings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words.
Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejec
ted as not in accordance with the legislative intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 12a, 36a
FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to
pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated d
emands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: Any owner or manager of f
ishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay
a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof p
er annum. He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinan
ce is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply
to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. ISSUE: 1. W/N the ordinance i
s null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. 2. W/N the ordinance appl
ies to Accused. HELD: No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ord
inance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the
above provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operat
or of the fishponds, he comes within the term manager. While it appears that the N
ational Government is the owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in
the profits they generated. It is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulder
s the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. And obviously, the word owner can
not be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that
the government is immune from taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 37
150 US v. Estapia
Case No. 298 G.R. No. 12891 (October 19, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 289, Footnote N
o. 23
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
U.S. v. Abad Santos
Case No. 294 G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote
No. 28
FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting, i
n violation of Sec. 1 of Act. No. 480. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clea
ring near a grove of buri palms. The prosecution argued that the term cockpit shou
ld be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. ISSUE: W/N t
he clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within t
he contemplation of the law. HELD: The term cockpit as used in the statute has a l
imited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as h
ad been used by the Defendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construe
d strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation
to the context. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 37, 48
FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Rev
enue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5, 1915 indicating whether
any business was done on that day or not. He had employed a bookkeeper with the
expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his posit
ion, including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Reve
nue. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. H
ELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part
in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an ent
ry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Courts will not hold one perso
n criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or conse
nt, unless the law clearly so provides. LATIN MAXIM: 41a, 48
151
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ROUND 3
155 US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote
No. 49
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote
No. 52
FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the
Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small
button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emil
io Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurr
ection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ig
norant of the law and consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law.
He claims acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonab
le doubt and that the law was referring to identical banners, emblem, flag, etc. I
SSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with
criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by
the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isnt necessary for violation of the
Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purv
iew of the class of articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that
in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Inte
ntion of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would
render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The st
atute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no int
erpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid
defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a partic
ular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a
FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, s
ought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the s
heriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Ca
ram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irriga
tion Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not th
e owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has an
y rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of th
e provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provi
ded that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Directo
r of Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to
file answer or appear in the civil case. No such publication or notice was evid
ent in this case. It is not sufficient that they had actual knowledge. Statutes in
the derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a re
publican state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
protected by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, w
henever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or prop
erty, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 153 G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote N
o. 22
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 95 G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No.
23
FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was register
ed with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole ho
meowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate b
ylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within t
he subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed
the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because
of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resu
lted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a
favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner a
ssociation cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision.
Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the fa
ilure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its
incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. HELD: No. The legislatures i
ntent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its
by-laws. The word must in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consis
tent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be consi
dered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the w
ord must or shall. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b
FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registr
ation of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his
heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to co
ntinue the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdict
ion. However, it was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and ex
clusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal
is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newsp
aper of general circulation pursuant to a law. The CA set aside the decision of
the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE:
Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an origina
l land registration case is mandatory or directory. HELD: It is mandatory. The l
aw used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon the latter s receipt of the court order setting the ti
me for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates t
he mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not an absolu
te rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its con
text in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must
be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of du
e process. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a
194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc.
Case No. 78 G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No.
14
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Gallardo v. Borromeo
Case No. 50 G.R. No. L-36007 (May 25, 1988)
FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from responden
t deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5
% as prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of th
e lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA 3843
was passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operatio
n of light, heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. ISSU
E: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity and equa
lity of taxation clause of the Constitution. HELD: It is valid. Sec. 259 of the T
ax Code was never intended to have a universal application. RA 3843 did not only
fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it in lieu
of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding, thus leaving no
room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. Charters or special laws grante
d and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do
not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. The Legislatu
re considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case.
RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. LATIN MAXI
M: 6c, 9c, 46, 49
FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so h
e (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job
as a letter carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that
the landowners desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dis
possessing the tenant. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application
to Sec. 7 of RA 6389. HELD: No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his com
plaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant shoul
d the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The newer
law, R.A. 6389 eliminated this ground. In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil Code
, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provi
sion for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. Since C
ongress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive, it may not a
pply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. LATIN M
AXIM: 6c, 46e
203 Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Andres, Jr. and
Burgos
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 104215 (May 8, 1996) Chapter IX, Page 377, Footnote No. 140
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Santos v. Duata and the Court of Appeals
Case No. 274 G.R. No. L-20901 (August 31, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote N
o. 134
FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service con
tract driver. Months after, another contract was executed which changed his posi
tion into that of a helper/laborer. When private respondent returned to the Phil
ippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the diff
erence between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and th
e amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual bonus. Private respondent fi
led the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.O. No. 797 was passed, creating t
he Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), vested with the origina
l and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees a
broad. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision i
n favor of private respondent. ISSUE: W/N E.O. 797 should be given retroactive e
ffect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. HELD: No. E.O. 797 is n
ot a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule
on prospectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislat
ive intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessita
ted. Furthermore, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
law in force at the time of the commencement of the action; in this case, these
were P.D. 1691 and 1391. LATIN MAXIM: 35, 46a, 46c, 46e
FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a qua
rter part of Lot No. 37. The lot was purchased by Santos, Gaanan and Aguilar. Fo
r convenience, the title was issued in Santoss name. On August 3, 1955, private r
espondent Duata, the daughter of the Duata spouses, instituted an action for rec
onveyance of of Lot No. 37. Santos denied the spouses ownership, claiming that th
e land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document. The trial court pr
onounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. Upo
n appeal, the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage u
nder Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the trial cou
rt. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar, in executing the said private document, i
ntended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. HELD: It is a mortgage. Art. 160
2 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale
with right of repurchase; it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurch
ase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price
is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a contract pur
porting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. Said article is remedial in nat
ure and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectiv
ity of the New Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 17, 21, 46e
209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. Concepcion and Lee Voo
Case No. 20 G.R. No. 33281 (March 31, 1930)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ynchausti & Co v. Stanley
Case No. 174 G.R. No 12330 (January 25, 1917)
FACTS: The accused, one Chan Sam, was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be
committed to an asylum. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two ye
ars later on the strength of doctors reports. In issuing the order of release the
respondent judge relied upon Art. 8, par. 4, of the Penal Code. On the other ha
nd, Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the a
uthority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. ISSUE: W
/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum poss
esses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum wi
thout the approval of the Director of Health. HELD: It is a well-known rule of s
tatutory construction that when there is no express repeal, none is presumed to
be intended. Likewise, when two portions of the law can be construed so that bot
h can stand together, this should be done. Art. 8 of the Penal Code has not been
impliedly repealed by Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code. The powers of the c
ourts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. Thus, any pe
rson confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. 8 of t
he Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the
Director of Health. The converse proposition equally holds true. LATIN MAXIM: 38
b, 49
FACTS: The petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business, sou
ght to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement,
which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the office
rs on each vessel. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 2614 was n
ot and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code; Act No. 2614 bei
ng specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. ISSUE: W/N ther
e is a conflict between Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. 1312 of the Admin
istrative Code. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. 2614. It is apparent
that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. The Philippine Legi
slature could not have intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks
after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the unco
ntrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 49,
50
223 Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, In
c.
Case No. 127 G.R. No. 45355 (January 12, 1990)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De Joya v. Lantin
Case No. 31 G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)
FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247, 3570, and 6020
to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system in Cag
ayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan, Opol,
Villanueva, and Jasaan. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from paym
ent of all taxes of whatever authority except 3% tax on its gross earnings. The Pr
ovincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental, however, demanded payment of the provinc
ial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231)
and pursuant thereto, the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 19. ISSUE: W/N CEPALC
O is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. HELD: No. No provision in
P.D. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247, 3570 and 6020. A spec
ial and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later
statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the t
erms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law unl
ess there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. Also, the Secre
tary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax C
ode may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exemptin
g clause. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 50
FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Comp
any Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that the good
s to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Customs took c
ustody of the shipment. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of Fi
rst Instance for Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI h
ad jurisdiction on the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Bureau of Customs.
RA 1937 and 1125, on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure a
nd forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction
over the shipment. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are specia
l laws, whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special
laws prevail over general ones. LATIN MAXIM: 50
230
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Latin Maxims
Chapter II CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. Legis interpr
etation legis vim obtinet. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute
acquires the force of law. Chapter III AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C. CONTEMPORARY CON
STRUCTION 2. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. Contempo
rary construction is strongest in law. Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. Cu
stom is the best interpreter of a statute. Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. In d
efault of the law, the maxim rules. 3. Optimus interpres rerum usus. The best in
terpreter of the law is usage. Communis error facit jus. Common error sometimes
passes as current law. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalesc
it. That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid. 4. R
atihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a man
date. 5. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past precedents and do not d
isturb what has been settled. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. The inter
est of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. Chapter IV ADHERENC
E TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6. Index ani
mi sermo est. Speech is the index of intention. Animus hominis est anima scripti
. The intention of the party is the soul. Verba legis non est recedendum. From t
he words of the statute there should be no departure. Maledicta et exposition qu
ae corrumpit textum. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. Littera scr
ipta manet. The written word endures. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. Things thus
standing. 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of t
he law is clear, no explanation is required. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be ha
rsh but it is the law. Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. It
is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written. B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTER
PRETATION 8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Equity never acts in contravent
ion of the law. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. What is good and equal is the la
w of laws. Jus ars boni et aequi. Law is the art of equity. 9. Ratio legis est a
nima legis. The reason of the law is the soul of the law.
231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The letter kills but the spirit gives lif
e. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice. Words ought to be more subs
ervient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Benignus leges interpret
andae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Laws are to be construed liberally,
so that their spirit and reason be preserved. Qui haret in littera haret in cor
tice. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep int
o its meaning. Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum
generaliter est intelligendum. When the words used in a statute are special, bu
t the purpose of the law is general, it should be read as the general expression
. 10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason of the law cea
ses, the law itself ceases. 11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda es
t ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, the interpreta
tion of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Legi
s construction non facit injuriam. The construction of the law will not be such
as to work injury or injustice. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in leg
e. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. Verba nihil operari
melius est quam absurde. It is better that words should have no operation at all
than that they should operate absurdly. Lex simper intendit quod convenit ratio
ni. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Ubi eadem ra
tio ibi idem jus. Like reason doth make like law. Argumentum a simili valet in l
ege. An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law. De simi
libus idem est judicium. Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition. Where there is the same re
ason, there is the same law 12. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio care
t. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. Le
x injusta non est lex. An unjust law is not a law. 13. Fiat justitia, ruat coelu
m . Let right be done, though the heavens fall. Nemo est supra legis. Nobody is
above the law. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. No power must be above th
e law. 14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria f
ieri locupletiorem. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stra
nger should reap the pecuniary produce of another mans work. 15. Surplusagium non
nocet. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. T
he useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. ) 16. Falsa demostratio non nocet,
cum de corpore constat. False description does not preclude construction nor vit
iate the meaning of the statute. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel pers
ona constat. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the desc
ription is sufficiently clear. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. That is suff
iciently certain which can be made certain. 17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur,
inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. Where anything is
granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that noth
ing shall be contrary to law and right.
232 18. Summum jus, summa injuria. The rigor of the law would be the highest inj
ustice. Jus summum saepe, summa est militia. Extreme law is often extreme wrong.
19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The law obliges no one to perform an impossib
ility. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. There is no obligation to do an impossib
le thing. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require an impossibili
ty. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. The law does not intend the impossible.
C. IMPLICATIONS 20. Ex necessitate legis. By the necessary implication of law.
In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus. The greater includes the lesser. Cui
jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdictio
n explicari non potuit. When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essenti
al to its exercise are also given. 21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a r
ight, there is a remedy for violation thereof. Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.
Where the law is uncertain, there is no right. 22. Ex dolo malo non oritur acti
on. An action does not arise from fraud. Nullius commodum capere potest de injur
ia sua propria. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. In pari d
elicto potior est condition defendentis. Where the parties are equally at fault,
the position of the defending party is the better one.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
23. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What canno
t, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Chapter V INTERPRETATION
OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 24. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intellig
enda. General words should be understood in their general sense. Generis dictum
generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is understood in its general
sense. 25. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. A word is to be u
nderstood in the context in which it is used. Verba mere aequivoca, si per commu
nem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus es
t. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according t
o their common and ordinary sense. Verba artis ex arte. Words of art should be e
xplained from their usage in the art to which they belong. Verba generalia restr
inguntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. General words should be confined accor
ding to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. 26. Ubi lex non dist
inguit necnon distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, the court
s should not distinguish. 27. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. Of things dissimi
lar, the rule is dissimilar. B. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. Noscitur a sociis. A thing
is known by its associates. 29. Ejesdem generis. Of the same kind or specie.
233 30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one perso
n, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Expressum facit ces
sare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 31. Argume
ntum a contrario. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to t
hat which is implied. 32. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, obje
ct or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intent
ionally. 33. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. A q
ualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antece
dent. 34. Reddendo singular singulis. Referring each to each, or referring each
phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper
place. C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. Exceptio firmat regulam i
n casibus non exceptis. A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming wi
thin the purview of the general rule. Chapter VI STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE I
N RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. Optima statute
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. The best interpreter of the statute is the st
atute itself. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. The exposition of a statute sh
ould be made from all its parts put together.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita in
dicare vel respondere. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular
part of a law without examining the whole of the law. Nemo enim aliquam partem
recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. The sens
e and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one w
hole and not of one part only by itself. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fi
t optima interpretation. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that
which precedes and follows it. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad p
riora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. Reference should be made to a su
bsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is d
oubtful. 37. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law sho
uld be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. B. STATUT
E CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Pari materia. Of
the same matter. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpreta
ndi modus. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes
as to form a uniform system of law. 39. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura.
Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. - Tempora mutantur et leges mutant
ur in illis. - Times have changed and laws have changed with them. Mutatis mutan
dis. With the necessary changes.
234 Chapter VII STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. IN GENERAL 40. Salus populi es
t suprema lex. The voice of the people is the supreme law. Statuta pro publico c
ommodo late interpretantur. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be constr
ued liberally. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. The private interests
of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. B. STATUTES
STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The act does not
make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Actus me invito facturs non
est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. 42. Privilegia
recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. Privileges ar
e to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. Renuncia
tio non praesumitur. Renunciation cannot be presumed. 43. Strictissimi juris. Fo
llow the law strictly. 44. Nullum tempus occurit regi. There can be no legal rig
ht as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Chapter VIII MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. MANDATORY STATUTES 45. Vigila
ntibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure. He who
is first in time is preferred in right. Chapter IX PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE S
TATUTES A. IN GENERAL 46. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, no
t backward. Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito. The law provides for the future,
the judge for the past. - Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non pr
aeteritis. - A new statute should affect the future, not the past. Leges quae re
trospciunt, et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur in le
gibus. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janu
s has really no place in the laws. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est da
re formam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim et de praet
erito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. Laws should be construed
as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made applicable to
past transactions and to such as are still pending. B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTI
VE EFFECT 47. Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime
without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law. 48. Favorabilia sunt ampl
ianda, odiosa restringenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are gi
ven retroactive effect.
235 Chapter X AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. REPEAL 49. Leges p
osteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Later statutes repeal prior ones which a
re repugnant thereto. 50. Generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does
not nullify a specific or special law.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. The bl
ack (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or
rubric of the statute printed in red).
BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. Ignorantia legis ne
minem excusat. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMB
IGUOUS B. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque fi
eri solet. When matters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be
more likely or what usually often happens. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla veri
ficatione excluditur. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evide
nce. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. Ad ea quae frequentibus accid
unt jura adaptatur. Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most
frequently occur. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non qua
e ex inordinato. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen m
ost frequently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Quo
d semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. Legislators pass over what hap
pens only once or twice. De minimis non curat lex. The law does not concern itse
lf with trifling matters.