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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA,
respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose
Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated
September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No.
72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner and against the respondents, declaring
Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void.

The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No

pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO
ARCA
Judge 1
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the
Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by
the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on
March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY
PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE
EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO
BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR
OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT
FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM
THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
3

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from

being employed or to engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00
except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of
foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both
the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those

working in their respective households, and members of religious

orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid
monetarily or in kind.

Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment

of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of
not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such
fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case
No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said
Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following
as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and
void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed
in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is
discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity
in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction
between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing
a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of
proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to
prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action
of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle
on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being
applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their

rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates

the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of
preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then
Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on March
27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly
committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of
September 17,1968: 9
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS
AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE
OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE
AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A
SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING
THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE

PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE

CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537
cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated
the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on
uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue
measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue
measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it
being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or
revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in
nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which
requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit
from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and
judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and therefore is
regulatory in character the second part which requires the
payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a
revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting
P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It
is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money
under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that
the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or

permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly

employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It
has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails
to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit
the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by
requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the
Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being
an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization
Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency power to
determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the
Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled
power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary
discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from
which it can be measured or controlled.

It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and
discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon
the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not
uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within
the limits of the law.

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or

suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the
ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit

from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at
will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people
in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it
is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot
be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to
all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.
Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the
result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez

which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance
No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that
the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of
national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the
national government officials and agencies concerned and not
to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after
all are mere creations of the national government.
The national policy on the matter has been determined in the
statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various Philippine
nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of
aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the
exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national
policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner
negated by any local government or its officials since they are
not separate from and independent of the national
government.
As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop.
Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila
is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...).
When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a
municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at
naught the action of the superior authority." Indeed, "not only
must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the
organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law
and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).
With more reason are such national policies binding on local
governments when they involve our foreign relations with
other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully
admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions
of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over

those of subordinate and local governments and officials who

have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez
which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance
No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that
the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of
national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the
national government officials and agencies concerned and not
to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after
all are mere creations of the national government.
The national policy on the matter has been determined in the
statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various Philippine
nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of
aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the
exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national
policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner
negated by any local government or its officials since they are
not separate from and independent of the national
government.
As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop.
Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila
is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...).
When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a
municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at
naught the action of the superior authority." Indeed, "not only

must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the

organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law
and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).
With more reason are such national policies binding on local
governments when they involve our foreign relations with
other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully
admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions
of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over
those of subordinate and local governments and officials who
have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.
Footnotes
1 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, p. 64.
2 Petition, Rollo, p. 28.
3 Annex "A", of Petition, Rollo, p. 37-38.
4 Section 1. It shall he unlawful for any person not a
citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any kind of
position or occupation or allowed directly or indirectly
to participate in the functions, administration or
management in any office, corporation, store,
restaurant, factory, business firm, or any other place of
employment either as consultant, adviser, clerk,
employee, technician, teacher, actor, actress, acrobat,
singer or other theatrical performer, laborer, cook, etc.,
whether temporary, casual, permanent or otherwise
and irrespective of the source or origin of his
compensation or number of hours spent in said office,
store, restaurant, factory, corporation or any other
place of employment, or to engage in any kind of
business and trade within the City of Manila, without

first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of

Manila, and paying the necessary fee therefor to the
City the City Treasurer: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
persons employed in diplomatic and consular missions
of foreign countries and in technical assistance
programs agreed upon by the Philippine Government
and any foreign government, and those working in their
respective households, and members of different
congregations or religious orders of any religion, sect
or denomination, who are not paid either monetarily or
in kind shag be exempted from the provisions of this
Ordinance.
5 Section 4. Any violation of this Ordinance shall upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less
than three (3) months but not more than six (6) months
or by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos
(P100.00) but not more than two hundred pesos
(P200.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the Court: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
in case of juridical persons, the President, the VicePresident or the person in charge shall be liable.
6 Annex "B", Petition, Rollo, p. 39.
7 Ibid
8 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 75-83.
9 Petition, Rollo, p. 31.
10 People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443, 446.
11 89 Phil. 439, 459-460.
12 80 Phil. 86.

13 Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil, 103.

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