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CrimPro - Cases For Oct. 4, 2016.JudgeCammanong
CrimPro - Cases For Oct. 4, 2016.JudgeCammanong
OF
THE
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals [1] which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Br. 32,[2] finding the accused ROSA UY guilty of
violating B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to
84-32340, inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa
under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code
in Crim. Case No. 84-32334.
Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don
Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of
complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During
Rosas employment she was regarded by the Leongs
as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15
March 1982, a few months before she was to give
birth, Rosa resigned. In the meantime, she helped
her husband manage their lumber business. The
friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion
continued. The two later agreed to form a
partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional
capital for the expansion of Rosas lumber business
and the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of
money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to
have been given by Consolacion for the business;
however, because of the trust they had for each
other, no receipt was ever issued.
Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was
constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with the funds
contributed by Consolacion evidenced by various
receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship between
Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the
partnership documents were never processed. As a
result, Consolacion asked for the return of her
investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the
purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
(Exh. F)
(4) 068601 16
December
Insufficient Fund
1983 Drawn
Against
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. E)
(5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient
Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. A)
(6) 068660 24
January
Insufficient Fund
1984 Drawn
Against
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. I)
CHECK
NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON
DISHONOR
(1) 068604 16
December
Insufficient Fund
FOR
1983 Drawn
Against
1983 Drawn
Against
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. G)
(2) 068605 16
December
Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
On appeal, respondent appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
(Exh. H)
(3) 068603 16
December
Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
1983 Drawn
Against
charged or
over
the
person
of
the
accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it
is provided that the failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of
x x x lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged x x
x as provided for in paragraph x x x (b) x x x of
Section 3 of this Rule.[12]
After a careful perusal of the records, it is
crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the
jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum [13] before
the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding
pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot
countenance the inadvertence committed by the
court. Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can
see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash,
he may still question the jurisdiction of the court
later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of
the proceedings or on appeal.[14]
Assuming arguendo that there was a belated
attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court and
hence,
on
the
basis
of
the Tijam
v.
Sibonghanoy case[15] in which respondent seeks
refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We
nonetheless
find
the
jurisprudence
of
the
Sibonghanoy case not in point.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,[16] the Court held that
the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to
the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches. The Court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not
be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
We do not agree.
NIC harps on the fact that the petition was sent
by registered mail only on 12 September 1994, when
the last day for filing was on 11 September
1994. NIC, however, overlooked one significant
fact. The last day for filing, 11 September 1994, fell
on a Sunday.
Based on Section 1,[10] Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court, and as applied in several cases,[11] where the
last day for doing any act required or permitted by
law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday
in the place where the court sits, the time shall not
run until the next working day. Thus, petitioner filed
on time its petition on 12 September 1994, the next
working day, following the last day for filing which
fell on a Sunday.
Second Issue: Consolidation of the Cases
The main issue before us is whether Civil Case
No. 1153-MN pending with the Malabon trial court
should be consolidated with Criminal Cases Nos.
16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
x x x.
The law does not include civil cases for
collection of sum of money among the cases falling
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. If we
consolidate the collection case in the Malabon trial
court with the criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan will
have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the collection
case. Even if NIC proves it is entitled to payment, the
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction to award any
money judgment to NIC. NIC will still have to file a
separate case in the regular court for the collection
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs. NASARIO
MOLINA
y
MANAMAT @ BOBONG and GREGORIO
MULA y MALAGURA @ BOBOY, accusedappellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the
Constitution in the name of protecting the society
from lawbreakers is to make the government itself
lawless and to subvert those values upon which our
ultimate freedom and liberty depend.[1]
For automatic review is the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accusedappellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong
and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,
[3]
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
[4]
and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty
of death.
The
reads:
information
against
accused-appellants
[40]
Moreover, it could not be said that accusedappellants waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA
.
It is significant to note that the search in
question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence
holds that the arrest must precede the search; the
process cannot be reversed.[71]Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause
to make the arrest at the outset of the search. [72] The
question, therefore, is whether the police in this case
had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable
cause has been defined as:
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
of the peace officers making the arrest.[73]
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction,
applied with a great degree of consistency, is that
reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
[74]
[78]
As
noted
earlier, Maspil,
Jr., Bagista and Montilla were
justified
by
other
exceptions
to
the
rule
against
warrantless
searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its
critics.There, majority of the Court held:
marijuana
which
led
to
his
apprehension
sometime
in
the
evening of August 1 and according to
the report [which] is based on your
report my question is, how did you
know that Tudtud will be bringing
along with him marijuana stocks on
August 1, 1999?
.
A Because of the
neighbor.[107]
information
of
his
answer
information
knowledge.
is
also
hearsay,
not
of
personal
Bellosillo,
(Chairman),
Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-