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G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995 People of The Philippines vs. Francisco Salle, JR., Ricky Mengote and TEN JOHN DOES, Facts
G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995 People of The Philippines vs. Francisco Salle, JR., Ricky Mengote and TEN JOHN DOES, Facts
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is
" final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973
Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes
final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except
where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation,
thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not
yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to
the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefore, if one is made, should not be
acted upon or the process toward its grant should not begin unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly,
the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that
he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the
form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release
of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an
appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the
accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
The case of Monsanto vs Factoran is inapplicable since the amendments of 1981 on the 1973
Constitution were enforced during that time.