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  • G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995 People of The Philippines vs. Francisco Salle, JR., Ricky Mengote and TEN JOHN DOES, Facts

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    Carlota Nicolas Villaroman
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    1) Francisco Salle Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of murder and arson but appealed their convictions. While their appeal was pending, both were granted conditional pardons by the President. 2) The Supreme Court ruled that pardons granted during the pendency of an appeal are not enforceable, as the Constitution requires "conviction by final judgment" before the President can pardon. 3) A judgment is only considered final after the appeal is withdrawn or waived, the right to appeal expires, or probation is applied for - none of which had occurred in this case. The conditional pardons granted to Salle and Mengote while their appeal was pending were therefore invalid.

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    1) Francisco Salle Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of murder and arson but appealed their convictions. While their appeal was pending, both were granted conditional pardons by the President. 2) The Supreme Court ruled that pardons granted during the pendency of an appeal are not enforceable, as the Constitution requires "conviction by final judgment" before the President can pardon. 3) A judgment is only considered final after the appeal is withdrawn or waived, the right to appeal expires, or probation is applied for - none of which had occurred in this case. The conditional pardons granted to Salle and Mengote while their appeal was pending were therefore invalid.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    62 views2 pages

    G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995 People of The Philippines vs. Francisco Salle, JR., Ricky Mengote and TEN JOHN DOES, Facts

    Uploaded by

    Carlota Nicolas Villaroman
    1) Francisco Salle Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of murder and arson but appealed their convictions. While their appeal was pending, both were granted conditional pardons by the President. 2) The Supreme Court ruled that pardons granted during the pendency of an appeal are not enforceable, as the Constitution requires "conviction by final judgment" before the President can pardon. 3) A judgment is only considered final after the appeal is withdrawn or waived, the right to appeal expires, or probation is applied for - none of which had occurred in this case. The conditional pardons granted to Salle and Mengote while their appeal was pending were therefore invalid.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 2

    G.R. No.

    103567 December 4, 1995


    People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Salle, Jr., Ricky Mengote and TEN JOHN DOES,
    Facts:
    On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of
    murder and destructive arson before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice
    of Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993. In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent
    Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal
    Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
    Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression
    that the motion was necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a
    conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. She also stated that Mengote was also granted
    conditional pardon and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She prayed that
    the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal. On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's
    motion. After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the
    President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant
    pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for
    accused-appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon
    and (2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it
    recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal. In
    its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted
    to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the
    pendency in this Court of his appeal. On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the
    conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it
    argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to
    have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of
    his conviction.
    Issue:
    Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of
    conviction by the trial court is enforceable.
    Ruling:
    No. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:
    Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
    reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

    He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
    the Congress.
    Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
    conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is
    " final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973
    Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the
    1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes
    final.
    A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
    commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except
    where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation,
    thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not
    yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to
    the appellant.
    The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
    prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
    his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefore, if one is made, should not be
    acted upon or the process toward its grant should not begin unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly,
    the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that
    he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the
    form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be.
    The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release
    of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an
    appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the
    accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
    The case of Monsanto vs Factoran is inapplicable since the amendments of 1981 on the 1973
    Constitution were enforced during that time.

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