PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS

Presumption: The lawmaking body does not intend to adopt laws which are
unnecessary and ineffective.
It is presumed that it intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will
render them operative and effective.

2 IMPORTANT RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

1) Where law is susceptible of two constructions, one which will render it
unconstitutional and the other upholds it validity, the latter must be adopted.
2) Where the language of statute is susceptible of two or more constructions, one
which will render the statute ineffective or inefficient and another which will tend
to give effect to the evident intent of the legislature, that construction which tends
to give effect to the object for which the law was adopted shall prevail.

Case at bar:
US V. TEN YU, 24 PHIL. 1
G.R. No. 7482, December 28,1912
Facts:
On or about the 11th day of October, 1911, a complaint was presented against said
defendants in the municipal court of the city of Manila accusing them of a violation of
section 3 of Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila. They were duly arraigned. After
hearing the evidence the Hon. Manuel Camus, judge of said municipal court, found
each of the defendants guilty of the offense charged and sentenced each of them to pay
a fine of P100. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila.
ORDINANCE NO. 152:
SEC. 3. Visiting places where opium is smoked or dealt in is prohibited. No person
shall visit or be present at or in any place where opium, or any of its derivatives or
compounds, is smoked or otherwise used in or upon the human body, or unlawfully
sold, given away, or otherwise disposed of.

Issue:
That the ordinance under complaint has been presented is unreasonable, for it punishes
the presence of anyone who may visit an opium joint or a place where opium is kept,
sold, or smoked, without considering whether said visit has lawful or unlawful purpose
or is with or without knowledge of the nature of such place.
Ruling:
Contention that the ordinance in question is unreasonable is not tenable. Courts are
slow to pronounce statutes invalid or void. The question of the validity of every statute is
first determined by the legislative department of the government itself, and the courts
should resolve every presumption in favor of its validity.
Upon the other hand, however, if the statute covers subjects not authorized by the
fundamental laws of the land or its constitutions, then the courts are not only authorized
but are justified in pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise of
beneficent such legislature may seem to be.

2 IMPORTANT RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

1) Where law is susceptible of two constructions, one which will render it
unconstitutional and the other upholds it validity, the latter must be adopted.
2) Where the language of statute is susceptible of two or more constructions, one
which will render the statute ineffective or inefficient and another which will tend
to give effect to the evident intent of the legislature, that construction which tends
to give effect to the object for which the law was adopted shall prevail.

Case at bar:
BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC. V. DENR
G.R. No. L-29534, February 23, 1977
Facts:
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with
Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of
four mining claims.

Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N.

Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining
claims.
However, on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then
sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the
RAWOP.
On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the
RAWOP with the Legaspi City POA, Region V, docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01
and entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.
Issue:
Should the controversy have first been submitted to arbitration before the POA took
cognizance of the case?
Ruling:
Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide:
11.01 Arbitration
Any disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET and the OWNER with
reference to anything whatsoever pertaining to this Agreement that cannot be amicably
settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever in any court or
administrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the other, be referred to a
Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by BENGUET,
another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to be selected by the
aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.
11.02 Court Action
No action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabove stated,
except to enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators
A contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to voluntary arbitration before the
parties can go directly to court is not illegal and is in fact promoted by the State.
In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary
arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion of

the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such
contractual provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court
or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES

There is a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and a construction of which a statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.
Case at bar:
CESARIO URSUA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 112170
April 10, 1996
Facts:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked
him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His
lawyer asked him that because the law firms messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was
unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he
feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in
the said case. Perez then told him than he can go there as Oscar Perez so that he
does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as Oscar Perez.
When he was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as Oscar Perez.
However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario
Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua.
Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as
amended, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases.
Issue:
Whether or not Cesario Ursuas conviction is proper.

Ruling:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A.
No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity something which could not
have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to
use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized.
Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used
habitually and publicly in business transactions without prior authorization by competent
authority.
In this case, Ursua merely used the name Oscar Perez once, it was not used in a
business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself,
and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was not even required to
disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting a copy of
the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the complaint is a public record
open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when
Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted.
When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no
crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish
evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said law need
not be applied.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEAL

Repeals by implication is not favored.
2 requirements:
1. That the statute touch the same subject matter; and
2. That the later statute is repugnant to the earlier one.

Case at bar:
CALDERON V. PROVINCIA DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-9475, October 6, 1914
26 Phil. 164
Facts:
This is an action brought to recover a legacy bequeathed to the defendant by the will of
Maria Cristina Calderon de la Barca which has been duly paid by the administrator of
said will and received by the defendant, an order of Dominican friars. The basis of the
action is that the bequest was void under article 752 of the Civil Code in that the will in
which the bequest is found was made during the last illness of the testatrix and said
bequest was in favor of the religious society to which the priest belonged who
administered the last rites to the testatrix.
Defense:
Article 752 of the Civil Code has been repealed by the provisions of the Code of Civil
procedure, especially section 622.
Article 752
"Testamentary provisions made by the testator during his last illness in favor of the
priest who took his confession during the same, of the relatives of the latter within the
fourth degree, or of his church, chapter, community, or institute shall not be valid.
Section 622
"When devise or legacy to witness void. If a person attests the execution of a will, to
whom or to whose wife or husband, or parent, or child, a beneficial devise, legacy, or
interest, of or affecting real or personal estate, is given by such will, such devise, legacy,
or interest shall, so far only as concerns such person, or the wife or husband, or parent
or child of such person, or anyone claiming under such person, or such wife or
husband, or parent or child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses
to such will, and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such
devise, legacy, or interest had not been made or given. But mere charge on the real or
personal estate of the testator, for the payment of debts, shall not prevent his creditors
from being competent witnesses to his will."
Before a statute can be held to have repealed a prior statute by implication, it must
appear, first, that the two statutes touch the same subject matter, and, second, that the

later statute is repugnant to the earlier. Neither one of these conditions is present in the
case before us. The article of the Civil Code quoted refers exclusively to testamentary
dispositions and the circumstances under which they will be illegal and unenforceable. It
has nothing to do with the form or manner of execution of the will or who shall not be
witnesses thereto. Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the other hand, refers
exclusively to the execution of a will. It has nothing to do with the legality of its
dispositions except so far as they are affected by the form and manner of its execution.
Moreover, both sections can be applied to the same will.
3 BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER ON THE MATTER OF REPEAL:
1. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Article 7, New civil code
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
2. When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived, unless expressly provided. When a law
which repeals a prior law by implication only, its repeal revives the prior law
unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.
3. A general law does not repeal a special law unless it is so expressly provided, or
they are incompatible.

Case at bar:
U.S. V. SOLIMAN
36 Phil. 5
Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he,
with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material
allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in
support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his
guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by
the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who

presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for
reasonable doubt
Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No.
1697. However, since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No.
1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was
effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting and
sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained and
the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing
the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law
prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the
Administrative code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the
commission of the crime of perjury.
Ruling:
Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed
the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not
expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697
revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in force where a law which
repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such
cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the
repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3
of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the
provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not
expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY
Presumption: All laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears
or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied.
In case of doubt: resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.
If statue is susceptible of construction other than that of retroactivity or will
render it unconstitutional the statue will be given prospective effect and
operation.

 Presumption is strong against substantive laws affecting pending actions or

proceedings. No substantive statute shall be so construed retroactively as to
affect pending litigations.
Case at bar:
YUN KWAN BYUNG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163553, December 11, 2009
Facts:
PAGCOR launched a program that aims to invite patrons from foreign countries to play
at the dollar pit of designated PAGCOR-operated casinos under specified terms and
conditions and in accordance with industry practice.
The Korean-based ABS Corporation was one of the international groups that availed of
the Program.
In a letter-agreement dated 25 April 1996 (Junket Agreement), ABS Corporation agreed
to bring in foreign players to play at the five designated gaming tables of the Casino
Filipino Silahis at the Grand Boulevard Hotel in Manila (Casino Filipino).
The PAGCOR charter then prevailing (PD 1869) prohibited PAGCOR from entering into
any arrangement with a third party that would allow such party to actively participate in
the casino operations.
Subsequently, RA 9487 amended the PAGCOR charter, granting PAGCOR the power to
enter into special agreement with third parties to share the privileges under its franchise
for the operation of gambling casinos.
RA 9487
Section 1. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) franchise
granted under Presidential Decree No. 1869 otherwise known as the PAGCOR Charter,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
xxx
(2) Section 3(h) is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Corporate Powers. "x x x

"(h) to enter into, make, conclude, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and
nature and for any lawful purpose which are necessary, appropriate, proper or incidental
to any business or purpose of the PAGCOR, including but not limited to investment
agreements, joint venture agreements, management agreements, agency agreements,
whether as principal or as an agent, manpower supply agreements, or any other similar
agreements or arrangements with any person, firm, association or corporation."
(Boldfacing supplied)
The Petitioner, a Korean national, brought an action against PAGCOR seeking the
redemption of gambling chips valued at US$2.1 million. Petitioner claims that he won
the gambling chips at the Casino Filipino.
The petitioner wants to avail of the provisions of RA 9487 which states that the acts
giving rise to the claimed liabilities was a legal gambling activity.
Issue:
Whether RA 9487 may be applied to the present case.
Ruling:
No. RA 9487 cannot be applied to the present case.
The Junket Agreement was entered into between PAGCOR and ABS Corporation on 25
April 1996 when the PAGCOR charter then prevailing (PD 1869) prohibited PAGCOR
from entering into any arrangement with a third party that would allow such party to
actively participate in the casino operations.
Thus, petitioner cannot avail of the provisions of RA 9487 as this was not the law when
the acts giving rise to the claimed liabilities took place. This makes the gambling activity
participated in by petitioner illegal.
It is a basic principle that laws should only be applied prospectively unless the
legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used.
RA 9487 does not provide for any retroactivity of its provisions. All laws operate
prospectively absent a clear contrary language in the text, and that in every case of
doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.