GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,

vs.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated 13 December 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Cebu City (trial court), which held that Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship
pension.
The Facts
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) married Milagros Orbiso (Milagros)
on 10 July 1983.[3] Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for
retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977 (PD 1146). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros
as his sole beneficiary.[4] Nicolas last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985.[5] On31 January 1986,
GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment
of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter.[6] Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros
filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim
because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified
for the pension.[7] According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date
of retirement on 17 February 1984.
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension.
On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship
pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including interest. Citing Articles
115[8] and 117[9] of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has
earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly salary deductions,
are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such
benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed
repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it
does not prejudice or impair vested rights.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition
for review.
In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted
GSIS decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in
pursuing the case.[10] Commenting on Milagros letter, GSIS asserts that the Court must decide the case on the
merits.[11]

The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves not only the
claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who are similarly situated and whose claims GSIS
would also deny based on the proviso. Social justice and public interest demand that we resolve the
constitutionality of the proviso.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerous and conjugal
because the pension came from the deceased pensioners salary deductions. The Court of Appeals held that
the pension is not gratuitous since it is a deferred compensation for services rendered.
The Issues
GSIS raises the following issues:
1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;
2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;
3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code repealed Section 18 of PD 1146. [12]
The Courts Ruling
The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read:
SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall be entitled to
survivorship benefits provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension
shall consist of:
(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly pension; and
(2) dependents pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly pension payable in accordance with
the rules and regulations prescribed by the System.
SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to:
(1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years; Provided, That, at the option of the
beneficiaries, it may be paid in lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, the member is
entitled to old-age pension at the time of his death; or
(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and the dependents
pension; Provided, That, the deceased had paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year
period immediately preceding his death, or a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior
to his death.
(b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a), the survivorship pension
shall be paid as follows:
(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or
until he remarries;

(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the survivorship pension for as
long as they are qualified;
(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, they shall be entitled to the
survivorship pension so long as there are dependent children and, thereafter, the surviving spouse shall
receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries.
(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries designated by the deceased and
recorded in the System, shall be entitled to:
(1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the basic survivorship pension when the member is qualified for
old-age pension; or
(2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average monthly compensation for each year he paid
contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at least thirty-six
monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death or paid a total of at least
one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death.
(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section,
they shall receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of the average monthly compensation for
each year the member paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos. In the absence of primary
beneficiaries, the amount shall revert to the funds of the System.
SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the
applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. When the
pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only after
the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act,
but the survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being received at the time of death.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until such spouse
remarries, and (2) the dependent children.[13] The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents
and legitimate descendants except dependent children. [14] The law defines dependent as the legitimate,
legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but physically or mentally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support. The term also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for
support on the member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support.[15]
The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso
prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension (the proviso).
We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros claim, is
unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies
equal protection of the law.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly
contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary
amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off and
withhold from the employees monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the same to GSIS. [16] The

government employer must also remit its corresponding share to GSIS. [17] Considering the mandatory salary
deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but
form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have
contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. [18] The
reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to
government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government
service. Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in
the service of their country.[19]
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to
benefits that is protected by the due process clause. [20] Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. [21]Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right
to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute. [22] No
law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and
opportunity to be heard.[23]
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors of
deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the
beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband
is also part of the husbands contractual compensation.[24]
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for
survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year
prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to
assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and
their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
The whereas clauses of PD 1146 state:
WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System in promoting the efficiency and welfare of the
employees of the Government of the Philippines, administers the laws that grant to its members social
security and insurance benefits;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
System; to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and to expand and increase the
benefits made available to him and his dependents to the extent permitted by available resources;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and effective discharge by the System of its
functions and have unduly hampered the System from being more responsive to the dramatic changes of the
times and from meeting the increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino public servant;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government employee;
restricted, rather than broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of benefits,
must now yield to his paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government employees must be continuously reexamined and improved to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that

will provide benefits responsive to their needs and those of their dependents in the event of sickness,
disability, death, retirement, and other contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public
service;
WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions affecting the welfare of government employees, there
is a need to expand and improve the social security and insurance programs administered by the Government
Service Insurance System, specifically, among others, by increasing pension benefits, expanding disability
benefits, introducing survivorship benefits, introducing sickness and income benefits, and eventually
extending the compulsory coverage of these programs to all government employees regardless of employment
status.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made available to him and
his dependents such as:

increasing pension benefits

expanding disability benefits

introducing survivorship benefits

introducing sickness income benefits

extending compulsory membership to all

government employees irrespective of status[25]

The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased
member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the
death of the wage earner or pensioner.[26]
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivors benefits under a pension
system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain
period before the employees death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One
example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivors annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was
married to a state employee for at least one year before the employees death. The Illinois pension
system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before a members death and those married
one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages
where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for
benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employees Retirement System of Illinois, [27] the Appellate Court
of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational
relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law.[28] The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing

conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. [29] Thus, the law may treat and
regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.[30]
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the
dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified
for the pension.[31] Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three
years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the
proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year
prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The
classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily
for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted
the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), [32] otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance
Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291,
the surviving spouse who married the member immediately before the members death is still qualified to
receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely
to receive the benefit.[33]
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before
retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present
GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted
marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the members retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship
benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices
the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of
Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said
pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
the pension. The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros
for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order, dated July 26, 1990, of Branch LXXVII of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque, which denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrants
emanating from the same Court. Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to
be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms, ammunition and
explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the
respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona
St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with
the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt
St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had
conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential
information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and
chop-chop vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of criminal
cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their
witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11 and 90-12, NBI agents
searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various high-powered firearms and
hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was conducted at the house at No. 326
McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-13, 9014 and 90-15. The said second search yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a
thousand rounds of ammunition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio
and telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle. Upon
verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the NBI agents found out that no license
has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio
agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in
question. Likewise, the radio transceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out to be unlicensed
and unregistered per records of the government agencies concerned.
On May 22, 1990, the raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent Judge requesting that
the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI (Annexes O, P, and Q, Petition).
On May 28, 1990, the petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants, contending
that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause;

2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth by the
Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.
On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order denying the said Motion To Quash
interposed by petitioners.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable
cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the
premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to
vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of
a crime by them (petitioners).
Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance
and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses
searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared
that he personally attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the
said witnesses personally saw the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises
referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota
Lite-Ace van and brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside
the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore decisively clear that
the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and
their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of whether or not
a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations. In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large
extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants and
the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by
the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular
opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and
witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able
to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the
surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing
that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so
conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his
findings and impressions.
Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the procedure followed in the issuance of subject
search warrants, reasoning out that the same did not comply with constitutional and statutory
requirements. They fault respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific questions they deem
particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their witnesses. To buttress their
submission, petitioners invite attention to the following question, to wit:
How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin Kho at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila? (TSN, Ali Vargas, May 15, 1990, p. 4)

Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted question, the respondent Judge assumed that the
firearms at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead of asking for a detailed account of how the
NBI agents came to know that the firearms being kept thereat were unlicensed.
This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any sustainable basis. Nothing improper is perceived in
the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and
their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching questions on the facts
and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed procedure and legal
requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were
duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge
to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of
inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable cause.
Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants proscribed by the
Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized were not described and detailed out, i.e. the firearms
listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.
Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items to be
seized thus:
Search Warrant No. 90-11
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners,
monitoring device and the like.
Search Warrant No. 90-13
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio
communications equipments, scanners, monitoring devices and others.
The use of the phrase and the like is of no moment. The same did not make the search warrants in
question general warrants. In Oca v. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court upheld the warrant although it
described the things to be seized as books of accounts and allied papers.
Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to:
Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said firearms.
Search Warrant No. 90-14 states:
Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are
looking for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching
on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a position to know before hand
the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose
the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises to be searched, they could not have known the
particular type of weapons involved before seeing such weapons at close range, which was of course
impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for subject search warrants.

Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same
general. Retired Justice Ricardo Franciscos book on Criminal Procedure has this useful insight:
A description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise; and its
nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of
concern. Further, the description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow. x x x
In People v. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court held that, ... But where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, for this
would mean that no warrant could issue.
It is indeed understandable that the agents of respondent Bureau have no way of knowing whether the
guns they intend to seize are a Smith and Wesson or a Beretta. The surveillance conducted could not give the
NBI agents a close view of the weapons being transported or brought to the premises to be searched. Thus,
they could not be expected to know the detailed particulars of the objects to be seized. Consequently, the list
submitted in the applications for subject search warrants should be adjudged in substantial compliance with
the requirements of law.
Petitioners contend that the searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the search
warrants in question. The petition avers supposedly reprehensible acts perpetrated by the NBI
agents. Among the irregularities alluded to, are:
1. The raiding team failed to perform the following before breaking into the premises:
a. Properly identify themselves and showing necessary credentials including presentation of the Search
Warrants;
b. Furnishing of Search Warrants and allowing the occupants of the place to scrutinize the same;
c. Giving ample time to the occupants to voluntarily allow the raiders entry into the place and to search the
premises.
2. The team entered the premises by climbing the fence and by forcing open the main door of the house.
3. Once inside the house, the raiders herded the maids and the sixteen year-old son of defendant Kho into the
dining room where they were confined for the duration of the raid. In the case of the son, he was gagged with
a piece of cloth, his hands were tied behind his back and he was made to lie face down.
4. Defendant Khos hands were immediately tied behind his back (initially with a rag and later with the
electric cord of a rechargeable lamp) and was restrained in a kneeling position with guns pointed at him
throughout the duration of the search. It was only after the search was completed and the seized items stuffed
in carton boxes (and a T-bag) that his hands were untied so he can sign the search warrants which he was
forced to do.
5. All throughout the search, defendant Kho and his companions were kept in the dining room and
continuously intimidated of being shot while the raiders search all the rooms all by themselves and without
anybody seeing whatever they were doing.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the challanged search warrants is not
within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of
the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue to be resolved
here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent Judge, petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal,

civil and administrative laws for their problem at hand, which cannot be solved by their present motion to
quash.
According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during the search sued upon
belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of which he is an agent and therefore,
the NBI agents involved had no authority to search the aforesaid premises and to confiscate the objects
seized.
Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties are questions of fact outside
the scope of the petition under consideration. The Court does not see its way clear to rule on such issues lest it
preempts the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI against the herein petitioners.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation of Section 3 in
relation to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, have
been instituted against the petitioners, the petition for mandamus with preliminary and mandatory injunction
to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has
become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and academic, the petition
at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 82585

November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V.ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO
L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C.
VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827
November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE
MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979
November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of
Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in
G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied
due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a
prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2)
whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant
for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable

cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of
Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal,
the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under
the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law
in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he
filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by
law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way
defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself
to possible contempt of court or perjury
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in
a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.
It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense
is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on
press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot
issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7,
1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R.No. 74869July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried
and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to
put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the

Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on
the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached
him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against
Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did
not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he
kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was
bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also
said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to
him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected
his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the
stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may
reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of
this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was
not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination.
That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time
under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up
to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible
in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the
Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid
because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the
search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification
was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received
the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June
25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol,
Jr., who testified as follows:
Q
You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on
June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.
Q
When did you receive this intelligence report?
A
Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on
that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular
informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming
of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q
Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance,
report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also
receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason
and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A
Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you
many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A
Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was
the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have
reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A
On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q
So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered
information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A
Only on the 23rd of June.
Q
You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in
your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q
Why not?
A
Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant
anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC.
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary.
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called
"buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer
was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial,
we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its
disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he
is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is
the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an
incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest
did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the

protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply
not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accusedappellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the
presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

, vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers
tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe wellentrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders
manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos
and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash Katutak placed in a
travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.[1]
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the
court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain
Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of
marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel
Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14,
1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the
Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt.
Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the
Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and
back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where
two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team Aling Rosa
who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the
latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo
affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a
Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said
specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the
prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality
of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment.
Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the incident
differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come
from Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an old woman
asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her
and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred
that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search
warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or Objection to
Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly
a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accusedappellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to
Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[2]
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search of a
bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that
the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM
agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a general
search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant
violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength
of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which
provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge

after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in
one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a
valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure
clause is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with
power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[4]
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence
pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.[5] This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses,
papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision
guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.[6]
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and
their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an
infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and
vindication yet often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2.

Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4.

Consented warrantless search;

5.

Customs search;[9]

6.

Stop and Frisk;[10] an

7.

Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample
upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and
seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense
or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in
fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to
be searched.[13]
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent
any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person
arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may
commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in
the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They
confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen
identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers
only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Arutas
alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen
knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their business address. More
significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the
policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single
indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the
identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the
officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of
the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police officers
had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly
ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving
vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched
while about to cross a street.

In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from
the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since
she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the
NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant.
Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police
officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the
Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place,
they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was observed to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the
policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he
showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost
accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled
with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the
warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken
together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and
seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988,
the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling
Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same
day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accusedappellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to
the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to
him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the arrival
of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known,
the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the
police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was
brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not
be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information the day
before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu
City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information
regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could
have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance
with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a
warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating
Encinadas constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize
the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have been validly
arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor
had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she
was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to
the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would
not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly
illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accusedappellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could
neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of
probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accusedappellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested.
Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was
similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not
be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be
rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order
that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected
based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary
to law.[18]
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this Court observed that:
x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of
the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of
accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the second
exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM
agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a moving vehicle.
There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several
minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and
not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by

government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the
suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. To reiterate,
accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases,
accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as
such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a
suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence reports that the
building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was fired at by
a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the door
despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building.
Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently
showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of
the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be consent
given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional right.
The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection
citing People v. Malasugui[23] where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The
right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q

When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened after that?

A
We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with our informant
and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.
Q

What was her reaction?

She gave her bag to me.

So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.[24]

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to the
instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless
search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.[25] On the contrary, the most essential element of
probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest
unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise
unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence
against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing over her
bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the
unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,[26] where this Court held:
[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search. This he
gleaned from Bolonias testimony.
Q:

After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q:

Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he carried, what
did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we
believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias
search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly,
i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the
performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional
rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People v. Barros:[27]
x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of
his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to objectx x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or
an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation
omitted).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.[28]
(Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly
illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q-

When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A-

When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.

Q-

And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A-

He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).

Q-

When he said that, what did you do?

A-

We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q-

When you said that, what did he tell you?

A-

He said you can see it.

Q-

And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?

Abag.

When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was contained in the

Q-

And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

AWhen I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it to my
companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation
of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court
would be the first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional
rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave prior consent to the search
and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police
officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured only if accusedappellants name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin
case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly
described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.[30]
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too much
difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been
particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the
afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized
was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely
positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming
that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from
securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has
held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized,
wherever and whenever it is feasible.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the trial,
accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to
the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for the
following reasons:

1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of not
guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction.
[32] The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and transform the
inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to object
thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and
objected and opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or
a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the
invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be
waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning
the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We
do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the
former--an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the nonadmissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not
casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its
vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on
constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were
formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellants objection to the admission of
such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his
rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis
supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that
they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the fruit of
the poisonous tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly
liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based on the
justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.[35]
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.[36]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is
less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not
allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.[37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.