Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DJK It's Just A Concussion Note
DJK It's Just A Concussion Note
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Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having more than one
or two concussions leads to permanent problems if each injury is managed properly.
It is important to understand that there is no magic number for how many concussions
is too many. . . . [Players] should not be at greater risk of further injury once [they]
receive proper medical care for a concussion and are free of symptoms.
Press Release, National Football League, NFL Outlines For Players Steps Taken to Address
Concussions (Aug. 14, 2007) (emphases added) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. See Robert Mitchum, Consensus Difficult to Find; NFL Conclusions Come Under
Attack, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 2007, at C2 (explaining how the NFLs conclusion that there is no
increase in secondary brain injuries after a second concussion is met with skepticism by NFL
players and independent doctors).
4. See Robert C. Cantu, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in the National Football
League Player, 61 NEUROSURGERY 223 (2007) (finding that the brain tissue of three dead NFL
alumni shared common features of brain damage). See also Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al.,
Association between Recurrent Concussion and Late-Life Cognitive Impairment in Retired
Professional Football Players, 57 NEUROSURGERY 719 (2005) (conducting a survey of over
2,550 former NFL players that indicated a direct correlation between the number of
concussions sustained by a player in his NFL career to the probability of his incurring
cognitive impairment in later life).
5. See Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National
Football League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 128 (2005) [hereinafter Omalu, CTE Part I]
(examining the brain tissue of fifty-year-old Mike Webster); Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic
Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football League Player: Part II, 59 NEUROSURGERY
1086 (2006) [hereinafter Omalu, CTE Part II] (examining the brain tissue of forty-two-yearold Terry Long); Cantu, supra note 4, at 223 (finding that the most recent subject of Omalus
forensic study, forty-four-year-old Andre Waters, exhibited the same type of neurological
damage as Webster and Long).
6. See Cantu, supra note 4, at 223. All three athletes were regarded as iron men: hard
hitters who rarely took themselves out of a game due to head trauma, and continued to play
despite suffering multiple concussions. Id.
7. Id.
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Scientists and players were initially hopeful that the NFLs scheduling of
the Summit indicated a newfound willingness on the part of the league to
revise its concussion policies and procedures.14 Unfortunately, the NFLs
August 14, 2007 press release denying the scientific probability that more
than one or two concussions leads to permanent problems indicates that the
research of doctors Omalu and Guskiewicz fell on unresponsive NFL ears.15
Thus, it seems that the Summit served largely public relations purposes for
the NFL.16
This Note will highlight several factors that contribute to the NFLs
concussion problem. Additionally, the note will analogize the NFLs denial
of a causal link between NFL concussions and cognitive decline to the
tobacco industrys denial of the link between cigarette consumption and
cancer. In the tobacco context, plaintiffs brought successful negligence and
deceit claims against the tobacco industry for knowingly and falsely leading
consumer-smokers to believe that smoking was safe.17 Here, the NFL
continues to inform players that multiple concussions will not cause later-life
cognitive problems in spite of an overwhelming amount of contrary
evidence.
If the NFL simply accepted the majority scientific opinion implicating a
causal link between concussions and later-life cognitive decline, it could take
procedural and legal actions to remedy the situation.18 However, a continued
attempt to raise ambiguity about the long-term consequences of concussions
might expose the league to a similar liability that struck the tobacco industry.
the NFLs internal Concussion Committee and outside scientists; namely, the NFLs stance
that concussions sustained while playing professional football do not cause later-life cognitive
decline).
14. Carpenter, supra note 13 (suggesting that the general tenor of the Summit was one
of optimism and mutual respect between the NFL Concussion Committee doctors and outside
doctors like Omalu, Cantu, and Guskiewicz).
15. See Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1. Upon notice of the
NFLs denial of any link between NFL concussions and later-life cognitive decline, Dr.
Guskiewicz stated: Theyre just trying to raise ambiguity when the science is becoming more
and more clear . . . The literature has proven it, [and] we confirmed it in June in the presence
of their entire committee. . . . Schwarz, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
16. See infra Part V.A.2 (discussing a potential misrepresentation claim against the
NFL).
17. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349-50, 353 (2007)
(holding that the Constitutions Due Process Clause forbids a state from using punitive
damages to punish a defendant for harm caused to nonparties).
18. The first step in remedying the problem is warning players about the long-term risks
associated with suffering multiple concussions. See infra Parts IV, V.A.
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Part I of this Note will track the well documented history of CTE in
contact sport athletes from the 1920s to the present. Part II will address the
definitions, symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment of concussions. Part III will
explore various contributing factors to the NFLs concussion epidemic. Part
IV will examine the sole case involving a player suit against an NFL
affiliated party for failure to warn about the risks of sustaining multiple
concussions. Part V will compare the facts and legal theories of the tobacco
litigation to the facts which present a fertile ground for player suits against
the NFL. Finally, Part VI will offer several suggestions intended to mitigate
the prevalence of cognitive degeneration among NFL alumni.
I. LONGSTANDING HISTORY OF CHRONIC TRAUMATIC ENCEPHALOPATHY IN
CONTACT SPORT ATHLETES
Scientific research indicating a link between multiple concussions
sustained by athletes and CTE is hardly a new development.19 After Dr.
Omalu concluded his third study of a former NFL players brain tissue,20 he
asked rhetorically whether one should be surprised that CTE was evidenced
in all three studies.21 Dr. Omalu answered his own question with a
resounding absolutely not.22
CTE was first described in 1928 as being characteristic of boxers who
take considerable head punishment . . . .23 Clinical symptoms of CTE as
described in 1928 included slight mental confusion, a general slowing in
muscular movement, hesitancy in speech, and tremors of the hands.24
Degenerative effects of CTE, evidenced as early as 1928, included marked
truncal ataxia, Parkinsonian syndrome, and mental deterioration
necessitating commitment to an asylum.25
19. The terms cognitive decline and cognitive degeneration will be used
interchangeably throughout the Note as the NFL Concussion Committee and outside scientists
employ the terms in like fashion.
20. Cantu, supra note 4, at 223.
21. Id. at 224.
22. Id. Dr. Julian Bailes, medical director of the Center for Retired Athletes and
Chairman of the Neurosurgery Department at West Virginia University, responded to Dr.
Omalus findings of CTE in former football players by lamenting: Unfortunately, Im not
shocked. Schwarz, supra note 12.
23. Cantu, supra note 4, at 224 (quoting Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM.
MED. ASSN 1103, 1103 (1928)).
24. Id.
25. Martland, supra note 23, at 1103. See also A. H. ROBERTS, BRAIN DAMAGE IN
BOXERS, 61 (1969) (echoing Martlands earlier findings regarding the dangers of chronic brain
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damage in boxers). Former world champion boxer Muhammad Ali embodies the paradigm
example of a boxer who presents with early-onset Parkinsons syndrome. Dave Anderson,
Sports of The Times; Ali's Boxing Curse, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1987 at 5:1.
26. Cantu, supra note 4, at 224; J. A. Corsellis, Brain Damage in Sport, 1 LANCET 401,
401 (1976) (finding that the brain tissue of fifteen former boxers who sustained multiple head
trauma evidenced neuropathological signs of CTE). See also J. A. Corsellis, The Aftermath of
Boxing, 3 PSYCHOL. MED. 270 (1973) (explaining that eight of the fifteen subjects in
Corselliss study were either world or national champions).
27. See Cantu, supra note 4, at 224. Corsellis also reported CTE in other athletes who
face a high risk of head injury such as jockeys and professional wrestlers. Id. Corsellis located
four different portions of the brain that evidenced signs and symptoms of CTE caused by
multiple head trauma. Id. However, he did not state that all four areas of the brain needed to
be involved in order for a CTE diagnosis to be made. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1.
30. Id. at 223. The NFLs internal study on CTE was conducted from 1996 to 2001. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. When using the term previous concussions, Cantu is referring to those
concussions sustained in the NFL prior to the study or those sustained during players careers
in high school, college, or other levels of football. Id.
33. Id. The initial data sheet did not ask for data regarding loss of consciousness. Id.
34. Id. The studies were conducted in multiple sites using different examiners. Id.
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resolve.42 After sustaining a concussion, brain cells that are not irreversibly
destroyed remain alive, but exist in a vulnerable state.43
In summary, athletes that are not fully recovered from an initial
concussion are significantly vulnerable for recurrent, cumulative, and even
catastrophic consequences of a second concussive injury.44 These injuries
can be prevented if the player presenting with concussive symptoms is
provided sufficient time to recover from a prior concussion and return-toplay decisions are properly made by treating physicians.45 Unfortunately,
most NFL players are unaware of the long-term consequences of concussions
and lack an adequate understanding of concussion symptoms.46
Routine neurological examinations may not detect concussions.47
Traditional neurological and radiologic procedures, such as CTs, MRIs, and
42. Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The
Merril Hoge Story, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT. L. 17, 24 (2002) (citing RL Saunders & RE
Harbaugh, The Second Impact in Catastrophic Contact-Sports Head Trauma, 252 J. AM. MED.
ASSN 538, 538-39 (1984) (citing James P. Kelly & Jay H. Rosenberg, Diagnosis and
Management of Concussion in Sports, 48 NEUROLOGY 575, 577 (1997)) (describing secondimpact syndrome as when an athlete suffers cerebral auto-regulation, or a loss of cerebral
auto-regulation, leading to malignant brain swelling and marked increase in intracranial
pressure.) See also Robert C. Cantu, Return to Play Guidelines After a Head Injury, 17
CLINICS IN SPORTS MED. 45 (detailing the pathophysiology of second-impact syndrome and
providing cases and illustrations).
43. Wojtys, supra note 41, at 677 (asserting that the concept of injury-induced
vulnerability is a major concern in the management of patients with head injuries). The true
incidence and impact of SIS remains a thorny issue as only 17 cases have been reported in
the literature, and only five cases had confirmed diagnoses of SIS. University of Virginia
Sports
Concussion
and
Second
Impact
Syndrome,
Health
System,
http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/neurogram/neurogram1_4_concussion.cfm,
(last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
44. imPACT Test, http://www.impacttest.com/impactbackground.php (last visited
Jan. 30, 2008).
45. Id. The NFL entrusts team physicians with total discretion over return-to-play
decisions. See Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1.
46. See discussion infra Part V.A.1 (explaining the NFLs failure to warn players about
the long-term risks associated with suffering multiple concussions). Troy Vincent, former
NFL defensive back and current president of the NFL Players Association (NFLPA),
explained his lack of concussion knowledge: Im not even sure we athletes know what a
concussion is. . . . Outside of being knocked out, I stayed in the game. Mitchum, supra note
3.
47. AANS, supra note 36. See also Michael W. Collins et al., Current Issues in
Managing Sports-Related Concussions, 282 J. AM. MED. ASSN 2283, 2283 (asserting that the
determination of when a player should return to play after sustaining a concussion is a
significant public health issue).
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EEGs, although helpful in identifying other brain related concerns,48 are not
useful in identifying the effects of a concussion.49 Considering that
concussions are difficult to detect by way of CTs, MRIs, and EEGs, the
diagnosis, evaluation, and treatment of concussions are almost entirely based
on the nature of the incident and the players communication of his
symptoms to a treating clinician.50
NFL athletes should not return to play when post-concussion symptoms
persist and recovery is ongoing.51 Baseline testing is a scientifically accepted
measure of determining when a player should return to the playing field.52
The testing involves a series of quizzes and interviews administered by
athletic trainers that monitor an athletes orientation, memory, vision,
attention span, language, mental flexibility, and coordination.53 Baseline
testing provides a comparison between a players normal brain function
48. Skull fractures, hematomas, and contusions are examples of acute head injuries that
traditional neurological and radiologic procedures are capable of detecting. See imPACT
Test, supra note 44. The reason CTs, MRIs, and EEGs cannot detect even the most serious
concussions is that a concussion is a metabolic rather than structural injury. Id. Thus,
structural neuroimaging techniques are insensitive to the effects of concussion. Id.
49. See id. See also Press Release, University of Pittsburgh Schools of the Health
Sciences, Sports Concussion Research Using Functional MRI Provides Insight (Aug. 8, 2007),
available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/08/070806114252.htm.
50. See imPACT Test, supra note 44. See also discussion infra Parts III.A-B
explaining how the structure of NFL player contracts and the conflicted nature of team
physicians discourage players from disclosing their concussive symptoms to team trainers.
51. imPACT Test, supra note 44. In 1991, former Philadelphia Eagle Andre Waters
experienced a severe concussion in a game against the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. Schwarz,
supra note 12. On the ensuing flight home to Philadelphia, Waters experienced a seizure-like
episode. Id. The team later diagnosed the incident that occurred on the flight as body
cramps. Id. Waters returned to the playing field the following Sunday. Id. This type of
concussion treatment helps explain why Waterss brain tissue resembled that of an
octogenarian Alzheimers patient at the time of Dr. Omalus study. Cantu, supra note 4, at
223.
52. imPACT Test, supra note 44. The NFLs adoption of baseline testing is one of the
changes the league implemented in the wake of the 2007 Concussion Summit. See Press
Release, National Football League, supra note 1. The other substantive change worth
mentioning was the NFLs adoption of a whistle blower program that enables players to
complain anonymously if they feel pressured to return to play too soon after sustaining a
concussion. Id.
53. Hecht, supra note 42, at 50 (quoting Kevin M. Gusk et al., Epidemology of
Concussion in Collegiate and High School Football Players, 28 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 643-650
(2000)).
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A. Trainer Conflicts
The conflicted interests that burden many NFL trainers exacerbate the
NFLs concussion problem.68 An emerging practice in sports medicine
involves medical providers auctioning off the right to be an NFL teams
official medical provider, hospital, or physician-group.69 The privilege of
being selected comes with the right to advertise in ones promotional
materials that her group has been named the official healthcare provider of
a particular team.70 In return, the team is provided with medical care for free
or at reduced cost.71
NFL players are the victims of this pay-to-play system as they receive
medical care compromised by the financial interests of NFL trainers.72 It is
no secret that the NFL is a business, and an extremely successful one at that.
When trainers are intertwined with team management, their medical
decisions become clouded by the number one money-making criterion in the
NFL business: winning. In order for teams to maximize profit through
winning games, it stands to reason that coaches and management place
incredible pressure on trainers to return their most talented athletes to the
68. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL and the NFLPA stipulates
that all teams shall provide for a physician to be available to players. NFL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012, art. XLIV, 1, at 197 (2006) [hereinafter NFL CBA],
available at http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/Agents/CBA_Amended_2006.pdf (follow CBA
hyperlink; then follow CBA download hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 9, 2009) (Each Club
will have a board-certified orthopedic surgeon as one of its Club physicians. The cost of
medical services rendered by Club physicians will be the responsibility of the respective
Clubs.).
69. Calandrillo, supra note 67, at 192. Dr. Dan Brock, director of Harvard Medical
Schools Division of Medical Ethics, criticized these arrangements as unseemly and
lamented the clear conflict of interest created. Bill Pennington, Sports Turnaround: The
Team Doctors Now Pay the Team, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1.
70. Calandrillo, supra note 67, at 193. Methodist Hospital, which provides medical
services to the NFLs Houston Texans, found that their association with the Texans is the
number-one driver of new calls from prospective clients. Id. (citing Pennington, supra note
69).
71. Calandrillo, supra note 67, at 192. These entrepreneurial arrangements began in
1995 with the expansion of the NFL into Jacksonville, Florida and Charlotte, North Carolina.
Id. [I]t is estimated that half of the major sports teams in the United States now have some
kind of financial or marketing arrangement to provide medical services. Id. at 193.
72. Dr. Andrew Bishop, physician for the Atlanta Falcons, threatened to resign if the
team entered a sponsorship agreement with a local hospital. Pennington, supra note 69.
Bishop is worried that if a physician is so desperate to become a trainer that hes willing to
pay to do it, then hes going to do whatever management wants to keep the job he paid for.
Id. This might include returning a player to the field before his concussive symptoms
completely disappear.
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both scientists and players.79 In this November 2, 2003 game against the New
York Giants, Chrebets concussion left him face down in an unconscious
state for several minutes.80 Pellman elected to send Chrebet back into contact
during the same game despite Chrebets prolonged state of
unconsciousness.81 Chrebet was subsequently placed on injured reserve for
the remainder of the season.82 Chrebet, 34, has recently acknowledged that
he has bouts of depression and memory problems so severe that he cannot
make the routine drive from his New Jersey home to his Long Island
restaurant without a global positioning system.83
B. NFL Player Contracts Incentivize Players to Withhold Their Concussion
Symptoms
NFL player contracts do not guarantee player payment beyond the
season in which an injury occurs.84 Thus, if a player cannot pass his team
physical at the start of the season subsequent to his injury, the contract is
79. NOWINSKI, supra note 58, at 86-87. Chrebet sustained at least six concussions
during his Jets career from 1995 through 2005. Schwarz, supra note 9.
80. NOWINSKI, supra note 58, at 86-87.
81. Id. Pellman defended his decision to return Chrebet to play in the same game based
on a scientific [and] medical evaluation. Id. This justification lacks merit. As director of the
NFLs Concussion Committee at the time of the collision, Pellman was on constructive, if not
actual, notice of peer reviewed works such as Edward Wojtyss Concussion in Sports article.
See Wojtys et al., supra note 41. Wojtyss article clearly stated that when a player sustains any
period of unconsciousness, he is not to return to the field of play in the same game. Id. at 68081.
82. NOWINSKI, supra note 58, at 87. Pellman further defended his decision to return
Chrebet to play by alleging that he asked Chrebet whether he was okay. Id. at 88. See
contract discussion infra Part III.B (indicating why Pellmans latter defense is even less
credible than his first defense).
83. Schwarz, supra note 9. The most recent example of a Pellman return-to-play
decision scrutinized by players and scientists involved Jets wide receiver Laveranues Coles.
Id. Coles suffered two concussions within the past year. Id. Declining to classify the second
injury sustained by Coles as a concussion, Jets coach Eric Mangini described the injury: He
got hit in the head. Id. Manginis words lack a sense of urgency regarding his concern over
the short and long-term consequences of Coless concussions.
84. Paragraph nine of the NFL player contract provides in relevant part:
If Player is injured in the performance of his service under this contract . . . then
Player will receive such medical and hospital care during the term of his services of
this contract as the Club physician may deem necessary, and will continue to receive
his yearly salary for so long, during the season of injury only and for no subsequent
period covered by this contract, as Player is physically unable to perform the services
required of him by this contract because of such injury . . . .
See NFL CBA, supra note 68, app. c, 9 at 251 (emphases added).
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considered void and the athlete could end up paying medical expenses for a
lifetime of chronic work-related physical problems.85 Player contracts may
also be terminated at will if a team finds that another player can make better
contributions to the teams success.86 Thus, when the injury and at will
termination provisions of player contracts are viewed in conjunction, NFL
players possess negligible job security.
A sad consequence of the NFLs player contract scheme is the tendency
of players to withhold concussion symptoms from their trainers and team
management for fear of losing their jobs. Dr. Kenneth Podell, director of the
Sports Concussion Safety Program at the Henry Ford Health System,
summarizes the problematic situation: The pressure is intense; theres
always someone on the bench waiting to take your place.87
When team management becomes privy to a players concussion history,
the team holds all leveraging power in restructuring a players contract.
Players are faced with the following Hobsons choice: (i) accept a less
lucrative contract or (ii) face employment termination. Dan Morgan, former
Carolina Panthers linebacker, suffered at least five concussions during his
tenure with the Panthers.88 Faced with the alternative of termination, Morgan
agreed to restructure his $2 million roster bonus into payments of $125,000
for each game played. Beyond acknowledging the teams concerns about
subsequent concussions, the contract gave Morgan financial incentive not to
reveal any concussion for treatment.89
Even when a player is confident enough to disclose his concussive
symptoms to a team trainer, he will not likely refuse a coachs orders to
return to play for fear of losing his starting position in the lineup. A recent
example of this situation involved the New England Patriots franchise.90
While playing linebacker for the Patriots in 2002, Ted Johnson sustained a
85. See generally Frederic Pepe & Thomas P. Frerichs, Injustice Uncovered? Workers
Compensation and the Professional Athlete, in SPORTS AND THE LAW 18 (Charles E. Quirk ed.,
1996). The only portion of an NFL players contract that can be considered guaranteed is the
signing bonus. See NFL CBA, supra note 68, at 43 (No forfeitures of signing bonuses shall
be permitted, except that players and Clubs may agree . . . .).
86. See NFL CBA, supra note 68, at 41 ([A]ny Player Contract may be terminated if,
in the Clubs opinion, the player being terminated is anticipated to make less of a contribution
to the Clubs ability to compete on the playing field than another player or players whom the
Club intends to sign or attempt to sign . . . .).
87. E.M. Swift, One Big Headache, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 12, 2007, at 22.
88. Schwarz, supra note 9.
89. Id.
90. See Swift, supra note 87, at 22 (providing an overview of the current concussion
climate in the NFL).
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severe concussion. After Johnson discussed his symptoms with his team
trainer, the trainer advised Patriots coach Bill Belichick not to return Johnson
to contact play until he became asymptomatic.91
Belichick disregarded the trainers advice by continually sending
Johnson back into full contact practices.92 In defending his decision to return
Johnson to play against the trainers orders, Belichick said: If [Johnson]
felt so strongly that he didnt feel he was ready to practice[,] he should have
told me.93 The flaw in Belichicks logic is that it assumes Johnson was
confident enough in his job security to defy his coachs orders. If Johnson
informed Belichick of his inability to return to play, he would have
effectively terminated his own contract with the Patriots.
An additional contractual reason why players fear disclosure of their
concussion symptoms pertains to the grievance hearing process in player
contract disputes. When a player is released from his team because he proves
unable to pass his physical, the NFL CBA allows a player to file a grievance
with the league.94 Here, team management might call the trainer as a witness
to testify against the player filing the grievance.95 One of the special
defenses a team may employ in response to a player contract grievance is
that the player did not pass the physical examination administered by the
Club physician at the beginning of the pre-season training camp . . . . 96
Thus, a player suffering from undisclosed concussion symptoms has a
91. Id.
92. Id. Today, Johnson suffers from depression and cognitive difficulties he attributes to
the multiple concussions he sustained in 2002. Id. An unfortunate consequence of Johnsons
post-concussion syndrome is his addiction to the amphetamines that he takes to alleviate his
symptoms. Id.
93. Id. Ernie Conwell, former NFL tight end, argues that Belichicks defense is nave
because most players would refrain from telling their coach about concussion symptoms for
fear of being labeled soft head. Carpenter, supra note 13 (emphasis added). Conwell lacks
confidence in the NFLs recently implemented anonymous hotline procedure as he finds it
unlikely that player complaints will be kept in confidence. Id. Conwell explains the
fundamental reason why players withhold concussion symptoms: Bottom line, guys are just
thinking about job security. Dave Scheiber, Concussions on Their Minds, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at 1C (emphasis added).
94. NFL CBA, supra note 68, art. X, at 16. The NFL CBA defines an injury grievance
as: a claim or complaint that, at the time a players NFL Player Contract was terminated by a
Club, the player was physically unable to perform the services required of him by that contract
because of an injury incurred in the performance of his services under that contract. Id. at 28.
95. See NFL CBA, supra note 68, at 31. At the hearing, the parties to the grievance
and the NFLPA and Management Council will have the right to present, by testimony or
otherwise, any evidence relevant to the grievance. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 28. The concept of a physician testifying against a former patient-player is a
practice unheard of in any other doctor-patient relationship. Calandrillo, supra note 67, at 195.
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97. Calandrillo, supra note 67, at 195. Another special defense to player grievances
provides in relevant part: player failed to make full and complete disclosure of his known
physical or mental condition when questioned during the physical examination. NFL CBA,
supra note 68, at 28. Consequently, it appears that players find themselves in a no-win
situation with regard to disclosure of their concussive symptoms. If they disclose, they will
potentially fail their physical and/or lose their roster spot to a player without a concussion
history; and if they neglect to disclose, their omission may be used as a special defense to their
grievance.
98. Hoge v. Munsell, No. 98 WL 0996 (Ill. Lake County Ct. July 5, 2000). See Hecht,
supra note 42, at 20 (covering the Hoge litigation in great detail and advocating for the
development of a meaningful set of guidelines for the management of sports related
concussions). Hecht argues that the scientific and legal communities should create a singular
set of concussion guidelines that would be admissible in a court of law and used by scientists
as an official standard of care. Id. at 63-64.
99. Hecht, supra note 42, at 29. Hoges trial was conducted before a county court
outside of Chicago, Illinois. Id. at 25 n. 47. Due to the fact there is no appellate record in the
case, much of Hoges story is reconstructed through anecdotal evidence, including newspaper,
magazine, and internet accounts. Id.
100. Hecht, supra note 42, at 30. See also Fred Mitchell, Hoges Suit vs. Ex-Bears
Doctor May Set Precedent, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2000, at 5.
101. Hecht, supra note 42, at 25-26. Hoge currently works as an NFL game analyst for
ESPN. Tracy L. Ziemer, New Test Helps NFL Teams Detect Concussions, ABC NEWS
ONLINE, Jan. 26, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/Story?id=99901&page=3.
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maintained that Dr. Munsell breached a duty to exercise the skill and care of
a physician for a professional football team who undertakes the return-toplay decision authority for a player who has sustained a concussion . . . .110
Finally, Hoge argued that if he had been adequately apprised of his postconcussion condition, he would have refrained from returning to play until
he had completely recovered from the first concussion.111
C. Dr. Munsells Assumption of the Risk Defense
A majority of jurisdictions hold that athletes generally assume the risk of
sports injuries that are known, apparent, and reasonably foreseeable
consequences of athletic participation.112 However, injuries which result
from conduct on the playing field that are not reasonably foreseeable are of a
different nature.113 The conduct of a coach, trainer, or member of team
treatment, and evaluation of the plaintiff following the plaintiffs injury . . . ; (c) Did
not diagnose the continuing post-concussion signs and symptoms . . . resulting from
[Hoges] concussion; (d) Did not assure that a mental status exam and cognitive
testing was performed . . . following the concussion . . . and prior to allowing [Hoge]
to return; (e) Did not instruct the plaintiff about post-concussion signs and symptoms
to watch for from his second concussion . . . ; (f) Did not instruct the plaintiff of the
risk of sustaining another and more severe concussion by returning to play contact
football while suffering post-concussion symptoms; and (g) Did not refer [Hoge] to a
neurologist or other physician for a neurological evaluation following the injury.
Id. at 27 n.60 (quoting Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 3-6, Hoge v. Munsell, No. 98
WL 0996 (Ill. Lake County Ct. July 5, 2000)).
110. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 3, Hoge v. Munsell, No. 98
WL 0996 (Ill. Lake County Ct. July 5, 2000)). See also Tony Gordon, Bears Doctor Failed to
Provide Information, CHI. DAILY HERALD, July 20, 2000, at 5.
111. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 7, Hoge v. Munsell, No. 98
WL 0996 (Ill. Lake County Ct. July 5, 2000)). If Hoge was afforded an opportunity to fully
recover from his first concussion, he alleges that it would have enabled him to remain active
as a salary-earning NFL player. Id.
112. See Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 219 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that defendants
had a continuing duty to players to keep a playing net in good repair and that a torn net is
not sufficiently interwoven into the assumed risk category.).
113. Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, An Analysis of Brown v. National Football League, 9
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 263, 286 (2002). [T]his foreseeability is dependent upon factors
such as the nature of the sport involved, the rules and regulations which govern the sport, the
customs and practices which are generally accepted and which have evolved with the
development of the sport, and the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 28687 (quoting Hanson v. Kynast, 526 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Ohio 1987)) (emphasis added).
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management may amount to such careless disregard for the safety of others
as to create risks not fairly assumed.114
With regard to voluntary participation in a sport, the assumption of risk
doctrine imports a knowledge and awareness of the particular hazard that
caused the injury.115 Thus, if a player lacks adequate knowledge of the risks
attendant to returning to play before his concussion symptoms have subsided,
he cannot be considered to have knowingly and voluntarily assumed the
short and long-term risks of such injury. Dr. Munsell argued that [t]he
patient must assume part of the responsibility for his own recovery.116
Testifying for the defense, Dr. Michael Schafer stated that Hoge withheld
from the Bears the headache symptoms he experienced after his first
concussion.117 When asked why he withheld his concussion symptoms from
management, Hoge responded that he was afraid [the team] would not let
him play.118
D. Injuries Sustained, Damages Requested, and Jury Verdict
Hoge alleged that he was unable to fully attend to his ordinary duties for
nearly one year after the concussion and continues to suffer from permanent
post-concussion symptoms.119 He explained the most frightening aspect of
the injuries he sustained: The scary part . . . is worrying about becoming
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senile at 45 or 50. The doctors told me that I may have sped up something
that normally might happen at 75 or 80.120
Hoge requested $2.2 million as an estimate for lost earnings he incurred
as a result of his premature retirement from the NFL.121 The jury found in
favor of Hoge, awarding him $1.45 million for the two years remaining on
his Bears contract, and an additional $100,000 for pain and suffering.122
E. Implications of the Hoge Verdict
The Hoge casecoupled with the evidentiary link between multiple
concussions and cognitive declineprovides players with an incentive to
tackle the NFLs concussion policies through litigation. If a collection of
judgments begins to accrue, concussion leverage might shift in favor of
players. Such case law might enable players to openly disclose their
concussion symptoms and receive proper treatment for same without fear of
employment termination.
V. TOBACCO LITIGATION PROVIDES POTENTIAL TEMPLATE FOR PLAYERS
TO STRUCTURE CLAIMS AGAINST THE NFL
The similarity between the tobacco industrys efforts to downplay the
adverse health effects of cigarettes and the NFLs attempt to raise ambiguity
about the long-term cognitive consequences of multiple concussions is
striking. The most important similarity between these factual scenarios is that
the NFL and the tobacco industry both formed research committees to refute
the mounting evidentiary load that threatened the vitality of their products.123
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The NFL has proceeded in the same manner as the cigarette industry by
denying a causal link exists and discrediting the work of independent
scientists. Given the tremendous success plaintiffs realized in the tobacco
litigation,124 the NFL Concussion Committee should disclose the findings of
independent scientists that indicate a causal link between multiple
concussions and later-life cognitive decline. If such disclosure is made, the
potential litigation listed below can hopefully be avoided.125
A. Causes of Action Employed in the Cigarette Litigation Context
Most plaintiff complaints against the tobacco industry allege several
bases of recovery, relying on theories of strict liability, negligence, express
warranty, and intentional tort.126 These claims divide into five categories: (1)
design defect claims,127 (2) failure to warn claims,128 (3) express warranty
124. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Punitive damage
awards as large as 79.5 million dollars were not uncommon in tobacco suits. Id. at 350. The
Court left the constitutionality of these massive damage awards unresolved, and remanded the
case to the Oregon Supreme Court to resolve a procedural question. Id. at 357-58. The damage
award was ultimately upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court. Williams v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
176 P.3d 1255 (Ore. 2008), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008), and cert dismissed, 129 S.
Ct. 1436 (2009).
125. See infra Part V.A.2 for a discussion of the potential misrepresentation claim
NFL players might plead against the NFL for withholding the work of outside scientists from
its August 14, 2007 press release.
126. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1992) (holding that
various state-law damages actions against the tobacco industry were not preempted by a
federal statute).
127. Id. The design defect claims allege that cigarettes were defective because the
manufacturers failed to use a safer alternative design for their products, and because the social
value of their product was outweighed by the dangers it created. Id.
128. Id. The failure to warn claims allege both that the product was defective as a
result of [the industrys] failure to provide adequate warnings of the health consequences of
cigarette smoking and that [the industry was] negligent in the manner that [it] tested,
researched, sold, promoted, and advertised its cigarettes. Id. (emphases added) (citation
omitted).
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reasonable efforts to keep the plaintiff safe while the plaintiff is in the
defendants care.135 The NFL assumed a duty to proceed with reasonable
care in its dealings with league players when it voluntarily created its internal
committee on concussions. One could argue that the NFL breached this duty
of care when it failed to warn NFL players about the long-term cognitive
risks associated with multiple concussions.
1. Failure to Warn
A duty to warn arises when one should realize through special facts
within ones knowledge or a special relationship that an act or omission
exposes another to an unreasonable risk of harm through the conduct of a
third party.136 The NFLs voluntary creation of its internal Concussion
Committee created a special relationship between the NFL and NFL players.
When the NFL became aware of empirical evidence indicating a causal link
between multiple concussions and cognitive decline, it had a duty to disclose
these special facts/risks to players. Players justifiably rely on the NFL to
warn them of any and all risks found by the Concussion Committee during
the course of its research, because the committee arguably holds itself out as
the foremost authority on the matter.137
The NFL might argue that empirical evidence spanning from the 1920s
to the 1970s failed to put it on notice that multiple concussions cause later-
An actor who undertakes to render services to another that the actor knows or should
know reduce the risk of physical harm to the other has a duty of reasonable care to the
other in conducting the undertaking if: (a) the failure to exercise such care would
increase the risk of harm beyond that which existed without the undertaking, or (b)
the person to whom the services are rendered or another relies on the actor's
exercising reasonable care in the undertaking.
Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 302B (1965) (A negligent act or
omission may be one which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through . . . the
foreseeable action of the other, [or] a third person . . . . ). Id. If a defendants relation to the
damage stems primarily from the fact that he could have prevented it or rescued the victim by
doing something rather than nothing, he is not held to a duty to take reasonable care, absent
special circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 314 cmt. a (1965). Here, the
special circumstance is the duty the NFL assumed when it voluntarily created the NFL
committee on concussions.
137. By creating the committee in 1994, one could argue that the NFL created an
impression that it was taking ownership of the concussion problem on behalf of the players.
2009]
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life cognitive decline.138 However, the NFL cannot escape the duty to warn
that was triggered at the 2007 Summit on Concussions.139 There, doctors
Omalu, Cantu, and Guskiewicz delivered face-to-face presentations to the
Concussion Committee about the causal link between multiple concussions
and cognitive decline.140 Thus, the NFL was put on actual notice about the
foreseeable risks of sustaining multiple concussions when the first
independent scientist presented his findings at the 2007 Summit.
Players could argue that, for a period of at least two years,141 the NFL
and its internal Concussion Committee not only failed to warn players about
the risks of sustaining multiple concussions, but potentially suggested that
incurring multiple concussions was safe and harmless.142 The NFL contends
that its assertions are supported by current research.143 Players might argue
that the NFLs material omission of facts144 and arguably false assertions
138. See supra Part I (discussing decades of scientific findings demonstrating a link
between multiple concussions and cognitive decline). The NFL might argue that head trauma
sustained by boxers and steeplechase jockeys is an unlike comparison to the concussions
sustained by NFL players.
139. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
140. Id. In sum, the NFL cannot plead ignorance as a defense to its failure to warn.
The NFLs response to this failure to warn claim will likely be an assumption of the risk
defense. This defense would likely prove unsuccessful because players must be aware of a risk
before they can assume the consequences. If the NFL denies the existence of risks associated
with multiple concussions, how could it logically defend that players assume these risks?
141. In 2005, Guskiewicz and Omalu published their first clinical and
neurolopathological studies on the causal link between concussions and cognitive decline. See
Guskiewicz et al., supra note 4; Omalu, CTE Part 1, supra note 5. Thus, the Concussion
Committee has been on constructive notice of this work for at least two years.
142. See Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1. The NFLs August 14,
2007 press release on concussions contained a question and answer section in which this
critical language was provided:
Am I at risk for further injury if I have had a concussion? Current research with
professional athletes has shown that you should not be at greater risk of further injury
once you receive proper medical care for a concussion and are free of symptoms.
If I have had more than one concussion, am I at increased risk for another injury?
Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having more than one
or two concussions leads to permanent problems if each injury is managed properly.
It is important to understand that there is no magic number for how many concussions
is too many.
Id. (emphases added). When asked for a response to this question/answer section of the NFL
press release, Dr. Guskiewicz responded: The first half of their statement is false . . . . And
the second part, if theyre managed properly? What does that mean? Schwarz, supra note 9.
143. Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1.
144. The omission of the clinical and neuropathological studies of Guskiewicz, Omalu,
and Cantu is material because these studies all demonstrate that players are at a greater risk of
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further injury (i.e. cognitive decline) after suffering more than one concussion. See supra
notes 4, 5, 11, 23, 35, 42 and accompanying text.
145. The NFL Concussion Committee is aware that current research does not
categorically find that there is no magic number for how many concussions is too many.
Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1 (emphases added). Dr. Cantus wellrespected return-to-play guidelines explicitly state that players should terminate their season
after suffering between two to three concussions. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
146. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 527 (1992). It is a fundamental
principle of tort law that fraud or deceit resulting in damages will give rise to a cause of
action. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 525 (1977).
147. False representation is the most important element of a claim of common law
fraud. See, e.g., Noved Realty Corp. v. A.A.P. Co., 250 A.D. 1, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937)
(suppression of a fact, coupled with a false impression, transcended shrewd trading and
entered the actionable domain of fraud). Essentially, fraud means deliberately producing a
false impression in the mind of an aggrieved party. Id. Express assertions are not the only
manner in which fraud can be perpetrated. Schemes and concealments may also constitute
actionable fraud. See, e.g., Hall v. Naylor, 18 N.Y. 588, 589 (1859) (concealing insolvency
with a design of procuring goods and not paying for same is fraud which renders a sale void).
A partial disclosure accompanied by a willful concealment of material and qualifying facts
can constitute a misrepresentation. See, e.g., Coral Gables v. Mayer, 241 A.D. 340, 341-42
(N.Y. App. Div. 1934) (failure to disclose vital facts may lead a jury to believe that fraud has
been committed). If a party speaks at all, it is obliged to make a full and fair disclosure. See,
e.g., Downey v. Finucane, 205 N.Y. 251, 264 (N.Y. 1912) (fraudulent intent on the part of an
author and publisher of a prospectus may be inferred from the falsity of the statements therein
contained and that alone).
148. See, e.g., Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 421 (1996). If
any of these elements are missing, plaintiffs claim fails. See McClurg v. State, 204 A.D.2d
999, 1000 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (a special relationship giving rise to a duty to impart
correct information could not be discerned from an arms length dealing between the parties
listed in the complaint).
2009]
723
NFL players could argue that the league misrepresented and omitted
material facts regarding the risks of sustaining multiple concussions.149 It
could be argued that the NFL omitted from its August 14, 2007 press release
the findings of Omalu, Cantu, and Guskiewicz that demonstrate a direct
correlation between concussions sustained in the NFL and later-life cognitive
decline.150 This concealment might have duped players into believing that
sustaining multiple concussions is safe, and that the NFLs committee
represents the only authoritative opinion on the matter.151 Players might
argue that what is worse than the NFLs concealment of material facts is its
arguably false statement that there is no magic number for how many
concussions is too many.152 Dr. Cantus authoritative return-to-play
guidelines clearly specify that a players season should be terminated when
he suffers between two to three concussions.153
149. American fraud theory can be summed up in its simplest form: [i]t is sufficient
to show that the defendant knowingly uttered a falsehood intending to deprive the plaintiff of
a benefit and that the plaintiff was thereby deceived and damaged. Channel Master Corp. v.
Aluminium Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 403, 406-07 (N.Y.1958) One who fraudulently makes
a misrepresentation of [intention] for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from
action in reliance [thereon is liable for the harm caused by the others] justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 525 (1977).
150. See Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1; Cantu, supra note 4,
at 223; Guskiewicz et al., supra note 4, at 719; Guskiewicz et al., supra note 11, at 903;
Omalu, CTE Part I, supra note 5, at 128; Omalu, CTE Part II, supra note 5, at 1086.
151. This tactic is similar to the tobacco industrys campaign to create doubt in the
minds of the consumer as to smoking dangers. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F.Supp.
1487 (1988). Dr. Guskiewicz voiced his frustration about the NFLs stall and delay technique:
Theyre just trying to raise ambiguity when the science is becoming more and more clear.
Schwarz, supra note 9.
152. Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1 (emphases added). The
Cipollone court held that fraud claims in the tobacco context presented genuine issues of
material fact:
A jury might reasonably conclude [that the tobacco industry] intentionally and
willfully ignored [known health consequences]; that their so-called investigation into
the risks was not to find the truth and inform their consumers, but merely an effort to
determine if they could refute the adverse reports and maintain their sales.
Cipollone, 683 F.Supp. at 1491 (emphases added).
153. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. This hypothetical litigation would
likely hinge on a courts determination of the expert methodologies at issue. Here, the players
might argue that the methodologies employed by the NFLs Concussion Committee lack
general acceptance by the scientific community. [A]n expert . . . may testify . . . in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis
724
[Vol. 40:697
added). See also supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (citing various methodological
flaws in the NFLs internal studies regarding the long-term consequences of concussions).
154. See supra notes 4, 11 and accompanying text. In response to the NFLs denial of
a link between multiple concussions and later life cognitive degeneration, Dr. Guskiewicz
made the following comment: The literature has proven it, we confirmed it in June in the
presence of their entire [concussion] committee, and I was flabbergasted that [the] statement
showed up in their literature. Schwarz, supra note 9.
155. See supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text.
156. Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1.
157. Id. (emphases added) (quoting NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell)
158. Id.
159. Id. (emphases added).
160. Id.
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players also suffering from dementia,181 and probably recognized that Mrs.
Mackeys support would prove critical in forming a potential class-action
pool.182
What makes the implementation of Section 88 even more significant is
that prior to 2006, the NFL Plan (a medical plan for retired NFL players),
made only four payments in its entire history on medical claims related to
dementia.183 Since the adoption of Section 88, the NFL has distributed $5.5
million to 107 players pursuant to the plan.184
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Note paints a bleak picture of the NFLs concussion crisis. In order
to configure potential solutions, several factors contributing to the problem
must be isolated. Violent collisions will always play an integral role in the
game of professional football. In turn, player concussions will inevitably
occur within the confines of NFL games. However, the methods in which
player concussions are diagnosed, managed, and treated can certainly be
revised. The following recommendations are intended to create a shift in
concussion policy leverage. If these critically needed changes are
implemented, NFL players and the game of professional football can only
benefit.
A. Remove Return-to-Play Decisions from Team Trainers
At present, the NFL entrusts team trainers with total discretion over
return-to-play decisions.185 Given the conflict-ridden nature of many NFL
181. Id. (detailing the contact Mrs. Mackey maintains with other retired NFL players
wives whose experiences are united by their husbands cognitive decline).
182. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (providing a list of the requirements needed to certify a
class for a class action suit).
183. See Oversight of the NFL Retirement System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Daryl Johnston, FOX Sports
Broadcaster
and
former
NFL
Player,
Dallas
Cowboys)
available
at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID
=453a85ee-b12c-41cf-ae6c-f3235655bc75&Witness_ID=7eada200-9db3-4da4-8e95b3fa278b08f9 (last visited Sept. 2, 2009).
184. Michael OKeeffe, Healing Begins for Ex-NFLers, NY DAILY NEWS, Sept. 6,
2009, at 8.
185. Press Release, National Football League, supra note 1. After a concussion, all
return-to-play decisions should be made by your team medical staff. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 308 (1965):
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2009]
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CONCLUSION
Professional football is a phenomenal sport that showcases the skills and
abilities of the worlds most talented athletes. The appeal of watching the
games best players collide at full speed has been central to the NFLs
mushrooming into a multi-billion dollar business. Unfortunately, concussions
are an inevitable consequence of many NFL collisions. Well respected
studies by the nations foremost experts demonstrate a causal link between
concussions sustained in the NFL and later-life cognitive decline. These
studies indicate that long-term damage associated with concussions is
mitigated if players allow their concussive symptoms to fully heal before
returning to play.
Players might argue that the league not only fails to warn players about
the causal link between multiple concussions and cognitive decline, but also
conceals scientific studies demonstrating same. If the NFL and its internal
Concussion Committee continue to assert arguably false facts, and conceal
the findings of outside scientists; players might target the league with a
comparable suit that struck the tobacco industry. However, litigation can
hopefully be avoided if the league simply informs players of the long-term
risks associated with concussions, revises the structure of player contracts,
and strips team trainers of return-to-play decisions. Finally, Congressional
oversight will be required to police the hopeful implementation of new
concussion procedures.
POSTSCRIPT
In 2008, Boston University Medical School and the Sports Legacy
Institute (SLI) created the Center for the Study of Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy (CSTE).195 The CSTE project is a living brain donation
program for college and professional athletes who agree to donate their
postmortem brain tissue to neuropathological analysis.196 Subjects of the
195. Boston University Alzheimers Disease Center: The Center for the Study of
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CSTE) Homepage, available at http://www.bu.edu/
alzresearch/research/encephalopathy/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). The non-profit
Sports Legacy Institute (SLI) was founded by Mr. Nowinski and Dr. Cantu in an effort to
advance the health and wellness of athletes, and the safety of athletic endeavors. Id.
196. Id. CSTEs research will include the following studies: CTEs neuropathology
and pathogenesis, CTEs clinical presentation, genetic and other risk factors for CTE, and
methods of preventing CTE. Id. Brent Boyd, former Minnesota Viking offensive lineman,
recently sent a letter to 2,000 retired NFL players imploring them to donate their brain tissue
to CSTE upon death. See Bob Hohler, Major Breakthrough in Concussion Crisis: Researchers
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study will complete a yearly interview with study staff during their lifetime
describing their athletic concussion history, educational, occupational, and
medical history, and current cognitive symptoms.197 As of Super Bowl
Sunday 2009, at least ten NFL alumni agreed to donate their brain tissue to
the CSTE project.198
On the morning of February 6, 2008, the NFL community received
troubling news regarding the accidental death of one of its alumni.199
Responding to a 911 call, Missouri City police found the body of former
Houston Oiler linebacker John Grimsley.200 Detective Steve Glave described
the gunshot cause of death as follows: This does not appear to be a crime of
violence. [Rather, ] [i]t appears to be a very tragic accident.201
When reports of a potential link between multiple concussions and the
early onset of cognitive decline began to surface in the media; Grimsleys
widow, Virginia, discussed the troubling topic with her husband.202 During
these conversations, Grimsley told his wife that he sustained at least nine
concussions during his nine season NFL career.203 Approximately five years
before Grimsleys death, he began to exhibit the irritability and short-term
memory problems that are considered early behavioral manifestations of
CTE.204
Find Signs of Degenerative Brain Disease in an 18-Year-Old High School Football Player,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/sports/other_sports/
articles/2009/01/27/major_breakthrough_in_concussion_crisis/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
Boyd, 51, played six seasons for the Vikings in the 1980s, and suffers from post-concussion
disability. Id.
197. Boston University Alzheimers Disease Center, supra note 201. CSTE recently
received a $250,000 grant from the National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic
Equipment, which aims in part to improve helmet safety. Hohler, supra note 196.
198. Alan Schwarz, 12 Athletes Leaving Brains To Researchers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2008, at D1. Some of the players agreeing to leave their brain tissue to science include: Joe
DeLamielleure, Willie Wood, Dan Pastorini, Ken Gray, Harry Jacobs, Mel Owens, Chad
Levitt, Willie Daniel, Wayne Hawkins, and Ralph Wenzel. Hohler, supra note 196.
199. Ex-Houston Oiler dies in shooting accident, WFAA.com, Feb. 6, 2008, available
at www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dws/wfaa/latestnews/stories/wfaa080206_mo_formeroiler.
97e82ea8.html.
200. Id.
201. Id. Grimsley is survived by his wife and two college-age sons. Id.
202. Schwarz, supra note 198.
203. Id. Grimsleys NFL career spanned from 1984 through 1993. Id.
204. Id. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing a brief historical sketch of
CTE, as well as some of the clinical and neuropathological symptoms of CTE). Virginia
Grimsley cites the following example as one of Grimsleys short-term memory problems: I
would tell him what to get at the store two miles away, and hed forget and have to call me
from there to ask. Id.
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205. Schwarz, supra note 198. Virginia explained her reasoning in donating her
husbands brain tissue as follows: John helped people his whole life. . . . Even though hes
gone, hell still be helping people. Id.
206. Jamie Talan, New Report Links Sports Concussion to Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy: Athletes Pledge to Donate Tissue for Brain Bank, 8 NEUROLOGY TODAY 12,
12-13 (2008), available at http://www.aan.com/elibrary/neurologytoday/?event=home.show
Article&id=ovid.com%3A%2Fbib%2Fovftdb%2F00132985-200810020-00008 (explaining
that Grimsleys postmortem tissue showed extensive evidence of CTE, and describing that
investigators at Boston University linked the condition to his past history of concussions).
207. Schwarz, supra note 198. Former Philadelphia Eagle Andre Waters, and former
Pittsburgh Steelers Mike Webster, Terry Long and Justin Strzelczyk were the first four NFL
alumni whose postmortem brain tissue presented signs of CTE. See supra notes 5-8 and
accompanying text. The only former player whose brain tissue did not show signs of CTE
upon examination was former NFL running back Damien Nash. Schwarz, supra note 198. Mr.
Nash died last year at 24 after collapsing while playing basketball. Id.
208. Alan Schwarz, Sixth N.F.L. Players Brain is Found to Have Damage, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at B11. McHales NFL tenure spanned from 1987 through 1995. Id.
209. Id. McHale was 45 years of age at the time of his death, and was survived by his
wife and three sons, ages 14, 11, and 9. Hohler, supra note 196.
210. Schwarz, supra note 208.
211. Id. McHale did not inform his wife whether he sustained any concussions in the
NFL. Id. However, McHales depression and lethargy might represent clinical manifestations
of CTE. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (detailing Dr. Guskiewiczs 2007 study
targeting the link between multiple NFL concussions and depression). Dr. McKee stated that
McHales drug use could not have caused the neuropathological signs of CTE evidenced in
his brain tissue. Schwarz, supra note 208.
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2009]
735
Perhaps Casson will respond to the McHale and Grimsley studies in 2009
when McKees forthcoming paper is published in a peer-reviewed scientific
journal.
In defense of the NFLs attempt to raise ambiguity about the link
between multiple concussions and later-life cognitive decline, Jeff Pash, NFL
executive vice president for labor, made the following comment: There are .
. . many people who have played football and other contact sports for many
years [who] do not appear to have suffered these types of deficits. Whether
its President Ford or major business leaders, [or] people on television.223
Dr. Perl criticizes Pashs logic on the basis that many members of a group
not having a condition is irrelevant to the question of how many do have it,
and why.224
The NFL is currently conducting its own internal study to determine if
there are any long-term effects of concussions on NFL athletes. NFL
221. Id.
222. Schwarz, supra note 208.
223. Id. In response to the Grimsley findings and the brain-donation program at
Boston University, NFL spokesperson Greg Aiello made the following statement: [T]here
continues to be considerable debate in the medical community on the precise long-term effects
of concussions and how they relate to other risk factors. See Schwarz, supra note 198.
224. Schwarz, supra note 208. Dr. Perl supported his logic with the following
hypothetical: Lets say 20 percent are susceptible to something80 percent are not going to
show anything. . . . But if 20 percent have what should otherwise be a very rare condition, and
that could be the case here, you cant rely on the 80 percent to suggest there is no problem.
Id.
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spokesman Greg Aiello estimates that the findings will be published in 2010,
but Pash pushed Aiellos estimate back to roughly 2011 or 2012.225 If
previous NFL publications on this issue serve as any indication, the
Concussion Committees forthcoming article will likely attempt to
undermine the studies of independent scientists as lacking scientific rigor,
and refute any causal link between multiple concussions and cognitive
decline.226
Researchers at Boston University Medical School question the NFLs
forthcoming study on the basis that it lacks proper independence. Dr. Robert
Stern, a neurologist and co-director of the BU brain study center articulates
this inherent conflict of interest: Its hard for the NFL to do its own research
because they have an implicit conflict of interest. . . . Thats not to say I
dont trust them, but its like trusting the tobacco industry to do its own
research on the link between cigarettes and lung cancer.227 Thus, in two
sentences, Dr. Stern crystallizes the central message of this Note.