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Constitutional Law 1 Digest Compilation
Constitutional Law 1 Digest Compilation
Thus the CSC is given the power over the President primarily
to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to
the classified service. To hold that civil service officials hold
their office at the will of the appointing power subject to
removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and
undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service
System and structure. System will devolve Jacksonian Spoils
System under which a victorious Chief Executive.
49. NAMARCO V. ARCA
Facts:
Respondent Arive was the Manager of the Traffic- Storage
Department of NAMARCO. Pursuant to General Managers
Administrative Order No. 1180, he was investigated by a
committee for violating Management Memorandum Order
directing that the allocation and deliveries of merchandise
imported under the Trade Assistance Program to its designated
beneficiaries be stopped and for causing the improper release
of shipments intended for delivery upon full payment by the
Federation United NAMARCO distributors (FUND). The
committee found Arive guilty, and so the General Manager
issued Admin Order No. 137 holding Arive guilty and
dismissing him from the service. The Board of Directors
adopted Resolution No. 584-60 dismissing him from the
service with prejudice to his reinstatement and to all benefits
he would have been entitled to.
Arive then appealed to the President of the Philippines,
resulting to a decision handed down by Executive Secretary
Ramon Diaz setting aside the Resolution of NAMARCO and
reinstating Arive to his former position. The reason stated was
that the decision of NAMARCO stopping the further delivery
of the commodities had been subsequently declared illegal by
the Supreme Court for violating the contract sale, so it would
be improper to hold Arive liable for his failure to comply with
an illegal order. In addition to that, ,The Pasig River bodegas
being private warehouses could not be controlled and
supervised by Arive, so the release of the commodities cannot
be blocked by him.
NAMARCO filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the
power to remove its subordinate employees through RA 1345
(NAMARCO Charter) belongs to the General Manager with
the approval of the Board of directors, which is not appealable
to any governmental body. The motion was denied, along with
a subsequent motion for reconsideration. NAMARCO failed to
comply with the order to reinstate Arive, despite a complaint
from Arive. The Court in granting the complaint of Arive ruled
that the President has control and supervision over all GOCCs
including NAMARCO, hence he may review or nullify any act
of NAMARCO, and that the right to reinstatement of Arive
appears to be very clear. Thus the present petition filed by
NAMARCO.
Issue/s:
W/N the President has authority to reverse the decision of the
Board of Directors of the NAMARCO and to order the
reinstatement of Arive.
Held:
Yes. The Court rules that the President can review and reverse
the decision of NAMARCO, and to order his reinstatement for
it falls within the constitutional power of the President over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. NAMARCO is
STREAMLINE
AND
HARMONIZE
THEIR
IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING
FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
AND
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies
and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems. Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798
allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of
the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420
infringes on the citizens right to privacy. Petitioners in G.R.
No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void because the Executive
has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no
power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation of
the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for
that purpose.
Issue/s:
W/N issuing EO 420 is unconstitutional as it is beyond the
power of the President.
Held:
No. Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All
government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents
shall be covered by this executive order. EO 420 applies only
to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions under existing laws. These government entities have
already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to
adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions
under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs. In short, the purposes of
the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce
costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility,
and provide convenience to the people served by government
entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and
recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific
items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4)
Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8)
Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight;
(12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any
prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and
(14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for
personal identification by government entities, and even by the
private sector. Anyone who applies for or renews a drivers
license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably
more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420
will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in
the ID databases of the government entities. Government
entities cannot collect or record data, for identification
purposes, other than the 14 specific data.
Making the data collection and recording of government
entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will
admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are
the various awards committees meet two tests: that there has
not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and
that the nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination
meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President for
conferment shall be made.
Clearly, the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited to
determining whether the nominations submitted by a particular
awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA and CCP
Boards, have been tainted by abuse of discretion, and whether
the nominees are in good standing. Should the nominations
meet these two criteria, the Committee on Honors shall make a
recommendation to the President for conferment of the Order
of National Artists.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection
process and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully
enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the
matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the
names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards.
Applying this to the instant case, the former President could
not have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Manosa and Moreno, as their names were not
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who
was the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time, the
Guidelines expressly provides: NCCA and CCP Board
members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and
staff are automatically disqualified from being nominated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009
proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Manosa, and Jose Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
58. IBP V. ZAMORA
Facts:
Because of the growing number of criminal incidents around
Metro Manila, then President Estrada gave a verbal directive
to the PNP and Marines to conduct a joint visibility patrols to
prevent and suppress crimes. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the
PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
were tasked to execute and implement the said order. A Letter
of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI) which detailed the manner of
the TASK FORCE TULUNGAN was released by PNP .
The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the Marines
and filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment of the Marines, unconstitutional on the ground
that: (a) There was no emergency situation obtains in Metro
Manila as would justify such deployment (violates Art 2, Sec.
3 of the constitution), (b) Deployment constitutes an insidious
incursion by the military in a civilian function of government
(violates Art. 16, Sec. 5) (c)Deployment creates a dangerous
tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions
of the government. Unwittingly making the military more
powerful than hat it should be under the constitution
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation
exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that
by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
Issue/s:
W/N the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao,
render the issues moot and academic.
Held:
Issue is moot. Although the above vests in the President the
power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the
Congress. Thus:
o The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary,
good for only 60 days;
o He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension,
report his action in person or in writing to Congress;
o Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly
convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for
the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
o The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the
Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow their limited
effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems
warranted.
Supreme Courts Power in Emergency Powers
Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers.
The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a
justiciable one in the hands of the Court. President Arroyo
withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.
Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot
and the Court has nothing to review.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully
implemented. The military did not take over the operation and
control of local government units in Maguindanao.
No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported President did
not issue any law or decreeaffecting Maguindanao. Those who
were arrested during the period
were either released or promptly charged in court.
Stated in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
Court has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate
proceeding to review but more than two years have passed
Held:
No. It should be observed that there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this constitutional prerogative on pardon by the
Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of
impeachment.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is
seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to
serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly
waived in writing, except where the death penalty was
imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies
for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and
has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case,
executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial
court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be
acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government concerned must require proof from the accused
that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a
certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as
the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those
in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as
a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
Counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is
hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which
to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to
submit it to this Court.
73. ECHEGARAY V. SEC. OF JUSTICE
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of
death was to be imposed upon him. He then filed motion for
recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death
penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress
changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No.
8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a
Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection
against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel,
degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due
process, 3. a violation of the Philippines obligations under
international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative
power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent
Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation
of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion
to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
Issue/s:
W/N the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her
debt power to the respondents.
Held:
Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing
powers and that the President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever
and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant.
On the other hand, the President can delegate this power to her
direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President
to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy
for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm
of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is
to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and
cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals. If the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she
would have to pause from running the country long enough to
focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward
this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives
to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board,
explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and
more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to
Held:
79. LAND BANK V. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held:
80. GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
Facts:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales
filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA
No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207,
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA
2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines,
and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration
and any other government agency from importing rice and
corn, Section 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties
may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid executive agreements
with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA
2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be
resolved under the American jurisprudence.
Issue/s:
W/N RA 3452 prevails over the executive agreements entered
into by the President.
Held:
Yes. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established.
The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the
same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said
contracts may properly considered as executive agreements,
the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent
with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement,
enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted
prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers
of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may
not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of law, byindirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point
of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, also insist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon
the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a
branch of the legislative department. No such justification can
be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up
and that of the United States.
81. PIMENTEL V. ERMITA
Facts:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the
cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective
departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed
a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel
averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the
consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in
accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive
Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective
departments should be designated in an acting capacity and
not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue
temporary designation to an officer in the civil service
Descript
ion
Interim
It is a permanent
appointment because it
takes effect immediately
and can no longer be
withdrawn
by
the
President
once
the
appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that
it
is
subject
to
confirmation by the
COA does not alter its
Appointments
in an Acting
Capacity
Acting
appointments
are a way of
temporarily
filling
important
offices but, if
abused, they
can also be a
way
of
circumventin
permanent
character
(Matibag vs Benipayo)
When
Effectiv
e
Upon Acceptance
Appointee
When
Made
When Congress is in
recess
Any
time
when there is
vacancy
Submitt
ed to the
COA
Yes
No
by
Upon
Acceptance
by Appointee
Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the
holding of Balikatan-02-1 joint military exercise has not
intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call
for the correction on its part.
The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.
83. BAYAN V. EXEC. SEC.
Facts:
On March 14, 1947 the Philippine and United States Forged a
Military Bases Agreement which allowed the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by United States
personnel. On August 30, 1951 the Mutual Defense Treaty was
signed where US and Phil agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessel,
and aircraft.
In 1991, the Philippines and US negotiated in the possible
extension of the military bases agreement since it was
expiring. On August of that year, the Senate rejected the RPUS Treaty of Friendship, which is the treaty that would have
extended the duration of military bases in Phil. The expiration
of the treaty held in abeyance the joint military exercise
between the two countries. Though the 1951 defense treaty
was still active.
In 1997, US Defense Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell and Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino, Jr. to exchange notes regarding the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). In 1998,
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA together with the
US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. President Joseph Estrada
also ratified the treaty during the same year through the Sec of
Foreign Affairs Exec Secretary Ronaldo Zamora. Sec Zamora
send the treaty to the Senate for concurrence pursuant to
Article 21 of the 1987 Constitution (No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate). The
Committee on Foreign Relations headed by Rodolfo Biazon
held joint public hearings and consider it for recommendation.
The treaty was numbered as Resolution number 443. In May
27, 1999, the Resolution number 443 was approved by the
Senate by a two-thirds (2/3) vote. It entered into force on June
1.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section
21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution.
2. W/N the US Senate needed to ratify the treaty with
the Philippines or a mere signature of the President
was enough.
Held:
(1) Section 21 deals with (a) treaties or international
agreements in general and (b) applies to variety of treaty or
international agreements. On the other hand, Section 25 deals
with treaties which involve the presence of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. In this case,
Section 25 is applied since it is a treaty concerning the
military. Section 21 will determine the number of votes
required, which is two-thirds or not less than 16 (Senate is
composed of 24 members). The 16 number will not be reduced
despite absence of other senators since it refers to the Senate
as a whole. Lex specialis derogant generali means that where
The fact that international law has been made part of the law
of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and
a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
they are in conflict with the constitution.
85. BAYAN MUNA V. SEC. ROMULO
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group
established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as
then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The
serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent
US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA
and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003
(E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In
esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace
of the strategic security and defense partnership between the
two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements
have been effected by and between the US and 33 other
countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or
former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other
shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,