Sagi and Statman, DCM
Sagi and Statman, DCM
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In sum, the claim that humanbeings must obey Godunconditionally and performcertainacts becauseGodhas ordainedthem doesnot
contradictthe claim that God commandsthese acts on the basis of
their intrinsicmoralvalue. Hence,the claimthat the commandments
have reasons does not contradictthe claim that the human duty to
obeythese commandmentsis not contingenton these reasonsbut relies on the acknowledgmentof God'sabsoluteauthority.
1.2 The overlapof divine commandand moralrequirement
We must still explain,however,how exactlythe duty of obedienceis
compatiblewith the autonomyof morality. To do that, we use a version of weak dependence. Since human beings are limited in their
moralunderstandingand in their abilityto pursuea moralactivityin
light of this understanding,only unconditionalobedienceto Godcan
ensure right moralbehavior.
Twerskyis certainlycorrectwhen he arguesthat God'scommandis
a crucialfactorin Judaism,but the questionis: what is the precise
role of this command?Morespecifically,do divine commandsdetermine morality,or do they merelyrevealwhat, independentlyof these
commands,is morallycorrect?Advocatesof the formeroptioncommit
themselvesto a DCMtheory,whereas supportersof the latter reject
DCMand adopt,at best, a thesis of weak dependence.
One cause for mistakemightbe the ambiguityof statementstaking
the form:"Actx is moralbecauseGodhas commandedit."This statement can be interpretedin two ways. One argues that God determines moralityand, therefore,if God commandsx, this necessarily
impliesthat x is moral. Anotherarguesthat, since Godis morallyand
rationally perfect, His commandis, necessarily, morally right. In
other words,whereasthe abovestatementmight be perceivedas implyingstrongdependence,it couldjust as easily be seen as compatible
with a view of moralityas independent.This analysisclarifiesan importantdistinction:while both supportersand opponentsof DCMadmit to a perfectoverlapbetween acts that are morallyrequiredand
acts that are divinelycommanded,they differin their interpretationof
this overlap. Supportersof DCMbelievethat the overlapis explained
by the fact that God determinesmorality;opponentsof DCMargue
that it reflectsthe moraland rationalperfectionof God. The fundamental claim of DCM,then, is not merelythat God'scommandsoverlap moral obligations,but that this overlapis explainedby the fact
that Goddeterminesmorality. Moreformally,DCMdoes not merely
assume a logicalequivalencebetweenGod'scommandsand moralob-
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ligations,but an asymmetricalrelationshipbetweenthem.6
Obviously,then, pointingto sourcesstressinga duty of obedienceto
God, or to sources claimingthat God'scommandsare moral, is not
enoughto lend credenceto the presenceof DCMideas in Jewish tradition. For the purposeof confirmingthis thesis, we wouldneed to find
sourcesarguingthat Goddeterminesmoralityby His free and spontaneous will, as this claim is formulatedin the writings of the Islamic
schoolof Al-Ash'ari,as well as in those of Williamof Ockham,Martin
Luther,and others.
In the secondpart of this article,we analyzeJewish sourceswhich,
prima facie, seem to supportDCM. We seek to demonstratethat a
carefulreadingof these texts fails to supportthis interpretationor, at
least, makesit highly questionable.Wethen pointto sourcesthat explicitly endorsethe autonomyof moralityand the rejectionof DCM.
In the third and last part of the articlewe suggest a theoryto explain
the absence- or the marginality- of the strongdependencethesis in
Judaism.
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All their actions [of the established teachers against the new ones] would
be guiltless, had Halakha ruled in their favor and allowed them to prevent the new ones [from working], and the new ones would [then] be
guilty. . . . But now, that the ruling is that "the jealousy of scribes increaseth wisdom,"and this is considered a higher principle than the livelihood of private people, the guests [new teachers] have followed the
Halakha, and those opposing them "spill innocent blood". . . [21].
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Why, indeed, the queries, Heaven forbid, and the misgivings. . . . How
could we wish to understand these acts of God and, Heaven forbid, be
hurt when we do not? If we do not understand a blade of grass created by
God, then we shall certainly be unable to grasp a soul and, all the more
so, an angel and, all the more so, His knowledge, may He be blessed.
How, then, could we wish to understand what He, may He be blessed,
knows and understands [139]?
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callingthe moralcommandments"rational"
(sikliyyot)does not imply
that he believesthem to be a result of God'sarbitrarywill. Although
Maimonidesis opposedto a particularkind of rationalityregarding
moral duties, he does not rule out the rationalbasis of moralobligations altogether. Quitethe contrary.Moralobligations,as noted, are
a conditionof humanperfection,and the fact that they are definedas
"truisms"(mefursamot)doesnot implythat they dependon God'scommand for their validity,as wouldappearfromDCM.10
This view regardingthe autonomyof moralityis quite widespread
in modernJewish thought- for example,in the work of Moses Mendelsohnand HermannCohen. It is interesting,however,to finda similar position being endorsed by thinkers deeply anchored in the
halakhic world. Followingis a text by R. Moses Samuel Glasner
(Hungary,the nineteenthcentury):
Know that human beings find many acts revolting, even if not forbidden
by the Torah, and anyone engaging in these acts would be more loathsome than one who transgresses an explicit prohibition of the Torah. As
for all things that enlightened people find loathsome, even if not explicitly
forbiddenby the Torah:one who engages in them is worse than one transgressing the laws of the Torah . . . and can no longer be seen as created in
His image [Glasner 1921, preface].11
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With respect to the verse "Its ways are ways of pleasantness and all its
paths are peace"(Prov 3:17). Are the ways [of the Torah] pleasant, peaceful and true of their own nature, though we did not know that and God,
may He be blessed, revealed them to us; or, are their pleasantness and
sweetness contingent to our being commanded, and through the command . . . they are pleasant and peaceful ways?12
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We couldthus expectthat some halakhicsourceswill explicitlyobject to DCM,and we considersome of the most relevant ones below.
The sevara, an halakhicnotiondepictingnormsand principlesbased
on reason,makes an excellentcase for the centralrole of human discretion in the shaping of halakhic decisions (Sagi 1991a, 1991b).
Norms based on a sevara are not derivedfrom textual material but
rest on rationalunderstanding.The sages infer both specificrulings
and general moralprinciplesfroma sevara. Sanhedrin74a is an instance of a specificrulinginferredfroma sevara:the decisionto define
homicideas an offenseto be avoidedeven at one's peril rests on an
autonomousreason:"Whois to say that yourbloodis redderthan his
blood?"An instance of a general principlebased on a sevara is the
legal rule:"theonus of proofis on the claimant,"whichis derivedfrom
the sevara:"Isit not commonsense that if a man has a pain he visits
the healer?"(Bava Kamma46b).
These examplesclarifythat a sevara is a productof independent
judgmentratherthan an inferencefroma text or a tradition. In the
wordsof R. ZeviHeyyot,"Allthese principlesare embeddedin human
rationality,and are neitherinferredfromthe Torahnor fromoraltraditions"(1958, 1:313). Even thoughhalakhicrulingsbased on human
understandingare not inferredfromthe Torah,"nevertheless. . . matters inferredthrougha sevara are of equal standingto the Torahitself" (1958, 1:313).
Furthermore,not only are the sages willingto acceptclaimsresting
on sevara,they actuallyview normsbasedon a sevaraas preferableto
those arguedthroughtextual arguments. The Talmudoften claims,
"Whydo I need a text? It is a matter of sevara!"(see Ketuboth28a;
Bava Kamma 46b). Wheneverpossible, norms should be inferred
throughhuman understandingratherthan pinnedon biblicalverses
or other texts. Human discretion is decisive in the shaping of
halakha,even whensevarais not specificallymentionedas a technical
term. Many discussions in talmudic literature are conductedon
purelyrationalgrounds,withoutany recourseto textualmaterial,and
the legitimationgrantedto this type of halakhicactivityis extendedto
the sevara. Evennormsbasedon biblicalverses are not generallyperceived as edicts but as logical andjust laws to be enforcedby logical
and just means.
This idea is well formulatedby R. Abrahamben Mosesben Maimon,
in a responsumregardingthe law of bar-matsra.Accordingto Jewish
law, whoeversells a piece of land has a specialobligationto sell it to
the person whose land borderson the seller's. Furthermore,if the
land has been sold to someoneelse, the neighbor(or bar-matsra)is
entitled to forcethe buyer out of the land. This law is based on the
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autonomousin the exerciseof his discretion.Moreover,the moralconsiderationshe appliesin any given situationare not mere amplifications of the writtenlaw and,at times, may evenbecomethe basis for a
new and radicalinterpretationof the law. Given this descriptionof
two of its basic components,halakhicactivityis clearlyhardto reconcile with DCM,whichassumesthat morallaw is determinedby God's
will, thereby making rational considerationsirrelevant. A powerful
expressionof the independentrole of moraldiscretionappearsin the
writings of R. Simeon Skop, a leading Eastern Europeanhalakhist
beforethe SecondWorldWar:
Legal rulings on civil matters are unlike other commandments of the Torah. All the commandments are what the Torah has warned us to do and
not to do, and our duty to follow them is [based] on the principle of observing God's commandments, but this is not so in civil matters. Before a
divine commandto pay or to return something can be enforced,it must be
preceded by a legal obligation. . . . Another fundamental principle is that,
whenever we discuss a person's ownership of a specific object, we are not
considering the observance of a commandmentbut a factual matter- who
does this object belong to, and who is legally entitled to seize it. Therefore, when the rabbis ruled on civil matters, their rulings were obviously
based on rational decisions, as would appear from legal theory [Skop
1980, 5:1; see Sagi 1995].
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when ruling, follows a text without understanding its reasons, who walks
like the blind [Loew 1971, 1:69].
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mercies are over all His works" [Maimonides 1951, Laws Concerning
Slaves 9:8].
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6. Summary
The purposeof this paperhas been to examinewhethertheories of
strongdependence,that is, DCMtheories,appearin Jewish tradition.
We analyzedseveral Jewish texts purportingto advocatethis theory
and foundthat most of them could,at best, supportonly a weak version of dependence. DCM features in both Christianityand Islam
and, in religiousterms, offers a highly appealingthesis. In light of
these factors,we viewedits absencefromJudaismas a puzzlingphenomenonrequiringexplanation. In the last section of the paper,we
arguedthat the nature of halakhicactivity,which grants broadlatitude to autonomoushumanjudgmentand acknowledgesthe independenceof moralvalues,couldaccountforit. In line with this argument,
we have endedby dwellingbrieflyon the image of Godembeddedin
Halakha, showing it to be incompatiblewith the one that emerges
fromDCM. The analysis we have suggestedmay shed new light on
several elementsconstitutiveof Judaismand on the systematiclinks
betweenthem. The absenceof DCMtheoriesmay help us gain important insights into Jewish ethics, as well as into centralaspectsof Jewish theologyand anthropology.
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