RULE 110 - Metrobank v. Reynado
RULE 110 - Metrobank v. Reynado
REYNADO
G.R. No. 164538; 9 August 2010
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) charged respondents Rogelio Reynado and Jose Adrandea
with the crime of estafa under Art. 315 parag. 1(b) of the RPC. It was alleged that the special audit conducted on
the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated
by respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents
were the only voting members of the branchs credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to
clients up to P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up
capital of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling
P81,652,000.00 against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioners Port Area branch; that,
consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioners funds even before the seven-day clearing period for
regional checks expired; that Universals withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without
prior approval of petitioners head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason "Account Closed"; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.
Respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they only
intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, Metrobank and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement whereby the latter
acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 and undertook to pay the
same in bi-monthly amortizations of P300,000.00 as covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the
remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any.
After preliminary investigation, prosecutor Edad found petitioners evidence insufficient to hold respondents
liable for estafa. According to her, the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts Metrobank in estoppel
to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the
relations between the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal
liability on the part of respondents. Thus, the dismissal of the case is recommended.
Likewise, the DOJ dismissed the petition averring that no estafa exists in the instant case as it was not clearly
shown how respondents misappropriated the P53,873,500.00. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the
Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which
they approved. Also, no damage was caused as Metrobank agreed to settle with Universal.
MR was filed by petitioner which was denied. Aggrieved, it went to the CA to file for certiorari and mandamus.
CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the DOJ Sec, and accordingly, just as Universal cannot be held responsible
under the bills purchase transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with
the former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions. And since the dismissal of the complaint is
founded on legal ground, respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to file an information in court.
Although, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other responsible
individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their
inclusion in the information, nevertheless, CA disposed of the petition.
ISSUE:
Is the non-inclusion of officers of Universal a ground for the dismissal of the complaint?
HELD: No. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced
either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to
be responsible therefor. Thus, the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the
circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private
complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG
correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of certain employees of Universal who
were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot
seriously argue that because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not
likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public prosecutor
from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged.
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into between petitioner
and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the latters liability as a corporate
entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner
Metrobank.
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense best
left to the trial courts deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To
emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is "not a
part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof." A "finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged."
Where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the
corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a
deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused
his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as acknowledged by the
investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latters finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution
anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause. Findings of the
Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.