Bantoto v. Bobis
Bantoto v. Bobis
Bantoto v. Bobis
L-18966
character of the employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property is not be
seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by analogy to a regular guarantor, the
master may not demand prior exhaustion of the servant's properties if he can not "point out
to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover
the amount of the debt" (Cf. Civil Code, Article 1060). This rule is logical, for as between the
offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter who is in a
better position to determine the resources and solvency of the servant or employee.
Vallejo invokes Marquez vs. Castillo:
The subsidiary liability of the master, according to the provisions of Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, arises and takes place only when the servant, subordinate, or employee
commits a punishable criminal act while in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and
service, and he is insolvent thereby rendering him incapable of satisfying by himself his own
civil liability.
The passage is a mere obiter because the part immediately preceding the quotation shows
that the ratio decidendi of the case was that the accident involved, unlike in the case at bar,
did not occur in the performance of the driver's assigned duties.
2. NO. Supposing that Exhibits "A" and "B", the execution and the sheriff's return, in the
criminal case were not admissible at the trial of the case against the master, they would
certainly be material and admissible when issuance of a writ of execution of the appealed
judgment is demanded. The Court has ruled that in the absence of collusion the judgment
convicting and sentencing the servant to pay indemnity is conclusive in an action to enforce
the subsidiary liability of the master or employer. Since Bobis, the driver, was also a
defendant, the writ of execution issued in the criminal case to enforce the civil indemnity, and
its return without satisfaction, are not irrelevant evidence in the action against him and his
employer.
3. YES. The award of exemplary damages was improper. The case was predicated upon the
sentence of conviction in the criminal case. No such damages were imposed on the driver,
and the master, as person subsidiarily liable, can not incur greater civil liability than his
convicted employee, any more than a guarantor can be held responsible for more than the
principal
debtor
(Cf. Civil
Code,
Article
2064).
Attorneys fees should be allowed. Vallejo had reason to know that his driver could not pay
the indemnity imposed in the criminal case, because if he could, or if he had money or
leviable property worth that much, Bobis would be operating his own jeepney instead of
another's. Article 2208, paragraph 9, authorizes the award of counsel's fees "in a separate
civil action to recover the civil liability arising from a crime."
Final Ruling:
Decision modified by eliminating the award of P1,000.00 exemplary damages and doubling
the award for counsel fees, with the result that appellant shall pay the indemnity of
P3,000.00, with interest at 6% from the filing of the complaint, plus P1,000.00 attorney's
fees. In all other respects, said decision is affirmed. No costs.