Criminallawreview Cases

Public Crime vs.
Private Crime
G.R. No. 85329
August 16, 1994
7. Groceries 200.00
8. Cash money 600.00
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDDIE APAWAN and RUBEN SAUSE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
to the damage and prejudice of Mrs. Fe Palmon in the

aforementioned amount of Five Thousand Two Hundred Five
(P5,205.00) pesos; that after taking the above-enumerated
items and on the occasion of said robbery, accused Eddie
Apawan held Fe Palmon by the hand and forcibly pulled her
towards the kitchen of the house and by means of threat, force,
violence and intimidation, and against her will, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with her.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:
In an Information dated December 3, 1985, accused-appellants EDDIE
APAWAN and RUBEN SAUSE were charged with the crime of ROBBERY WITH
RAPE, 1 allegedly committed as follows:
T O T A L P 5,205.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
That on or about the 19th of September, 1985 at about 10:00
o'clock in the evening thereof, at Sitio Crossing Sulit, Barangay
Sulit, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, in (the) company with (sic) three (3)
other persons whose names, identities and whereabouts are
unknown, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with deliberate intent, intent of (sic) gain,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, without the
consent and against the will of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away
the following:
1. One (1) unit cassette (valued at) P 40.00
2. One (1) wrist (S)eiko watch . . . 500.00
3. One (1) leather bag 30.00
4. One (1) blanket 200.00
5. One-half (1/2) (sack) clean rice 275.00
6. Assorted personal belongings 3,000.00
When arraigned, Eddie Apawan and Ruben Sause pleaded not guilty.
underwent trial.
They
The records reveal that FE PALMON is a married woman and a mother of five
children. She resides with her family in Crossing Sulit, Polomolok, South
Cotabato.
In the evening of September 19, 1985, Fe was at home looking after her children.
That night, her mother, Candelaria Junsay, and her younger brother's wife,
Seremia Junsay, stayed with her as her husband and younger brother were in
Banga to harvest palay. 3
At around 10:00 P.M., Seremia heard someone forcing to open the door leading
to the kitchen. She went to the kitchen and saw that the kitchen door was being
opened with a knife. Seremia hurriedly woke up and Fe and Candelaria. They
heard voices downstairs. The intruders were saying: "We are members of the
walay sapatos, abrehe kami." Someone said further: "Allow us to go upstairs
because we want to eat." The intruders commanded the women to switch off the
lights. 4 Fe followed.
Two (2) of the intruders, later identified as accused Ruben Sause and Eddie
Apawan, entered the kitchen. Ruben was holding a flashlight. 5 The beam
coming from the flashlight illuminated the area, allowing Fe, Candelaria, and
Seremia to see the faces of Ruben and Eddie. Ruben's head was shaved, while
Eddie, who was in fatigue uniform, had long hair. Armed with a knife, 6 Eddie
immediately grabbed Fe, poked the knife at her neck and demanded fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) from her. When she denied having that sum of
money, Eddie ordered her to open the "aparador" (cabinet), but the latter only
found P100.00. Upon searching the house, Eddie and Ruben managed to take
several items, viz: a wrist watch, a cassette, a bag, a blanket, a half sack of rice,
some grocery items, and five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash from Candelaria.
The loot, valued at approximately five thousand two hundred five pesos
(P5,205.00), was gathered in the kitchen.
Thereafter, Eddie led Fe to the kitchen, saying he would tell her about the "way
sapatos." Apparently, Eddie had other sinister intent in mind. He made Fe sit on
a stool and threatened her to let him have sexual intercourse with him,
otherwise, he would kill her child. Appalled, Fe was unable to speak. Eddie then
laid her on the floor and took her panty off. He lifted her skirt and, without much
ado, mounted her. They had coitus. Fe was too nervous to remember for how
long Eddie stayed on top of her as his threat, that he would kill her child, lingered
on her mind. 8 She did not shout or resist, fearful that Eddie would kill her if she
did. 9 She could see Seremia and Candelaria, who were in the adjoining room
barely two (2) meters from her, but Ruben Sause was guarding them. 10
During the rape, Ruben indiscriminately focused the flashlight towards the
kitchen, thus, albeit there was a "transparent" curtain covering the door between
the kitchen and the room where Candelaria and Seremia had been kept at bay,
they saw the bestial act. 11 Fifteen minutes later, Eddie and Fe emerged from
the kitchen. Fe was crying as she told Seremia and Candelaria that she was
raped. They cried as they, too, saw what happened. 12
After the robbery and rape, accused-appellants left but warned the three (3)
women not to report the incident to the authorities, otherwise, they would be
killed. 13
That same evening, Candelaria, Seremia, Fe, and her children proceeded
towards the house of Fe's mother-in-law. There, Fe recounted her ordeal to her
mother-in-law who advised her not to immediately divulge her misfortune to her
husband, Errol Palmon, as he might take some drastic action on the matter. 14
The following morning, September 20, 1985, Fe reported the robbery to the
authorities but withheld the rape from them since her husband had yet to be
informed about it. On September 24, 1986, Fe, accompanied by her husband
and her mother-in-law, reported the rape to the authorities.
Policeman Rodolfo Buenavidez investigated the case. Among those he
investigated was Eddie's wife, Jovelyn Apawan. Upon Buenavidez' request,
Jovelyn handed to Buenavidez a solo black and white photograph of Eddie who
was then in military uniform. 15 Subsequently, said photograph was shown to Fe

and she recognized Eddie as the rapist. 16
Accused-appellants hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Eddie Apawan and
Ruben Sause, both residents of Barangay Sulit (proper), Polomolok, South
Cotabato, claimed they were in their respective houses when the incident
happened.
Ruben averred he was sleeping in his house the night the robbery and rape were
committed as it was already late. The following day, he was arrested by the
authorities. He denied knowing the complainant, Fe Palmon, prior to the incident.
Eddie, for his part, alleged he stayed in his house, from 6:00 P.M. of September
19, 1985 until 6:00 A.M. the following morning, as his child was sick. He admitted
having a fatigue uniform, claiming he was a former member of the army. In the
early morning of September 20, 1985, he allegedly went to the 3rd Infantry
Battalion, in Polomolok. He averred he was in the company of some CHDF
members from said date until his arrest on September 24, 1985. At the police
station, he met the victim for the first time, and the victim cried upon seeing him.
Eddie's wife, Jovelyn, corroborated the testimony of her husband that he stayed
in their house the whole evening of September 19, 1985 and left for the 3rd
Infantry Battalion the following morning.
After trial, the lower court, in its Decision dated August 2, 1988, convicted Eddie
Apawan and Ruben Sause of the complex crime of Robbery with Rape. The
dispositive portion of the Decision 17 of the trial court reads:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the accused Eddie Apawan and
Ruben Sause guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of robbery with rape attended by the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength
without being off-set (sic) by any mitigating circumstance, they
are both sentenced to suffer the supreme (sic) penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to jointly and severally pay the
aggrieved parties Fe Palmon and Candelaria Junsay
compensatory damages of P5,000.00 (and) moral damages to
(sic) the rape victim in the amount of P5,000.00 (sic) plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
These are the assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EDDIE APAWAN WAS NOT
PUT IN A POLICE LINE-UP FOR IDENTIFICATION BY THE
OFFENDED PARTY BUT WAS INSTEAD IDENTIFIED
THROUGH HIS PICTURE SHOWN BY THE POLICE TO THE
OFFENDED PARTY PRIOR TO HIS ARREST.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED WAS PROVEN (SIC) BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Accused-appellants claim they were not properly identified by prosecution
witnesses, viz: Fe, Seremia, and Candelaria, as there was no police line-up
conducted before they were pinpointed as the culprits. Specifically, the defense
assails Eddie's identification, claiming that the act of Pat. Buenavidez, i.e., in
borrowing Eddie's photograph and showing it to the victim, Fe, prior to Eddie's
arrest, was pointedly suggestive. The defense, further alleges, that using Eddie's
picture for identification purposes departs from the standard police procedure of
placing the suspects in a police line-up to test the accuracy of the offended party
in identifying the real culprit. We are not persuaded.
There is no rule requiring that before a suspect can be identified as the culprit,
he should first be placed in a police line-up and then pinpointed by the victim.
What is important, is the positiveness of the victim that the persons charged
were the malefactors. Such identification goes to the credibility of the witness
which was tested at the trial. 18
We have examined the records of this case and we agree with the findings of
the trial court on the positive identification of the accused-appellants.
The records reveal that accused-appellants stayed in the victim's house for
almost an hour. 19 While searching for some valuables to rob, the flashlight held
by Ruben Sause was on, thus allowing prosecution witnesses Fe, Candelaria,
and Seremia to see the faces of accused-appellants. Moreover, Eddie Apawan
constantly held Fe close to him, particularly during the rape, thus giving her
enough time to take a good look at him. As regards Ruben Sause, his shaved
head left a distinctive mark in the minds of the witnesses, not to mention that he,
too, was seen at close range by witnesses Seremia and Candelaria, while he
was keeping an eye on them during the rape.
We have ruled that it is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence
to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner in
which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of
the assailants create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from
their memory. 20
The records are bereft of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses have
improper motives to falsely point to accused-appellants as the culprits.
Significantly, accused-appellants were not known to these women prior to the
incident. Thus, we adhere to the established rule that in the absence of any
evidence to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by any
improper motive, their identification of the accused-appellants as the assailants
should be given full faith and credit. 21
The allegation of Fe Palmon that she was raped by Eddie Apawan inspires belief
as it is unlikely for her, a married woman with five children, to contrive such a
painful experience. Her failure to resist during the carnal act is of no moment
since the rapist had already intimidated the victim with his continued threats on
the victim's life and children. In this jurisdiction, the testimony of a woman, whose
morality is beyond dispute, carries a lot of weight. For no decent Filipina would
publicly admit that she has been abused and ravished unless it is the truth. Her
natural instinct is to protect her honor. 22
Fe's conduct immediately after the assault, particularly, (1) in immediately telling
her sister in-law, Seremia, that she was raped, and (2) consulting her husband's
family on whether or not to inform her husband of the incident, bolters her claim
that the robbery was accompanied by rape.
In contrast, the denial and alibi interposed by accused-appellants fail to
persuade us that they are innocent of the crime imputed against them. Alibi is a
weak defense, particularly, when it is not physically impossible for accused to
be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 23 In the case at bench,
it was not physically impossible for accused-appellants to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission as their houses were only about one and
one-half kilometers away from the residence of Fe Palmon.
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that accused-appellants are liable as
co-conspirators considering these circumstances: (1) accused-appellants acted
in unison and cooperated with each other during the robbery; (2) while Eddie
was raping Fe, Ruben kept Seremia and Candelaria at bay, and he was
nonchalant; and (3) accused-appellants left together and warned the three (3)
women not to report the incident to the authorities. Since conspiracy had been
established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the

extent of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the
act of all. 24
All things considered, we hold that accused-appellants Ruben Sause and Eddie
Apawan are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape,
as defined in Article 249 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. 25 Considering the
presence of aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nightime, and abuse of
superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same,
accused-appellants should be sentenced to death penalty. In view, however, of
the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of death penalty, 26 accusedappellants were correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with modification. Thus, the moral damages awarded in favor of Fe Palmon is
increased from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00)..27 Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 149357
March 04, 2005
MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HAJIME UMEZAWA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 149403
March 04, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUDGE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA,
Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions: a petition for review on certiorari
filed by the People of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 149403 of the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440 which
reversed its decision and granted the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus filed by respondent Hajime Umezawa; and the petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 149357 filed by petitioner Mobilia Products, Inc.
(MPI), the intervenor in the CA, assailing the same Resolution of the appellate
court.
The Antecedents
The antecedents were amply summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in the petition at bar, to wit:
Mobilia Products, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export
of quality furniture which caters only to the purchase orders booked and placed
through Mobilia Products Japan, the mother company which does all the
marketing and booking. After orders from customers are booked at the mother
company in Japan, the same are coursed through Mobilia Philippines for
implementation and production, after which, the ordered items are shipped to
Japan through the mother company.
Mobilia Products Japan sent Hajime Umezawa to the Philippines in order to
head Mobilia Products, Inc. as President and General Manager. To qualify him
as such and as a Board Director, he was entrusted with one nominal share of
stock.
Sometime in the last week of January 1995, Umezawa, then the President and
General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., organized another company with his
wife Kimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as Astem Philippines
Corporation, without the knowledge of the Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer Susumo Kodaira and the other members of the Board of Directors
of Mobilia.
The said company would be engaged in the same business as Mobilia. Spouses
Umezawa recruited Justin Legaspi, former Production Manager of Mobilia, to act
as Manager and one Yoshikazu Hayano of Phoenix Marble Corporation to serve
as investors [sic].
Pending formal organization, Spouses Umezawa, Justin Legaspi and Yoshikazu
Hayano wanted to accelerate the market potentials of Astem by participating in
the International Furniture Fair 1995 held at the Word Trade Centre of Singapore
on March 6 to 10, 1995.
One of the requirements of such Fair was that the furniture exhibits must arrive
and be received at Singapore not later than February 23, 1995. Pressed for time,
with less than one month to prepare and while Astem had yet no equipment and
machinery, no staff and no ready personnel, Umezawa, with grave abuse of the
confidence reposed on him as President and General Manager of Mobilia
Products, Inc., and in conspiracy with his wife, his sister Mitsuyo Yaguchi,
Yoshikazu Hayano and Justin Legaspi, all with intent to gain for themselves and
for their company Astem Philippines Corporation, stole prototype furniture from
petitioner Mobilia so that the said pieces of furniture would be presented and
exhibited as belonging to Astem in the International Furniture Fair 95 in
Singapore.
In order to avoid detection, Umezawa contacted Henry Chua, the owner of Dew
Foam, one of the suppliers of Mobilia, for that the latter to load several pieces of
prototype furniture into a Dew Foam truck and store them at the Dew Foam
warehouse. The first batch of furniture was stolen on February 8, 1995, when
Mr. Henry Chua, upon the request of respondent Umezawa, caused to be loaded
into his Dew Foam truck two prototype sofa models worth P500,000.00, after
which, the same were spirited from the Mobilia compound, then transported and
stored in Henry Chuas warehouse.
Again, on February 18, 1995, Umezawa, with grave abuse of confidence and
taking advantage of his position as President and General Manager, unlawfully
stole expensive furniture from Mobilias factory worth P2,964,875.00. In order to
avoid detection, the said furniture were loaded in the truck belonging to Dew
Foam, with respondent Umezawa personally supervising the loading, the carting
and spiriting away of the said furniture. Thus, taking advantage of his position
as General Manager, he managed to have the said furniture taken out of the
company premises and passed the company guard without any problem and
difficulty.
Further, on February 19, 1995, around 1 oclock in the afternoon, respondent
Umezawa again loaded into his motor vehicle, and took away from company
premises under the same irregular and unlawful circumstances, an expensive
three-seater sofa worth P255,000.00.
The taking out of the said furniture was effected in violation of the standard
procedures established by petitioner corporation which requires that every
shipment or taking out of the furniture be checked and reviewed by Mobilias
Production, Planning, Inventory Costing and Control (PPICC) Division. All the
foregoing furniture were transported to and stored at Henry Chuas warehouse.
After sometime, the foregoing furniture were photographed for slide photos at
Photo Folio at the Reclamation Area, Cebu City and then finally catalogued for
use in the Singapore Fair for the use of Astem and its supposed owners, namely:
spouses Umezawa, Hayano and Legaspi. The foregoing furniture models were
finally shipped for exhibition at the International Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore
as furniture belonging to Astem Philippines Corporation.
Sometime in March 1995, based on orders booked for Astem, Umezawa, with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed on him as the President and
General Manager of petitioner Mobilia, ordered and caused the manufacture of
eighty-nine (89) pieces of furniture with a total value of P17,108,500.00. The said
pieces of furniture were made with Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries,
as well as with Mobilia time and personnel, all of which were under the
administration and control of Umezawa as President and General Manager. The
said materials and supplies, the time and labor, were supposed to be used for
the manufacture and production of quality furniture for the EXCLUSIVE USE of
Mobilia. However, Umezawa, in violation of his duty to apply the same for the
use of Mobilia and the duty to account for the same, converted their use for the
benefit of Astem or for the use and benefit of Umezawa, his wife and sister,
Yoshikazu Hayano and Legaspi, much to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia
Products.
The same furniture could also have been taken out of the company premises by
Umezawa and cohorts for shipment and delivery to Astem customers had it not
been for the timely discovery of the previous theft. 2
The Board of Directors of MPI, consisting of its Chairman Susumo Kodaira and
members Yasushi Kato and Rolando Nonato, approved a Resolution on May 2,
1995 authorizing the filing of a complaint against Umezawa for two counts of
qualified theft allegedly committed on February 18 and 19, 1995. Attached to the
complaint was the Joint Affidavit of Danilo Lallaban, George del Rio and Yasushi
Kato. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 95-275.
On May 15, 1995, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft
against Umezawa with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City. The
accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013231L, reads:
That during or about the period comprised between the 18th and 19th day of
February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, while being then the President and General
Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the manufacture
and export of furniture, holding office and doing business in the Mactan Export
Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed
upon him by his employer, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the corporations
factory in Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, expensive pieces of
furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 3, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 208,125.00
8) 1 piece, Model Table No. 2,

Italian marble table, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 93,750.00
with an aggregate value of P3,219,875.00, Philippine currency, without the

consent of his employer, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc.,
in the said amount of P3,219,875.00.
Contrary to law.3
On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary

attachment covering the properties of Umezawa.
10) 2 pieces, Model Pedestal

No. 6, Italian marble pedestal, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 150,000.00
11) 1 piece, Model Column
Standard No. 11, Italian marble worth - - - - - - - - - - - - P 93,750.00
Umezawa then filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the information filed against
him, the discharge of the writ of attachment issued by the trial court, and to set
the case for preliminary investigation. MPI, the private complainant therein,
opposed the motion.
In the meantime on July 21, 1995, MPI filed another criminal complaint for
qualified theft against Umezawa, his wife Kimiko Umezawa, Mitsuyo Yaguchi,
Justin Legaspi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Henry Chua allegedly committed in
March 1995, with the Office of the City Prosecutor. The case was docketed as
I.S. No. 95-442.

13) 1 piece, Model High Table
No. 10, Italian marble, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 187,500.00
15) 1 piece, Model Table No. 7
16) 1 piece, Model Table No. 5
On July 25, 1995, the trial court issued an Order in Criminal Case No. 013231L denying the omnibus motion. On joint motion of Umezawa and the public
prosecutor, the trial court ordered a reinvestigation of the case. Conformably,
the public prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 013231L jointly with I.S. No. 95-442.
On September 25, 1995, Umezawa filed a petition with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 002919, for the
nullification of the Resolution issued by the three alleged members of MPI Board
of Directors, authorizing the filing of criminal complaints against him in behalf of
the corporation.
On January 3, 1996, the public prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution finding
probable cause for qualified theft and one count of estafa against Umezawa, and
dismissing the case against the other accused. The Prosecutor maintained his
finding of probable cause against Umezawa in Criminal Case No. 013231-L.

On February 20, 1996, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified
theft with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City against Umezawa, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013423-L. The accusatory portion reads:

18) 3-seater sofa, worth- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 255,000.00
That on the 8th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
being the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture, whose
principal place of business is at the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu

City, with intent to gain, without the consent of his employer, and with grave
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from the corporations factory the following expensive
pieces of furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater German
leather sofa, all valued at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 225,000.00
2) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater German
leather sofa, all valued at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 275,000.00
with an aggregate value of P500,000.00 Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Another Information for estafa was thereafter filed against the same accused,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013424-L. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in March 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed upon him as the President and
General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the amount of Seventeen Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred
(P17,108,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, which was the total value of the
furnitures ordered and manufactured by the accused or at his instance using
Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as well as time and personnel
which were supposed to be for the exclusive use of Mobilia Products, Inc. but
were converted for the use and benefit of the accused and Astem Philippines
Corporation, a company or firm engaged in the same business as that of Mobilia
Products, Inc., which is, [in] the manufacture and production of quality furniture
for export, owned by the accused, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia
Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On April 25, 1996, Umezawa filed a motion for the suspension of the
proceedings on the ground of the pendency of his petition with the SEC in Case
No. 002919. The trial court, however, issued an Order on May 21, 1996, denying
the said motion. It held that the filing and the pendency of a petition before the
SEC did not warrant a suspension of the criminal cases.
On September 25, 1998, Umezawa was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On September 30, 1998, Umezawa filed anew a Joint Motion to Quash the
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 013231-L and 013423-L, on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did not constitute the felony of qualified theft. Umezawa
claimed that based on the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses for the prosecution
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Yasushi Kato and George del
Rio, MPI Vice-President and the head of the Upholstery Department,
respectively, the appropriate charge should be estafa and not qualified theft.
Umezawa further claimed that for their failure to object to and resist his alleged
delictual acts, the said witnesses were as guilty as he was and should have been
included in the Information. He also asserted that there was, likewise, no
allegation in the Informations as to who was the owner of the articles stolen;
hence, there was no offended party. He noted that the Informations merely
alleged that MPI was his employer. He further posited that there was no valid
charge against him because the resolution authorizing the filing of the cases
against him was approved by a mere minority of the members of the MPI Board
of Directors.6
Umezawa, likewise, filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information in Criminal Case
No. 013424-L on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information did not
constitute the felony of estafa. He posited that the Information did not contain
any allegation that any demand was made for him to return the goods.
Furthermore, the owner of the said articles was not specified. He noted that as
gleaned from the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses for the prosecution, there was
no lawful private complainant. He reiterated that the MPI board resolution
authorizing the filing of the charge against him was not approved by the majority
of the members of its board of directors. Umezawa also alleged that the charge
for estafa with abuse of confidence was already included in the charge for
qualified theft, where it was alleged that he committed theft with abuse of
confidence; hence, the charge for estafa should be quashed, otherwise, he
would be placed in double jeopardy. The motion was duly opposed by the
prosecution.
On January 29, 1999, the trial court issued a Joint Order8 dismissing the cases
for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the dispute between the private complainant
and the accused over the ownership of the properties subject of the charges is
intra-corporate in nature, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. It
ruled that Umezawa, as a member of the board of directors and president of
MPI, was also a stockholder thereof. While Umezawa claimed to be the bona
fide owner of the properties subject of the Informations which he appropriated
for himself, the private complainant disputes the same; hence, according to the
trial court, the conflicting claims of the parties should be resolved by the SEC.
The private and public prosecutors received their respective copies of the Joint
Order on February 2, 1999.
The MPI, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
joint order of the court and for the reinstatement of the cases on February 15,
1999. The MPI relied on the following grounds:
I
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE LEGAL AND MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE AND JURISDICTION OF
THESE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES;
II
a. The Honorable Court has jurisdiction and must exercise it over these cases;
b. The above-entitled case is not an intra-corporate controversy;
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS

JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST RESPONDENT
HAJIME UMEZAWA;
and
III
c. The accused could not claim ownership nor co-ownership of the properties of
private complainant corporation.9
The MPI maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the cases and cited
Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, which provides the rules on
cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. A copy of the
motion was served on the public prosecutor for his approval. However, the public
prosecutor did not affix his conformity to the motion, and instead opted to appear
before the trial court during the hearing of the same. During the hearing, both
the public and private prosecutors appeared. In support of his motion, the private
prosecutor argued that the trial of the case must be done in the presence of and
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.10
The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated April 19, 1999. It held that
the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. It
also ruled that the motion of the private complainant was pro forma, it appearing
that the public prosecutor had not approved the same.
The public prosecutor received a copy of the Order on April 20, 1999. On April
26, 1999, the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the CA against Presiding Judge Rumuldo R.
Fernandez and Umezawa, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52440. The CA allowed
the MPI to intervene as petitioner, and admitted its petition- in-intervention.
The People of the Philippines, as the petitioner therein, raised the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASES AND DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.11
The People asserted that the controversy involving the criminal cases was not
between Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI, but one between him as
the accused therein and the People of the Philippines. It averred that under
Section 20(b) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases against Umezawa. It also alleged that in dismissing
the criminal cases against Umezawa on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
over the crimes charged, the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
On September 2, 1999, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and
nullifying the assailed Orders of the RTC. It ruled that the issue of ownership of
the properties subject of the Informations was not an intra-corporate dispute. It
held that Umezawa, although president and general manager of the MPI and a
stockholder thereof, was not a joint owner or co-owner of the personal properties
subject of the charges. It also held that the dispute between a private corporation
and any of its stockholders relative to the ownership of properties does not ipso
facto negate the jurisdiction of the RTC over the criminal cases under B.P. Blg.
129, as amended. It also declared that the material averments of the
Informations sufficiently charged qualified theft and estafa.
Umezawa filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the CA. In a
complete volte face, the appellate court issued a Resolution on August 8, 2001,
granting the motion and reversing its decision. It affirmed the ruling of the RTC
that the dispute between Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers over
the implementation of the MPIs standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature;
hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. Citing Section 5(a)(b) of P.D.
No. 902-A, and the ruling of this Court in Alleje v. Court of Appeals,12 the
appellate court ruled that based on the material allegations of the Solicitor
General in the petition before the CA, the SEC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the conflicting claims of the parties. It likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that
the absence of any allegation in the Information that the MPI was the owner of
the properties subject of the Information is fatal.
The petitioner MPI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST UMEZAWA.
II
WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES OF
QUALIFIED THEFT AND ESTAFA ARE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATIONS.
III
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED DO NOT
CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE THE CORRECT RULING IS NOT TO DISMISS
THE CASE BUT TO ORDER AMENDMENT.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA
IS PRO FORMA.13
The People of the Philippines filed a separate petition for review on certiorari,
contending that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND INJUNCTION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME
AND THAT PETITIONER HAS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL;
2. THE COURT OF APEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN

RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND
ESTAFA ARE PRESENT;
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED BLATANT AND SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW IN FINDING THAT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (SEC) HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASES;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PROFORMA MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA.14
The two petitions were consolidated in the Second Division of the Court.
The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the
petition for certiorari of the People of the Philippines in the CA assailing the
January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court was time-barred; (b) whether the
RTC has jurisdiction over the crimes charged in the said Informations; (c)
whether the Informations sufficiently charge the felonies of qualified theft and
estafa; and (d) if in the affirmative, whether all the elements of qualified theft and
estafa are alleged in the Informations.
On the first issue, the CA held that the Public Prosecutor failed to file a motion
for the reconsideration of the trial courts January 29, 1999 Joint Order
dismissing the cases, that is, within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the said
order on February 2, 1999; neither did the People appeal the said Order within
the period therefor. Thus, according to the CA, the People filed its petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the January 29, 1999 Joint Order
of the trial court only on April 26, 1999, well beyond the 60-day period therefor.
The appellate court, likewise, held that the filing of the motion for reconsideration
of the said Joint Order by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the
Public Prosecutor did not toll the period for the People to file its motion for
reconsideration thereof, or to appeal therefrom, or to file a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. It ruled that, having lost its right to appeal in due
course, the People was proscribed from filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus. The CA declared that the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner MPI of the Joint Order of the RTC is pro forma, the public prosecutor
not having signified his written conformity thereto.
On the other hand, the petitioner People of the Philippines insists that while the
public prosecutor did not expressly conform to the motion for reconsideration of
the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor,
through the public prosecutors presence during the hearing of the said motion,
his supervision and control over the private prosecutor during the said hearing,
he in effect adopted and conformed to the said motion for reconsideration.
Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the
accused:
In his comment on the petitions, respondent Umezawa maintains that the motion
for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court filed by the private
prosecutor did not interrupt the period within which the People could appeal,
citing the ruling of this Court in Cabral v. Puno.15 The respondent posits that the
finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, that the public prosecutor
did not conform to the motion for reconsideration of the private prosecutor, is
binding on this Court. The respondent also avers that the petitioner has no
personality to file the petition. Moreover, he insists that whether the public
prosecutor conformed to the private prosecutors motion for reconsideration is a
question of fact which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in
Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
The Courts Ruling

The contention of the petitioner People of the Philippines is not correct. All
criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.16 When the civil action
for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in
the prosecution of the offense.17 In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,18 we held
that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended
party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then
act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of
the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the
purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for
both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of
suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action
is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him
or, in general, to maintain social order.19
The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his
prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has
been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to
take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full
responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately
prepared to pursue it to its termination.20 The prosecution of offenses is a public
function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation
or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. 21 Under
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to
intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a
matter of tolerance.22
The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case,
in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual
conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be
present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is
absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.23
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an
appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended
party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the
criminal aspect of the case.24 However, the offended party or private
complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal
or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.25
In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the
conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for
reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a
petition for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from
filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the
acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only petitioner MPI, through counsel, filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the trial courts Joint Order dated January 29, 1999, praying
for the reinstatement of the cases insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.
The public prosecutor did not approve nor conform to the said motion. Although
petitioner MPI provided ample space for the said conformity of the public
prosecutor, the latter did not do so; he merely appeared during the hearing of
the said motion with the private prosecutor when the latter presented his oral
arguments in support of the said motion.
Even then, the Court still holds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the
People of the Philippines simply because the public prosecutor erred in not
himself filing a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court, on
his perception that by being present during the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of
the States. The settled rule is that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of
its officers and employees. Indeed, in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court
declared:
The fact that the public prosecutor did not conform to the said motion, however,
does not mean that the same is pro forma. It must be stressed that the propriety
and efficacy of the motion, insofar as the civil aspect of the cases is concerned,
is not dependent upon the conformity of the public prosecutor. Hence, the filing
of the joint motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the
period for petitioner MPI to assail the joint order in the CA via an appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Estoppel does not lie against the government because of the supposedly
mistaken acts or omissions of its agents. As we declared in People v.
Castaeda, "there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct
application of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its agents."
However, since the public prosecutor did not file any motion for the
reconsideration of the joint order nor conform to the motion of petitioner MPI,
insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is concerned, the period for the State
to assail the said joint order was not suspended. Only the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor of the joint order of dismissal of
the cases could have tolled the period within which the State could appeal,
insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases was concerned. The bare fact that
the public prosecutor appeared for the State during the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner MPI does not amount to or constitute his adoption
of the said motion as that of the State. As ruled by this Court in Cabral v. Puno:26
While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed,
there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice
so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 31
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private
prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day
period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not
have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his
behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for
reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period
for appeal.27
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner People of the Philippines with the CA on April 26, 1999 was filed
beyond the 60-day period as provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court,28 it appearing that the public prosecutor received a copy of the joint order
of the trial court on February 2, 1999, and, thus, had only until April 3, 1999
within which to file the said petition.
The Court also held in Chua v. Court of Appeals:30
On the second issue, the petitioners assert that the CA erred in holding that the
dispute between it and the respondent is intra-corporate in nature; hence, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned from the material allegations
of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
Petitioner MPI further avers that even if there is no allegation in the Informations
identifying it as the owner of the personal properties described in the
Informations, its ownership of the properties can be inferred from the other
allegations. The petitioners maintain that even if the Informations are deficient,
the remedy is the amendment of the Informations and not the dismissal of the
cases.
For his part, the respondent avers that the assailed Resolution of the CA is
correct, and that it is the appellate courts decision which is erroneous.
We agree with the petitioners.
According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129
SEC. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter

be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Section 32 thereof was later amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691,
as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
Case law has it that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal
cases, the complaint or Information must be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the prescribed period
provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and where the said
Information or complaint is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or Information
and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court after trial.32
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in force at the time
of the filing of the Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the
court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. Indeed, in People v. Purisima,33
this Court held that:
In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of
the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation
charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment
provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is
presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
In Criminal Case No. 013231-L, the value of the properties subject of qualified
theft is P3,219,875.00, while in Criminal Case No. 013423-L, the value of the
property was pegged at P255,000.00. Under Article 309 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for theft when the value of the stolen property exceeds
P22,000.00 is as follows:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 20,000 pesos;
but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall
be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph and one year of
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code further provides for the penalty for
qualified theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle
or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from
a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 013424-L for estafa, the amount of the
fraud involved is P500,000.00, and under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for such crime is
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations in the three
cases, the court a quo had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
The bare fact that the respondent was the president and general manager of the
petitioner corporation when the crimes charged were allegedly committed and
was then a stockholder thereof does not in itself deprive the court a quo of its
exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. The property of the corporation
is not the property of the stockholders or members or of its officers who are
stockholders. 34 As the Court held in an avuncular case:35
(b) controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between

and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them
and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates, respectively.
... Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an

entity separate and distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute
personal property, they do not represent property of the corporation. The
corporation has property of its own which consists chiefly of real estate (Nelson
v. Owen, 113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75; Morrow v. Gould, 145 Iowa, 1, 123 N.W. 743).
A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the corporations property, or the
right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and
equity (Hall & Faley v. Alabama Terminal, 173 Ala., 398, 56 So. 235), but its
holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation (Bradley v.
Bauder, 36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite
portion of its property or assets (Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U.S., 521; Jones v. Davis,
35 Ohio St., 474). The stockholder is not a co-owner or tenant in common of the
corporate property (Harton v. Johnston, 166 Ala., 317, 51 So., 992) "36
In Fabia v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court explained that Section 5 of P.D. No.
902-A should be taken in conjunction with Section 6 of the law. It then proceeded
to explain:
As early as the case of Fisher v. Trinidad,37 the Court already declared that "[t]he
distinction between the title of a corporation, and the interest of its members or
stockholders in the property of the corporation, is familiar and well-settled. The
ownership of that property is in the corporation, and not in the holders of shares
of its stock. The interest of each stockholder consists in the right to a
proportionate part of the profits whenever dividends are declared by the
corporation, during its existence, under its charter, and to a like proportion of the
property remaining, upon the termination or dissolution of the corporation, after
payment of its debts."38
We also agree with the ruling of the CA in its decision that the SEC (now the
Regional Trial Court) had no jurisdiction over the cases filed in the court a quo.
The appellate courts reliance in the assailed Resolution issued by the Board of
Directors of the petitioner corporation, on Section 5(b) of P.D. No. 902, has no
factual and legal basis.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A provides that the SEC39 shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:
(a) devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of, the board of directors,
business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or
of the stockholders, partners, members of association or organizations
registered with the Commission, and
In synthesis, Sec. 5 of PD 902-A mandates that cases involving fraudulent

actions and devices which are detrimental to the interest of stockholders,
members or associates and directors of the corporation are within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. Taken in conjunction with Sec. 6 of the
same law, it will be gathered that the fraudulent acts/schemes which the SEC
shall exclusively investigate and prosecute are those "in violation of any law or
rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission" alone.
This investigative and prosecutorial powers of the SEC are further "without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of The Revised Penal
Code."
From the foregoing, it can thus be concluded that the filing of the civil/intracorporate case before the SEC does not preclude the simultaneous and
concomitant filing of a criminal action before the regular courts; such that, a
fraudulent act may give rise to liability for violation of the rules and regulations
of the SEC cognizable by the SEC itself, as well as criminal liability for violation
of the Revised Penal Code cognizable by the regular courts, both charges to be
filed and proceeded independently, and may be simultaneously with the other.41
Thus, the filing of a petition in the SEC for the nullification of the Resolution of
May 2, 1995 issued by the Chairman and two members of the Board of Directors
of petitioner MPI, which authorized the filing of criminal cases against
respondent Umezawa, was not a bar to his prosecution for estafa and qualified
theft for his alleged fraudulent and delictual acts. The relationship of the partylitigants with each other or the position held by petitioner as a corporate officer
in respondent MPI during the time he committed the crime becomes merely
incidental and holds no bearing on jurisdiction. What is essential is that the
fraudulent acts are likewise of a criminal nature and hence cognizable by the
regular courts.42 Thus, notwithstanding the fact that respondent Umezawa was
the president and general manager of petitioner MPI and a stockholder thereof,
the latter may still be prosecuted for the crimes charged. The alleged fraudulent
acts of respondent Umezawa in this case constitute the element of abuse of
confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code on estafa.43
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the CA in its decision, to wit:
A dispute involving the corporation and its stockholders is not necessarily an

intra-corporate dispute cognizable only by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Nor does it ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court over the subject cases. The Supreme Court citing the case of Viray v.
Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 92481, 191 SCRA 308 [1990]) in Torio v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 107293, March 2, 1994, 230 SCRA 626) held:
complaint filed by private complainant company sufficiently established prima

facie case against the accused and the legality or illegality of the constitution of
the board which authorized the filing of the complaint does not materially affect
either the informations filed against Umezawa or the pending criminal
proceedings. As petitioners contend, the action is now between the People of
the Philippines and herein private respondent.45
"It should be obvious that not every conflict between a corporation and its
stockholders involves corporate matters that only the SEC can resolve in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440 dated August 8,
2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 2, 1999 is AFFIRMED.
As the Supreme Court further ruled in the Torio case that "a contrary
interpretation would distort the meaning and intent of P.D. 902-A, the law reorganizing the Securities and Exchange Commission. The better policy in
determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider not
only the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the questions raised in
the subject of the controversy.44
On the last issue, we find and so hold that the Informations state all the essential
elements of estafa and qualified theft. It was adequately alleged that respondent
Umezawa, being the President and General Manager of petitioner MPI, stole
and misappropriated the properties of his employer, more specifically, petitioner
MPI. As expostulated by the CA in its decision:
In any event, the allegations in the informations, if hypothetically admitted,
are sufficient to bind Umezawa to the charges of qualified theft and estafa. As
aptly ruled by the court a quo in its Order of July 25, 1995, all the elements of
the offense of qualified theft are present. There is no basis for claiming
otherwise. Furthermore, the private offended party, as well as the subject matter
of the felonious taking and the ownership thereof, have been adequately
indicated or identified leaving no room for any doubt on these matters.
Considering that the motions to quash of September 30, 1998 are fundamentally
rehash of the motion to quash filed on May 29, 1995 and the culpable acts
subject of the new informations are virtually the same as the first information
filed against Umezawa, there is no conceivable reason why the court a quo
abandoned its previous stand and controverted itself in regard the sufficiency of
the informations.
In our considered view, and as the court a quo had correctly held in its Order of
May 26, 1996, "even a SEC ruling voiding the resolution authorizing the filing of
criminal charges versus the accused Hajime Umezawa can have no bearing on
the validity of the informations filed in these three criminal cases as pointed out
by private complainant, the public offenses of qualified theft and estafa can [be]
prosecuted de officio." The resolution of the office of the prosecutor on the
preliminary investigation as well as the re-investigation conducted on the letter-
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
No Crime when no law punishes it/No common law crimes

G.R. No. 119619
December 13, 1996
RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO

GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK,
EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE,
ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA,
FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ANGEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL,
RICHARD ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS MACTAN, MARLON
CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE,
JOSEPH AURELIO, RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VILLACARLOS,
RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES,
IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD,
DODONG DELOS REYES, JOLLY CABALLERO and ROPLANDO
ARCENAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Palawan in Criminal Case No. 10429 convicting petitioners of the
offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance
penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of
1975.
In an Information dated October 15, 1992, petitioners were charged with a
violation of P.D. 704 committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of September 1992, at Brgy. San
Rafael, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First
Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard
Hizon, a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of
the Philippines, being then the owner, crew members and
fishermen of F/B Robinson and with the use of said fishing boat,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another catch, take or gather or cause to be caught,
taken or gathered fish or fishery aquatic products in the coastal
waters of Puerto Princess City, Palawan, with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more

or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally
caught thru the use of obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium
cyanide). 1
The following facts were established by the prosecution: In September 1992, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the
city. In response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay
Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the
laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay
Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small
crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of
Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members
of the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately
proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and
a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline
of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the
acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their
inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez
examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police
also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing
approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. 2 They checked the license of
the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SP03
Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto
Princesa for further investigation.
At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SP03
Enriquez to guard the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two foreigners
were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an
Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and
fishermen were charged with the following violations:
1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal
waters without mayor's permit;
2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized 26; On
board 36);
3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original
passports. 3
The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to
get random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory
examination. As instructed, the boat engineer, petitioner Ernesto Andaya,
delivered to the Maritime Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a plastic
shopping bag filled with water. SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and in the
presence of the boat engineer and captain, placed them inside a large
transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic with heat from a
lighter. 4
The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) suboffice in the city for examination "to determine the method of catching the same
for record or evidentiary purposes." 5 They were received at the NBI office at
8:00 in the evening of the same day. The receiving clerk, Edna Capicio, noted
that the fish were dead and she placed the plastic bag with the fish inside the
office freezer to preserve them. Two days later, on October 3, 1992, the chief of
the NBI sub-office, Onos Mangotara, certified the specimens for laboratory
examination at the NBI Head Office in Manila. The fish samples were to be
personally transported by Edna Capicio who was then scheduled to leave for
Manila for her board examination in Criminology. 6 On October 4, 1992, Ms.
Capicio, in the presence of her chief, took the plastic with the specimens from
the freezer and placed them inside two shopping bags and sealed them with
masking tape. She proceeded to her ship where she placed the specimens in
the ship's freezer.
Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5, 1992 and immediately
brought the specimens to the NBI Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI
Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and
found that they contained sodium cyanide, thus:
Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28
fishermen of the said boat.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense,
they claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries,
Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they
catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for
one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island. They related that on
September 30, 1992 at about 7:00 A.M., they anchored the F/B Robinson in the
east of Podiado Island in Puerto Princesa City. The boat captain and the
fishermen took out and boarded their sampans to fish for their food. They were
still fishing in their sampans at 4:00 P.M. when a rubber boat containing
members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat
approached them and boarded the F/B Robinson. The policemen were in
uniform while the Bantay Dagat personnel were in civilian clothes. They were all
armed with guns. One of the Bantay Dagat personnel introduced himself as
Commander Jun Marcelo and he inspected the boat and the boat's documents.
Marcelo saw the two foreigners and asked for their passports. As their passports
were photocopies, Marcelo demanded for their original. The captain explained
that the original passports were with the company's head office in Manila.
Marcelo angrily insisted for the originals and threatened to arrest everybody. He
then ordered the captain, his crew and the fishermen to follow him to Puerto
Princesa. He held the magazine of his gun and warned the captain "Sige, huwag
kang tatakas, kung hindi babarilin ko kayo!" 8 The captain herded all his men
into the boat and followed Marcelo and the police to Puerto Princesa.
They arrived at the city harbor at 7:45 in the evening and were met by members
of the media. As instructed by Marcelo, the members of the media interviewed
and took pictures of the boat and the fishermen. 9
FINDINGS:
Weight of Specimen. . . . . . 1.870 kilograms
Examinations made on the above-mentioned
specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS to the
test for the presence of SODIUM CYANIDE. . .
.
REMARKS:
Sodium Cyanide is a violent poison. 7
In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City
filed the complaint at bar against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson,
the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein petitioner
Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto
The following day, October 1, 1992, at 8:00 in the morning, Amado Villanueva,
one of the fishermen at the F/B Robinson, was instructed by a policeman
guarding the boat to get five (5) fish samples from the fish cage and bring them
to the pier. Villanueva inquired whether the captain knew about the order but the
guard replied he was taking responsibility for it. Villanueva scooped five pieces
of lapu-lapu, placed them inside a plastic bag filled with water and brought the
bag to the pier. The boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, received the fish and
delivered them to the PNP Maritime Office. Nobody was in the office and Andaya
waited for the apprehending officers and the boat captain. Later, one of the
policemen in the office instructed him to leave the bag and hang it on a nail in
the wall. Andaya did as he was told and returned to the boat at 10:00 A.M. 10
In the afternoon of the same day, the boat captain arrived at the Maritime office.
He brought along a representative from their head office in Manila who showed
the police and the Bantay Dagat personnel the original passports of the
Hongkong nationals and other pertinent documents of the F/B Robinson and its
crew. Finding the documents in order, Marcelo approached the captain and
whispered to him "Tandaan mo ito, kapitan, kung makakaalis ka dito, magkikita
pa rin uli tayo sa dagat, kung hindi kayo lulubog ay palulutangin ko kayo!" It was
then that SP03 Enriquez informed the captain that some members of the
Maritime Command, acting under his instructions, had just taken five (5) pieces
of lapu-lapu from the boat. SP03 Enriquez showed the captain the fish samples.
Although the captain saw only four (4) pieces of lapu-lapu, he did not utter a
word of protest. 11 Under Marcelo's threat, he signed the "Certification" that he
received only four (4) pieces of the fish. 12
Two weeks later, the information was filed against petitioners. The case was
prosecuted against thirty-one (31) of the thirty-five (35) accused. Richard Hizon
remained at large while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos, Marlon
Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were unknown.
On July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty and
sentenced them to imprisonment for a minimum of eight (8) years and one (1)
day to a maximum of nine (9) years and four (4) months. The court also ordered
the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton
of assorted live fishes as instruments and proceeds of the offense, thus:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 45, in relation to the second sentence of

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
a) Fishing Boat (F/B) Robinson;
b) The 28 motorized fiberglass sampans; and
c) The live fishes in the fish cages installed in the F/B Robinson,
all of which have been respectively shown to be tools or
instruments and proceeds of the offense, are hereby ordered
confiscated and declared forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED. 13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioners contend that:
I
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered finding the accused SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO
ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG
TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL
AURELIO,
GODOFREDO
VILLAVERDE,
ANGELITO
DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA,
FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ARNEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO
CASAMPOL, JORNIE DELA CRUZ, JESUS MACTAN,
FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE,
RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VLLLACARLOS, RICARDO
SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES,
IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO
LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, ROLANDO
ARCENAS and JOLLY CABALLERO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious
or poisonous substance commonly known as sodium cyanide,
committed in violation of section 33 and penalized in section 38
of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended, and there being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances appreciated
and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
each of the aforenamed accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from a minimum
of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to a maximum of NINE
(9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and to pay the costs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE MERE "POSITIVE RESULTS TO THE
TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF SODIUM CYANIDE" IN THE
FISH SPECIMEN, ALBEIT ILLEGALLY SEIZED ON THE
OCCASION OF A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND ARREST,
IS ADMISSIBLE AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE
PETITIONERS' CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
FISHING.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF
GUILT UNDER SEC. 33 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
704 CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, SUCH THAT THE
GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL FISHING MUST
STILL BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONERS. 14
Given the evidence admitted by the trial court, the next question now is whether
petitioners are guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances. Again, the petitioners, joined by the Solicitor General, submit that
the prosecution evidence cannot convict them.
We agree.
The Solicitor General submitted a "Manifestation in Lieu of Comment" praying

for petitioners' acquittal. 15
The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, primarily question
the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless
search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners. More
concretely, they contend that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide in the fish
specimens should not have been admitted and considered by the trial court
because the fish samples were seized from the F/B Robinson without a search
warrant.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without
a judicial warrant. 16 As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however,
subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: 17 (1) a search incident to a
lawful of arrest; 18 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving
motor vehicle; 19 and (4) search in violation of customs laws. 20
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations
of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and
an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to
this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected. 21
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats
breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed
motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the
Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. 22
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat
suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence
seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search
and seizure. 23
Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38
of P.D. 704 24 which provide as follows:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended
for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or
fishery/aquatic products. It shall be unlawful for any person to
catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered
fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use
of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use
of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and (d),
respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere
possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for
illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as
hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon
recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards
and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research,
educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take
or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area:
Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate
predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific
fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in
neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this
section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for
killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous
fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
It shall, likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to
possess, deal in, sell or in any manner dispose of, for profit, any
fish or fishery/aquatic products which have been illegally
caught, taken or gathered.
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical
compounds containing combustible elements, or obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric fishing
in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall
constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in
violation of this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of

fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a
presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing
with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance
or electricity.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 38. Penalties. (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in
illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. Violation of
Section 33 hereof shall be punished as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if
obnoxious or poisonous substances are used: Provided, That if
the use of such substances results 1) in physical injury to any
person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from ten (10) to
twelve (12) years, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty
shall be imprisonment from twenty (20) years to life or death;
xxx xxx xxx 25
The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes
or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or
aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a
presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when: (a)
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device
for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a
fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a
fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or
fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree
violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. 26 As
early as 1916, this Court has rejected this argument by holding that: 27
In some States, as well as in England, there exist what are
known as common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act
is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the
right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain welldefined limitations, has the right to specify what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima

facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the
burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
not committed with any criminal intent or intention. 28
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a
settled matter. It is generally conceded that the legislature has the power
to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence
of the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the
accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed. 29 To avoid any constitutional
infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be
arbitrary and unreasonable. 30 In fine, the presumption must be based
on facts and these facts must be part of the crime when committed. 31
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt
based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes
the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for
electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and
poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing
boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate
fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were
engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the
discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the
fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the
fact proved. 32
We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima
facie. 33 It can not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence,
operate to preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main
fact presumed. 34 At no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut
the presumption. 35 thus:
The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common
experience of men. But the experience of men has taught them
that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to
rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore
put witnesses on the stand or go on the witness stand himself
to explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of
his possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection with the
commission of the crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt
which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty
possession of the stolen goods. 36
We now review the evidence to determine whether petitioners have successfully

rebutted this presumption. The facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the
Information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail, petitioners moved that
the fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be reexamined. 37 The trial
court granted the motion. 38 As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime
Command of Puerto Princesa, in the presence of authorized representatives of
the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local Fisheries Office, took at random five (5)
live lapu-lapu from the fish cage of the boat. The specimens were packed in the
usual manner of transporting live fish, taken aboard a commercial flight and
delivered by the same representatives to the NBI Head Office in Manila for
chemical analysis.
upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael. One of the apprehending
officers, SPO1 Demetrio Saballuca, testified as follows:
ATTY.
TORREFRANCA
EXAMINATION:
ON
CROSS-
Q: I get your point therefore, that the illegal

fishing supposedly conducted at San Rafael is
a moro ami type of fishing [that] occurred into
your mind and that was made to understand by
the Bantay Dagat personnel?
On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in
Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found the fish negative
for the presence of sodium cyanide, 39 thus:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Upon reaching the place, you and the
pumpboat, together with the two Bantay Dagat
personnel were SPO3 Romulo Enriquez and
Mr. Benito Marcelo and SPO1 Marzan, you did
not witness that kind of moro ami fishing,
correct?
Gross weight of specimen = 3.849 kg.

Examinations made on the above-mentioned specimens gave
NEGATIVE RESULTS to the tests for the presence of SODIUM
CYANIDE. 40
A: None, sir.
The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing "with the use of obnoxious
or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of
assorted live fishes" There was more or less one ton of fishes in the F/B
Robinson's fish cage. It was from this fish cage that the four dead specimens
examined on October 7, 1992 and the five specimens examined on November
23, 1992 were taken. Though all the specimens came from the same source
allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two tests resulted in conflicting
findings. We note that after its apprehension, the F/B Robinson never left the
custody of the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing boat was anchored near
the city harbor and was guarded by members of the Maritime Command. 41 It
was later turned over to the custody of the Philippine Coast Guard Commander
of Puerto Princesa City. 42
Q: In other words, there was negative activity

of moro ami type of fishing on September 30,
1992 at 4:00 in the afternoon at San Rafael?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what you saw were 5 motorized
sampans with fishermen each doing a hook
and line fishing type?
A: Yes, sir. More or less they were five.
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples
and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the
cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners'
claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught
the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on board their
sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The
apprehending officers saw petitioners fishing by hook and line when they came
Q: And despite the fact you had negative

knowledge of this moro ami type of fishing,
SP03 Enriquez together with Mr. Marcelo
boarded the vessel just the same?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any
sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they
find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage
itself. An Inventory was prepared by the apprehending officers and only the
following items were found on board the boat:
Emilia Rosales, the NBI forensic chemist who examined the samples, testified
that when she opened the package, she found the two ends of the same plastic
bag knotted. 50 These circumstances as well as the time interval from the taking
of the fish samples and their actual examination 51 fail to assure the impartial
mind that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded.
ITEMS QUANTITY REMARKS
Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force
Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply
observed by the Solicitor General, the report received by the Task Force Bantay
Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally through "muro ami" on the
waters of San Rafael. "Muro ami" according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with
"the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the
fishermen surround[ing] the net." 52 This method of fishing needs approximately
two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. 53 What the apprehending officers
instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by
hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have
indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the
fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit
under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal
fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
F/B Robinson (1) unit operating

engine (1) unit ICE-900-BHP
sampans 28 units fiberglass
outboard motors 28 units operating
assorted fishes more or less 1 ton live
hooks and lines assorted
xxx xxx xxx 44
We cannot overlook the fact that the apprehending officers found in the
boat assorted hooks and lines for catching fish. 45 For this obvious
reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared by the
apprehending officers immediately after the search did not charge
petitioners with illegal fishing, much less illegal fishing with the use of
poison or any obnoxious substance. 46
The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result
of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. Under the
circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible
conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four
specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
Prosecution witness SPO1 Bernardino Visto testified that for the first laboratory
test, boat engineer Ernesto Andaya did not only get four (4) samples of fish but
actually got five (5) from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson. 47 The Certification
that four (4) fish samples were taken from the boat shows on its face the number
of pieces as originally "five (5)" but this was erased with correction fluid and "four
(4)" written over it. 48 The specimens were taken, sealed inside the plastic bag
and brought to Manila by the police authorities in the absence of petitioners or
their representative. SP02 Enriquez testified that the same plastic bag
containing the four specimens was merely sealed with heat from a lighter. 49
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are
acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances
defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita

G.R. No. 199898
September 3, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
LEO DELA TRINIDAD y OBALLES, Accused-Appellant.
Inspector Benigno Albao, Sr. (PSI. Albao), Chief of the Intelligence Section,
interviewed the informant and after having been convinced that the information
was true,3 he referred the matter to Senior Police Officer 1 Feliciano Aguilar
(SPO1 Aguilar) and SPO1 Fersebal Abrantes (SPO1 Abrantes) for the conduct
of a surveillance operation for further details.4
The surveillance operation confirmed the identity and exact location of appellant.
The police operatives also observed during the surveillance that some
suspected drug pushers visited the residence of appellant.5
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal assailing the 24 March 2011 Decision1 of the
Court of. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288. The CA affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Naga City, Camarines
Sur finding the accused guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
On 22 October 2008, an Information was filed against accused Leo Dela
Trinidad yOballes (appellant) before the RTC, Naga City, Camarines Sur for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A No. 9165, to wit:
That on or about October 21, 2008, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his
possession, custody and control nine and one-half (9 ) bricks of suspected
dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less 475 grams
including its (sic) wrapper; two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves
with fruiting tops weighing more or less 550 grams including its (sic) wrapper;
four (4) pieces of medium size cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves
weighing more or less 41.1 grams including its (sic) plastic containers; eighteen
(18) pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops
weighing more or less 55.4 grams including its (sic) plastic container; and
seventy[-]seven (77) pieces of small empty transparent plastic sachet, with a
total weight of more or less 1,121.5 grams, which is a dangerous drug, inviolation
of the above-cited law.2
After having verified the report thatappellant is indeed involved in drug trade, a
test-buy was conducted on 10 October 2008.6 The test-buy brought forth
positive result as the police asset was able to buy marijuana cubes, dried
marijuana leaves and fruiting tops worth P100.00 from appellant. After the initial
test-buy, the informant was directed by the police operatives to continue
monitoring appellant because there was a report that the latter is in possession
of quantities of marijuana by the kilo.7
On 13 October 2008, a discussion onthe use of code names was made by the
members of the team in order to conceal the identity of appellant and to secure
their operation.8 The code name is "Leonidas de Leon" and the name of the plan
is "Code Plan Sativa."9
On 16 October 2008, around 5:30 P.M., another test-buy took place through
SPO1 Aguilar and SPO1 Abrantesand again, the asset was able to purchase
one brick of dried marijuana leaves from appellant.10
On 17 October 2008, the bricks of marijuana purchased from appellant on 10
October 2008 and 16 October 2008 were submitted to the Camarines Sur Police
Provincial Office.11
On 20 October 2008, the police operatives applied for two search warrants from
the RTC, Branch 25 in Naga City.12 One search warrant was applied for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 while the other one was for
violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294 or for illegal
possession of firearmsand ammunitions because during the second test-buy,
the police asset saw appellant with a gun which was tucked in his waist.13 Upon
receipt of the search warrants, the team coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), as shown by the Certificate of Coordination. A
pre-operation report was then submitted to the PDEA.14
Version of the Prosecution

On 27 September 2008, the Office of the Intelligence Section of the Naga City
Police (Intelligence Section) received an information concerning a certain Leo
De la Trinidad who was allegedly involved in drug trafficking. Police Senior
The police operatives proceededto conduct a briefing for the execution of the
search warrants. The said briefing was made at the Conference Room of the
Naga City Police Office on 21 October 2008, at about 4:10 A.M.15 The briefing
of the teamwas photographed. Among those present are the members of the
raiding team16 and the mandatory witnesses, i.e.representative from the DOJ,
Carlo Lamberto Tayo; media representative, Roy Ranoco; elected punong
barangayof Sabang, Naga City Jose Jacobo and Kagawad Eugene Froyalde of
Sabang, Naga City.
Around 5:10 AM of 21 October 2008, the group proceeded to the residence of
appellant. They wereaccompanied by the DOJ and media representatives
together with the local barangayofficials. Upon reaching appellants house, the
raiding team knocked at his door and identified themselves as police officers
from the Naga City Police Office and informed him that they are executing the
search warrants issued by Judge Jaime Contreras. They told appellant that they
have witnesses with them, and read to him the contents of the warrants and
apprised him of his constitutional rights.17 PO2 Quintin Tusara took picturesof
everything that transpired while the operatives were executing the warrants.18
When appellant was asked to produce the items enumerated in the search
warrant, if indeed he really had them, appellant voluntarily presented the items
which he took under his pillow. The items consisted of nine and a half (9 )
bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape, two (2)
big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape, four
(4) medium sizecubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the
small transparent plastic sachet, and eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of
suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small transparent plastic
sachet.19 Also found were seventy-seven (77) pieces of empty transparent
plastic sachets. SPO1 Aguilar, placed his initial, "FBA," in the said items.20
No firearm was found at the residence of appellant. An inventory was then
conducted right inside the house of appellant and a certificate of inventory was
prepared by SPO1 Louie Ordonez.21 The Certificate of Inventory and
Certification of Orderly Search were duly signed by the witnesses in the
presence of appellant.22
After making the necessary markings, appellant and the items seized from him
were brought to the Naga City Police Station.23
The seized items were returned to the court of origin but were subsequently
withdrawn for laboratory examination.24 A request to the Camarines Sur
Provincial Office was subsequently madeby SPO1 Aguilar and the seized items
were immediately brought to the Crime Laboratory for field test examination.25
The seized items were duly received by P/Insp. Edsel Villalobos (P/Insp.
Villalobos).26
When subjected to both initial and final test examinations by P/Insp. Villalobos,
the seized items were found positive for the presence of marijuana.27
Version of the Defense

In the early morning of 21 October 2008, appellant was in his house located in
Sabang, Naga City together with his wife and children. Somebody knocked at
their door, so hepeeped through the window and asked who was knocking. He
noticed a lot of people outside and asked them who were they. Somebody
answered that he was Kapitan, so the witness opened the door. They entered
appellants house and immediately took pictures of it. He was told to just stay at
the side and asked him to bring out the gun and the illegal drugs. When asked
to bring out the illegal drugs, he heard somebody shouted, "I have already found
it." They went near the table, but he was not able to see whatthey were doing
because the table was surrounded by men. At that time, the appellant was
seated on a bamboo chair with his hands placed on his nape. Thereafter, he
was called and asked to sign on a piece of paper. When he asked what was that
for, they told him that they were for the things found inhis house. A man
approached him and read to him the contents of the warrant. Then, he was
handcuffed and brought to the police station.28
Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 16 November 2009,the trial court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The RTC found that the
prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
appellant for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
The RTC ruled that the evidence presented during the trial adequately proved
all the elements of the offense.It held that appellant, not being authorized by law,
with full knowledge that the items were dangerous drugs, had actual and
exclusive possession, control and dominion over the drugs found in his house.29
It likewise held that the officers strictly complied with the guidelines prescribed
by law on how drug operations should be conducted by law enforcers and in
takingcustody and control of the seized drugs.30 On the other hand, accused
failed to present any substantial evidence to establish his defense of frame-up.
The RTC placed more weight on the affirmative testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, rather than the denials of the accused because positive testimonies
are weightier than negative ones.31 With the positive identification made by the
government witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime, his self-serving denial is
worthless.32 Since there was nothing in the record to show that the arresting
team and the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motives, their
affirmative statements proving appellants culpability were respected by the trial
court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements
of illegal sale of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution. It found credible the statements of prosecution witnesses about
what transpired during and after the test-buy, service of search warrant, and
arrest of the accused. Further, it ruled that the prosecution has proven as
unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA likewise upheld the findings
of the trial court that the entire operation conducted by the police officers enjoyed
the presumption of regularity, absent any showing of illmotive on the part of
those who conducted the same.
The CA likewise found appellants defenses of denial and frame-up
unconvincing and lacked corroboration. Itnoted that appellant did not even
present his wife, who was allegedly present during the search, to corroborate
his claim.33
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the

following elements must beestablished: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which isidentified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.37 As correctly ruled by the CA, these elements were duly
established by the prosecution. Jurisprudence is consistent in thatmere
possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facieevidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused inthe absence of any
satisfactory explanation.38
The ruling of this Court in People v. Lagman39 is instructive.1wphi1 It held that
illegal possession ofregulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the
accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists whenthe drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found.Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion
over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Appellant raised in his brief a loneerror on the part of the appellate court, to wit:
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant submits that the trial court overlooked and misapplied some facts of
substance, which if considered, could have altered the verdict. He maintains that
he has no knowledge as to where the illegal drugs were found as he was not in
possession of the same, and alleged thatthe bricks of marijuana were merely
planted by the police operatives.34
Appellants contention is belied by the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution. It bears to stress that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi,
has been invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily be
concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.35 They are self-serving evidence, and unless
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot be given weight over
the positive assertions of credible witnesses.36
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a

house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the
presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is
sufficient to convict.40 Here, accused-appellant failed to present any evidence
to overcome such presumption. He merely insisted that he was framed and had
no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence of any
contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and dominion of the drugs
found in his house. Accused-appellant argues that the corpus delictihas not been
clearly established. He points out that although SPO1 Aguilar allegedly placed
his markings on the confiscated items, no such marking was indicated in the
certificate of inventory, nor were the weight of the said specimens indicated
thereon. He further argues that the markings allegedly placed on the specimens
seized were not even indicated in the return of the search warrant.41 Thus, he
centers his argument on the contention that the integrity of the dangerous drugs
was not ensured and its identity was not established with moral integrity.
Relevant to appellants case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II, R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or counsel, a

representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.]
"FBA". Besides, he also placed his own initials and signatures in blue markings
to preserve and maintain the integrity of the specimens. Thus, there was no
cogent reason why the court should doubt the trustworthiness and credibility of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.43
This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules

and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there
is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in
the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers
properly discharged their duties.44 Accused-appellant in this case failed to
present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting
officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and
credit.45 In fact, accusedappellant did not even question the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely on his allegation of frameup and denial and on the alleged broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same inthe presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative orcounsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, thatthe physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long asthe integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, the aforecited provision of the IRR does not even require that
the certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and the weight of the
seized items. In fact, the rule even sanctions substantial compliance with the
procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are property preserved by the apprehending officers.
In People v. Pringas,42 the Court recognized that the strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions;
the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all
the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity
of corpus delictiand the unbroken chain of custody. Aptly noting the findings of
the trial court:
It was sufficiently established that representatives from the media and
Department of Justice and even two (2) barangay local officials were present
during the briefing and even until the conduct of the inventory. And that
immediately after seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the same
were inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant and said
persons, who even signed copies of the inventory. The seized illegal drugs were
marked at accuseds residence and in his presence. P/S Insp. Villalobos testified
that the seized items he received from Aguilar already contained the markings,
In sum, we find no reason to modifyor set aside the decision of the CA. Accusedappellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIEDand the 24 March 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Penal Law not Subject to Facial Challenge

G.R. No. 167011
December 11, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ,

petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Spouses
Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez on 26 May 2008 from the Decision
of this Court dated 30 April 2008, affirming the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004
and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc.
We find that petitioner has not raised substantially new grounds to justify the
reconsideration sought. Instead, petitioner presents averments that are mere
rehashes of arguments already considered by the Court. There is, thus, no
cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration of this Courts Decision.
Similarly, we reject the contentions put forth by esteemed colleagues Mr. Justice
Dante O. Tinga in his Dissent, dated 2 September 2008, which are also mere
reiterations of his earlier dissent against the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Tingas
incessant assertions proceed from the wrong premise. To be clear, this Court
did not intimate that penal statutes are beyond scrutiny. In our Decision, dated
30 April 2008, this Court emphasized the critical limitations by which a criminal
statute may be challenged. We drew a lucid boundary between an "on-its-face"
invalidation and an "as applied" challenge. Unfortunately, this is a distinction
which Mr. Justice Tinga has refused to understand. Let it be underscored that
"on-its-face" invalidation of penal statutes, as is sought to be done by petitioners
in this case, may not be allowed. Thus, we said:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations
by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-itsface" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate. We have so
enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are

analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional
on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases,
the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our
jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not
because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere
Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held
that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue
delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would
result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have
even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a
departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and
controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract
context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this
evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies,
and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact
on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis
of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation
of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the

conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)1
Neither does the listing by Mr. Justice Tinga of what he condemns as offenses
under Republic Act No. 8189 convince this Court to overturn its ruling. What is
crucial in this case is the rule set in our case books and precedents that a facial
challenge is not the proper avenue to challenge the statute under consideration.
In our Decision of 30 April 2008, we enunciated that "the opinions of the dissent
which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of
provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge."2 On
this matter, we held:
An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be
limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of
Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are
charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which
are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that
for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not
conjectural or anticipatory.3
In conclusion, I reiterate that the doctrine embodied in Romualdez and Estrada
remains good law. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on
free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes maybe hampered. No prosecution would
be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case
of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain
of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before
judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal
statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the
court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a
test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be
nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute
is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
As structured, Section 45 enumerates acts deemed election offenses under
Republic Act No. 8189. The evident intent of the legislature in including in the
catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed
acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the
declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the
policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to

establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.
In People v. Gatchalian, the Court had the occasion to rule on the validity of the
provision of the Minimum Wage Law, which in like manner speaks of a willful
violation of "any of the provisions of this Act." This Court upheld the assailed
law, and in no uncertain terms declared that the provision is all-embracing, and
the same must include what is enjoined in the Act which embodies the very
fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.
Finally, as the records would show, petitioners managed to set up an intelligent
defense against the informations filed below. By clearly enunciating their
defenses against the accusations hurled at them, and denying their commission
thereof, petitioners allegation of vagueness must necessarily be rejected.
Petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption of constitutionality in favor
of the law. The constitutionality must prevail in the absence of substantial
grounds for overthrowing the same.
The phraseology in Section 45(j) has been employed by Congress in a number
of laws which have not been declared unconstitutional:
1) The Cooperative Code
Section 124(4) of Republic Act No. 6938 reads:
"Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is
imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6)
months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) or both at the discretion of the Court."
2) The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8371 reads in part:
"Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act,
such as, but not limited to "
3) The Retail Trade Liberalization Act
Section 12, Republic Act No. 8762, reads:
"Any person who would be found guilty of violation of any provisions of
this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day but not more than eight (8) years, and a fine of at least
One Million (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Twenty Million

(P20,000,000.00).
For reasons so stated, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Corpus Delicti
G.R. No. 189850
September 22, 2014

vs.
REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO
TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES, Accused,
BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision1 ofthe Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case
No. 02-200171. The RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @Roberto Torres y
Nava (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on
appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide.
Factual Antecedents
On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation3 was filed before the charging
siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie)
and appellant with the special complex crime ofrobbery withhomicide committed
against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information contained the
following accusatory allegations:
That on or about September 21, 2001, inthe City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating together
with one malefactor whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts [is]
still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence, and
intimidation,to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board his car and
travelling along C.M. Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , this City, by
blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the latter his belt-bag; that on the
occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse
of superior strength upon the said JAIME M.ESPINO and that when the latter
resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed weapons on x x x
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and
afterwhich, divest, take, rob and carry away a belt-bag, wallet, necklace, watch
and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to said JAIME M. ESPINO.
Contrary to law.4
Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date.
During arraignment, appellantentered a plea of "not guilty".5 After the
termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.6
The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Eduardo Umali (Umali), a butcher,
and MerlitoMacapar (Macapar), a cigarette vendor. Also presented were Dr.
Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), who testified on the cause of death of Espino. From
their testimonies,7 the following facts emerged:
At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was driving his car along
C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path.
Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his
belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his
belt-bag but the latters brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified
companion suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons,
appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his
body while the unidentified companion held him by the neck. When Espino was
already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelries and
immediately fled.
Espino was rushed to the hospital butwas pronounced dead on arrival. In his
Medico-Legal Report No. W-658-2001,8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died
of multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladedinstruments. The back portion
of his head bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds
which proved fatal. Considering the number and varying measurements of the
wounds, Dr. Salen opined that there weremore than one assailant.
To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espinos daughter, Winnie EspinoFajardo
(Winnie) testified that the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a
necklace worth P35,000.00, bracelet worth P15,000.00, wristwatch worth
P10,000.00 and two rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their expenses, Winnie
said that P25,000.00 was spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for the funeral
services. She stated further that Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death
and was earning P3,000.00 a day asa meat vendor.9

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita).
They proceeded to the house oftheir friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel,
Tayuman, Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until they fell
asleep. They did not leave their friends house until the following morning when
they went home. Thereupon, he was told that policemen were looking for him
because his brothers got involved in an altercation that resulted in the death of
someone.10 Merlita and Marilou corroborated appellants alibi in their respective
testimonies.11
From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna),
wife of Ronnie, the defenses version of the incidentemerged as follows:
In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes
with other vendors in Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall.
The driver alighted and asked why they were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had
nothing to do with him. The driver seemed drunk since he walked back to his
vehicle in an unsteady manner. Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed
Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and
got a bolo which he used to hack the driver repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and
Jay fled.12 Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a vegetable vendor in Divisoria,
corroborated Jornas version of the incident in her testimony.13
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its December 5, 2006 Decision,14 the RTC held that appellant could not have
committed robbery. It ratiocinated, viz:
Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the belt bag
of the deceased while Bobby and the rest took his wristwatch, ring and necklace.
However, on cross-examination, witness admitted that he did not see who took
the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the deceased fell on the
ground, accused and companions surrounded him. Merlitos testimony was
contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus, Merlito testified that there
was an exchange of heated words. There was no intimation whatsoever what
the altercation was about. He was ten meters away. No such altercation,
however, took place according to Eduardo who was barely five meters away.
This tainted the testimony of Merlitoand Eduardo with suspicion. When material
witnesses contradict themselves on vital points, the element of doubt is injected
and cannot be lightly disregarded. That was not all though. Merlito testified [that]
several people witnessed the incident. The stall of the victims daughter was
about ten meters from the crime scene, which was a few meters from the stall
of Ronnie. They both had been in their respective stalls for quite sometime. The
principal prosecution witnesses are familiar with the deceased and the accused
except for the unidentified companion as they often see them at the vicinity.
Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the victim are familiar if not know each other
very well. The perpetration of robbery at the place was thus unlikely.
Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot be held
liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason that it was
not indubitably shown that the mainpurpose of the accused was to rob the victim.
To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the prosecution
skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack. To sustain
a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the original
criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetrated
with a view to the consummation of the robbery, or by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).
xxxx
The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the accused
cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.15
The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino.
It held him guilty of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and duly established by
the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy among the accused
attended the crime.
Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and
moral damages to the heirs of Espino,but denied the claim for loss of earning
capacity for lack of documentary evidence.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused
Bobby Torres y Nava, "Guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00,
the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, actual damages in the
amount of P62,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay Torres
and Ronnie Torres.
SO ORDERED.16
Our Ruling
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration17which was denied in an Order18

dated April 10, 2007.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Hence, appellant appealed to the CA.19
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double

jeopardy.
In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide instead of murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant
and his co-accusedwas to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the
robbery. The blocking of Espinos car and the struggle for possession of his beltbag after he alighted are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery.
The dispositive portion of the July 23, 2009 Decision20 of the CA reads as
follows:
Appellant maintains thatthe CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to
the CA was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for
robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his
constitutional right not to be subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery.
He claims that even assuming that the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery
charge, such error can no longer be questioned on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila,

Branch 27 dated December 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY with
HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial courts award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and actual damages in the amount of P62,000.00 as well as its
order to appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby AFFIRMED.
We cannot give credence to appellants contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal

case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised
by the parties."26 "[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant."27 In other words, when appellant
appealed the RTCs judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have
abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became
the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed
judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when
the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with
homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, this present appeal.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errorsin his Supplemental Brief.22
The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left
undisturbed as being final and executory which cannot be overturned without
violating the proscription against double jeopardy.23
The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case
despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for
murder.24
It was an error to convict the accused-appellant of the crimes charged
considering that his guilt was notproven beyond reasonable doubt.25
Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason,
or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent togain; (3) with the use of violence
or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective
of the malefactor and the killing ismerely incidental to the robbery. The intent to
rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery."28
In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
primary intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and
Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified that at
around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellants brother and co-accused,
Ronnie, blocked Espinos car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya
Street. When Espino alighted from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his
beltbag. A struggle for possession of the belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture
that appellant and the other co-accused joined the fray and stabbed Espino
several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the pavement from his
stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the victims wallet,
beltbag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together.29
From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his
companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they
would have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie
initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that
the central aim was to commit robbery against Espino.This intention was
confirmed by the accuseds taking of Espinos belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and
jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The killing was therefore merely
incidental, resulting by reason oron occasion of the robbery.
The testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses are worthy of credence.
Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are
glaring contradictions in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTCs
observation that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies on whether he actually
witnessed who among appellant and his cohorts took Espinos valuables after
he fell to the ground. Appellant asserts further that Umalis testimony that an
altercation did not precede the commission of the crime contradicts the
testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of words occurred prior to the
incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human nature for Espino to alight
from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of money
without fear of an impending hold-up.
We are not persuaded. The inconsistencies attributed to the prosecutions
eyewitnesses involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect their credibility.
Said inconsistencies do not depart from the fact that these eyewitnesses saw
the robbery and the fatal stabbing of Espino by appellant and his cohorts. "[T]o
the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to
relate to details of peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the
positive identification by [Umali and Macapar of appellant] as the perpetrator of
the crime."30 "Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the
truth and have not been rehearsed. Witnesses are not expected to remember
every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."31
Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour
while in possessionof a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing
business in the vicinity where the incident occurred. He was familiar with the
people and their activities in the premises. In view of the above, the Court finds
that the CA properly lent full credence to the testimonies of Umali and Macapar.
The weapons are not the corpus delicti.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the
weapons used in the stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he
asserts that it was improper to convict him because the corpus delictihad not
been established.
We disagree. "[C]orpus delictirefers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not
refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body
of the person murdered or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission
of robbery with homicide]. Since the corpus delictiis the fact of the commission
of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated
testimony, if credible may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor.
Corpus delictimay even be established by circumstantial evidence."32
In this case, the corpus delictiwas established by the evidence on record. The
prosecution eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to
perpetrate the crime. Their testimonies on the existence and use of weapons in
committing the offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Salen who
conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino sustained
several stab wounds with varying measurements which were caused by sharp
bladed instruments. Appellant is therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to
present the weapons used in killing Espino was fatal to the cause of the
prosecution.
The defenses of denial and alibi cannot prosper.
We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit
in appellants defenses of denialand alibi.
Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friends house in
Villaruel, Tayuman,Manila, from 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00
a.m. of the following day. He alleges to have slept atthe place and went home
at around 7:00 a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he did not
depart from his friends house from the time they started drinking until he went
home the following morning.
Appellants alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that Villaruel
is less than two kilometers awayfrom Divisoria and that it would only take a few
minutes to go toDivisoria from Villaruel.33 Clearly, it was not impossible for
appellant to be physicallypresent at the crime scene during its commission. "For
alibi to prosper, it muststrictly meet the requirements of time and place. It is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, but it must also be demonstrated that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed."34
penalty on [appellant]."41 In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled

"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," the
penalty that must be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.42
The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves
scant consideration. Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the
very nature of alibi the witnesses affirm.35 Appellant can easily fabricate an alibi
and ask relatives and friends to corroborate it.36
The Civil Liabilities
We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and
must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained the identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic
thatpositive testimony prevails over negative testimony.37
The evidence was sufficient to establish the presence of abuse of superior
strength.
Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the
presence of abuse of superior strength. In the samemanner, appellant claims
that the number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not the criterion for the
appreciation of this circumstance.
"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense."38 Here, appellant and
his four companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority, they
were also armed with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed and
defenseless. While Ronnie was wrestling with Espino, appellant and his
coaccused simultaneously assaulted the latter. The unidentified companion
locked his arm around the neck of Espino while appellant and his co-accused
stabbed and hacked him several times. While Espino was lying defenseless on
the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they immediately
fled the scene of the crime.39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act by
employing physical superiorityover Espino.
The Proper Penalty
Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superiorstrength should not result in
qualifying the offense to murder.1wphi1 When abuse of superior strength
obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is to be
regarded as a generic circumstance, robbery withhomicide being a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. With
the penalty of reclusion perpetuato death imposed for committing robbery with
homicide,40 "[t]he generic aggravating circumstance of[abuse of superior
strength] attending the killing of the victim qualifies the imposition of the death
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded
automatically without need ofallegation and evidence other than the death of the
victim owing to the commission of the crime.43 Here, the RTC and CA granted
civil indemnity and moral damages to Espinos heirs in the amount of P50,000.00
each. These courts were correct in granting the awards, but the awards should
have been P100,000.00 each.Recent jurisprudence44 declares that when the
imposable penalty is death, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages
shall be P100,000.00 each.
In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and the best evidence obtainable to the injured party."45 "Receipts should
support claims of actual damages. Thus, as correctly held by the [RTC] and
affirmed by the CA, the amount of [P62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses
can be sustained since these are expenditures supported by receipts."46 The
existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary
damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, we likewiseaward P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the
victims heirs.47 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of
damages from the finality of this judgment until fully paid should likewise be
granted to the heirs of Espino.48
Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of Espino despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned
P3,000.00 a day as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not awarded in the
absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either selfemployed or was a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor proved that the victim
was either selfemployed or was a daily wage earner, indemnity for loss of
earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim."49
WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02925 that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No.
02-200171 is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby
Torres@ Roberto Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime
M. Espino, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages. The interest rate of 6% per annum is

imposed on all damages awarded from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Elements of criminal liability

G.R. No. 207175
November 26, 2014
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the
coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into
coco lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the
coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left the site and
proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the incident.
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police.
Thereafter, the two, accompanied by SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut
plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33) coconut trees (subject
trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the area. They
took photographs of the stumps left by the men.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
December 14, 2012 Decision1 and the May 6, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 filed by Eduardo Magsumbol
(Magsumbol), questioning his conviction for Theft.
The Facts
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio
Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with the
crime of Theft in the Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2002-1017. The Information indicting Magsumbol and his co-accused
reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan I, in the
Munipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with seven (7) John Does whose true names and real
identities are still unknown and whose physical descriptions were not made
known by available witnesses, and who are all still at large, and mutually helping
one another, with intent togain and without the consent of the owner, Menandro
Avanzado, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut, take, steal
and carry away with them thirty three (33) coconut trees from the coconut
plantation of the said owner, valued at FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (P44,400.00), Philippine currency, belonging to said
Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount.3
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal
(Caringal), private complainant Engr. Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and
SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00 oclock
in the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare
unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado

(Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol, Barangay Captain Pedro
Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to substantiate its
claim of innocence for all the accused.
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and
Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property,
which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted that
he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that he was
not present whenthe cutting incident happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002,
Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to his office seeking
permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and
Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land
owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that
morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader
and that Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot. Magsumbol
claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely
supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for
the service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale.
Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the coconut treesbut
confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to supervise the
accomplishment of the work being done thereat. Inanoria corroborated the
narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the felled trees were planted inside
the lot owned by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the
complaint for theft due to his refusal to accede to latters request for him to testify
against his co-accused in relation to the present criminal charge.4
Ruling of the RTC

On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the prosecution
was able to establish with certitude the guilt of all the accused for the crime of
simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial invoked by the accused in
the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators
of the crime. It did not believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him
as biased witness on account of his relationship with accused Magsino and
Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo
Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez guilty
as charged and applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby
sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of
Prision Correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro
Avanzado and the other heirs of Norberto Avanzado the sum of P13,200.00
representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they have cut and sold to accused
Ramirez.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment of the RTC
before the CA insisting that the prosecution evidence did not meet the quantum
of proof necessary towarrant their conviction of the crime charged. They posited
that the RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal intent on their part
to commit the crime of simple theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence
was presented to prove the element of intent to gain.6
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained the
findings of facts and conclusions of law by the RTC and upheld the judgment of
conviction rendered against the accused. The CA was of the view, however, that
the crime committed in this case would not fall under the general definition of
theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but rather under
paragraph (2) of the same provision which penalizes theft of damaged property.
The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of Caringal who was not shown to have been motivated by any ill will
to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with the RTC that Atanacios
testimony should not be given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship
with Magsino and Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason for him to
suppress or pervert the truth. Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated
that the mere fact that the accused cut the coconut trees on Menandros land
and made them into coco lumber, gave rise to the presumption that it was done
with intent to gain. The falloreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena
City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants Erasmo
Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of tw0 (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as
maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private complainant Menandro
Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P13,200.00).
SO ORDERED.7
The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 Decision but
their motion was denied by the CA on May 6, 2013.
Issues:
Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before this Court
and imputes to the CA the following
ERRORS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS
OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN THAT:
I
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THAT THE COCONUT TREES THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND
THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and
II
MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT,
ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT HAND.8
The Courts Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the
credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason
that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing
the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. Though it is
true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, this
rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is observed if there is a
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
factor circumstance of weight and substance that would have cast doubt on the
guilt of the accused.9 The said exception apparently exists in the case at bench.
It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime
under the RPC, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts
of execution and accompanying criminal intent. In the case at bench, petitioner
Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft
of damaged property under paragraph (2) of Article 308 of the RPC which
provides:
defense, on the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within the
land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his co-accused. Menandro
testified that there were muniments that delimit the boundaries between the
adjacent lots11 while Atanacio claimed that there were none and that "x" marks
were just etched on the trunk of the trees to delineate the boundary of his land.12
Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no concrete and competent
evidence was adduced to substantiate their respective submissions. In view of
such conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court
cannot determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The
uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presenceof the
criminal intent to gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within
Menandros land, no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to
Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one important
point in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to
Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut trees
belonging to Atanacio upon the latters instruction.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.: xxxx

Theft is likewise committed by:
1. xxxxx;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and xxx.
Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial
reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his land to Ramirez, a coco lumber
trader; that since he could not go to the site due to health reasons, he authorized
Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of
the felled trees; that he informed Menandro about this and even offered to pay
for the damages that he might have sustained as some of his (Menandros) trees
could have been mistakenly cut down in the process; that Menandro refused his
offer of compensation and replied that a case had already been filed against the
four accused; and that he tried to seek an audience again from Menandro, but
the latter refused to talk to him anymore.13
[Emphasis Supplied]
To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged
property, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the accused
maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter, removed
or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged
property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it
is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
crime is committed.10 Was criminal intent substantiated tojustify the conviction
of Magsumbol and his co-accused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land
owned by Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut
coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by Menandro. The
Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted
testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable and considered him a biased witness
simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino. Family
relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness testimony inadmissible
or devoid of evidentiary weight.14 To warrant rejection of the testimony of a
relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship,
the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil
motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.15
The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his
credibilty.1wphi1 It bears stressing that while Magsumbol and Magsino are
Atanacios brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the
accused and the accuser are Atanacios relatives, and purportedly both have
bearing with regard to his decision, why would then Atanacio support one over
the other? The logical explanation could only be that Atanacio had indeed
ordered Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The Court is
convinced that Atanacio was telling the truth.
Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus.
All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacios instructions, Magsumbol and his
co-accused encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because they
missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down some of
Menandros trees, such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error. The
following pronouncement in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may
serve as a guidepost, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012

Decision and the May 6, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo Magsumbol is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing
the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. x x x.
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind
is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest
and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of
course is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which
is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent
is supplied by the element ofnegligence and imprudence.17
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
[Emphasis supplied]
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his
co-accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut
down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad daylight
effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that
the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real intention was
tosteal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute
their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid
detection of the commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken impression
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should always be looked at
with askance. The point is that courts should carefully scrutinize the prosecution
evidence to make sure that no innocent person is condemned. An allegation, or
even a testimony, that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as
proof that it was really done. Evidence adduced must be closely examined under
the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that conviction only flows from moral
certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.1wphi1 The prosecution
miserably failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol,
together with his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with malice
and deliberate intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the
premises.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198020
Stages of execution
CAUSE OF DEATH:
July 10, 2013
MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND

vs.
JOSEPH BARRA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11, 2011 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 041552 affirming with modification the
August 24, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, San
Jose, Camarines Sur in Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding appellant Joseph4
Barra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with
homicide instead of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On March 21, 2004, an information5 for the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide was filed against appellant, to wit:
That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at Barangay Tinawagan,
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining entrance into
the residence of his victim, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money from
Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling him to take and steal the money, the herein accused, with
intent to kill, did then and there feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan, thereby
inflicting upon him gunshot wound which caused his death, to the prejudice of
his heirs. (Emphases deleted.)
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.6 Trial ensued thereafter.
Dr. Peafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines
Sur, examined the corpse of Elmer Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem
Report7:
Findings:
1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms, circular, with inverted edges at
the mid left frontal area. Hematoma formation is noted at the site of entry.
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the
circular and inverted edges of the point of entry. She concluded that since there
was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close range.8
Ricardo de la Pea testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated
that he was on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00
p.m. on October 9, 2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter
the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victims
right forehead and demanded money. De la Pea hid behind a tree ten meters
away. When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession,
appellant shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following
morning.9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the
victims house to collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the
victims house. He inquired from appellant if the victim was around. Appellant
responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor
was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he
learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.10
The victims mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial
expenses in the amount of P33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that
he was in Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he
was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of
"robbery with murder."11 Appellants brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his
testimony.12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
It stated that the affirmative testimony of the prosecutions witnesses deserved
more weight than the appellants defense of denial and alibi. Thus, finding the
prosecutions witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the victim to be by
reason of the robbery, the RTC decisions decretal portion read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, Joseph Barra GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 291(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. To pay the surviving heirs of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death, as actual damages in the amount
of Php55,579.80, as moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the
crime of homicide is bereft of merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason
of or on the occasion of robbery.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he

abides by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners during his
confinement, otherwise he shall only be entitled to four-fifths (4/5) thereof.13
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellants intent to rob the

victim. That motive was manifested by accused-appellants overt act of poking a
gun at the victims forehead demanding money from the latter. When the victim
refused to accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot the former. The killing
was an offshoot of accused-appellants intent to rob the victim. Accusedappellant was bent on resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to the
victims failure to give his money, the crime of robbery was, however, not
consummated.15 (Citations omitted.)
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of

attempted robbery with homicide. It stated that:
Regarding the trial courts finding that accused-appellant is responsible for the
death of Lagdaan, WE will not disturb the same as it is well supported by the
evidence on record and in accord with prevailing law and jurisprudence.
However, WE disagree with its determination of the nature of the crime that
accused-appellant committed. Instead of robbery with homicide at its
consummated stage, accused-appellant should have been declared guilty only
of attempted robbery with homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG,14 the only evidence introduced by the
government to establish robbery is the statement of De la Pea that when
accused-appellant reached the victims place, the latter barged into the said
residence, poked a gun at the victims forehead, demanded money and when
the victim refused to accede to his demand, fired a gun and shot the victim.
Indeed, no iota of evidence was presented to establish that accused-appellant
took away the victims money or any property, for that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this
fact was not duly established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for
the crime of attempted robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
"When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a
homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the
homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code."
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he
commenced the commission of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce robbery by reason of some causes
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Judgment is hereby
MODIFIED as follows
1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Attempted
Robbery with Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Elmer Lagdaan the
following:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d) the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
e) the cost of suit.16
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011.17
After appellants confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and appellant
manifested that they would adopt the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in
lieu of supplemental briefs.18
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not
sufficiently established by the prosecution. Appellant stated that the testimonies
of the prosecutions witnesses were rife with inconsistencies. Moreover,
appellant argued that the elements for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide were not proven particularly the element of taking of personal property.
We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals with
modification on the award of damages.
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula19 we stated that:
Findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the probative
weight of the testimonial evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored
on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive
effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing at close
range the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the said witnesses as they
testify, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances which if considered will change the outcome of the
case. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecutions
witnesses, he does not present any sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC
indeed ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances
of the case. We also found, after reviewing the records, nothing that would
indicate any misinterpretation or misapprehension of facts on the part of the
appellate court that would substantially alter its conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties.
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation
or arson.
In People v. Quemeggen,20 this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the
prosecution for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and

4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed. (Citation omitted.)
In the case before us, appellants intention was to extort money from the victim.
By reason of the victims refusal to give up his personal property - his money to appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing his death. We, however,
agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of taking was not complete,
making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the
crime appellant was convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held
by the RTC. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain
circumstances. When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated
robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the
provisions of this Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v.
Macabales,21 to wit:
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide
is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because
the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was
shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot.
Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus
punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found appellant's crime to be aggravated by disregard of
dwelling, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of
reclusion pe1petua.1wphi1
Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of
existing rules and recent jurisprudence, we find the same to be in order and need
not be disturbed.22
However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary
awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6%) per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.23
WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04I55 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of
exemplary damages shall be increased to P30,000.00 and all monetary awards
for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 202867
July 15, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of
the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The
CA-Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal
Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias "Banok" (appellant) of
murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant of frustrated
murder.
The Facts
unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means
of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gregorio Conde with said
unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect, middle third right forearm
1 cm. In diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused; that is by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio Conde which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag
pled not guilty in both cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution
presented four witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No.
2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obaana and Dr.
Edwin Jose Figura, the physicians at the Sara District Hospital where the victims
were admitted. The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant,
Demapanag, and the latters brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias

Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with
Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an Information3 which reads:
The prosecutions version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23

December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn
Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter,
Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their
house.
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of

Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JUDY CONDE alias JOJO
with said unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting gunshot wounds on the
different parts of her breast which caused her death thereafter.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from
Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn
rushed to Gregorios aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other
accused were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already
dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was
pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment
of his gunshot wound.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4
which states:
Dr. Jeremiah Obaana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her
death was caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade
due to gunshot wound."5

Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident.
He found that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring one centimeter
in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation" in

his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23
December 2000. He claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio,
armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot
appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from
Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not
know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill,
which is approximately 14 kilometers away from the crime scene. This was
corroborated by Frederick, Demapanags brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted of murder and frustrated murder.
The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTCs Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely
erred in convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu,
however, upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral
and exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a
distinction between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case No.
2001-1555 and the moral damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal
Case No. 2001-1555. It did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial
court should have awarded both, considering that they are two different kinds of
damages. For death indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to
the current judicial policy on the matter, without need of any evidence or proof
of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of the surviving family should be
assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable moral damages."9
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of
Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused
to reclusion perpetua together with accessory penalty provided by law, to pay
the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby
sentences the said accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the necessary penalty provided
by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to
pay the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
Accuseds entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein
imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory
penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde P25,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(s) entire period of detention
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the

crimes charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation
Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag
from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision

dated March 10, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo,
Iloilo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of the said
Joint Decision should now read as follows:
shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his
sentence.
Appellants claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the
shotgun accidentally fired is also implausible.

crime(s) charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation
In contrast, we find that the Condes account of the incident is persuasive. Both
the CA-Cebu and the RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were
credible and presented in a clear and convincing manner. This Court has
consistently put much weight on the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court.14 In People v.
Mangune,15 we stated that:
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that
appellant is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. We uphold
appellants conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify
the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the
award of moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially
in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and
inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and
the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the
witnesses were not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of
relevant facts, the same must be sustained by this Court.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Appellants feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly

rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v. Damitan,11
explained that:
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous

attack is one in which the victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend
himself or resist the attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely determined
by the type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was deliberately
chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and to render the victim
defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the accused.18
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden
of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements
of his defense. However, appellants version of the incident was uncorroborated.
His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.12
Appellants failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony
and his unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio
before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as correctly
pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellants theory of self-defense is belied by the
fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorios alleged
unlawful aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant
claimed. And, when appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not
also inform the police that what happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.13
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant.
The use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly
treacherous, as it denies the victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and
not frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of
felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated
felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
xxxx
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony

directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma
formation at the anterior aspect right shoulder.22
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted

felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas
in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the
crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the
other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of
the crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would
have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails
to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victims
death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio
Conde was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined
Gregorio after the shooting incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court
what was the situation of the patient when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in
distress.
Court (to the witness)

Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should
be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall
be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under
Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.1wphi1
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium
period to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.
Award of damages
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of
damages imposed by the lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 20011555, this Court hereby awards P75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.24 The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages in the
foregoing case is sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay P40,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in relation to Criminal Case
No. 2002-1777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY
of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and
pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
G.R. No. 191723
July 23, 2014

vs.
ROLANDO LAS PIAS, JIMMY DELIZO AND MERWIN LAS PIAS,
Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
This ordinary appeal seeks to reverse the consolidated December 22, 2009
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00401 and CA-G.R.
CR No. 28975, which affirmed the July 21, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 53, Sorsogon City, in Criminal Case No. 2001-5445,2 and
the Decision dated May 28, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 52, Sorsogon City, in
Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448.3
The Facts of the Case
In an Information dated July 25, 2001 docketed as Criminal Case No. 20015445, the public prosecutor charged Renato, Rolando, Armando, Gilberto,
Merwin, Freddie, Salvador, all surnamed Las Pifias, and Jimmy Delizo with
frustrated murder committed as follows:
That on or about 2:00 x x x in the morning of May 2, 2001 at the fishpen in the
Municipality of Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, th[e] above-named accused with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, armed with guns,
conspiring[,] confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one ROGER
ARINGO thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries, to wit:
= Gunshot wound face right side[;]
= Gunshot wound chest right side, contusion[;]
= Gunshot wound buttock left[.]
which injuries could have caused the death of said Roger Aringo, thus accused
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Murder, as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Roger Aringo, which prevented
his death, to his damage and prejudice.4
In three other Informations all dated July 25, 2001, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448, the public prosecutor charged the
same persons above-enumerated with three counts of murder, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 2001-5446
That on or about 2:00 x x x in the morning of May 2, 2001, at the fishpen in the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDGARDO
ARINGO, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries on the different parts
of his body which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.5
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one BENJAMIN
ARINGO, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injury which caused his death,
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.6
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one CARLITO
LASALA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injury which caused his death,
Of the eight accused, only Rolando Las Pias, Merwin Las Pias, and Jimmy
Delizo were apprehended8 and held for trial. The rest remained at large.9
Though the charges of Frustrated Murder and three counts of Murder emanated
from the same set of facts, they were tried separately. Criminal Case No. 20015445 for Frustrated Murderwas raffled to RTC-Br. 53, while Criminal Case Nos.
2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448 (all for Murder) were raffled to RTC-Br.
52, both in Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Of the four, only Roger remained alive by daybreak and was eventually rescued
by a passing fisherman. He was broughtto the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital for
treatment.18 Initially, only the bodies of Benjamin and Carlito were recovered
from the platform. But four days later, Edgardos body was found floating in the
water.19
Upon their arraignment, the three accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged.10
Dr. Antonio Lopez (Dr. Lopez) testified and presented a medical certificate on
Rogers condition. He explained that Roger suffered gunshot wounds on the
right side of his face, his left chest, and in his left buttock; that he lost his eyesight
in the left eye; and that his wounds were not immediately fatal but could have
led tohis death if neglected. Dr. Lopez further testified that he could only remove
the bullet lodged in Rogers chest, but not the one stuck behind his left eye and
left buttock.20
In Criminal Case No. 2001-5445, toprove the charge of Frustrated Murder, the
prosecution presented the victim, Roger Aringo (Roger), Dr. Antonio Lopez
(attending physician), Rowan Estrellado (National Bureau of Investigation [NBI]
special investigator)11 and Atty. Tomas C. Enrile (a lawyer and executive
officerof the Naga City NBI).12
In Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448, to establish the
indictment for three counts of Murder, the prosecution again presented Roger,
Susan Aringo (Edgardo Aringos wife), Gleceria Lasala (Carlito Lasalas wife),
Catalino Aringo (father of the Aringo brothers), and Dr. Salve Sapinoso
(municipal health officer of Castilla Rural Health Office).13
From the testimony of Roger, the prosecution established that on the night of
May 1, 2001, he and his brothers, Edgardo and Benjamin, and their cousin,
Carlito Lasala, were at Edgardos fishpen located within the coastal waters of
the town of Castilla, Sorsogon. The fishpen was supported by four wooden posts
arranged in a square. On top of the posts was a 9 to 10-meter bamboo platform
about four to five meters above the sea. While on the platform, they lighted three
pressure lamps in the middle of the fishpen to attract the fish. After checking the
fishnet and eating supper, they took turns in resting and watching.14
At around 2:00 a.m. of May 2, 2001, while Roger was on guard duty and the rest
were sleeping, the eightabove-named accused arrived on board a "sibidsibid,"15 a long wooden boat mobilized by paddles. The accused then climbed
up the platform and opened fire at the Aringo brothers and Carlito.16
Specifically, Roger narrated thathe saw accused Armando and Rolando shoot
Edgardo and Benjamin, while he witnessed Jimmy, Merwin and Freddie shoot
Carlito. He likewise witnessed Armando slash the throat of Edgardo after the
latter was incapacitated, and throw his (Edgardo) body into the sea. As for
himself, Roger testified that his assailants were accused Renato, Salvador and
Gilberto; and thathe sustained gunshot wounds on his right cheek, left chest,
and left buttock. The carnage finally ended when the accused thought that the
three Aringo brothers and Carlito were all dead; and then they boarded their boat
and left towards Sorsogon. Roger recognized all the accused because they used
to be neighbors at Sitio Dulungan, Brgy. Libtong, Castilla, Sorsogon.17
Dr. Salve Sapinoso testified thatshe conducted the post mortem examination on
the remains of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, and issued their death
certificates.21
Rowan Estrellado, who was the assigned investigator of the NBI, testified that
he took the sworn statements of Roger, Susan Aringo, Catalino Aringo, and
Gleceria Warde Lasala;22 while it was Atty. Tomas C. Enrile who administered
the oaths of said witnesses.23
The wives of the deceased and the father of the Aringo brothers testified on the
circumstances surrounding the incident and its discovery, how they felt on the
loss of their loved ones, their family background, and the burial and
hospitalization expenses.24
On the other hand, the defense presented the same set of witnesses for the
frustrated murder case and consolidated murder cases,25 i.e., Gilberto Jesalva
(Gilberto), Rodel Lato (Rodel), Lito Bojorque (Lito), Serafin Deocareza (Serafin),
Leonora Delizo (Leonora), Rolando Las Pias (Rolando), Merwin Las Pias
(Merwin), Blandino Diaz (Blandino), and Jimmy Delizo (Jimmy). Gilberto, the
chief barangay tanodof Barangay Bitan-o, Sorsogon City, testified that he and
accused Rolando were with the other barangay tanoddoing patrol duty on May
1, 2001. At around 11:45 p.m., Rolando asked permission to leave to unload the
truck containing cargoes of shellfish locally known as "badoy" that arrived from
Naga City. At about 12:45 a.m., they came upon Rolando still unloading the
cargoes with the other workers.26
Blandino, the barangay captain, testified that at 11:00 p.m. on May 1, 2001, he
saw the accused Rolando in the barangayhall and then left after 30 minutes. He
later learned that he was unloading cargoes from a delivery truck.27
Rodel testified that he was in the business of buying and selling cooked "badoy."
He stated that at around midnight to 1:00 a.m. on May 2, 2001, there was a
delivery of "badoy" from Naga City. When the delivery truck arrived at his house
in Barangay Bitan-o, his supervisor and all around caretaker Rolando woke him.
In turn, Rodel woke up Merwin, who was the designated cook. He saidthat
Rolando and Merwin never left the premises until they were arrested.28
Lito, another cook,corroborated Rodels testimony on Rolando and Merwins
whereabouts in the early morning of May 2, 2001.29
Serafin, who testified for accused Jimmy, stated that he, Jimmy, and their
companions went fishing in the morning of May 1, 2001 until 4:00 p.m. After
getting their respective shares, they decided to have a drinking session in his
house at 7:00 p.m. and ended at midnight of May 1, 2001. According to him,
Jimmy was so drunk that he needed to be escorted home.30 Jimmys wife,
Leonora corroborated Serafins testimony and the two of them brought Jimmy
home.31 When it was their turn to testify, accused Rolando, Merwin and Jimmy
corroborated the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
RTC-Branch 53 Decision in Criminal Case No. 2001-5445 for Frustrated Murder
In its July 21, 2004 Decision, RTC-Branch 53 convicted the accused appellants
of the crime charged. The fallo of said decision provides:
The RTC found Rogers testimony tobe credible, spontaneous, and

straightforward having stood his ground despite the lengthy and intensive crossexamination.33
In contrast, the RTC did not believethe accused-appellants defense of alibi
because it was not established with clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the fishpen when the offense was
committed especially so that the coastal Barangay Bitan-o was along the same
coastline as Barangay Poblacion and Bagalaya of Castilla; and the fishpen
involved in the incident was off-shore of these barangays. In fact, it was
established that from Barangay Bitan-o to the two other barangays, one can
travel by boat in one hour or less.34
In addition, the RTC held that the defense of alibi becomes unworthy of merit
where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives and not
by credible persons. Here, accused-appellants Rolando and Merwins alibis
were supported by each other and their friends, while accused-appellant
Jimmys alibi was supported by his wife and his drinking buddy.35 Of the three
qualifying circumstances alleged in all the Informations, i.e., treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, the RTC held that only the
circumstance of treachery was proved, that is, the means of execution gave the
victims no opportunity to defend themselves, and the accused deliberately and
consciously adopted said means.
Premises considered, the court believes that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the offense charged of Frustrated Murder was committed
and that the accused Rolando Las Pias, Merwin Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo
are guilt[y] thereof.
The RTC also concluded that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime
all the accused arrived together, all were armed with short firearms, and all
participated in the shooting; and after the attack, they all left together the overt
acts of the eight accused showed a common design and purpose to kill the
victims in this case. Thus, the act of one was the act of all.36
For the pain that Roger Aringo suffered by reason of the assault on him and the
injuries he sustained he is entitled to moral damage in the amount of
P25,000.00. No credible evidence was adduced for the medical expenses.
RTC-Branch 52 Decision inCriminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and

2001-5448 for Murder
The imposable penalty for Frustrated Murder is Reclusion Temporal. Applying

the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby imposes upon the said
accused the penalty of imprisonment for the period from eight (8) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and orders them to pay
jointly and severally Roger Aringo P25,000.00 as moral damage[s] and to pay
the cost of suit.
The period of their detention shall be credited in their favor.
The case against the other accused is ordered archived. Issue a standing
warrant for their arrest.32
In a joint Decision dated May 28, 2004, RTC-Branch 52 found the accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed in
conspiracy with each other.
Similar to the finding of RTC-Branch 53, RTC-Branch 52 held that Rogers
testimony as the lone eyewitness was credible, and his positive identification of
the accused-appellants prevailed over the latters defense of alibi. The RTC also
determined thatthe accused-appellants failed to prove the physical impossibility
to be at the place and time of the incident.37
The dispositive portion of the joint Decision of RTC-Branch 52 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Rolando Las

Pias, Merwin Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo each guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in Criminal Case No.
2001-5446, Criminal Case No. 2001-5447 and in Criminal Case No. 2001-5448
and the Court hereby sentences each of them to an imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua for Crim. Case No. 2001-5446, for Crim. Case No. [2001-]5447 and
for Crim. Case No. 2001-5448 and to pay the heirs of Edgardo Aringo, Benjamin
Aringo and Carlito Lasala as civil indemnity, at P50,000.00 each, jointly and
severally the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY [THOUSAND]
(P150,000.00) Pesos, also the amount of Ninety Thousand (P90,000.00) Pesos,
at P30,000.00 each victim, as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused being detained, their detention shall be credited in full in the service
of their sentence.
The case against accused Renato Las Pias, Armando Las Pias, Gilberto Las
Pias, Freddie Las Pias,and Salvador Las Pias are hereby ordered archived[.]
Let issue an alias warrant of arrest of them and the same be coursed thru the
Central,Regional, Provincial and Local PNP Command for service.38
The accused-appellants appealed the foregoing decisions to the Court of
Appeals. They prayed for their acquittal in the Murder cases; and either a similar
acquittal in the Frustrated Murder case, or a downgrading of the charge to
Attempted Murder.39
The Court of Appeals Decision
In its consolidated40 December 22, 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decisions of RTC-Br. 52 and Br. 53, viz:
And in an attempt to discredit Rogers eyewitness account pertaining to the

murder of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, the accused-appellants alleged that
he (Roger) did not really see what transpired as his left eye was blinded when
the bullet that entered his right cheek eventually ended behind his left eye. But
the Court of Appeals discredited said argument on account of the testimony of
Dr. Lopez, Rogers attending physician, that Rogers right eye remained visually
unimpaired.43
This case is now before the Court in view of the Notice of Appeal interposed by
the accused-appellants from the consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Courts Decision
The parties waived the filing of supplemental briefs and adopted their Appeal
Briefs earlier filed with the Court of Appeals.
The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the
criminal cases on the following assignment of errors: (i) that the trial court gravely
erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder despite the insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution; (ii)
granting arguendo,that the accused appellants committed an offense, they can
only be held liable for attempted murder; and (iii) that the trial court gravely erred
in not giving credence to the accused-appellants defense of alibi.44
In essence, the accused-appellants attack the consolidated disposition of the
Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for frustrated murder and three counts
of murder on the ground that the prosecution failed to discharge its function of
proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They make an issue out of Rogers
delay in reporting the crimes to the authorities, and his supposed physical
inability to observe the entire commission of the crimes. In a nutshell, they raise
reasonable doubt in view of the issues identified by the accused-appellants that
hinge on the credibility of Roger as an eyewitness.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions appealed from are affirmed.41

The appeal fails.
The Court of Appeals did not disturb both trial courts rulings since the
convictions of the accused-appellants for frustrated murder and three counts of
murder were based on the narration of a credible eyewitness, which was
independently assessed by the two trial courts.42
Particularly, in sustaining that the acts committed against Roger amounted to
frustrated murder, the Court of Appeals held that downgrading the charge to
attempted murder insteadwas not supported by expert medical opinion. On the
contrary, the attending physician explained that the injuries sustained by Roger
would haveled to his death if his injuries were neglected or medically
unattended.
After a review of the records, the Court sustains the conviction of the accusedappellants for Frustrated Murder and three counts of Murder.
The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses on the witness stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the
trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies before it.
It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses enjoy, asa rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have
the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.45
With respect to this case, the Court nevertheless carefully scrutinized the
records but found no indication thatthe trial and the appellate courts overlooked
or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of this
case. The two trial courts and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of Roger who was
an eyewitness to the crime and was himself a victim of the shooting.
Rogers testimony does not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency
that could possibly detract from his credibility. The accusedappellants were
directly identified by Roger as three of the eight perpetrators of the crimes
charged. Roger saw the shooting of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, and was
categorical and frank in his testimony. His testimony was the same with respect
to his own experience at the hands of the other accused. From his direct and
straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits, viz:
Q: Who was with you?

A: I was with Eduardo46 Aringo.
Q: What happened to this [Edgardo] Aringo?
A: He was shot.
Q: Do you know who shot this [Edgardo] Aringo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you be able to tell the Court?
[Direct Examination]
A: [They] were Armando Las Pias and Rolando who shot him.
Q: By 2:00 oclock in the early morning of May 2, 2001, do you recall of any
unusual incidentthat took place?
Q: Do you know what weapon was used?

A: It was a caliber .38.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After this [Edgardo] Aringo was shot, what happened to him, if you know?
Q: What is that incident?
A: After he was shot heturned his body on his side.
A: At around 2:00 oclock persons arrived in our place.
Q: What happened to him after that?
Q: What did you do if you did anything?
A: After he was shot he felt his body.
A: We did nothing.
Q: And what happened afterwards?
Q: And did these people do if they did anything?
A: When he was already dead Rolando kept on holding him
A: Upon arrival in our place theyimmediately fired their guns aiming at us.
Q: Who was this Rolando?
INTERPRETER:
A: There were several rounds of gunfires and some of our companions fell dead.
Q: By the way, in what particular part of that fishpen were you staying on that
particular date and time?
A: At the upper portion of the fishpen.
Witness pointing to a man in court wearing white T-shirt who identified himself
as Rolando Las Pias.
Q: What did this Rolando Las Pias do to Edgardo Aringo if Rolando did anything
to him?
A: The accused was holding [Edgardo] Aringo on his body.
A: On my right portion. They were positioned at the right portion.
Q: You made mentioned (sic) of another companion as Benjamin Aringo, what

happened to this Benjamin Aringo?
Q: Were they on the water or at the palicede?

ATTY. OLIVAR:
A: He was shot on his head.

Leading, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know who shot Benjamin Aringo?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
They were positioned at the upper portion of the palicede.
Q: Could you be able to tell the Court?
ATTY. LAGUNA:
A: It was Jimmy Delizo, Merwin Las Pias and Freddie Las Pias.
Q: What about you, what happened to you?
A: I was also shot/fired upon.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you recall who shot you?
Q: What is that?
A: Yes, sir.
A: It was a caliber [.]38.
Q: Could you tell the court?
Q: What is your distance to Benjamin Aringo at that time?
A: Renato Las Pias, Salvador Las Pias and Gilberto Las Pias.
A: Three (3) arms length.
Q: And in what part of your body were you hit?
Q: You also made mentioned (sic) another companion as Carlito Lasala, what
happened to Carlito Lasala?
A: He was also shot.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to his right che[e]k; witness pointing below the left side of his
nipple and also at the buttocks.
Q: Who shot Carlito Lasala?

ATTY. LAGUNA:
A: Merwin Las Pias, Freddie Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo.
Q: After you were shot, what happened afterwards, if you can still recall?
Q: What weapon was used?
A: It was also a caliber [.]38.
A: After I was shot they left me, and they went to my companion [Edgardo] Aringo
and held him.
Q: When your companions were shot, where were the assailants located?
Q: After they held him, what happened?
A: After they held him he was thrown into the sea.

Q: After this person you mentioned was thrown to the sea, what happened if
there was anything else that happened?
A: After Edgardo Aringo was thrown into the sea, they left already.47
A: Armando Las Pias, Renato Las Pias, Rolando Las Pias, Salvador Las
Pias, Freddie Las Pias, Gilberto Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo. Yes, sir. They
were quick ("listo") in their climbing on the fishpen.
Q: Where were they when they started firing their guns, were they already on
top of the fishpen; while they were climbing?
[Cross Examination]
A: Some were firing while already on the top of the fishpen and some were firing
while still climbing.
Q: What was your reaction when you saw these persons climbing the pole going
to the top of the fishpen?
Q: And who were those who were firing who were already on top of the fishpen?
A: We were not able to do anything.
A: Renato Las Pias, ArmandoLas Pias, Rolando Las Pias, Gilberto Las
Pias, SalvadorLas Pias and Jimmy Delizo.
Q: Where were the assailants when you said they shotyou? Were they in the
climbing position; were they still in the boat or were they in the fishpen already?
Q: And who were those firing while still climbing?
A: Some of them were on the boat,some were climbing and they were firing
shots while climbing.
A: Merwin Las Pias who was firing while still climbing.48

[Direct Examination in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446 to 5448]
Q: So no one was on top of the fishpen and firing shots?

A: There [were] already on top of the fishpen.
Q: Can you tell us who were those on the boat firing?
A: Merwin Las Pias and some of his brothers were already at the upper portion
of the fishpen.
Q: Who were the ones who first reached the top of the fishpen?
A: Renato Las Pias, Armando Las Pias, Rolando Las Pias, Freddie Las
Pias, Salvador Las Pias,Gilberto Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo.
Q: The question of the court was that you said a while ago that when they
arrived some were climbing, some were still left on the boat and some have
reached already the top of the fishpen. The question of the court is that when
you saw these actions of the accused whom did you see were the first ones who
reached the top of the fishpen?
Q: Now, after [Edgardo] was shot, what happened to him, if there was anything
that happened?
A: After [Edgardo] was shot, Rolando Las Pias helped him while Armando
slashed the throat of [Edgardo] and then he was thrown overboard.
Q: But would you be able to describeto this court how the throat of this [Edgardo]
was slashed?
A: While [Edgardo] was lying on his back he was held by Rolando this way
(witness stood up and placed his two hands downward as if pinning down
something) while Armando slashed his
([Edgardo]) throat.
Q: Did you see the weapon used in slashing the throat of [Edgardo]?
A: Yes, sir.
A: The persons that I have named.
Q: What was that?
Q: You name the first ones?
A: A knife.
Q: Would you be able to tell thiscourt how long is that knife?

A: About this size (witness demonstrated by placing his hands apart from each
other with the length of about 1 and feet.)
Q: Now, what happened next to [Edgardo] after his throat was slashed?
A: He was already dead, but still his throat was slashed and then after that, he
was thrown to the sea.49
The three Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447
and 2001-5448 charged the accused-appellants with the crime of Murder, for
shooting and killing Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, which circumstance was
attended by treachery defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz:
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means toweaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity[.]
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be
established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.50
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo,
Benjamin and Carlitowere shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three
of the eight perpetrators who killed them; (3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlitos
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by
prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin and
Carlito were neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, donein a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.51 In order for treachery
to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms
of attack employed by him.52 These elements are extant in the facts of this case
and as testified to by Roger above-quoted.
To emphasize, the victims, Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, were caught
off guard when the accused, including the accused-appellants, in the dead of
night, arrived at the fishpen and climbed the same, and without warning, opened
fire at the sleeping/resting victims to disable them. Upon disabling the victims,
the accused and the accused-appellants continued shooting at the victims
accused Armando and accused-appellant Rolando shot Edgardo and Carlito;
accused-appellants Jimmy and Merwin and accused Freddie shot Benjamin;
and accused Renato, Salvador and Gilberto shot Roger. Accused Armando
even slashed Edgardos throat after shooting him and threw his body out to the
sea53 the stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was
carried out gave the four victims no chance at all to evade the bullets and defend
themselves from the unexpected onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that the
collective acts of the accused and the accused-appellants reek of treachery.
Conspiracy
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Codestates that "conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it."54 It does not need to be proven by direct evidence and
may beinferred from the conduct before, during, and after the commission of
the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments as in conspiracy. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.55
That there was conspiracy among the accused and accused-appellants is a
matter not in issue. Both trial courts and the Court of Appeals deduced the
conspiracy among the accused/accused-appellants fromthe mode and manner
in which they perpetrated the killings. This Court is satisfied that their deduction
was warranted. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their conduct
before, during, and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy. In
thiscase, all the accused/accused-appellants were convincingly shown to have
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed
victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their
going together to the fishpen located offshore on board the same boat,but also
from their joint attack commenced simultaneously, firing successive shots at the
four victims and immediately followed by clambering upthe platform and
resuming their shooting of Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. It was also
significant that they fled together on board the boat that they arrived in as soon
as they had achieved their common purpose. Their conduct before, during,
and after the commission of the crime indicated a joint purpose, concerted
action, and concurrence of sentiments. Hence, conspiracy attended the
commission of the crimes.
As to the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2001-5445, the accusedappellants were indicted with the crime of Frustrated Murder for shooting Roger,
which was also attended by treachery, punished by Article 250 also of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 248 thereof, reading:
Article 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder or homicide. The courts, in
view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated
crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding
articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under
the provisions of Article 50.
In the same way that the murder was proved, to establish frustrated murder, the
prosecution must show that the accused performed all the acts of execution
which would kill the victim, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the offenders will.56 Here, the only survivor, Roger,
recounted that accused Renato, Salvador and Gilberto shot him on the face,
chest and buttock using a .38 gun and then left him for dead. Had it not been for
the timely medical treatment of his injuries, they would have been fatal. As
confirmed by Dr. Lopez, who testified that:
ATTY. LAGUNA:
Q: Mr. witness, your first finding here is "gunshot wound face right side, how
were you able to find this out?
A: There is a bullet hole on the face right side.
Q: What happened to the bullet?
A: Together with that we took anx-ray examination of the skull and we found the
bullet just behind the orbit of the left eye.
Q: To your knowledge, doctor, where is that bullet now?
A: I dont know. We refer the patient for that purpose to the BRTH.
Q: What is that BRTH?
A: In Legaspi City Bicol Regional Training Hospital.
Q: As a doctor, would you be able tosay whether or not this particular wound is
fatal?
A: That particular wound may not be immediately fatal but it could lead to the
death of the patient if neglected.
Q: And when you say neglected, what do you mean by that, doctor?
A: Without medical attention or assistance extended to the patient.57
Thus, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that frustrated murder
was committed. In view of the preceding discussion, there is no more reason to
entertain the issue raised by the accused-appellants that the charge of frustrated
murder be downgraded to attempted murder. And although only the three
accused-appellants were apprehended, they shall be held liable for the acts
oftheir five other co-accused since the prosecution similarly established
conspiracy with respect to the frustrated murder case the act of one is the act
of all.
Defenses of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail
in light of the positive identification made by one of their victims, Roger. Alibi and
denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused
as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony.58 The accused-appellants alibis that they were at different places at
the time of the shooting, and that family members and or their friends vouched
for their whereabouts are negative and self-serving assertions and cannot not
be given more evidentiary value vis-vis the affirmative testimony of a credible
witness. The accused-appellants and Roger, at one point,resided in the same
barangay and, are, therefore, familiar with one another. Therefore,Roger could
not have been mistaken on the accused-appellants identity, including the five
other accused who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility
involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present
at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.59
Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted
requirements. As held by the Court of Appeals, "[j]udicial notice was taken of the
fact that Barangay Bitan-o in Sorsogon City where the accused claimed they
were at the time of the shooting and the area of the sea adjacent to the
municipality of Castilla where the incident took place are neighboring sites that
can be negotiated with the use of a banca in one hour or less."60 Certainly, the
distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at
the fishpen, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be,
unnoticed.
prision mayor,which is correctly within the range of prision mayor under the
Revised Penal Code, the Court will no longer disturb the minimum term fixed.
However, the maximum term must be taken from reclusion temporal in its
medium period, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Finally, the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecutions
witnesses to discredit their testimonies.1wphi1 Absent any reason or motive for
a prosecution witness to perjure himself, the logical conclusion is that no such
motive exists, and his testimony is, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.61
In Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446 to 5448 (for three counts of Murder), the RTC
awarded in each case the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P30,000.00 as moral damages to the victims heirs. But to conform to recent
jurisprudence, the foregoing awards must be raised as follows: P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and another P75,000.00 as moral damages.63 The Court notes,
however, thatboth the RTC and the Court of Appeals overlooked the award of
exemplary damages. When a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is
justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code.64 Thus, conformably with the
above, the legal heirs of each victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.65
The Penalties
From the foregoing discussion, the Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellants are guilty of three counts of Murder and Frustrated
Murder.
For Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448 (for Murder), the
prosecution successfullyestablished the presence of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery in the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. The crime of murder
qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion perpetuato death. There
being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
felony, the accused appellants were correctlymeted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, for each separate count of Murder, conformably to Article 63(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, for Criminal Case No. 2001-5445 (for Frustrated Murder), the
indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court in this case is eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5)
months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The period is
incorrect in sofar as the maximum penalty is concerned.
Article 61, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
frustrated murderis one degree lower than reclusion perpetuato death, which is
reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporalhas a range of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no modifying circumstance in the
commission of the frustrated murder and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximumof the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion
temporal in its medium period, and the minimumof the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor, which is one degree lower
than reclusion temporal, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years.62 Since the RTC imposed the minimum term of 8 years and 1 dayof
The Proper Indemnities
And in Criminal Case No. 2001-5445 (for Furstrated Murder) the RTC awarded
to Roger P25,000.00 asmoral damages. But current jurisprudence dictates that
the samemust be increased to P40,000.00.66 Moreover, Roger is also entitled
to exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00, in view of the presence of
treachery as above reasoned.
Further, an interest at the rate ofsix percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed
on all the damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment
until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.67
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals consolidated
Decision dated December 22, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00401 and in CAG.R. CR No. 28975, affirming the Decisions promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon,Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446
(Murder), 2001-5447 (Murder), 2001-5448 (Murder), and Branch 53 in Criminal
Case No. 2001-5445 (Frustrated Murder), finding accused-appellants Rolando
Las Pias, Jimmy Delizo and Merwin Las Pias GUILTYbeyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of Murder and Frustrated Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONas follows:
In Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448, where the
conviction of the accused-appellants for three separate counts of Murder and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of Murder, are AFFIRMED
(1) The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;
(2) Moral damages is increased to P75,000.00; and

(3) Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is awarded.
In Criminal Case No. 2001-5445, the conviction of the accusedappellants for
Frustrated Murder is likewise AFFIRMED. But while the Court affirms their
conviction, the indeterminate penalty to be imposed instead is eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Further, the amount of damages awarded are adjusted
The accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay legal interest on all damages
awarded in this case at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 166441
October 8, 2014
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and
breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if
the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of
the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the
said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused
to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
BERSAMIN, J.:
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape
requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct
overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However,
merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape
without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's
vagina.
The Case
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and
imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages of P20,000.00 to
AAA,2 the victim.
Antecedents
The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness involving different victims. At arraignment, he pleaded not guiltyto
the respective informations, to wit: Criminal Case No. 2388
Attempted Rape
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the
morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2,
Municipality of Bangar,Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation commenced
the commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit: While private complainant
AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was sleeping inside the
tentalong Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty and
Criminal Case No. 2389

Acts of Lasciviousness
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 oclock in the
morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2,
Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB]4
against the latters will and with no other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious
desire to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows:6
x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged
in the selling of plastic wares and glass wares in different municipalities around
the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and
BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then
celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La
Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned by Norberto. The
young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver)
and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December
20, 1993, they parked in front of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the
goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a
place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more
goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 oclock in the morning, AAA and BBB
went to sleep. Less thanan hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that
somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching
her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she
was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or shell be killed. AAA
tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell
on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money
and told her not totell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed.
AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed
to wake him up.
Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching
the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands
wereshaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that
early morning. Later still, while they were on their way to fetch water, AAA and
BBB asked the people around where they can find the municipal building. An old
woman pointed to them the place.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the
municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name of "Sabas".
They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was
summoned to the police station where he personally confronted his accusers.
When Norbertos wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument ensued
between them.
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 oclock in the morning, the police
investigator ordered the complainants to return at6:00 oclock in the morning.
Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them and
worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their
respective sworn statements against Norberto.
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was
presented in the assailed decision of the CA,7 as follows:
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different
version of the story. The accused maintains that it was not possible for him to
commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged incident, there
were many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi".
Considering the location of the tents, which were near the road and the municipal
hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention
the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the municipal
hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the complainants filed
these cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.
Judgment of the RTC
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on
April 6, 2000 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No.
2389,8 to wit:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment
declaring the accused NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic)
Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code respectively. With
respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to
TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory penalties
provided for by law and to pay the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as
moral damages.
With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and to pay the victim BBBthe amount of
P10,000.00 as moral damages.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two
cases is counted in his favor.
SO ORDERED.9
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him
of attempted rape despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of
lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the
petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of
the acts of lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the
insufficiency of the evidence,10 holding thusly:
I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of

the alleged victim; and
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and

inconsequential as to dent, even slightly, the overall integrity and probative value
of the prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.
II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony
is the "penalty lower by two (2) degrees" prescribed by law for the consummated
felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been consummated would have
been reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The penalty two degrees lower than
reclusion perpetuais prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be the medium period of prision mayorin the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty nextlower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is prision
correccionalin any of its periods.
We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of P20,000.00 by
way of moral damages against the accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral
damages may be awarded without the need of proof or pleading since it is
assumed that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the
victim is aged 13 to 19.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the
accused argues that there is not enough evidence to support such accusation.
BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally offered in
evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.
In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to
substantiate the charge of acts of lasciviousness against the accusedappellant.
The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn statement of
BBB to the effectthat the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing
her breast and touching her private part. However, she was not presented to
testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused touching the
private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect that suchlascivious
acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB.11
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA.
He argues that AAA still continued working for him and his wife until December
30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the early morning of December
21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her; that he could
not have undressed her without rousing her if she had gone to sleep only an
hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about
his having been on top of her for nearly an hour while they struggled was also
inconceivable unless she either consented to his act and yielded to his lust, or
the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertileimagination;
that the record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis
was poised to penetrate her; and that she and her mother demanded from him
P80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she would file a case against him.12
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the
testimony of AAA that cast doubt on her veracity.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only
questions of law. No review of the findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a
consequence of thisrule, the Court accords the highest respect for the factual
findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its factual
findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has
shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to decideissues of
credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses and
observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying
under exacting examination. As such, the contentionsof the petitioner on the
credibility of AAA as a witness for the State cannot beentertained. He thereby
raises questions of fact that are outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, he
thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the entire
evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CAs decision was not in accord with
law or with jurisprudence, particularly:
Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the
question of law of whether or not the petitioners climbing on top of the undressed
AAA such thatthey faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching
her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the
RTC and the CA convicted and punished him. Based on the information, supra,
he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge ofher by means
of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal
knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but
because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of
said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party."
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. In
People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice Claro
M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute anattempted
felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense;
that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction,
that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is
necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural
relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation,
will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.
"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated,
as the material damage iswanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin)
cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of
the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be
such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the
circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected
therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the
consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in
favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent aswell as a
punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for
attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted
for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce
must be direct; the intention must be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it
is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be
able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a
particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring
that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts
performed must be such that, withoutthe intent to commit an offense, they would
be meaningless."15
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted
rape, we have to determine the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993,
when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:
Article335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither
of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs
shall be present.
xxxx
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal
knowledge isdefined simply as "theact of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman,"16 which explains why the slightest penetration of
the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is
consummated once the peniscapable of consummating the sexual act touches
the external genitalia of the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18 the Court has
defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on
the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias
or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof,
for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are
required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location
beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to
attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that
are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the
hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded
eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the
surface. The next layer is the labia majoraor the outer lips of the female organ
composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the
outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the
inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many
sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majoramust be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the
mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in
People v. Eriia20 whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated
rapebecause of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ
of the offended party, was a stray decisionfor not having been reiterated in
subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in
its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of
a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony;
and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrators will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment
he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing
more to be done by him.21
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the
character of the overt actsfor purposes of the attempted stage has been
explained in People v. Lizada:22
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison detrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that, in a
majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of
preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so,
irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must
be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any

fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason
that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what
the intent of the accused is.It is necessary that the overt act should have been
the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was
the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission
of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute
the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt
must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the
overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does
not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted
stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by
overt actswithout the offender performing all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the
accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime
is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that
intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law,23 that showing
must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held
liable for attempted rape withoutsuch overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie
with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that
his overt acts, should his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination
without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for, as
succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.:25 "The gauge in determining whether
the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the
act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the
interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from
his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her
being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of
double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such
that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape
as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rapehad he
been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some
other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield
to him)26 could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced
attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would
have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the
latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended
crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him
guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His preparatory acts could include
his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB,
and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for
Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had
no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable
under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or of
uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine
with certainty what the perpetrators intent really was.28
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute
acts of lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts
of lasciviousness is the offendersintent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to
lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of
lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching"
of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to
penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.30
Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.31
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is consummated whenthe following essential elements concur,
namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon
another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is
committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party
is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party
is under 12 years of age.32 In that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful,
indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear
and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast."
With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness,
not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did
not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his
erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her
deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner,
even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly
leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin,34
where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an information
alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape
directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the
undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against
her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away."
The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent
to commit rape "is not apparent from the actdescribed," and the intent to have
sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia.
The Court also pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a
preparatory act to sexual intercourse."35
Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of
acts of lasciviousness, is punished with prision correccional. In the absence of
modifying circumstances, prision correccional is imposed in its medium period,
which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years
and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than prision
correccionalwhich ranges from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the
Court fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision
correccional, as the maximum.
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender
violates her chastity by his lewdness.1wphi1 "Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission."36 Indeed,
Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in
acts of lasciviousness to recover moral damages.37 Towards that end, the
Court, upon its appreciation of the record, decrees that P30,000.00 is a
reasonable award of moral damages.38 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover
civil indemnity of P20,000.00.39
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to
impose interest as a part of the damages in crimes and quasidelicts. In that
regard, the moral damages of P20,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.40
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO

CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and,
ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of three (3)
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one day of prision correccional, as the maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral
damages of P30,000.00 and civil indemnity of P20,000.00 to the complainant,
with interest of 6% per annum on such awards reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Conspiracy and proposal

G.R. No. 197360
July 3, 2013

vs.
RONALD CREDO aka "ONTOG," RANDY CREDO and ROLANDO CREDO
y SAN BUENA VENTURA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Decision1
This is an appeal from the

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 04113 promulgated on 28 February 2011. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirmed, with modifications, the Decision2 dated 14 July 2009 of the
Regional Trial C6urt, Branch 31, Pili, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case No. P3819 finding accused-appellants Ronald Credo a.k.a. "Ontog," Randy Credo and
Rolando Credo y San Buenaventura guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
for the death of Joseph Nicolas.
Factual Antecedents
The amended Information3 filed against appellants reads:
That on June 22, 2005 at around 10:30 in the evening at Zone 4 Barangay San
JOSE, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, with intent
to take the life of JOSEPH NICOLAS Y arroyo (sic), willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and hack the latter with a bolo, wounding him in the different
parts of the body, per autopsy report marked as Annex "A" hereof, thereby
causing the direct and immediate death of said JOSEPH NICOLAS y ARROYO.
Abuse of superior strength being attendant in the commission of the crime, the
same will qualify the offense committed to murder.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Based on the respective testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, the
following sequence of events was gathered:
On 22 June 2005, at around 10:30 in the evening, the victim, Joseph Nicolas
(Joseph), was at a "bingohan" in Zone 3 of Brgy. San Nicolas, Pili, Camarines
Sur, together with his wife Maria and friends Manuel Chica (Manuel) and Ramon
Tirao. Randy Credo (Randy) arrived at the "bingohan," approached Joseph and
suddenly punched the latter on the chest, causing him to fall down. Randy then
immediately ran away towards the direction of their house located at Zone 4.
Joseph, on the other hand, stood up, gathered his things consisting of a lemon
and an egg, and gave Randy a chase. The people at the "bingohan" all
scampered away as a result of the commotion.4 Josephs friend Manuel
proceeded towards Zone 3. There, he met Randy, who was already
accompanied by his co-appellants: his brother Ronald Credo (Ronald) and their
father Rolando Credo (Rolando). The three were each armed with a bolo.5
Meanwhile, when Josephs children, Russel, Ramon, Roldan and Rea, heard
that their father was in trouble, they decided to look for him in Zone 3. On their
way, they met appellants, who suddenly started throwing stones at them,
causing them to run away. Russel got separated from his siblings but he
continued to look for his father. He came across appellants again in Zone 2
where he saw them hacking somebody with their bolos. That person later turned
out to be their father. Russel saw that when all three appellants were done
hacking their victim, Randy and Rolando went back to where the victim was lying
and gave him another blow, saying in the Bicolano dialect, "pang-dulce" (for
dessert).6
The scene was witnessed by another person, Francis Nicolas Credo (Francis),
a resident of Zone 2.7 According to Francis, at the time of the incident, he was
in his bedroom preparing to go to sleep when he heard a commotion outside his
house. He heard Roger Credo, the brother of Randy and Ronald, shout: "Tama
na Manoy, gadan na!" (Enough brother, he is already dead!) Upon hearing these
words, Francis went out of the bedroom, proceeded to their sala and peeped
through the jalousies of the sala window. He saw appellants, all armed with a
bolo, repeatedly hacking Joseph to death.8 He saw the hacking incident very
clearly because the place was lighted by a lamppost and the moon was shining
brightly. Moreover, the distance between the crime scene and the window from
where he was watching is only about 3 to 4 meters.9 Francis was able to note
that Joseph was unarmed and was, in fact, holding a lemon in his right hand and
an egg in his left hand.10
Joseph died on the same day of the incident. He obtained six (6) hack wounds:
one on the right ear, two on the left scapular area, one on the lumbar area, one
on the right forearm and another one on the left lateral neck area which,
according to the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the body of Joseph, was
the most fatal wound.11
Rolando and Randy denied any participation in the hacking incident, claiming
that it was Ronald alone who killed Joseph. They also claimed that the killing
was done in defense of Ronald and Randys mother whom Joseph was, at the
time of the incident, about to hack.12 Based on appellants testimony, when
Ronald heard of what happened between Randy and Joseph, Ronald left the
house with a bolo in search of Joseph. When their parents learned that Ronald
left to confront Joseph, they followed Ronald to the "bingohan."13 Rina Credo
Hernandez, sister of Ronald and Randy, testified that while their parents and
Ronald were walking back towards their house from the "bingohan," Joseph
suddenly emerged from the back of their house with a bolo. She saw that Joseph
was brandishing the bolo and was about to attack their mother so she shouted
a warning to their mother. Ronald came to her rescue and attacked Joseph,14
resulting in the latters death.
The trial court found that appellants conspired in the commission of the crime
and that the killing of Joseph was attended by abuse of superior strength. Hence,
on 14 July 2009, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay the widow of Joseph the
amounts of P14,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.15
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS ROLANDO CREDO AND RANDY CREDO ARE GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE FLAWED AND
INCONSISTENT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE ITS ATTENDANCE.
Appellants subsequently filed a Supplemental Brief18 before this Court, alleging
the following as additional assignment of errors:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but modified
the award of damages in the following manner: (1) civil indemnity was increased
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; (2) the award of moral damages was likewise
increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; (3) the amount of exemplary
damages was reduced from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00; and (4) temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 was imposed in place of actual
damages.16
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CONSPIRED WITH EACH OTHER IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
The Issues
In their Brief17 filed before the Court of Appeals, appellants prayed or their
acquittal, pleading the following grounds:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY
WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF RELATIVES INTERPOSED BY ACCUSEDAPPELLANT RONALD CREDO.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN INCREASING THE AWARD
OF CIVIL INDEMNITY FROM FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP50,000.00) TO
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP75,000.00).
Pending resolution of this appeal, the Court received a letter,19 dated 13
September 2011, from P/Supt. Richard W. Schwarzkopf, Jr., Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison, informing the Court that
Rolando had died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 23 June 2011. Attached
to his letter was a certified true copy of the certificate of death20 of Rolando listing
"Cardio respiratory Arrest" as the immediate cause of death.
As a consequence of Rolandos death while this case is pending appeal, both
his criminal and civil liability ex delicto were extinguished pursuant to Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code. The said provision of law states that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by "the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the

death of the offender occurs before final judgment."
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the

various indicia available but not reflected on the record."26
This appeal shall, as a result, be decided as against Randy and Ronald only.
We agree with the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals which
gave weight to the accounts of the two eyewitnesses, Russel and Francis. Their
respective testimonies positively and categorically identified appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime. Their statements on the witness stand also
corroborate each other on material aspects. Both Russel and Francis testified
that they saw the appellants hacking a man. Although Francis was able to
immediately recognize the victim as Joseph, Russel was to learn only later on
that the appellants victim was his own father. It is also worth noting that the
statement of Russel and Francis claiming that all three of the appellants were
holding a bolo at the time of the incident is corroborated by another witness:
Manuel Chica. Manuel testified that after Randy and Joseph left the "bingohan,"
he also left to follow the two. On his way, he met the three appellants all armed
with a bolo.27
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
At the outset, it bears repeating that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive upon the
Supreme Court.21 Except for compelling or exceptional reasons, such as when
they were sufficiently shown to be contrary to the evidence on record, the
findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court will not be disturbed by this Court.22
Thus, once a guilty verdict has been rendered, the appellant has the burden of
clearly proving on appeal that the lower court committed errors in the
appreciation of the evidence presented.23 Here, there is no showing that the trial
court or the Court of Appeals overlooked some material facts or committed any
reversible error in their factual findings.
Trial courts assessment of the credibility
of a witness accorded great weight
Appellants claim that the respective testimonies of Russel and Francis were
marked with several inconsistencies that cast doubt on their veracity, especially
considering that they are the son and the nephew, respectively, of the victim.
They noted that Francis narrated that after Ronald hacked Joseph, Rolando left
with his wife followed by Ronald and Randy. Russel, on the other hand, testified
that after the three appellants hacked the victim, Randy and Rolando went back
to where the victim was lying down and gave him another blow, saying, "pangdulce." Moreover, Francis initially stated that after the hacking incident, the victim
was left lying on the ground on his side. However, when again questioned by the
court as to what he saw, Francis gave a different answer, saying that the victim
was lying flat on the ground.24
This Court is not persuaded.
Corollary to the principle that appellate courts generally will not interfere with the
factual findings of the trial court is the rule that when the credibility of an
eyewitness is at issue, due deference and respect is given by the appellate
courts to the assessment made by the trial courts, absent any showing that the
trial courts overlooked facts and circumstances of substance that would have
affected the final outcome of the case.25 "As consistently adhered to by this
Court, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched
The pertinent portions of the respective testimonies of Francis and Russel on

the matter are as follows:
PROS. FAJARDO:
xxxx
Q Now, lets clarify, Mr. witness. If you could demonstrate actually the distance
from where you are seated to anywhere of this courtroom, the place as you said
the distance of that hacking incident happened [sic], can you do that?
xxxx
PROS. FAJARDO:
Three (3) meters.
ATTY. PREVOSA counsel for the defense:
Three (3) to four (4) meters, your Honor.
PROS. FAJARDO:
xxxx
Q You mentioned the person being hacked by three (3) persons, right?
[FRANCIS N. CREDO]
PROS. FAJARDO:
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Now, in what particular place did you see Randy and Rolando and Ontog
hacked [sic] this person?
Q Who were these three (3) persons hacking this other person as you said?
[RUSSEL NICOLAS]
A Rolando Credo, Ronald Credo, Randy Credo.
A In front of the house of Lolita Credo.
Q Why were you able to identify Rolando, Ronald, Randy Credo?
Q How is this Lolita Credo related to Francisco Credo?
A I was able to identify the accused because other than the light there is a
moonlight so I clearly identified the three (3) persons.28 (Emphases supplied)
xxxx
A Lolita is the mother of Francisco.31
PROS. FAJARDO:
Both Francis and Russel likewise support each others statement on the act of
at least one of the appellants of going back to where Joseph was lying on the
ground to give him another blow with a bolo. Thus:
Q Now, after you were stoned, what did you and your group do?
PROS. FAJARDO:
xxxx
xxxx
[RUSSEL NICOLAS]
Q When you peeped to [sic] your window, jalousie window, what was Rolando
Credo doing?
A We went on our separate way [sic] one of my brother Ramon went directly to
our grandmothers house x x x and then I saw something.
[FRANCIS N. CREDO]
Q What was that you saw?

A Then I saw the three (3) Randy, Ontog, and Rolando [sic].
Q Now, what did you observe when you saw this Randy, Rolando and Ontog?
A I saw them hacking someone but I was not able to eye that someone because
I was not yet near them x x x.29 (Emphases supplied)
xxxx
It is worth mentioning as well that the following testimony of Russel confirms the
statement of Francis that the hacking incident occurred just in front of their
house,30 giving him (Francis) a clear view of what transpired:
A The three (3) of them hacked the man and the man fell on the ground, while
on the ground he was again hacked on the head by Ronald Credo.32 (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
PROS. FAJARDO:
xxxx
Q Now, what did you observe when you saw this Randy, Rolando and Ontog?
[RUSSEL NICOLAS]
A I saw them hacking someone but I was not able to eye that someone because
I was not yet near them however, these Randy and Rolando returned back and
said "pang dulce" then hacked again.33 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
proper defense that should have been appreciated by the lower court is defense
of relatives.
The inconsistency in the respective statements of Francis and Russel with

respect to who among the three appellants actually dealt the final blow on the
victim is understandable considering that they witnessed the scene from
different vantage points. Francis definitely had a clearer view as he was nearer
the scene of the crime (3-4 meters) whereas Russel was much farther as
evidenced by the fact that from where he was watching, he was unable to
recognize the victim as his father. All the same, both were one in saying that at
least one of the appellants returned to where the victim was prostrate to give
him another blow.
The aforementioned inconsistency is, moreover, a minor detail that does not
affect the credibility of Russel and Francis as eyewitnesses. Likewise, the other
inconsistencies pointed out by appellants pertain "only to collateral or trivial
matters and has no substantial effect on the nature of the offense."34 The
primordial consideration is that both Russel and Francis were present at the
scene of the crime and that they positively identified appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime charged.35 This Court has been consistent in ruling that
"although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor
details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating
the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant."36
Finally, the attack of appellants on the credibility of Francis as a witness for the
prosecution on the ground that the victim is the brother of Francis mother
making Francis the nephew of the victim loses significance when the
relationship of Francis with the appellants is considered: appellant Rolando is
his uncle, being the brother of his father, thereby making appellants Randy and
Ronald his first cousins. As held by the Court of Appeals:
Considering that appellants are also his close relatives, it is difficult to believe
that Francis would point to appellants as the killers, if such were not true.
Moreover, the lack of proof of ill-motive on the part of Francis, indicate that he
testified, not to favor any of the parties in this case, but solely for the purpose of
telling the truth and narrating what he actually witnessed. His testimony
deserves full faith and credit.37
Requisites for valid defense
of a relative not present
This argument is untenable.

The following excerpts from the Transcripts of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) of
this case categorically show that appellant Ronald interposed not just defense
of relatives but self-defense as well:
1. TSN of 12 August 2008:
ATTY. PREVOSA [counsel for the defense]:
x x x. This witness [Flora O. Credo, mother of Randy and Ronald] will testify on
the theory of self-defense of the accused, x x x.38
2. TSN of 27 August 2008:
ATTY. PREVOSA:
The Witness [accused Rolando Credo] is being presented to testify that in order
to safe [sic] himself and her [sic] mother, Ronald Nicolas [sic] was able to cause
injury to Joseph Nicolas x x x.39
3. TSN of 14 January 2009:
ATTY. PREVOSA:
We are offering the testimony of this witness [accused Ronald Credo] to prove
the following;
That he was able to harm to death the private complainant [sic] Joseph Nicolasin
[sic] order to defend himself, relatives and his own family, x x x.40
Further, the following portions of the testimony of Flora Credo likewise clearly
demonstrate that Ronald pleaded self-defense before the trial court:
THE COURT:
Randy contends that the trial court misconstrued the facts of this case when it
held that the defense he interposed was self-defense. According to him, in view
of the consistent and corroborating testimonies of the defense witnesses that he
merely stepped-in to protect his mother from being hacked by the victim, the
By the way, your son hacked for self-defense did you report that to the Police
when you surrendered your son?
A No, your Honor, please.
xxxx
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Q You even surrendered your son to the Police so why did you not immediately
tell the Police that your son killed Joseph Nicolas for self-defense?
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his
relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the
next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had
no part therein.
A I said that, your Honor I directed that statement, your Honor.

xxxx
Q When did you right then and there that you surrendered you [sic] son to tell
the Police he hacked for self-defense?
A Yes, your Honor.
xxxx
Q Do you have proof to show that indeed you informed the Police that your son
the (sic) hacking is self-defense?
xxxx
Based on the afore-quoted provision, both self-defense and defense of relatives
require that unlawful aggression be present in order to be held valid. "For the
accused to be entitled to exoneration based on self-defense or defense of
relatives, complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful aggression, there
would be nothing to prevent or repel. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude."42
A Yes, your Honor.41

xxxx
Thus, appellant Ronald cannot now claim that the defense he pleaded is defense
of relatives only and does not include self-defense and that the trial court
misappreciated the facts of this case when it considered self-defense instead of
defense of relatives.
In any case, even if the claim of defense of a relative is taken into consideration,
the same would still not be valid.
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides, in part, as follows:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of
Joseph because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an
egg. According to the trial court, the fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively
belied the allegation of Ronald that he was prompted to retaliate in self-defense
when Joseph first hacked and hit him on his neck. The trial court further pointed
out that if Joseph indeed hacked Ronald on the neck, "it is surprising that the
latter did not suffer any injury when according to them (Ronald, Rolando and
Flora Credo), Joseph was running fast and made a hard thrust on Ronald, hitting
the latters neck."43
Since the criterion for determining whether there is a valid self-defense and a
valid defense of relatives require that there be unlawful aggression perpetrated
by the victim on the one making the defense or on his relative, it is safe to
conclude that when the trial court held that there can be no valid self-defense
because there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it was, in
effect, likewise saying that there can be no valid defense of a relative for lack of
an essential requisite. In other words, when the trial court made a ruling on the
claim of self-defense, it, at the same time, also necessarily passed upon the
issue of defense of a relative.
Appellants acted in conspiracy with one

another in the execution of the crime
"Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is
not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from
which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime."44
In the present case, the prosecution witnesses were one in saying that prior to
the hacking incident, they saw all three appellants walking together towards the
direction of the "bingohan" and that all three were each carrying a bolo.
Appellants, therefore, deliberately sought Joseph out to confront him about the
altercation incident between him and Randy. Likewise, the two eyewitnesses
confirm each others respective statements that all three appellants were armed
with a bolo with which they repeatedly hacked the victim, who fell to the ground;
after which, appellants left the scene of the crime.
While no evidence was presented to show that appellants met beforehand and
came to an agreement to harm Joseph, their concerted acts before, during and
after the incident all point to a unity of purpose and design. Indeed, "proof of a
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the
fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective
suffices."45 Such proof "may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest."46
Abuse of superior strength attended
the commission of the crime
There is abuse of superior strength when the perpetrators of a crime deliberately
used excessive force, thereby rendering the victim incapable of defending
himself.47 "The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the
aggressor."48
Here, there can be no denying that appellants took advantage of their superior
strength to ensure the successful execution of their crime. This is evident from
the fact that there were three of them against the victim who was alone. More
importantly, their victim was unarmed while the three of them were each armed
with a bolo.
Award of damages
In People v. Anticamara,49 this Court laid down the standards in the proper
award of damages in criminal cases, as follows:
x x x the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. In People
v. Quiachon, the Court held that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is
proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People
v. Salome, while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
fact remains that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still
death, and the offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity
in the amount of P75,000.00 is proper.1wphi1
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without
need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. However,
consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable
penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,
the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct in increasing the lower courts
award of civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Regardless of the
penalty imposed by the trial court, the correct amount of civil indemnity is
P75,000.00, pursuant to the ratiocination of the Court in the above-cited case of
People v. Anticamara.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred when it increased the amount of moral
damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In accordance with the
pronouncement of the Court in the Anticamara Case, the correct sum should be
P50,000.00.
In connection with the award of exemplary damages, the Court of Appeals
correctly reduced the amount from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.50
Finally, pursuant to the ruling of the Court in People v. Villanueva,51 "when actual
damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, as in
this case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of
actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual
damages proven exceeds P25,000, then temperate damages may no longer be
awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should
instead be granted." As a result, the Court of Appeals likewise correctly held

that, since the receipted expenses of Joseph's family amounted to only
P14,300.00, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual
damages should be awarded.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 February 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04113, finding
appellants Ronald, Randy and Rolando, all surnamed Credo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The appeal with respect to the deceased appellant Rolando Credo is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 189343
July 10, 2013
BENILDA N. BACASMAS, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 189369
ALAN C. GAVIOLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 189553
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are three consolidated cases: (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari1
dated 16 September 2009 (G.R. No. 189343), (2) Petition for Review on
Certiorari2 dated 15 September 2009 (G.R. No. 189369), and (3) Petition for
Review on Certiorari3 dated 12 October 2009 (G.R. No. 189553). All assail the
Decision4 in Crim. Case No. 26914 dated 7 May 2009 of the Sandiganbayan,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Alan C. Gaviola ("Gaviola"), Eustaquio B. Cesa
("Cesa"), Benilda N. Bacasmas ("Bacasmas") and Edna J. Jaca ("Jaca") are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 12 years and
1 month to 15 years. They also have to suffer perpetual disqualification from
holding any public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the City
Government of Cebu the amount of Nine Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand,
Seven Hundred Fifty-two and 60/100 Pesos (Php 9,810,752.60).5 (Emphasis in
the original)
The Petitions also question the Resolution6 dated 27 August 2009 denying the
Motions for Reconsideration7 of the Decision dated 7 May 2009.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
All the petitioners work for the City Government of Cebu.8 Benilda B. Bacasmas
(Bacasmas), the Cash Division Chief, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189343.9 Alan
C. Gaviola (Gaviola), the City Administrator, is the petitioner in G.R. No.
189369.10 Eustaquio B. Cesa (Cesa), the City Treasurer, is the petitioner in G.R.
No. 189553.11
By virtue of their positions, they are involved in the process of approving and
releasing cash advances for the City. The procedure is as follows:
A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz Gonzales
(Gonzales), who then submits it to Cash Division Chief Bacasmas for approval.
Once the latter approves the request, she affixes her initials to the voucher,
which she forwards to City Treasurer Cesa for his signature in the same box. By
signing, Bacasmas and Cesa certify that the expense or cash advance is
necessary, lawful, and incurred under their direct supervision.12
Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca (Jaca) for
processing and pre-audit. She also signs the voucher to certify that there is
adequate available funding/budgetary allotment; that the expenditures are
properly certified and supported by documents; and that previous cash
advances have been liquidated and accounted for. She then prepares an
Accountants Advice (Advice).13
This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation
of the check. After it has been prepared, she affixes her initials to the check,
which Cesa then signs. Afterwards, City Administrator Gaviola approves the
voucher and countersigns the check.14
The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash Division,
where Gonzales signs the receipt portion of the voucher, as well as the Check
Register to acknowledge receipt of the check for encashment.15
Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the voucher,
and records the cash advance in her Individual Paymaster Cashbook. She then
liquidates it within five days after payment.16
A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of
Disbursement (RD). An RD must contain the audit voucher number, the names
of the local government employees who were paid using the money from the
cash advance, the amount for each employee, as well as the receipts. The RDs
are examined and verified by the City Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the
Cash Division for recording in the official cash book.17
On 4 March 1998, COA issued Office Order No. 98-001 creating a team to
conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of
the Cash Division, City Treasurers Office of Cebu City.18
This team conducted a surprise cash count on 5 March 1998.19 The examination
revealed an accumulated shortage of P9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995
to 5 March 1998 from the cash and accounts of Gonzales.20 The team found that
Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca failed to follow the above-mentioned
procedure, thus facilitating the loss of more than nine million pesos on the part
of the city government. Specifically, the team said in its report that there were
irregularities in the grant, utilization, and liquidation of cash advances; shortages
were concealed; and inaccurate and misleading pieces of information were
included in the financial statements.21 These irregularities were manifested in
the following: additional cash advances were granted even if previous cash
advances had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for salaries were
not supported by payrolls or lists of payees, and cash advances for salaries and
wages were not liquidated within five days after each 15th day or end-of-themonth pay period.22
The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed,
certified, and approved the cash advance vouchers, but also signed and
countersigned the checks despite the deficiencies, which amounted to a
violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160; Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445;
and the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit (COA), specifically COA
Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002.23 According to the COA, the violation
of the foregoing laws, rules, and regulations facilitated the loss of a huge amount
of public funds at the hands of Gonzales.24
Hence, an Information25 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 2001
against Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca, to wit:
That on or about the 5th and subsequent thereto, at Cebu City, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N.
BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then the City
Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant,
respectively, of the Cebu City Government, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to Office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping with each other [sic], with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and with gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there
allow LUZ M. GONZALES, Accountant I, Disbursing Officer-Designate of the
Cebu City Government, to obtain cash advances despite the fact that she has
previous unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing LUZ M. GONZALES to

accumulate Cash Advances amounting to NINE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
TEN day of March 1998, and for sometime prior THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS AND 60/100 (P9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE
CURRENCY, which remains unliquidated, thus accused in the performance of
their official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to LUZ M. GONZALES
and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly
the Cebu City Government.26
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the COA Auditors who had
conducted the examination on the cash and accounts of Gonzales: Cecilia Chan,
Jovita Gabison, Sulpicio Quijada, Jr., Villanilo Ando, Jr., and Rosemarie
Picson.27 The COA Narrative Report28 on the results of the examination of the
cash and accounts of Gonzales covering the period 20 September 1995 to 05
March 1998 was also introduced as evidence.29
Bacasmas testified in her own defense. She said that she could not be held
liable, because it was not her responsibility to examine the cash book. She
pointed to Jaca and the City Auditor as the ones responsible for determining
whether the paymaster had existing unliquidated cash advances. Bacasmas
further testified that she allowed the figures to be rounded off to the nearest
million without totalling the net payroll, because it was customary to round off
the cash advance to the nearest amount.30
Cesa averred that Jaca was the approving authority in granting cash advances.
Hence, when he signed the vouchers, he merely relied on Jacas certification
that Gonzales had already liquidated her cash advances. Besides, he said, he
had already delegated the function of determining whether the amount stated in
the disbursement voucher was equal to the net pay, because it was humanly
impossible for him to supervise all the personnel of his department.31
Jaca admitted that cash advances were granted even if there were no
liquidations, so that salaries could be paid on time, because cash advances
usually overlapped with the previous one. Additionally, she acknowledged that
when she affixed her signatures to the vouchers despite the non-attachment of
the payrolls, she was aware that Gonzales still had unliquidated cash
advances.32
Lastly, Gaviola claimed that when he affixed his signatures, he was not aware
of any anomaly. Allegedly, he only signed on the basis of the signatures of Cesa
and Jaca.33
The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision dated 7 May 2009, did not give credence to
the defense of the accused, but instead afforded significant weight to the COA
Narrative Report submitted in evidence. It found that the accused, as public
officers, had acted with gross inexcusable negligence by religiously disregarding

the instructions for preparing a disbursement voucher and by being totally remiss
in their respective duties and functions under the Local Government Code of
1991.34 Their gross inexcusable negligence amounted to bad faith, because they
still continued with the illegal practice even if they admittedly had knowledge of
the relevant law and COA rules and regulations.35 The Sandiganbayan held that
the acts of the accused had caused not only undue injury to the government
because of the P9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave unwarranted benefit to
Gonzales by allowing her to obtain cash advances to which she was not
entitled.36 Lastly, it found conspiracy to be present in the acts and omissions of
the accused showing that they had confederated, connived with, and mutually
helped one another in causing undue injury to the government through the loss
of public money.37
Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for
Reconsideration of the 7 May 2009 Decision.38 Their motions impugned the
sufficiency of the Information and the finding of gross inexcusable negligence,
undue injury, and unwarranted benefit.39 To support their innocence, they
invoked the cases of Arias v. Sandiganbayan,40 Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,41
Sistoza v. Desierto,42 Alejandro v. People,43 and Albert v. Gangan,44 in which we
held that the heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates.45 The Motion for Reconsideration of Jaca also averred that her
criminal and civil liabilities had been extinguished by her death on 24 May
2009.46
The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution47 promulgated 27 August 2009 denied the
Motions for Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information was
sufficient, because the three modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
commonly involved willful, intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when
there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or employee.48 Furthermore,
the three modes may all be alleged in one Information.49 The Sandiganbayan
held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. Claiming
that it was the practice in their office, they admittedly disregarded the
observance of the law and COA rules and regulations on the approval and grant
of cash advances.50 The anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the
government was unquestionable because of the shortage amounting to
P9,810,752.60.51 It further declared that the aforementioned cases cited by the
accused were inapplicable, because there was paucity of evidence of conspiracy
in these cases.52 Here, conspiracy was duly proven in that the silence and
inaction of the accused - albeit ostensibly separate and distinct indicate, if
taken collectively, that they are vital pieces of a common design.53 Finally, the
Sandiganbayan decided that although the criminal liability of Jaca was
extinguished upon her death, her civil liability remained.54 Hence, the Motions
for Reconsideration were denied.55
Thus, Bacasmas, Gaviola, and Cesa filed their respective Petitions for Review
on Certiorari, in which they rehashed the arguments they had put forward in their
Motions for Reconsideration previously filed with the Sandiganbayan.
We resolved to consolidate the three Petitions on 23 November 2009.56 The
Office of the Special Prosecutor was required to comment on the three
Petitions,57 after which petitioners were instructed to file a Reply,58 which they
did.59
Petitioners, through their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari and
Comments, bring these two main issues before us:
I. Whether the Information was sufficient; and
II. Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
We deny the Petitions.
I.
The Information specified when the crime was committed, and it named all
of the accused and their alleged acts or omissions constituting the offense
charged.
An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of
all the accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the
offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
(f) the place where the offense was committed.
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds:
first, it did not specify a reasonable time frame within which the offense was
committed, in violation of their right to be informed of the charge against them;
second, not all of the accused were named, as Gonzales was not charged in the
Information; and third, the Information did not specify an offense, because
negligence and conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime.
The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it
contained no inherent contradiction and properly charged an offense. We uphold
its ruling for the following reasons:
First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof.60 The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date
of its commission.61 Here, the date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not
having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time
ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact
dates of the commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as
well. That the Information alleged a date and a period during which the crime
was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners that before
and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by Gonzales as
a result of petitioners acts. These acts caused undue injury to the government
and unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster.
Second, the Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019, to wit:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information,
because the latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash
advances.62 Cesa is wrong. The Information seeks to hold petitioners
accountable for their actions, which allowed Gonzales to obtain cash advances,
and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading to a loss of over nine
million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her because her alleged
acts did not fall under the crime charged in the Information.
advantage or preference in the discharge of the functions of the

accused.63
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and
cause of the accusation against petitioners,64 namely the violation of the
aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" in the same Information does
not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only implied that
the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes
provided by the law.65 In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both
the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the
latter was not simple negligence.
Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference
to the consequences of ones actions or omissions.66
II.
Petitioners gross negligence amounting to bad faith, the undue injury to
the government, and the unwarranted benefits given to Gonzales, were all
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioners do not controvert the first element of the offense but assail the
Sandiganbayans finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury and
unwarranted benefit. Nevertheless, their contention must fail.
Petitioners committed gross
negligence amounting to bad faith
when they approved and disbursed
the cash advances in violation of law
and rules and regulations.
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
Petitioners being the Cash Division Chief, City Treasurer and City
Administrator have to comply with R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA Circulars
90-331, 92-382, and 97-002 on the proper procedure for the approval and grant
of cash advances. These laws and rules and regulations state that cash
advances can only be disbursed for a legally authorized specific purpose and
cannot be given to officials whose previous cash advances have not been settled
or properly accounted for.67 Cash advances should also be equal to the net
amount of the payroll for a certain pay period, and they should be supported by
the payroll or list of payees and their net payments.68
3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
However, petitioners failed to observe the foregoing. We quote hereunder the

findings of the COA team as contained in its Narrative Report:
Third and last, the Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the essential elements of which are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
A. Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of cash advances:

1. During the period, September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998,
records and verification documents show that additional cash
advances were granted (Annex 13), even if the previous cash
advances were not yet liquidated.
It resulted in excessive granting of cash advances, which
created the opportunity to misappropriate public funds since
excess or idle funds were placed in the hands of the paymaster
under her total control and disposal. This is in violation of
Section 89, PD 1445; Section 339, RA 7160 and paragraph
4.1.2 of COA Circular No. 97-002.
2. The amounts of cash advances for salary payments were not
equal to the net amount of the payroll for a pay period in
violation of par. 4.2.1. COA Circular No. 90-331. Section 48 (g),
COA Circular No. 92-382 and par. 4.2.1, COA Circular No. 97002. In fact, all cash advance vouchers for salaries were not
supported by payrolls or list of payees to determine the amount
of the cash advance to be granted, and that the face of the
disbursement voucher (sample voucher marked as Annex 14)
did not indicate the specific office/ department and period
covered for which the cash advance was granted in violation of
par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. No. 90-331, Section 48(e) COA Cir. 92-382
and par. 4.1.7 and 4.2.2 COA Cir No. 97-002. The amount of
the cash advance could therefore be in excess of the required
amount of the payroll to be paid since it can not be determined
which payroll, pay period and department employees are going
to be paid by the amount drawn. Consequently, the liquidations
which were made later, cannot identify which particular cash
advances are liquidated, considering that there are other
previous cash advances not yet liquidated, thus resulting in the
failure to control cash on hand.1wphi1
3. Cash advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated
within 5 days after each 15 day/end of the month pay period in
violation of par. 5.1.1 COA Cir. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section
48 (k) of COA Cir No. 92-382. In fact, the balance of
unliquidated cash advance as of December 31, 1997 per audit,
amounted to P 10,602,527.90 consisting of P6,388,147.94,
P3,205,373.16 and P 1,009,006.80 for General, SEF and Trust
Fund (Annex 15) respectively, in violation of Par. 5.8 COA Cir
Nos. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48 (o) COA Cir. No. 92382. However, the balance shown was understated as of
December 31, 1997 by P2,395,517.08 as discussed in items

D.2 pages 15 & 16.
Records showed that part of the total cash advances of P12,000,000.00 appears
to have been used to liquidate partially the previous years unliquidated cash
advance/balance of P10,602,527.90 since the accountable officer liquidated her
cash advance by way of cash refunds/returns from January 8-14, 1998 in the
total amount of P8,076,382.36 (Annex 15 E) in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir.
90-331, Section 48 of COA Cir 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 of COA Cir. 97-002.
The concerned City Officials (refer to Part III of this report) signed, certified and
approved the disbursements/cash advance vouchers, and signed and
countersigned the corresponding checks despite the deficiencies which are
violations of laws, rules and regulations mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.
The accountable officer was able to accumulate excess or idle funds within her
total control and disposal, resulting in the loss of public funds, due to the flagrant
violations by the concerned city officials of the abovementioned laws, rules and
regulations.
On the other hand, the verification and reconciliation of the paymasters
accountability cannot be determined immediately because the submission of
financial reports and its supporting schedules and vouchers/payrolls by the
Accounting Division was very much delayed (Annex 16), in violation of Section
122, PD 1445, despite several communications from the Auditor to submit said
reports, latest of which is attached as Annex 16.a.
xxxx
D. The following practices of the Office of the City Accountant resulted in
inaccurate and misleading information in the financial statements including the
balance of unliquidated cash advances in violation of Section 111 and 112 of PD
1445:
1. Cash returns made on January 8 to 14, 1998 were recorded
in the accounting records as credits to Mrs. Gonzales
accountability in December 1997 amounting to P8,075,382.36
as shown in the subsidiary ledger (Annex 20. 1-4) and as
evidenced by the official receipts (Annex 20a. 1-6) as follows:
xxxx
2. Some liquidations/ disbursements in January 1998 were
included as credits to accountability or a reduction of the
paymaster's accountability as of December 1997 amounting to

P2,395,517.08.
xxxx
3. Verification of accounting records maintained in the
Accounting Division revealed that the index cards (Annex 21)
as a control device in the processing of cash advance voucher
recorded only cash advances granted to Paymaster. It failed to
show the liquidations/ disposition of public funds. Hence,
unliquidated balance of cash advances can not be determined
at a glance when a cash advance voucher is being processed
by the accounting personnel.
E. Other Deficiencies:
1. There were two claimants who alleged that they did not
receive the financial aid intended for them as fire victims.
However, payroll showed that there were initials/signatures
indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said claim.
2. There were two (2) cash advance vouchers (Annex 22b. 1-2)
which bear no approval of proper official in BOX marked as "C"
hereof, yet checks were issued in violation of Section 4.5 of PD
1445 which provide that disbursement or disposition of
government funds of property shall invariably bear the approval
of the proper officials. x x x
3. Accounting records showed that JV #354 under Trust Fund
in the amount of P147,200.00 was a liquidation on December
31, 1997. x x x one payroll supporting the JV was signed by only
one (1) person x x x. The other two payrolls supporting the JV
were not signed/ approved by the concerned officials, which
means that the payrolls were not valid disbursements.69
(Emphases supplied)
The above findings of the COA cannot be any clearer in thoroughly describing
the illegal and anomalous practices of the accused which led to the loss of
P9,810,752.60 in peoples money.
When he testified before the anti-graft court, Bacasmas admitted that she did
not consider the net pay, which was lower than the amount requested, when she
affixed her signature to the vouchers, because it was supposedly common
practice for the paymaster to round off the figures.70 Furthermore, she signed
the vouchers after relying on the representation of Jaca, Cesa, and Gaviola.71
During his direct and cross-examination, Gaviola admitted that he had affixed
his signature to the vouchers, because they had already been signed by
Bacasmas, Cesa, and Jaca despite the incompleteness thereof the periods
covered by the vouchers were not stated; the employees who were to be paid
by the cash advance were not specified; no supporting documents were
attached to the cash advances requested; and there was no determination of
whether the amounts requested were equivalent to the net pay.72
Cesa said that because it was impossible for him to supervise all the personnel,
he instructed Bacasmas to examine and check the documents before signing
them.73 Thus, once Cesa saw the signature of Bacasmas, he immediately
assumed that the documents were in order, and he then signed the vouchers.74
These facts show that petitioners failed to act in accordance with their respective
duties in the grant of cash advances. Moreover they repeatedly failed to do so.
Bacasmas signed 294 requests for cash advance, 11 disbursement vouchers,
and 7 checks. Cesa signed cash advance requests and 299 disbursement
vouchers. Gaviola approved 303 disbursement vouchers and signed 355
checks.
All these acts demonstrate that petitioners, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, were guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Gross
and inexcusable negligence is characterized by a want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation in which there is a duty to act not
inadvertently, but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons are affected.75 Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or simple negligence.76 It imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.77
Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their
signatures on the cash advance vouchers. Yet, they still chose to disregard the
requirements laid down by law and rules and regulations by approving the
vouchers despite the incomplete information therein, the previous unliquidated
cash advances, the absence of payroll to support the cash requested, and the
disparity between the requested cash advances and the total net pay. What is
worse is that they continue to plead their innocence, allegedly for the reason that
it was "common practice" in their office not to follow the law and rules and
regulations to the letter. For them to resort to that defense is preposterous,
considering that as public employees they are required to perform and discharge
their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence
and skill.78 The law and the rules are clear and do not provide for exceptions.
Petitioners acts show that they were

unified in illegally approving
irregular cash advance vouchers in
order to defraud the government.
petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by rules
and regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain
whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash
advance.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners acts not only show gross

negligence amounting to bad faith, but, when taken together, also show that
there was conspiracy in their willful noncompliance with their duties in order to
defraud the government.
Petitioners wrongly approved Gonzales cash advance vouchers, thereby

causing a loss to the government in the amount of P9,810,752.60.
In order to establish the existence of conspiracy, unity of purpose and unity in

the execution of an unlawful objective by the accused must be proven.79 Direct
proof is not essential to show conspiracy.80 It is enough that there be proof that
two or more persons acted towards the accomplishment of a common unlawful
objective through a chain of circumstances, even if there was no actual meeting
among them.81
A cash advance request cannot be approved and disbursed without passing
through several offices, including those of petitioners. It is outrageous that they
would have us believe that they were not in conspiracy when over hundreds of
vouchers were signed and approved by them in a course of 30 months, without
their noticing irregularities therein that should have prompted them to refuse to
sign the vouchers. Clearly, they were in cahoots in granting the cash advances
to Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded the government of such a
large sum of money that should not have been disbursed in the first place, had
they been circumspect in performing their functions.
Not only were petitioners unified in defrauding the government, but they were
also unified in not reporting the negligence of their cohorts because of their own
negligence. Cesa himself admitted knowing that Gonzales had unliquidated
cash advances, yet he signed the vouchers. He also failed to inform the other
officials that they should not sign the vouchers and tolerated their negligence
when they affixed their signatures thereto. Petitioners, through their admissions
before the Sandiganbayan, all knew that there were irregularities in the
vouchers; still they failed to correct one another, because they themselves
signed the vouchers despite the glaring irregularities therein.
The third element of the offense is that the action of the offender caused undue
injury to any party, including the government; or gave any party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her functions. Here,
the Sandiganbayan found that petitioners both brought about undue injury to the
government and gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales. It is not mistaken.
Undue injury means actual damage.83 It must be established by evidence84 and
must have been caused by the questioned conduct of the offenders.85 On the
other hand, unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference means giving a gain
of any kind without justification or adequate reasons.86
When a cash examination is conducted, the paymaster should present her
cashbook, cash, and cash items for examination.87 Upon assessment thereof in
the instant case, it was discovered that P9,810,752.60 was missing, as plainly
evidenced by the COA Narrative Report, from which we quote:
Balance last cash examination, September 20, 1995 P 2,685,719.78
Add: Cash Advances received September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998
Gen. Fund
193,320,350.00
SEF
107,400,600.00
Trust Fund
3,989,783.00
Total:
304,710,733.00
P
307,396,452.78
Less: Liquidations September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998

Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan82 that
heads of offices cannot be convicted of a conspiracy charge just because they
did not personally examine every single detail before they, as the final approving
authorities, affixed their signatures to certain documents. The Court explained
in that case that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to the case at
bar in which petitioners unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful
objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in Arias, where there were
no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine each voucher in detail,
Gen. Fund
187,290,452.66
SEF 105,243,526.99
Trust Fund
2,750,722.51
Balance of Accountability, March 5, 1998
295,284,752.16
P 12,111,700.62
Less: Inventory of Cash and Cash Items Allowed
2,300,948.02
Shortage
(Emphasis supplied)
P 9,810,752.60
88
It is beside the point that no one complained about not receiving any salary from
the city government. The fact remains that more than nine million pesos was
missing public funds lost, to the detriment of the government.
This undue injury was brought about by petitioners act of approving the cash
advance vouchers of Gonzales even if they lacked the requirements prescribed
by law and rules and regulations, and even if Gonzales had failed to liquidate
her previous cash advances, thereby clearly giving her an unwarranted benefit.
No less than the Constitution declares that public office is a public trust.89 Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.90 Petitioners, by
intentionally approving deficient cash advance vouchers, have manifestly failed
to live up to this constitutional standard.
III.
The
indeterminate
penalty
of
12
years
and
month as minimum to 15 years as maximum is fully justified.
one
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special

law such as R.A. 3019, the trial court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by this law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same law. The penalty for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019 is "imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor
more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest
and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income." Hence, the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum
to 15 years as maximum imposed by the Sandiganbayan in the present case is
within the range fixed by law.
However, we are aware that if the range of imposable penalty under the law
were to be divided into three tiers based on the length of imprisonment, the
penalty imposed in this case would be on the highest tier. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan should have explained the reason behind its imposed penalty,
for while Section 9 of R.A. 3019 seems to grant it discretion over the
indeterminate penalty to be prescribed for violation of Section 3(e), this Court
finds it only proper that the anti-graft court justify the latters imposition of the
highest possible penalty. Otherwise, the exercise of this discretion would appear
to be whimsical something that this Court will not tolerate. After all, it is our
duty to be vigilant in ensuring the correctness and justness of the ultimate
adjudication of cases before us.
Nevertheless, we find the imposition of the highest range of imposable penalty
in this case to be fully justified.1wphi1 In Jaca v. People of the Philippines,91
promulgated on 28 January 2013, the Court convicted the very same petitioners
herein of exactly the same kinds of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 as
those in the present case and imposed therein the indeterminate penalty of 12
years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as maximum. The violations in that
case arose from acts of gross inexcusable negligence similar in all respects to
those committed in this case, except for the amount of cash shortages involved
and the identity of the paymaster who benefitted from the acts of petitioners.
Even the period covered by the COA audit in Jaca 20 September 1995 to 5
March 1998 is exactly the same as that in the present case. It is therefore clear
that the Court has previously determined these identical acts to be so perverse
as to justify the penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and 1 month as minimum
to 15 years as maximum. Hence, we adopt the same penalty in this case.
Indeed, the penalty imposed is justified, considering the extent of the negligent
acts involved in this case in terms of the number of statutory laws and regulations
violated by petitioners and the number of positive duties neglected. The Court
emphasizes that petitioners violated not just one but several provisions of
various regulations and laws namely: Sections 89 and 122 of P.O. 1445, Section
339 of R.A. 7160, paragraphs 4.1.2, 4.1.7, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 5.1.1 of COA
Circular No. 97-002, paragraphs 4.2.1, 4.1.5, and 5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 90331~ and Section 48 (g), (e), and (k) of COA Circular No. 92-382. Worse, they
admitted being aware of these regulations. These circumstances. coupled with
the number of times such instances of violations and negligence were wantonly
and systematically repeated, show that their acts bordered on malice. Hence,
we are convinced that the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is warranted.
Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the need to stop these corrupt practices
that drain local government coffers of millions of pesos in taxpayers' money,
which could have been utilized for sorely needed services. In fact, as discussed
in its Narrative Report, the COA team found instances where fire victims alleged
that they did not receive the financial aid intended for them and yet the payroll
showed that there were initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging
receipt of said claim. This diversion of people's money from their intended use
has to end.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 07 May 2009 Decision and 27
August 2009 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 26914 are
AFFIRMED
G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000
July 17, 2013
DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO, Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioners assail their conviction for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 7(b) of
R.A. No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees) under Decision1 dated June 28, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in
Crim. Case Nos. 25465-66.
The Facts
Petitioner Dr. Roger R. Posadas (Dr. Posadas), a Ph.D. in Relativity Physics
graduate from the University of Pittsburgh, is a longtime professor and former
Dean of the College of Science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus (UP Diliman). He was appointed by the Board of Regents (BOR) of the
University of the Philippines System as UP Diliman Chancellor for a three-year
term starting November 1, 1993 and ending October 31, 1996.
During his term as Chancellor, Dr. Posadasisone of the leading figures in the
emerging inter-disciplinary field of technology management in the Philippines.
Upon the recommendation of the UP Diliman Task Force on Science and
Technology Assessment, Management and Planning composed of deans and
professors from the various colleges in UP Diliman, the BOR on February 23,
1995 approved the establishment of the Technology Management Center (TMC)
under the direct supervision of the Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman. When
the TMC became operational in June 1995, the Task Force on Science and
Technology Assessment, Management and Planning wrote then UP President
Dr. Emil Q. Javier, nominating Dr. Posadas for the position of TMC Director. For
undisclosed reason, Dr. Posadas declined the nomination and instead he (Dr.
Posadas) designated Prof. Jose Tabbada of the College of Public Administration
as Acting Director of TMC.
On July 26, 1995, Dr. Posadas submitted to the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) an Application for Funding of his proposed
project entitled "Institutionalization of Technology Management at the University
of the Philippines in Diliman" (TMC Project). The TMC Project, to be funded by
a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), aimed to
design and develop ten new graduate courses in technology management for
the diploma, masters and doctoral programs to be offered by TMC.2
On September 18, 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement3 (MOA) was executed
between Dr. Posadas, on behalf of UP-Diliman, and the Philippine Institute for
Development Studies (PIDS) as the Local Executing Agency of the Policy,
Training and Technical Assistance Facility (PTTAF) of CIDA. Under the MOA,
CIDA shall provide the funding for the total project cost (P5,442,400.00), with
the NEDA as the designated PTTAF Project Implementor for the Government of
the Philippines, while UP Diliman shall direct, manage and implement all
activities under the approved project with counterpart funding in the amount of
P4,228,524.00.
In a letter dated July 30, 1995, the President of Hua Qiao University in Fujian
Province, China invited Dr. Posadas and a delegation from UP Dilimanto visit on
October 30 to November 6, 1995. On October 5, 1995, then Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (retired Member of this Court)
issued the Authority to Travel for the UP Diliman delegation headed by Dr.
Posadas. Among those who joined the delegation were Dr. Amaryllis Torres and
Dr. Rosario Yu, UP Dilimans Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs and ViceChancellor for Student Affairs, respectively.4 Under Administrative Order (AO)
No. 95-170 dated October 24, 1995, Dr. Posadas designated petitioner Dr.
Rolando P. Dayco (Dr. Dayco), Vice-Chancellor for Administrative Affairs, as
Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of UPDiliman effective October 30, 1995 until November
6, 1995. This was followed by AO No. 95-170-A dated October 27, 1995, which
amended the previous order by extendingthe OIC designation of Dr. Dayco to
November 7, 1995.5
On November 7, 1995, Dr. Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as Project Director of
UP TMC effective September 18, 1995 up to September 17, 1996.In another
undated "Contract for Consultancy Services" signed by Dr. Dayco, Dr. Posadas
was hired as Consultant for the TMC Project for the same period.6 As evidenced
by disbursement vouchers and admitted by Dr. Posadas, the latter received his
"honoraria"(P30,000.00 per month) and consultancy fees (totaling P100,000.00)
as Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until May 1996 when the
Commission on Audit (COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees.7
In August 1996, payment of the subject "honoraria" and fees was suspended by
COA Resident Auditor Romeo J. Pulido who noted the following deficiencies:
1. Honoraria were in excess of the rates provided for under the National
Compensation Circular No. 73, dated March 1, 1996, x x x.
2. Legal basis for designating the incumbent Chancellor as Project
Director by the Officer-In-Charge (OIC), considering that the latter can
assume the post only in the absence of the former. An OIC cannot
validly designate since the authority to designate/appoint is among the
functions of the Chancellor which cannot be delegated as provided in
the University Charter. Moreover, the authority to appoint can never be
delegated since it involves discretion.
3. On the assumption that the designation of the Chancellor as Project
Director and Consultant is valid, collecting the remuneration for both
positions amount to double compensation which is contrary to existing
auditing rules and regulations.8
In a Memorandum9 dated September 16, 1996, UPs Chief Legal Officer Marichu
C. Lambino addressed the foregoing concerns of COA Auditor Pulido.Atty.
Lambino stated that (a) the compensation received by Dr. Posadas are in the
nature of consultancy fees and hence expressly exempted by Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 75
dated March 11, 1995; (b) the TMC Project, being a training program, is likewise
exempted from the coverage of NEDA Guidelines on the Procurement of
Consulting Services for Government Projects; and (c) under Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 43, series of 1993
"Streamlining and Deregulating Human Resource Development Functions" UP
is authorized, without prior approval from the CSC, to determine the rates of
honorarium for government personnel participating as resource persons,
coordinator, and facilitator, in training programs. On the issue of double
compensation, Atty. Lambino pointed out that Dr. Posadas was appointed
Project Director because of managerial expertise, and his skills in supervising
personnel who are involved in an academic undertaking, and as Consultant
because of his expertise in technology management. Finding these
explanations/justifications acceptable, Auditor Pulido lifted the notices of
suspension in September 1997.
However, even before the issuance of the suspension notices, then UP
President Dr. Emil Q. Javier, ordered an investigation on the basis of an
administrative complaint filed by Mrs. Ofelia L. Del Mundo, a staff of the
University Library who was detailed at the TMC as its Administrative Officer. On
July 24, 1996, President Javier created a Fact-Finding Committee to gather,
review and evaluate pertinent documents regarding certain transactions of the
TMC.10 After the conduct of a preliminary investigation and finding a prima facie
case against the petitioners, President Javier issued the formal charges11 for
Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority. Pursuant to the Universitys "Rules
and Regulations on the Discipline of Faculty Members and Employees approved
at the 704th Meeting of the Board of Regents on January 11, 1963,"12 an
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) was constituted, chaired by Atty.
Arturo E. Balbastro, a faculty member of the UP College of Law.
On August 21, 1998, the ADT submitted its Report13 (ADT Case 96-001) to
President Javier. The ADT found petitioners guilty of serious or grave
misconduct and recommended the penalty of dismissal in accordance with CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989, as well as Article 250 of the
University Code. The Report likewise stated that the acts of petitioners for which
they were held administratively liable may warrant prosecution under Section
3(h) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019. Under the Order14 dated August 25, 1998 signed
by President Javier, petitioners were dismissed from the service.
On September 3, 1998, Atty. Carmelita Yadao-Guno in her capacity as General
Counsel of UP formally endorsed the findings and recommendations of the ADT
to the Ombudsman.15 The case was docketed as OMB-0-98-1843.
Meanwhile, the BOR at its 1126th meeting on November 26, 1998, resolved
petitioners appeal in ADT Case 96-001, as follows:
1. The Board affirmed the ADT decision finding the respondents guilty
of grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of forced
resignation with the accessory penalties defined in the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292 and other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws i.e., cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of all leave
credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from government
service for one year.
2. If after one year they should reapply to the University, they must
render an apology to the University and their reappointments will be
subject to Board approval.
3. The respondents are permanently disqualified from holding any
administrative position in the University.
4. The decision takes effect immediately.16
Satisfied with the BORs action, petitioners caused the withdrawal of their appeal
before the CSC.17
On June 9, 1999, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the
Office of Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the charges against
petitioners for insufficiency of evidence. However, said recommendation was
disapproved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who ordered that
petitioners be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section
7(b) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713.18
The corresponding Informations19 were thus filed against the petitioners before
the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case Nos. 25465-66), as follow:

That on or about 7 November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, both high-ranking public officers, ROGER DELA ROSA
POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty member of the University of
the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO PASCUAL DAYCO, being
then the Vice-Chancellor of the said university and Officer-In-Charge of the
Office of the Chancellor, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while
in the performance and taking advantage of their official and administrative
functions, and conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits, privilege or advantage to accused POSADAS, when accused DAYCO
appointed or designated accused POSADAS as a Project Director of the lone
project, Institutionalization of the Management of Technology at U.P. Diliman, of
the Technology Management Center (TMC) of the Office of the Chancellor, U.P.
Diliman, which enabled or caused the disbursement and payment of monthly
salary of P30,000.00 of accused POSADAS, duly received by the latter, for the
period 18 September 1995 to 17 September 1996, with accused POSADAS also
receiving his salaries as Chancellor and faculty member of U.P. Diliman during
this period, and both accused knowing fully well that the appointment of accused
POSADAS was beyond the power or authority of accused DAYCO as an OIC
and likewise violative of the law, rules and regulations against multiple positions,
double compensation and retroactivity of appointment, thereby causing undue
injury to the Government in the amount of PESOS: THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
THOUSAND (P360,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
That on or about 7 November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, both high-ranking public officers, ROGER DELA ROSA
POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty member of the University of
the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO PASCUAL DAYCO, being
then the ViceChancellor of the said university and Officer-In-Charge of the Office
of the Chancellor, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the
performance and taking advantage of their official and administrative functions,
and conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally engage in the unauthorized private
practice of accused POSADASs profession as a technology manager, when
accused DAYCO appointed or designated accused POSADAS as a consultant
to the project, Institutionalization of the Management of Technology at U.P.
Diliman, of the Technology Management Center (TMC) of the Office of the
Chancellor, U.P. Diliman, which enabled or caused the disbursement and
payment of consultancy fees in the amount of P100,000.00 to accused

POSADAS, duly received by the latter, with respondent POSADAS also
receiving his salaries as Chancellor and faculty member of U.P. Diliman, and
both accused knowing fully well that the appointment to and acceptance of the
position of consultant by respondent POSADAS was without authority from the
latters superior(s) or the U.P. Board of Regents, to the damage and prejudice
of the Government service.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas were duly arraigned on June 15, 2000 and May 28,
2001, respectively, both pleading not guilty to the charges against them.20
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision21 dated June
28, 2005, the decretal portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds both accused Roger R. Posadas and Rolando
P. Dayco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019
and Section 7(b) of RA 6713 and are sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
For violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019: accused Posadas and Dayco are
sentenced to suffer in prison the indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years and one
day as minimum and twelve (12) years as maximum, with the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from public office. Both accused are directed to
jointly and severally indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
the amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P336,000.00).
For violation of Section 7(b) of RA 6713: accused Posadas and Dayco are
sentenced to suffer in prison the maximum penalty of five (5) years and
disqualification to hold public office.
SO ORDERED.22
The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence supports a finding of evident bad
faith on the part of petitioners who, knowing very well the limitations of Dr.
Daycos power as OIC, effected the appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project
Director and Consultant. These limitations are
based on the nature of the power to appoint which is merely delegated to the
Chancellor by the BOR, Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual, and CSC MC No. 38, s. 1993 on non-retroactivity of appointments.
The Sandiganbayan concluded that petitioners acts caused undue injury to the
Government with the receipt by Dr. Posadas of salaries and consultancy fees.
Petitioners contention that the Government did not suffer loss or damage since
the funding for the TMC Project came from CIDA was rejected by the
Sandiganbayan which stated that from the moment UP received the CIDA funds
intended for the TMC Project, said funds became "impressed with public
attributes or character," as in fact it was subjected to the control of UP and
audited by the COA.
The Sandiganbayan likewise found no merit in petitioners claim that they were
just victims of "university politics"as they were staunch critics of President Javier.
Petitioners adduced documentary and testimonial evidence to show that Ms. Del
Mundos filing of a complaint against petitioners was triggered by the fact that it
was Dr. Posadas who ordered an administrative investigation against her and
recalled her to the University Library, which incident led to the resignation of
Prof. Tabbada from TMC. However, the Sandiganbayan stressed that
regardless of the reason for the filing of the cases against petitioners at the
university level, these cases would not have come into being if no law has been
violated in the first place.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied due course for
the reason that it has not been set for hearing as required by the rules, hence
the motion ispro forma.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion and
blatant violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
The Issues
The Court is asked to resolve whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction: (1) in denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was not set for
hearing; and (2) in convicting petitioners of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 and Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713 on the basis of facts not supported by
evidence and on inapplicable rules and principles.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners argue that the July 19, 2005 Resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration is not only baseless, but capricious, arbitrary and most unjust
because the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan does not require that
the motion for reconsideration be set for hearing. They cite the case of Alvarez
v. Sandiganbayan23 where this Court ruled that motions for reconsideration of
decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan are not governed by Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, as these may be filed within 15 days from promulgation or
notice of the judgment or final order "upon the grounds, in the form and subject
to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121
of the Rules of Court."
On the charges of graft, petitioners assert that they did not act with bad faith,
manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. They reiterate that Dr.
Daycos designation as OIC Chancellor was adjusted for one day merely to
accommodate the change in the official travel schedule of Dr. Posadas to China.
The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant was a
valid appointment and was made retroactive for no other reason than to
synchronize the activities relative to the TMC Project with the project schedule
as approved by the funding agency. The power of appointment was within the
power of the Chancellor to delegate to the OIC Chancellor, it not being expressly
prohibited by the University rules. Such practice, in fact, is not an unusual
occurrence in UP.
Petitioners also contend that no injury was caused to the government because
the TMC Project budget came from foreign funds, hence not an expense
incurred by the Government and neither did UP incur any expense in relation to
the said project, its counterpart funding was not in the form of money.
Consequently, there can be no conviction under the law in the absence of real
or actual damage suffered.
On the "honoraria" and fees received by Dr. Posadas as Project Director and
Consultant, petitioners insist they cannot be held liable for double compensation
because these were given for separate services rendered by Dr. Posadas. As
opined by the UP Chief Legal Officer, the compensation were in the nature of
consultancy fees being received by UP personnel in their capacity as private
persons for services to a project outside of their official time, hence it is not
covered by the DBM NCC No. 75. Moreover, petitioners stress that Dr. Posadas
did not receive any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in his
appointment as TMC Project Director and Consultant. Dr. Posadas possesses
the superior qualifications and expertise in the field of technology management
necessary to ensure that the project was a success. In fact, his colleagues were
expecting him to head the TMC Project and did not oppose his appointment.
As to the charge of unauthorized outside employment, petitioners point out that
the University rules do not require clearance from the UP President to engage
in consultancy work and the same rules do not prohibit him from performing
consultancy work for a project such as TMC.
Therefore, Dr. Posadas appointment as TMC Project Director and Consultant
were not prohibited outside employment.
Petitioners reiterate their "university politics" defense, claiming that President

Javier at the time chose to champion Del Mundos complaint motivated by
vengeance and spite against two of his staunch critics. Thus, despite knowledge
of the opinion of the UP Chief Legal Officer clearing petitioners of any
wrongdoing, President Javier underhandedly caused the filing of administrative
charges in the ADT.
Petitioners further submit that the complainant before the Ombudsman, Atty.
Carmelita Yadao, was incompetent as she had no personal knowledge of the
contents thereof, which were merely narrated or reported to her in her capacity
as General Counsel of UP at that time. The letter-complaint should not have
been given due course as it was based on pure hearsay and its main proponent
suffered from conflicting interests because she had earlier endorsed the MOA
which included the compensation package for TMC Project Director and
Consultant.
Finally, petitioners deny having acted in conspiracy as there was no evidence to
prove it. The only assumed fact considered by the Sandiganbayan is based on
its erroneous hypothesis the alleged act of "extending" the period of OIC
Chancellor for one day to accommodate Dr. Posadas. Dr. Dayco did not even
gain anything from his designation of Dr. Posadas. Thus, in the absence of clear
and convincing proof, petitioners cannot be held liable as conspirators.
Under the Rules of Sandiganbayan, effective January 10, 1979, a petition for
reconsideration of a judgment or final order may be filed upon the grounds, in
the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal
cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.24 In the case of Alvarezv.
Sandiganbayan25 decided in 1991, the Court upheld the Sandiganbayan in not
considering "the failure of the movant to fix the place, date and time of the
hearing of his motion a substantial defect, for instead of giving the motion a short
shrift, it set the incident for hearing, and even granted the prosecution ten days
from notice within which to oppose/comment." The Court noted what was then
the practice of the Sandigabayan itself, rather than the movant, to determine the
date and time of hearings of motions. The peculiar circumstances of said case
heavily weighed in favor of relaxation of the rules, with the Courts finding that
the evidence presented against the petitioner does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Hence, the
Court was not prepared "to declare that petitioners omission to set his motion
for hearing is so grievous an error as to foreclose the award to him of the relief
to which he is otherwise entitled."
In any event, the mandatory setting for hearing a motion for reconsideration to
reverse or modify a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan is already
settled. This Court categorically ruled in the recent case of Flores v. People26
Our Ruling
Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did Not contain any
notice of hearing, the Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records
Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration."
Notice of Hearing in Motions
In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion for being a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing
and disposed as follows:
The petition has no merit.
For Reconsideration Is Mandatory

Contrary to petitioners stance, the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan requires a motion for reconsideration to be set for hearing, as it
provides under Rule VII:
SECTION 1. Motion Day. - Except for motions which may be acted upon ex
parte, all motions shall be scheduled for hearings on a Friday, or if that day is a
non-working holiday, on the next working day.
Motions requiring immediate action may be acted upon on shorter notice.
In appealed cases, the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 49 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, on Motions shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of

accused Flores is considered pro forma which did not toll the running of the
period to appeal, and thus, the assailed judgment of this Court has become
FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx
Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for Reconsideration by the
Sandiganbayan on a mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due
process. The dismissal rendered final and executory the assailed decision which
was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that were contrary to the
evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified
by the merits of this case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective
perspective, indubitably demonstrate self-defense on his part.
Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section2 of Rule
37 and Section 4 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was
served upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact, admitted receiving a copy.
For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due notice of the motion
which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a
motion for reconsideration is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a
hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.
Flores argument fails to persuade this Court.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Section 2, Rule 37 provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof.
The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a
written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.
xxxx
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary
period of appeal.
Section 4, Rule 121 states:
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new
trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it
is based. x x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given
to the prosecutor.
As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec.2 of Rule
37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec.5 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing
by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without
prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be
addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with
proof of service.
This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with
the requirement renders the motion defective. "As a rule, a motion without a
notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading."
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice
of hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect
whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.27
(Emphasis supplied.)
We thus find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Sandiganbayan
when it denied due course to petitioners motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it "has not been set for hearing as required by the rules" and the
same is "deemed pro forma."
Violation of Section 3(e)of R.A. No. 3019
The essential elements of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, are:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.28
There is no question regarding the presence of the first requisite considering that
at the time the subject appointments were made, both petitioners were faculty
members and holding administrative positions in UP Diliman. What petitioners
dispute is the existence of the second and third requisites.
In Criminal Case No. 25465, the information charged that petitioners willfully,
unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to Dr. Posadas in appointing
him as TMC Project Director, in violation of the prohibition against multiple
positions and the rule on non-retroactivity of appointments, thereby causing
undue injury to the Government.
In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,29 this Court explained that there are two (2) ways
by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the
performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either
mode or under both. Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,30 the Court held
that the use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.31 Here, petitioners were charged with
committing the offense under both modes.
Upon the entire evidence on record, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that
petitioners were guilty of causing undue injury to the Government. In Llorente,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,32 this Court said that to hold a person liable for causing
undue injury under Section 3(e), the concurrence of the following elements must
be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
We sustain the decision of the Sandiganbayan holding petitioners liable for
causing undue injury to the Government in appointing Dr. Posadas as TMC
Project Director with evident bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud.33 It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.34
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage.35
In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan,36 the Court en banc defined injury as "any wrong
or damage done to another, either in his person, or in his rights, reputation or
property; the invasion of any legally protected interests of another." It must be
more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. It is required that the
undue injury caused by the positive or passive acts of the accused be
quantifiable and demonstrable and proven to the point of moral certainty.37

"Undue" means illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of equity and moderations.38
In this case, that petitioners acted in evident bad faith was duly established by
the evidence. We recall that the MOA was executed on September 18, 1995 and
became effective upon the signature of the parties.39 Between that date and the
China trip scheduled in the first week of November (the invitation was dated July
30, 1995), Dr. Posadas could have already appointed the Project Director and
Consultant as indeed the retroactive appointment was even justified by them
because supposedly "project activities" have already started by September 18,
1995. And yet, he waited until the China trip so that in his absence the
designated OIC Chancellor, Dr. Dayco, would be the one to issue the
appointment. Apparently, Dr. Posadas appointment by Dr. Dayco in an OIC
capacity was pre-conceived. Prof. Jose Tabbada testified that when he was
summoned by Dr. Posadas to his office, the latter asked him how he (Posadas)
could be appointed TMC Project Director. He then suggested that Dr. Dayco as
OIC Chancellor can appoint him to the position and even drafted the memo for
this purpose. He admitted that he gave such advice with some reservations but
it turned out to have been pursued by petitioners.40
However, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the delegated authority of the OIC
Chancellor has limitations and did not include the power to appoint.
Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (Volume I on
Government Auditing Rules and Regulations) provides:
Sec. 204. Appointment issued by an officer-in-charge. -- A person designated in
an acting capacity may be differentiated from one who is designated merely as
an Officer-in-Charge (OIC). In the latter case, the OIC enjoys limited powers
which, are confined to functions of administration and ensuring that the office
continues its usual activities. The OIC may not be deemed to possess the power
to appoint employees as the same involves the exercise of discretion which is
beyond the power of an OIC (CSC Res. 1692, Oct. 20, 1978).
To prove the alleged practice in the University of an OIC appointing a Chancellor
to a certain position, petitioners presented copies of temporary appointment
papers issued by OIC Chancellor Paz G. Ramos to former Chancellor Ernesto
G. Tabujara who was appointed Consultant-In-Charge of the Campus Planning,
Development and Maintenance Office, UP Diliman with P2,000.00 monthly
honorarium effective January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1986. It must be noted,
however, that the said appointment was made by the OIC "by authority of the
Board of Regents" and these were actually approved and signed by then
Secretary of the University, Prof. Martin V. Gregorio, while the renewal
appointment was approved by Secretary of the University Prof. Emerlinda R.
Roman. Both Gregorio and Roman signed the Notification of Approval of

Temporary Appointment.41
Petitioners nonetheless argue that the appointments made by Dr. Dayco were
valid on the basis of Section 9(a) of the Resolution of the BOR reorganizing UP
into the UP System adopted at its 828th meeting on December 21, 1972, as
amended at its 863rd meeting on July 31, 1975. Under said resolution, the BOR
authorized the Chancellor of an autonomous university of the UP System to
delegate his functions and responsibilities which have been assigned or
delegated to him by the BOR, unless instructed otherwise by the BOR. It also
enumerated those functions that may not be delegated, among which is:
B. Functions That May Not Be Delegated
xxxx
f. Authority to approve the following appointments
(1) those covered in II, C, 1, and e of the Presidents Memorandum
Circular No. 30 dated August 28, 1975; and
(2) those covered in II, C, 4, a through c of the aforecited memorandum
circular of the President;
x x x x42
MC No. 30 dated August 28, 1975 issued by former UP President Onofre D.
Corpuz provided for "Operating Guidelines on Appointments and Related
Personnel Transactions in the University System," which specifically delineated
the authority to appoint of university officials.
The pertinent provisions of said MCNo. 30 read:
C. Delegated Authority of the Chancellor to Appoint
1. The Chancellor of an autonomous University approves appointments to the
following positions:
a. directors or heads and assistant directors or assistant heads of units
supervised by or attached to principal units, except those whose starting
salaries are equal to or higher than that of associate professor;
b. program or project directors;
xxxx
5. The Chancellor approves the appointment of personnel, regardless of rank or
salary range, incidental to employment in research projects, study and training
programs and other programs or projects undertaken in collaboration with, or
with the support of, public or private institutions or persons.
TYPES OF APPOINTMENT/PERSONNEL ACTION COVERED:
Appointment as used in II, C, 5 above includes all types of appointment and
personnel action pertaining to appointment, except transfer to permanency of
faculty members. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to petitioners, since appointments falling under II, C, 5 was not
specifically mentioned in the enumeration of those functions of the Chancellor
that may not be delegated, it follows that such appointments may be validly
delegated, as in this case, the appointments issued by OIC Chancellor Dayco to
Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant. Moreover, it is argued that
in the BOR Resolution itself, the designated OIC Chancellor was granted full
powers:
E. Extent of Authority of One Appointed in an Acting/Officer-in-Charge Capacity
One appointed/designated, in an acting or officer-in-charge capacity, to the
office of chancellor shall discharge all the functions of the position unless
instructed otherwise by the regular incumbent, and in any case, subject to the
latters instructions, to the policies of the Board of Regents and to the provisions
of D herein above and of F herein below; provided, that "all the functions of the
position" as used in and for purposes of this resolution shall be construed as
inclusive of all the functions assigned to the position by competent University
authority and all such functions as usually pertain, or are "inherent," to the
position although not expressly assigned thereto by competent University
authority.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It must be emphasized that the subject appointments involve not an ordinary
personnel or faculty member but the Chancellor himself who was also vested
with administrative supervision over the institution implementing the TMC
Project, TMC. Note that while II, C, 5 in MC No. 30 speaks of "personnel,
regardless of rank or salary range, incidental to employment," the same could
not possibly refer to the Chancellor himself. This is evident from the exception
provided in II, B, 1 where it is the President himself who approves the
appointment, viz:
B. Delegated Authority of the President to Appoint

1. The President approves the appointment of officers and employees (including
faculty members if there are any) who are not included in or covered by the
enumerations in II, A above and of those who are covered in II, C, 5 below who
are:
a. in or directly under the Office of the President; or
b. in University-wide units; or
c. in other offices or units, academic or non-academic, that are not part
of any autonomous University;
to the same extent and under the same conditions stipulated in II, C below for
the delegated authority of the Chancellor of an autonomous University to
appoint.
TYPES OF APPOINTMENT/PERSONNELACTION COVERED:
Appointment as used in II, B, 1 above includes all types of appointment and
personnel action pertaining to appointment, except transfer to permanency of
faculty members. (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that it is the Chancellor himself who is being appointed to a project
covered in II, C, 5, the BOR resolution on the authority of the Chancellor to
delegate his functions may not be invoked because the situation is covered by
II, B, 1, the Chancellor being directly under the administrative supervision of the
UP President as the Chief Executive Officer of the University. The Chancellor,
on the other hand, is the executive officer and the head of the faculty of the
Constituent University, who likewise performs other functions that the BOR or
the President may delegate to her/him. This is clearly indicated in the
organizational structure of the UP Diliman, sourced from the Faculty Manual of
the University of the Philippines Diliman43:
Thus, even granting that the subject appointments in UP Diliman, an
autonomous educational institution, are not covered by Section 204 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, they are still invalid and illegal,
because the delegated authority to appoint in this case, involving as it does the
Chancellor himself, pertains to the President of the University. Indeed, the
Chancellor cannot exercise the delegated authority to appoint in the situations
covered by II, C, 5 when he himself is the appointee. The designated OIC
likewise had no authority to make the appointment.
As to the prohibition on government officials and employees, whether elected or

appointed, from holding any other office or position in the government, this is
contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
xxxx
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Emphasis supplied.)
The prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the
government service is further specified under Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,44 as follows:
Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters or their
subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position.
Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law, xxx.
Under Section 2(d), Rule III of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and
Other Personnel Actions,45 appointments of personnel under Foreign-assisted
projects shall be issued and approved as coterminous with the project. The MOA
itself provides that the "services of the contractual personnel of the University
for the Project shall be discontinued upon its completion or termination." The
appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the prohibition
against holding of multiple positions since there is no distinction in Section 7,
Article IX-B as to the employment status, i.e., whether permanent, temporary or
coterminous. Petitioners failed to cite any law to justify Dr. Posadas holding of
concurrent positions as Chancellor and TMC Project Director.
Another legal infirmity in the appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project
Director is the fact that it was made retroactive, in violation of CSC MC No. 38,
Series of 1993, the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions. Section II, 5 B (7) thereof reads:
7. Effectivity of Appointment
a. The effectivity of an appointment shall be the date of actual
assumption by the appointee but not earlier than the date of issuance of
the appointment, which is the date of signing by the appointing authority.
b. No appointment shall be made effective earlier than the date of
issuance, except in the case of change of status in view of qualifying in
written examination, the effectivity of which is the date of release of the
result of the examination. However, the issuance of such appointments
shall be within the period of the temporary appointment or provided the
temporary appointment has not yet expired.
xxxx
Petitioners assert that appointment as TMC Project Director is not covered by
the above rule because it is in the nature of consultancy which is no longer
required to be submitted to the CSC.
A perusal of the duties and responsibilities of the TMC Project Director reveals
that the latter is tasked to perform the following:
Provide overall direction to the Project;
Exercise supervision over Project personnel, including the visiting
experts;
Approve the recruitment of personnel, disbursement of Project funds,
and changes in the Project activities and schedule;
Coordinate with other persons, agencies and institutions involved in
technology management;
Perform such other functions as may be necessary to ensure the
efficient, orderly and effective management and timely completion of the
Project.46
The foregoing duties and responsibilities are not susceptible of partial
performance or division into parts as would justify its classification into lump sum
work. Neither are these advisory in nature as would make it fall under the scope
of a consultancy service.47 The status of Dr. Posadas employment as TMC
Project Director is a coterminous one. Under civil service rules, appointments of
personnel under foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved as
coterminous with the project,48 that is, they are considered employees for the
duration of the project, in which case, the name of the project and its completion
date shall be indicated in the appointment.49 This status of employment is to be
distinguished from contract of services which covers lump sum work or services
such as janitorial, security or consultancy services, whose appointments need
not be submitted to the CSC for approval.
We also find no merit in petitioners argument that the element of injury caused
to the Government is lacking since the budget for TMC Project came from a
foreign source and hence no public funds are involved. Under the MOA, UP shall
be "principally accountable for the project funds" which shall be released to and
properly managed by it to ensure the attainment of the Projects objectives.
Clearly, these funds are in the nature of "trust fund" which is defined by
Presidential Decree No. 1445 as "fund that officially comes in the possession of
an agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or
administrator, or that is received for the fulfillment of some obligation.50 A trust
fund may be utilized only for the "specific purpose for which the trust was created
or the funds received."51 The Sandiganbayan thus correctly held that the funds
received for the TMC Project were impressed with public attributes or character
from the time it came into UPs possession.
The disbursement and payment of the P30,000.00 monthly salary as TMC
Project Director to Dr. Posadas was improper, in view of his invalid appointment.
Said amount represents the actual injury to the Government. The third requisite
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, therefore, was sufficiently established by the
prosecution.
Violation of Section 7(b),R.A. No. 6713
In Criminal Case No. 25466, the charge involves the private practice of
profession prohibited under Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
by appointing Dr. Posadas as Consultant of the TMC Project. Said provision
reads:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; or
xxxx
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 93-1881 dated May 25, 1993, a contract for
consultancy services is not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations
because the said position is not found in the index of position titles approved by
DBM. Accordingly, it does not need the approval of the CSC.52 CSC MC No. 38,
series of 1993 expressly provides that consultancy services are not considered
government service for retirement purposes. A "consultant" is defined as one
who provides professional advice on matters within the field of his special
knowledge or training. There is no employer-employee relationship in the
engagement of a consultant but that of client-professional relationship.53
Consultancy is deemed private practice of profession. Under CSC Resolution
02126454 dated September 27, 2002, accepting a consultancy job under a parttime status is subject to the following conditions:
1. It must not violate the rule against holding multiple positions
2. The employee/officer must obtain permission or authority from his/her
head of agency as the same constitutes private practice of profession;
3. The consultancy job must not conflict or tend to conflict with his/her
official functions; and
President, the Sandiganbayan ruled that they violated Section 7(b) of R.A. No.
6713.
Petitioners contend that the section of the University Code cited by the
Sandiganbayan had already been superseded by the guidelines on outside
activities promulgated by the BOR at its 1031st Meeting on June 28, 1990. Thus,
in the Faculty Manual of the University of the Philippines Diliman while the
consultancy at TMC Project falls under the coverage of "outside activities," prior
authorization by the University President is no longer required. The pertinent
provisions of the manual read:
10.3 Guidelines on Outside Activities [1031st BOR meeting, June 28, 1990]
10.3.1 Coverage
Outside activities of University personnel shall include: limited practice of
profession, management of private enterprises, outside consultancy,
secondment, teaching in other educational or training institutions with which the
University has a Memorandum of Agreement, as well as research and other
activities or projects under the auspices of outside agencies which are not
considered integral functions of the University. Such activities shall not be
considered part of the regular workload of the personnel concerned.
10.3.2 Prior Authorization
No member of the University personnel shall engage in outside activities without
prior authorization from the Chancellor, upon endorsement by the Dean,
Director, or head of office concerned, subject to the exigencies of the service.
4. It must not affect the effective performance of his/her duty.

xxxx
In convicting petitioners, the Sandiganbayan cited Article 250 of the University
Code, which provides:
10.3.5 Penalties
Art. 250. No member of the academic staff, officer or employee of the University
shall, without permission from the President or the Chancellor, as the case may
be, practice any profession or manage personally any private enterprise which
in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be directly
financially interested in any contract with the University unless permitted by the
Board. Violation of this provision shall be punishable by reprimand, suspension,
or dismissal from the service. (Emphasis supplied.)
Violation of any of the rules on outside activities shall be ground for disciplinary
action. The immediate superior of the faculty/staff member shall immediately
submit a report on any violation of the rules to the Office of the Chancellor,
through channels.
Since Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco entered into the contract for consultancy
services for the TMC Project without prior permission from the University
10.3.6 Types
Disciplinary action on any faculty/staff member may be imposed, but only in

accordance with the law, and after due process.
xxxx
c. Limited/private practice of profession

Permission to engage in private practice of the profession of faculty members
may be granted only if such private practice may enhance their usefulness to
the University or improve their efficiency. [Art. 252]
The privilege of private practice, when granted, shall be for a definite period of
one (1) year, renewable at the discretion of the Chancellor for one-year periods,
and under such conditions as may be prescribed by him/her regarding the nature
of the work, the time of performance, and other circumstances. [Art. 253;
amended at BOR meetings: 839th , Nov. 29, 1973; 1031st, June 28, 1990]
The limited practice of ones profession shall be governed by the following
guidelines:
1) No member of the academic staff, officer or employee of the
University shall, without prior permission from the Chancellor, practice
any profession or manage personally any private enterprise which in any
way may be affected by the functions of her/his office; nor shall s/he be
directly financially interested in any contract with the University unless
permitted by the Board.
Violation of this provision shall be punishable by reprimand, suspension,
or dismissal from the service. [Art. 250; amended at 1031st BOR
meeting, June 28, 1990]
2) Permission to engage in private practice of profession may granted
provided that such practice:
is NOT ADVERSE to the interests of the University;
shall NOT be conducted on official time;
will improve the persons efficiency and usefulness to the
University; and
shall be subject to such other requirements as may be
imposed by law or University rules and regulations. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Notwithstanding the supposed amendment of the rule on limited practice of
profession as contained in Article 250 of the University Code, we sustain the
Sandiganbayan in holding that petitioners should have obtained prior permission
from the University President for the contract for consultancy services in the
TMC Project. As with our conclusion on the issue of authority to appoint the TMC
Project Director, considering that it is the Chancellor himself who was engaged
as TMC Project Consultant, the contract for consultancy services of Dr. Posadas
should have been authorized by the University President as the chief executive
officer of the UP System. To hold otherwise is to leave the matter of determining
the criteria or conditions for allowing the private practice of profession provided
in the University rules entirely to Dr. Posadas himself as then UP Diliman
Chancellor. Consistent with the Civil Service rules that prior authorization by the
head of the agency or institution must be sought by the government officer or
employee who desires to accept a consultancy job, it is no less than the
University President who should have given permission to Dr. Posadas, the
latter being directly under his administrative supervision.
Upon the established facts and applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Sandiganbayan in convicting
petitioners for violation of Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713.
Conspiracy
A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of
an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence
of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it.55 For the accused to
be held as conspirators, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out."
Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment,
then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved.56
The Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy rests on firm factual support.
Although Dr. Dayco tried to downplay his participation, stating that he did not
benefit from the subject appointments and that there were many other
appointment papers he had signed in the absence of Dr. Posadas, it is clear as
daylight that he had a principal and indispensable role in effecting the said
appointments. To stress the point, the Sandiganbayan quoted the relevant
portions of the Report submitted by the ADT, as follows:
It would be the height of naivet to assume that before making the two (2)
appointments of respondent Posadas as Director of the TMC Project and as
Consultant to the TMC, respondent Dayco did not, in any manner, confer with
respondent Posadas about the matter. To believe the claim of respondent
Posadas that he just saw his appointment papers at his desk when he came
back from his trip is to tax human credulity too much.
Under the said circumstances, the natural course of events necessarily points
to connivance between respondent Posadas and respondent Dayco in the
making of the questioned appointments.
Despite the claim of respondent Posadas that he just saw the appointment
papers on his desk when he returned from his trip, the admitted fact is that
respondent Dayco made those appointments for respondent Posadas and the
latter acted upon the same favourably as he (respondent Posadas) collected the
compensation therein (Exhibits :E" and "E-1"). In fact, as Chancellor, respondent
Posadas approved his own Disbursement Voucher for payment from the coffers
of the University, covering his honoraria and consultancy fees as Project Director
for the TMC Project and as consultant to the TMC, respectively (Exhibit "E-2").57
Penalty
Any person guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is punishable with
imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month nor more than
fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public office.58 Thus, the
penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which is an indeterminate penalty of
nine (9) years and one day as minimum and twelve (12) years as maximum, with
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office, is in accord
with law. Petitioners shall also indemnify the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines the amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P336,000.00) representing the compensation/salaries paid to Dr. Posadas as
TMC Project Director.
As to the offense defined in Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713, Section 11 of said
law provides that violations of Section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court, disqualification to hold public
office. The Sandiganbayan imposed the maximum penalty of five (5) years
imprisonment and disqualification to hold public office.
The Court is aware of the sentiments of the succeeding BOR who agonized
while deliberating whether to readmit petitioners into the faculty of UP Diliman,
with majority of the Regents lamenting the loss of two of its distinguished
intellectuals and scientists who had served the University for so long despite the
meager compensation UP has to offer compared to private educational
institutions.59 The BOR eventually allowed them to teach part-time in the TMC
even waiving the conditions the previous BOR had imposed -- a move perceived
to be a first step in the healing process for the academic community that was
"torn into pieces" by the issue.
However, this Court's mandate is to uphold the Constitution and the laws. Our
Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.60 These constitutionally enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law,
are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken
as working standards by all in the public service.61
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 28, 2005
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 25465-66 is hereby AFFIRMED
and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 187731
September 18, 2013

vs.
SPO1 ALFREDO ALAWIG, Accused-Appellant.
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot PO3 MIEL DE OCAMPOCAFE,

causing multiple gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
latters heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For final review is the November 3, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification the May 17, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch II, Manila, finding SPO1 Alfredo Alawig (appellant) and
SPO2 Enrique M. Dabu (SPO2 Dabu) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant, along with PO3 Romeo Ventinilla (PO3 Ventinilla), was initially
charged with homicide for the killing of PO3 Miel de Ocampo Caf (victim). Upon
motion of Percelita Caf (Percelita), the victims mother,3 a reinvestigation of the
case was conducted. Subsequently, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
approved the filing of an Amended Information4 against appellant, PO3 Ventinilla
together with SPO4 Ponciano Miraples (SPO4 Miraples), PO2Armando de Vera
(PO2 De Vera), SPO2 Dabu and PO2 Vivencio Corpuz (PO2Corpuz). The
Department of Justice accordingly moved for the admission of said Amended
Information,5 which the RTC Manila, Branch 18 granted.6 The accusatory portion
of the Amended Information reads as follows:
The undersigned Ombudsman Investigator, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military, hereby accuses SPO4 PONCIANO MIRAPLES,SPO1
ALFREDO ALAWIG, PO3 ROMEO VENTINILLA, PO2 ARMANDODE VERA,
SPO2 ENRIQUE DABU and PO2 VIVENCIO CORPUZ of the crime of
MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about November 30, 1996, or for sometime subsequent thereto, in
Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused (SPO1 ALAWIG and PO3
VENTINILLA), both public officers, being then members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP)Force assigned at the Valenzuela Police Station, armed
with various firearms, with evident premeditation, treachery and with deliberate
intent to kill, conspiring and confederating with their co-accused
(SPO4MIRAPLES,
PO2
DE
VERA,
SPO2
DABU
and
PO2
CORPUZ),committing the offense in relation to their Office, did then and there
SPO2 Dabu pleaded not guilty when arraigned on July 1, 1999 as did appellant
when arraigned on July 29, 1999. SPO4 Miraples, PO2 De Vera and PO2
Corpuz were never apprehended and remain at large while PO3 Ventinilla met
his violent death on February 27, 2001.8 Per letter9 of Police Chief Inspector
Isidro C. Suyo, Jr. dated March 5, 2001, PO3 Ventinilla "who was tagged as
member of the dreaded GAPOS GANG was killed during the encounter with
the police elements x x x at Rodriguez, Rizal." Accordingly, the case against
PO3Ventinilla was dismissed per Order10 dated January 31, 2005.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Fernando Mandapat
(Dr.Mandapat), Dr. Valentin Bernales (Dr. Bernales), Aida Pascual (Pascual),
MacGregor Reyes (Reyes), Percelita, Sr. Insp. Edison Lopez (Lopez), Joel
Lester Valdez (Valdez) and Dr. Olga Bausa (Dr. Bausa), whose collective
testimonies established the facts of this case as hereunder summarized.
In the early morning of November 30, 1996, the victim and Reyes went to a
nearby market. Upon their return, Reyes left the victim at the latters residence
and came back at noon. He did not immediately enter the house as he noticed
several policemen strategically positioned on the premises. He saw appellant
and PO3 Ventinilla standing by the door shortly before entering the victims
house. He also saw SPO2 Dabu standing at the front gate while PO2 De Vera
was on top of the septic tank. Standing at the main door was PO2 Corpuz. To
avoid being noticed, Reyes used the alternative road and went inside the house
through the back gate. From his position, he could hear the conversation among
appellant,PO3 Ventinilla and the victim. The latter who just woke up was told to
dress up and bring his firearm as he was summoned by SPO4 Miraples to join
a police team in an operation regarding illegal drugs. After the group left the
victims residence, Reyes entered the house. While inside, he received a
telephone call from the victim telling him, "Pare wala pala kaming tatrabahuhin,
ako pala angtatrabahuhin, tulungan mo ako, sumundo ka ng tao na tutulong sa
akin." But before Reyes could say anything, the telephone conversation was cut.
Not longafter, Reyes learned that the victim died from gunshot wounds in
different parts of his body while inside the premises of Police Kababayan Center
I in Doa Ata Subdivision, Marulas, Valenzuela City.
Dr. Mandapat, the physician on duty at the time the victim was brought to the
Fatima Hospital (now Fatima Medical Center), conducted the initial postmortem
examination. He noticed that the victim had no upper clothing and shoes when
he was brought to the hospital by PO2 Corpuz. He identified the Medico-Legal

Record11 and Medico-Legal Report12 that he prepared.
Dr. Bernales, a medico-legal officer from the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), corroborated the initial medical findings of Dr. Mandapat. His autopsy
report13 indicates that the victim sustained three gunshot wounds, contusions on
the chest, subclavicular area and the forearm, lacerated wounds on the ear and
posterior axillary line, and abrasions in post aurical and anterolateral.
Lopez was the Team Leader of the Scene of the Crime Operatives which
investigated the shooting incident. The team took photographs and other
physical evidence at the crime scene some of which were disturbed and
tampered with. Lopez noticed a pool of blood leading to the door of the police
station. Six spent shells taken from the office of SPO4 Miraples were placed on
the floor by the members of the police station contingent when the team was
about to take pictures. He also noticed that the holes on the wall were not caused
by gunshots but by a concrete nail. He invited all the members of the police
station contingent to undergo paraffin examination but only appellant and PO3
Ventinilla acquiesced to be paraffin tested. Both of them were positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
Dr. Bausa, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted a
forensic examination on the blood-stained hat, face towel and T-shirt worn by
the victim and submitted by the Valenzuela police. According to her, the T-shirt
had no bullet holes on the areas where the victim was apparently shot and had
not race of blood.
Percelita testified that sometime in September 1996, the victim confided to her
that he earned the ire of his superior and fellow police officers after he
apprehended a drug pusher in Valenzuela. She likewise recalled that on
November 28, 1996, the victim told her, "Inay, ang Valenzuela ay bulok" as some
high-ranking officials were involved in a drug syndicate. The victim even told her
that some unknown persons were following him from time to time. As a result of
her sons death, she testified that she suffered moral damages and actual
damages amounting to P104,000.00. She also spent P221,000.00 as attorneys
fees.
On the other hand, the version of appellant and SPO2 Dabu as summarized by
the CA is quoted hereunder:
On November 30, 1996, at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, accusedappellant Alawig, accused PO3 Ventinilla and PO2 De Vera were dispatched by
their Precinct Commander SPO4 Miraples to ARTY Subdivision to respond to a
report involving illegal drugs. However, they were not able to proceed to the
assigned operation because SPO4 Miraples directed them to go to Gumamela
Street to investigate on a reported trouble in the area. When they arrived at the
area, the reported trouble was already over, thus, they proceeded to the house
of the victim which was also within the vicinity and also to inquire on the trouble
which occurred there. They reached the house of the victim while the latter was
playing dart with a certain Tomas Beroy. The victim invited the police officers to
get inside the house but only the accused-appellant Alawig and Ventinilla
entered. The victim admitted to them that he had a quarrel with his wife which
caused him to shoot the thermos bottle. Thereafter, the victim joined them in
reporting back to the police station in order to explain the alleged trouble that
took place in the area where he also resided. The victim brought his armalite
rifle and .45 pistol and boarded the owner-type jeep of Ventinilla. When theywere
about to leave, Ventinilla noticed that the victim was holding a plastic sachet
containing "shabu". There, Ventinilla said to the victim, "Matagal kanang
tinatrabaho ng DILG Parak ." Upon arrival at the police station, the accusedappellant Alawig went to a store to buy cigarette and, when he returned, he saw
the victim and the accused Ventinilla having a heated argument. During the
occurrence, Dabu and De Vera left the station to respond to a reported illegal
gambling while the victim and Ventinilla went inside the station.
Inside the station, the victim made a telephone call and thereafter the heated
argument between the victim and Ventinilla resumed. Alawig could seethe
events from outside the station where he was seated. He saw the victim kick his
armalite rifle and point it at Ventinilla which the latter tried to impede by holding
the end part of the weapon and pointed it upward. At the same time, Ventinilla
kicked the table towards the victim which caused the latter to fall down to his
knees. At that moment, the victim fired his armalite rifle and, in retaliation thereto,
Ventinilla shot the victim x x x several times. Thereafter,Alawig told Ventinilla to
stop, after which the latter left the scene.14
xxxx
For his part, Dabu testified that he was not among those who fetched the victim
at his house. He remained at the police station to wait for De Vera before they
would respond to a reported illegal gambling somewhere in Pasong BaleteHills.
Immediately after De Vera arrived, Dabu left the station with De Vera. They
apprehended three (3) persons in their operation and brought them to their
station. Upon their arrival at the station, Dabu learned that a shooting incident
transpired between the victim and Ventinilla while they were away. Due to the
incident, Dabu released the persons he apprehended in an illegal gambling
pursuant to an order of his superior, SPO4 Miraples.
On May 17, 2005, the RTC convicted appellant and SPO2 Dabu of murder
qualified by treachery. The RTC also considered the killing of the victim as
attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Accordingly,

they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
is hereby AFFIRMED by us with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death

imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.21
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case, finding accused

Alfredo Alawig and Enrique M. Dabu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder qualified by treachery. There being attendant in the commission of the
offense the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation without any
mitigating circumstance present, the greater penalty shall be applied (Art. 63,
par. 1, RPC). Under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
7659, the maximum penalty of the crime of Murder is death. Accordingly, both
accused Alawig and Dabu, who stand trial, are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death.
Hence, this appeal
Accused Dabu and Alawig are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of the victim, Miel Cafe, compensatory damage in the amount of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P325,000.00, moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
SO ORDERED.15
Considering, however, the failure of SPO2 Dabu to appear during the
promulgation of the Decision, the RTC issued an Order16 directing the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, SPO2 Dabu filed a Motion for
Reconsideration17 of the RTC Decision but the same was denied in an Order18
dated October 25,2005.
SPO2 Dabu then filed with the CA a Compliance (With Omnibus Motionto (a)
Give Due Course to the Appeal, (b) Lift and Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and (c)
Allow Accused to Post Bail.19 However, in a Resolution20 dated March22, 2006,
the CA denied due course to SPO2 Dabus appeal. Hence, the CAs disposition
was limited to the appeal interposed by appellant.
The CA agreed with the factual presentation of the prosecution and discredited
the version of the defense. On November 3, 2008, the CA promulgated its
Decision affirming the RTC Decision but reduced the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, in Manila rendered on May 17, 2005 in Criminal
Case No. 99-170722 finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder
Issues
In his Brief22 appellant contends that in affirming his conviction, the CA
1. X X X ERRED IN ITS FACTUAL FINDING THAT
[APPELLANT]CLAIMED SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE
SHOWING THATHIS DEFENSE WAS TOTAL DENIAL.
2. X X X ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE FOLLOWING
ISSUESRAISED TO IT ON APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT, TO
WIT:
A. WHETHER X X X THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDINGTHAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT WAS
PROVENBEYOND
REASONABLE
DOUBT
BASED
ONCIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
i. WHETHER X X X THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULINGTHAT
THERE
EXISTS
SUFFICIENT
CIRCUMSTANTIALEVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT
THE APPELLANT CONSPIRED IN KILLING THE
VICTIM
ii. WHETHER X X X THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULINGTHAT THERE WAS MOTIVE ON THE PART
OF THE APPELLANT
3.
X
X
X
ERRED
IN
APPRECIATING
QUALIFYINGCIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
THE
4.
X
X
X
ERRED
IN
APPRECIATING
THE
AGGRAVATINGCIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
5. X X X ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER
XX X THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING FLIGHT ONTHE
PART OF APPELLANT.23
Self-defense
Appellant faults the CA when it imposed on him the burden of proving the
elements of self-defense. He claims it was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in selfdefense and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the latter to establish such fact.
He avers that his defense is denial as found by the trial court.
Obviously, appellant was confused. It must be noted that he was the only
witness who testified on the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of the
victim. It was he who supplied the necessary evidence showing that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding
of Dr. Bernales that there are more than one assailant in view of the multiple
bullet wounds on the body of the victim, appellant insists it was only PO3
Ventinilla who killed the victim. However, neither PO3 Ventinilla nor the victim
could be resurrected from their graves to controvert appellants version of the
story.
Besides, it has not escaped our attention that in the Counter-Affidavit24 of SPO4
Miraples, appellants co-accused, he stated therein that appellant acted in selfdefense when the victim allegedly went berserk.25 More important, in his
Answer26 to the administrative complaint filed by the victims widow, appellant
interposed self-defense by alleging that it was the victim who initiated the attack
through unlawful aggression.
Hence, the CA committed no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving
the elements of self-defense.
At any rate, appellants claim of self-defense deserves no credence at all. Aside
from the fact that the defense presented absolutely no credible evidence to
establish self-defense, this was belied by appellants assertion that he was
outside the police station premises when the victim was killed. But even the
appellants denial equally deserves scant consideration. The physical evidence
presented by the prosecution put appellant in the crime scene. He tested positive
for gunpowder nitrates which proved that he fired his firearm. Dr. Bernales also
testified that the victim was killed by more than one assailant. Clearly, appellant
was with PO3Ventinilla when the victim was killed.
Circumstantial evidence
Appellant also claims that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was not sufficient to convict him. He argues that the prosecution
failed to establish an unbroken chain of events that showed his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, he is entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
We find the contention unconvincing.

Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime.
But jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix
from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on
evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt.27 Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly
proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the
evidence established."28
In this case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly synthesized the
circumstances constituting circumstantial evidence as culled from the entire
testimony of Reyes, the prosecutions key witness, to wit:
1. Around x x x noon of November 30, 1996, Reyes saw appellant and
the late PO3 x x x Ventinilla enter the house of the victim after the latters
friend Tomas Beroy, opened the door upon the instruction of the victim;
2. Reyes saw appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla carrying an armalite rifle
and [a] .38 caliber pistol;
3. Reyes heard appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla tell the victim that he was
being instructed by SPO4 x x x Miraples, the Chief of Police of Police
Kababayan Center I, Doa Ata Subdivision Station, Marulas,
Valenzuela, to join a team of police which will apprehend a big person x
x x involved in illegal drugs in Malanday, Valenzuela;
4. Because of the alleged instruction of the victims superior, Reyes saw
the victim leave his house together with appellant and PO3 Ventinilla
around 1:00 p.m. of November 30, 1996;
5. A few minutes thereafter, Reyes received a telephone call from the
victim who nervously told him, "Pare wala pala kaming tatrabahuhin, ako
palaang tatrabahuhin. Tulungan mo ako sumundo ka ng tao na tutulong
sa akin."But before Reyes could respond, the line at the other end of the
telephone wassuddenly cut x x x; and
6. Later in the afternoon, Reyes learned from his friend that the victim
was already dead.29
The prosecution likewise presented corroborating evidence which constitute an
unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that appellant is guilty of
killing the victim. For instance, the presence of gunpowder nitrates on appellant
after a paraffin test;30 the firearm used in the killing which could either be a .38
caliber or 9 mm pistol31 dovetails with the testimony of Reyes that he saw
appellant carrying a .38 caliber short firearm which was later found to have been
recently fired; and the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the victim
after a paraffin test32 which belies appellants claim that he was shot by the victim
or that the latter exchanged fire with PO3 Ventinilla.
"Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more
than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are
proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."33 All the foregoing elements were
sufficiently established in this case.
Conspiracy
"Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code [RPC], there is conspiracy if two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It must be
proven during trial with the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of
the agreement of the parties either by direct or circumstantial evidence of the
conspirators conduct before, during and after the commission of the felony to
achieve a common design or purpose."34
We affirm the findings of the RTC that all of the accused conspired to commit
the crime, viz:
x x x In the case at bar, the record of the case is enmeshed withvarious acts of
the accused, before, during, and after the killing of Cafe that are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Before the
victim was fetched by Alawig, Ventinilla, Dabu, de Vera and Corpuz, as
witnessed by Reyes, accused made it appear in Exh. "KK-1" that on November
30, 1996 at 2:45 p.m., accused Alawig, Ventinilla, de Vera, Corpuz and a certain
Cario who is not a member of PKC-1 and without including accused Dabu, they
were dispatched to an unnamed place to conduct surveillance on a suspect
involved in drugs. A cursory reading of said entry presupposes that said accused
were already dispatched at the place at 2:45 p.m. Although it appears strange
that the subject area and the subject person are not specified in the entry
contrary to the standard practices in making entry in a Dispatch Log Book,
accused Alawig, however, when confronted with the said entry during the trial,
had a different tale to tell. He claims that another instruction was made by their
Police Precinct Commander, co-accused Ponciano Miraples, to proceed instead
to Gumamela Street where there was a reported trouble. Thus, his group
according to him proceeded to Gumamela St. at 1:00oclock p.m. on the said
date but said change of dispatch was not recorded in the Dispatch Log Book of
the PKC-1.Interestingly, the court finds the version of Alawig incredible. For how
can a later dispatch instruction (2:45 p.m. dispatch) be changed by another
instruction that occurred earlier (1:00 p.m. dispatch to Gumamela St. per
accused Alawig) than the first? The Court likewise notes the entry on Exh. "LL-
1". The same is a clear indication of orchestrating the purported activities of the
accused on the day of the killing of the victim. Accused entered in the police
blotter at 3:00 p.m. about a call regarding a trouble in Gumamela St. to which
the group of Alawig according to him responded. If indeed they were dispatched
to the said place at1:00 p.m., how then could it be possible, when the call about
the reported incident happened at 3:00 p.m.? To the Courts mind, the latter
entry (Exh. "LL-1") further strengthen the theory of the prosecution that the police
operation before and after the killing of the victim, which the accused want to
dramatize are nothing but falsehood and are part of the grand design where
each of the accused are made to appear doing acts that are independent of each
other in order to muddle the events that actually transpired when Cafe was killed.
Moreover, the Court also observes that the alleged call claimed by Dabu to have
been received by accused Miraples on the same day at 3:20 p.m. about people
playing tong-its was not recorded in the PKC-1 Police Blotter (Exh. "LL").
Strangely, it was the dispatch for the purpose that was recorded in the Dispatch
Log Book (Exh. "8-A", Dabu) at a very precise time at3:28 p.m., November 30,
1996 by accused de Vera. How then can accused de Vera record such dispatch
when according to Alawig upon their arrival at the PKC-1 from Gumamela St.,
accused Dabu and de Vera immediately left without the latter entering the police
precinct? It is also noted that such entry (Exh."8-A") has signs of peculiarity from
the rest of the entries in the Dispatch Log Book. The time written was precise up
to the last minute (3:28 p.m.) unlike the other entries the time is rounded-off to
3:25 or 3:30. Also, the time is written in bold stroke. Compared with the other
entries, the same bears signs of alterations. Such entry therefore supports the
view that there was actually no dispatch made to Pasong Balete Hills. The
alleged arrest of three (3) people playing tong-its in the area never happened
there being no such entry in the PKC-1 Police Blotter. Gleaned from the
foregoing, every entry made in there cord books could not be accomplished by
just one or two accused without the concurrence of the rest of the accused
assigned at the PKC-1 and the imprimatur of the Police Precinct Commander,
accused Ponciano Miraples.
After the victim was brought to the PKC-1, accused Alawig tried to make the
Court [believe] that his co-accused Ventinilla, who is already deceased, was the
sole perpetrator in killing Cafe, exculpating himself and the rest of the accused.
The version of Alawig, however, is [diametrically at odds with the conclusion of]
Dr. Bernales of the NBI that there were more than one assailant in slaying Cafe.
From the evidence adduced by the defense, there is no iota of credible evidence
to show that one or two accused at least attempted to prevent the slaying of
Cafe. To the Courts mind, there was indeed a concurrence of sentiments among
the accused for the attainment of evil purpose.
The joint purpose and concurrence of sentiments among the accused is further
demonstrated when accused Alawig again tried to mislead the Court in claiming
that it was he who brought the victim to the hospital after being shot when in
truth and in fact as shown in Exh. "A", it was his co-accused Vivencio Corpuz
who brought the victim to the hospital. The most outrageous act done by the
accused, as police officers, was when they tampered with the evidence to coverup the crime while the team of P/Insp. Lopez was still conducting investigation
in thePKC-1 premises. The accused placed six (6) spent ammunition cartridges
coming from the office of accused Miraples that were not initially found lying on
the floor. Likewise, they submitted a T-shirt (Exh. "OO") allegedly worn by the
victim at the time of the shooting for forensic examination. It was found out,
however, by Dr. Bausa that despite the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim,
the submitted T-shirt does not bear a single bullet hole that would match the
location of any of the gunshot wounds in the body of Cafe. To top it all, the
accused failed to record the killing of Cafe in the PKC-1 police blotter, which
should have been done as a matter of standard operating procedure.
In light of the foregoing, it is inescapable to conclude that conspiracy is attendant
in the commission of the offense. Thus, the guilt of one is the guilt of all and the
accused are equally liable for the offense committed.35
Thus, by manipulating the entries in the logbook, the accused conspired to make
it appear that they were in some place other than where the killing took place
and that they were performing acts independent of each other. The entries were
recorded with the concurrence of all the accused. With PO3 Ventinilla dead,
appellant painted him as the sole perpetrator and tried to exculpate himself and
the rest of the accused. Records also show that none of the accused attempted
to prevent the killing of the victim. More telling is their act of placing six empty
cartridges at the crime scene to make it appear that the victim fired his firearm
and was the unlawful aggressor. As borne out by the Firearms Identification
Report No. FAID-212-96:36
the two cartridges were fired from an M16 rifle with Serial No. RP154135; two
other cartridges were fired using an M16 rifle with Serial No.RP144440; while
the last two cartridges were fired from an M16 rifle with Serial No. RP138254.
Per the Initial Investigation Report37 of SPO1 Angeles I. Miranda, the M16 rifle
with Serial No. RP144440 belonged to appellant as well as a 0.38 caliber
revolver with Serial No. BBW4740; the M16 rifle with Serial No.RP154135 and
the 0.38 caliber revolver with Serial No. AUS1926 belonged toPO3 Ventinilla;
while the M16 rifle with Serial No. RP138254 and 0.45 caliber pistol with Serial
No. 162457 belonged to the victim. Significantly, the Physical Sciences Report
No. 0-552-9638 indicated that all the aforementioned firearms were fired.
However, as already mentioned, the victim tested negative for gunpowder
nitrates hence the possibility that he fired his weapons is remote. Besides, as
already testified to by Dr. Bernales, the possible firearm used could be caliber
0.38 of which both the appellant and PO3 Ventinilla were equipped at the time
the victim was killed.
Finally, the accused presented a T-shirt allegedly worn by the victim which,
however, did not bear any holes compatible to the gunshot wounds sustained
by the victim. In fact, Dr. Bausa testified that the T-shirt did not even contain
traces of human blood.
All these taken together suffice to show that appellant conspired with the other
accused in the killing of the victim. There is evidence that the accused performed
specific acts in the furtherance of the conspiracy to kill the victim as well as to
cover-up the same. The evidence is adequate to establish unity of purpose at
the time of the commission of the offense and unity in its execution.
Treachery
Appellant disputes the CAs finding affirming that of the RTC that treachery
attended the commission of the crime as shown by the medical evidence
submitted by the NBI. The CA found that the location of the wounds and the
victims stooping or kneeling position coincide with the concept of treachery
regarding the means or modes of execution tending to insure their execution
without risk to the perpetrators. The latter reflected on the means they adopted
in killing the victim while he was not given sufficient time to defend himself from
the attack."
For treachery to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that: a)the
malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure
his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and b) the
said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately adopted."39
"The circumstances surrounding the killing must be proved as indubitably as the
crime itself."40 Treachery cannot be presumed.
We agree with the RTC finding as affirmed by the CA that treachery attended
the killing. The Medico-Legal Record41 showed that the victim sustained two
puncture wounds at his lower neck and three gunshot wounds. The Autopsy
Report42 also showed that the victim had contusion on his chest, upper quadrant
and contused-abrasion on his left forearm. As regards the gunshot wounds, the
prosecution was able to establish that the same were inflicted by more than one
assailant using three different firearms in view of their size and location. On
September 10, 1997, SA Danielito Q. Lalusis of the NBI requested Dr. Bernales
to enlighten them on the following: "(1) What was the relative position of the
victim when he was fired upon by the assailants?; (2) What was the relative
position of the assailants when they fired at the victim?; (3) What could have
been the distance of the firearms of the assailants to the victim?; (4) How many
firearms could have been used in killing the victim?; and (5) What was the
trajectory of the bullets that hit the body of the victim?"43
In compliance with the directive, Dr. Bernales opined that:
THE APPROXIMATE RELATIVE POSITION OF THEVICTIM AND THE

ASSAILANT.
In determining the relative positions, we assumed that both are standing, in
anatomical position and that, the assailant is a right-handed person.
In gunshot wound No. (1), based on the trajectory of the projectile from the
entrance wound to the exit wound, which was BACKWARD, DOWNWARD AND
LATERALLY; the assailant and the victim are both facing each other, with the
assailant positioned more to the left side of the victim and that, he could be on
a stooping position or the assailant is taller and/or positioned in a higher level.
In gunshot wound No. (2), based on the trajectory of the projectiles, from the
entrance wound to exit wound, which was MEDIALLY, SLIGHTLY FORWARD
AND DOWNWARD; the assailant is at the left side and more to the back of the
victim, with the victim leaning to the left or the assailant is positioned on a higher
level.
In gunshot wound No. (3), based on the trajectory of the projectile, from the
entrance wound to exit wound, which was MEDIALLY, DOWNWARD AND
SLIGHTLYBACKWARD; the assailant is at the right side of the victim with the
assailant positioned on a higher level.
THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE BETWEEN THEVICTIM AND THE MUZZLE
OF THE GUN.
Based on negative findings of any products of explosion of a bullet, with
exception of the projectile, the approximate distance could be more than one (1)
foot, to a small firearm and more than two (2) to three (3) feet, to a high powered
firearm.
THE POSSIBLE CALIBER OF FIREARM USED INKILLING THE VICTIM,
Based on the sizes of the entrance wounds, the possible caliber used could be
caliber 32 to 38, including 9 mm. caliber pistol.
The trajectory of the bullet that hit the body of the victim was already mentioned
in the above paragraph relative to the positions of the victims and the assailant.44
Considering the contusions, abrasions, and puncture wounds sustained by the
victim, it is clear that he was first manhandled prior to the shooting. The location
of the gunshot wounds likewise is indicative of the relative positions of the
assailants vis--vis the victim. As noted by Dr. Bernales, the first assailant was
facing the victim but more to his left; the second assailant was at the left side but
more at the back of the victim; while the third assailant was at the right side of
the victim. More importantly, the assailants were positioned on a higher level
than the victim which could mean that the victim was in a kneeling or stooping
position. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, "based on the nature and
location of the wounds sustained, the victim definitely would not be able to put
up any defense even if he was armed with armalite rifle and caliber .45 at the
time. This explains why he was found negative of gunpowder nitrate in both
hands x x x when he was killed. He was not able to fire his gun to defend himself.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that the attack on the victim was
perpetrated with alevosia, hence, qualifying the killing to murder."45
Evident Premeditation
In order "for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an
overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and, (3)
sufficient lapse of time between [such a determination and the actual execution
to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act."46
In this case, the courts below based their finding of evident premeditation on the
entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged pretense made by the appellant and
cohorts that they were going to conduct a police operation regarding illegal
drugs, as well as the telephone call made by the victim to his friend Reyes before
the incident. To our mind, however, these circumstances do not constitute clear
and positive evidence of outward acts showing a premeditation to kill. At most,
these circumstances are indicative only of conspiracy among the accused.
Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was
hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered.47 "It must appear not only that the accused
decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that
this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent
attempt."48 Notably, even the OSG admitted that the lapse of time from the
moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient
for appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Flight
The trial court properly disregarded appellants non-flight. While it has been ruled
that an accuseds decision not to flee after the crime despite an opportunity to
do so is not characteristic of a guilty person, the opposite has also been upheld
in some cases. Appellant may not have indeed fled from the scene of the crime
as he even allowed himself to be subjected to paraffin test, but the same are not
necessarily indicative of a clear conscience. "Non-flight is not proof of
innocence" as ruled in People v. Del Castillo.49 Thus, the fact that appellant did
not flee may be a badge of innocence, nevertheless, it is not a sufficient ground
to exculpate him from his proven criminal liability.
The Crime Committed and The

Imposable Penalty
the loss of earning capacity of the victim who died at the age of 31 would
beP1,445,990.00 computed as: 2/3 x (80-31) x (P88,530.00 P44,265.00).
In view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is

murder. In the absence of any attendant circumstance, appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with
Article248 in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the RPC. He is not eligible for
parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, Section 3.
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest at the rate of 6%

per annum on all damages awarded from date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.56
The Civil Liability

In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. This is given without need of proof
other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of appellants
responsibility for it.50
We also affirm the grant of P50,000.00 as moral damages. This is "mandatory
in cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof other than
the death of the victim."51
In addition, we sustain the award of actual damages but only to the amount of
P103,472.00 representing expenses incurred during the wake of the victim
supported by uncontroverted receipts. "Credence can be given only to claims
which are duly supported by receipts or other credible evidence."52
We also sustain the award of exemplary damages but in the increased amount
of P30,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.53
We note, however, that no indemnity for loss of earning capacity was awarded
to the heirs of the victim as a consequence of his untimely death. Under Article
2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of
earning capacity. The evidence54 shows that the victims annual gross income
as a police officer was P88,530.00 computed from his monthly rate of P7,377.50.
There being no proof of his living expenses, the net income is deemed
equivalent to 50% of the gross income, hence, his estimated annual net income
isP44,265.00. As computed on the basis of the usual formula adopted by the
Court in cases similarly awarding compensation for loss of earning to wit:
Net Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income Living
Expenses
= [2/3 (80-age of death)] x (GAI) 50% of GAI)55
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 3,2008

which affirmed with modification the May 17, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 11, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder is further
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant SPO1 Alfredo Alawig is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; to pay the heirs of the victim
PO3 Miel de Ocampo Cafe the amount of P103,472.00 as actual damages;
P1,445,990.00 as indemnity for the victims loss of earning capacity and to pay
the costs of suit. The award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00
while the awards of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages stand. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgement until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 172707
October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y
Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul
Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman
Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian
Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under
the criminal information3 which reads:
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 oclock in the evening at No. 118 FB
Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named-accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
and grouping themselves together, did then and there by force and intimidation,
and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the
purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a
condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount
and such other amounts as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish
deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime
in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as
Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chans residence at FB Harrison St.,
Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly
placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport,
the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion
identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she
was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the
fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them to the
airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen
and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large,
returned to Chans residence that evening. Chans houseboy ushered them in
and Chan met them by the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of
Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chans son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house
companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried
to stop the man by grabbing his mothers feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed
his gun at Levys head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chans feet.8 Levy
thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two
hours, the group stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman
(Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth.
Chan was ordered to go with two women,11 later identified in court by Chan as
appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad).12 Chan was brought
inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad,
Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened
Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the
"Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and
the group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house.
Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as
Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman,
later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 oclock
in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao),
entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa
pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim),
ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their
boss to ask her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her
son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the P75,
000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chans son and
negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mothers release. It was
agreed upon that Levy was to deliver P400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant
at Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector
Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation
regarding the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and
demanded for ransom in exchange for Chans release.21 During their
surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victims residence. The
inspectors observed that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the
second floor of the house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until
Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort and stopped in
front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage was
the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received
information that the abductors acceded to a P400,000.00 ransom money to be
delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am.
Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and strategically
positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a
light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the
ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The
surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later
identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also
able to recover the P400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 oclock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted
Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of
seven of her abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol,
Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim
manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The
presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea, stating:
"It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and
enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it
has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you
to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the
presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences
of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea of
guilty?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred
with them and explained to each of them the consequences of a change of plea,
their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately asked
each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing

their pleas. All of them answered in the affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman
manifested his desire to change his plea and assured the trial court that he
understood the consequences of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial
court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the trial court
directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim,
Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and
Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications
the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL
GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH,
TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon
each of them the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17
years old at the time of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 005-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly
ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants in
their respective briefs, supplemental briefs and manifestations will be discussed
collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that
the witness, Chan, was not able to positively identify them because of her failing
eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA
found Chans testimony credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she
positively identified the accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she
could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact, the participation
of these accused-appellants was further established through the testimonies of
the other prosecution witnesses.
shows that on 7 October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of

"not guilty" and were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty"
to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v.
Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to
a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of
witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its
observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless,
through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
been considered.31 In People v. Taedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate
the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed that the briefs
submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting
in relevant particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the
findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We
also find her argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven
people apprehended when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00
oclock in the morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the positive identification of
Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate evidence working against her defense
of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants
proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail
over the witnesses positive identification of the accused-appellants, more so
where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant
testimonies of witnesses and the absence of evidence other than mere denial
proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of the
lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records36
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of

the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care
where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the
reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial
purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where
grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the
meaning, significance and consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review
in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of
guilt was based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on
the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences
of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines
provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must
conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should
be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the

custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judges intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences
of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not
infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon
bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of
the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain
to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of
the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his
right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime
or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully
complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure
that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact,
it is readily apparent from the records43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption
that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge
and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate
the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not
warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and
indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. The trial court judges seemingly annoyed statement
that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For
accused Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this court that he be allowed to
be re-arraigned Your Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as
charged but the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You
plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no
condition attached. We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the
penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenians, were improvidently made,
this Court will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial
court judges shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-appellants
culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis
of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be
sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on
evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.45 The manner by
which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence
proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants assertions, they were convicted by the trial

court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court.47
The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their
degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs
that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly
established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of
those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector
Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the fact
that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom
money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at
the cottage during the rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector
Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people apprehended
when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49
Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that
Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue
operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every
act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each
of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.52
Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-appellants and placed all of
them at the crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit
it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy
need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective
conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission
of the offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common
purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its execution
from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the
incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house;
(2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the
victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the ransom
money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao,
Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable
doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenians Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Courts attention to the
manifestation made by the prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting,
insofar as she was concerned.55 However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in
Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any disposition of the
case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so in this
case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers
and lied several times under oath during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about
substantial details such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she
saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several times,
Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the other
accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom
she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore,
that there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was
there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of the unlawful
act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient
evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence
the prosecution had was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August
1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed
with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court
opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only
as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered
an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal
liability.1wphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it
was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the
criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room.
A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and would have
reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet;
and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held
before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being
committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellants presence and
company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the
kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.62 Moreover,
this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was
stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered
as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
considering the evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accusedappellants participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their
guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom and
imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the
penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian.
Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she
acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian
acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the commission
of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting
circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from
the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the
suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the
law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This leaves the Court
with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since
this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code
shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant
to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the
commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the
penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion
Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the
penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law
(Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the maximum
imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the
maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent
any aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance.
Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenians possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other
training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in
People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of
the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that
Perpenians actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for
her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the
documentary evidence offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the
real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved
of all personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his death72 having
occurred before rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission
of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted
were held liable for P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages,
where, as in this case, the penalty for the crime committed is death which,
however, cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have
suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public

good.
the penalty imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any
other lawful causes.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is
the penalty warranted by the facts but is not imposable under present law.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the

Director of the Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The
Director of the Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the action he has taken
thereon.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive on the

apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire
amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their
liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each
principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount
of indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an
accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them
shall be liable for the total amount of P300,000.00 divided among the principals
who shall be liable for P288,000.00 (or P32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who
shall be liable for P12,000.00. This is broken down into P10,666.67 civil
indemnity, P10,666.67 moral damages and P10,666.67 exemplary damages for
each principal; and P4,000.00 civil indemnity, P4,000.00 moral damages and
P4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CRH.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accusedappellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accusedappellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in the amounts of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the crime shall
jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of P288,000.00 while the
accomplice shall pay the victim P12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code on several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release
THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 194582
November 27, 2013

vs.
ALLAN NIEGAS y FALLORE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
This is an appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in
toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 209, of
Mandaluyong City finding accused-appellant Allan Niegas y Fallore guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
The Information dated February 17, 2003 charging accused-appellant Nie gas
states:
That on or about the 9th day of December 2002, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together with one (1) alias Obet,
one (1) alias Jun and three (3) John Does whose true identities and whereabouts
are unknown, and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, detain or deprive of their liberty JAMES
AUGUSTO T. MANIKIS and MILA ROSE N. FERNANDEZ for the purpose of
extorting ransom from Augusto Alejandro Manikis, Jr., the father of James
Augusto T. Manikis.4
The prosecutions version of the events, based on witnesses testimonies, can
be summed as follows:
Mila Rose Fernandez (Fernandez) worked for Augusto Manikis, Jr. (Augusto) as
the nanny of his son, James Augusto Manikis (James). She testified that on
December 9, 2002, at around 7:30 in the morning, she took James, who was
then crying, outside the house. She saw Augustos driver, accused-appellant
Niegas, who offered to take them to Jollibee at the Maysilo Circle to pacify the
child.5 They used Augustos car, a brown Toyota Revo with plate number WLK
755.6
From Jollibee, Fernandez thought that accused-appellant Niegas was driving
them home. However, accused-appellant Niegas kept on driving and only
stopped to allow an unknown man to board the vehicle. She told accusedappellant Niegas to take them home, warning him that the childs grandmother
might get angry. The unknown man, however, insisted that accused-appellant
Niegas take them to Barangka where he would alight, and accused-appellant

Niegas complied.7
Two other unknown men boarded the vehicle and sat to the left and right of
Fernandez. At Boni Avenue, she was forced to wear covered shades so she
could not see anything. They drove for around four hours, and apparently got
lost somewhere in Calamba, Laguna. She heard the unknown men asking for
directions to go to a place called Larang.8
They later reached their destination. Accused-appellant Niegas took her and
James inside the concrete house. She and James were held inside a room and
were told by accused-appellant Niegas that she should follow their instructions
if she wanted to go home alive.9
During the eleven days when she and James were missing, there were times
when she tried to escape. She attempted to run, but accused-appellant Niegas
caught her and pushed her towards the room. When she tried to shout upon
seeing an old person, accused-appellant Niegas told her that he will kill her if
she does that.10 She identified accused-appellant Niegas in court, and said that
she would recognize the other kidnappers should she see them again.
Augusto testified that his son, James, who was six years old at the time of the
testimony, was around one and a half to two years old at the time he was
kidnapped. Accused-appellant Niegas was his personal driver for less than a
year. He recalled seeing James crying in the morning of December 9, 2002. He
instructed Fernandez to buy pandesal at the bakery and for her to ask accusedappellant Niegas to accompany them. They left on board his brown Toyota Revo
with plate number WLK 755.11
Augusto expected them to be back in around fifteen minutes. When they were
not yet home at 10:00 a.m., he thought they might have encountered an accident
and searched for them in vulcanizing shops and even at the nearest hospital.
He then went to the police station to ask for help. While he was at the police
station, he was informed through his cellular phone that someone called their
home landline and asked for him and his wife.12
Augusto went home. At around 4:00 p.m., a caller informed him that his son was
under his custody. The caller demanded that he produce Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00).13
Augusto sought the help of his relative, Colonel Molina, who referred him to the
Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) for assistance. During
meetings with the PACER, he was instructed to secure a safe house in order to
prevent the kidnappers from monitoring their operation.14
The kidnappers continued to call Augusto around twice a day, asking about the
money demanded by them. He told them each time that he and his family were
still raising the money. After about ten days, Augusto told them that he was able
to raise One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,700,000.00). The
kidnappers settled for this amount and agreed to meet with Augusto. Initially,
Augusto was supposed to bring the money to Tagaytay City. The meeting place
was later changed to Marikina City. The kidnappers, noticing that there were
police officers following Augusto, postponed the delivery of the money.15
On December 19, 2002, Augusto was told to go to the Sta. Mesa train station at
6:00 p.m. He used his motorcycle to go to Sta. Mesa, and, as always, the police
officers followed him. Upon arriving at the station, the kidnappers instructed him
through his cellular phone to walk through the rails until it was dark. He complied.
He proceeded to a basketball court. A short man approached him and told him
to give the bag and his cellular phone. He was then instructed to wait for further
information as to when he can see his son.16
Augusto was fetched by his brother at a mini store. The following day, on
December 20, 2002, at around 7:00 p.m., he was informed by the negotiator of
the kidnappers that he could meet his son and Fernandez at the Metropolis Mall.
He went to said mall with the help of his brother-in-law, and found James and
Fernandez at the parking lot of the jeepney station.17
Augusto never saw accused-appellant Niegas since the kidnapping incident.
Fernandez told Augusto that accused-appellant Niegas was one of the
kidnappers who took them somewhere in Laguna, and that when she asked
accused-appellant Niegas to help them escape, he punched her stomach.
Augusto filed a criminal complaint against accused-appellant Niegas in
Mandaluyong City. He thereafter learned that accused-appellant Niegas was
arrested one year later and was told that the person who organized the crime
was the father of accused-appellant Niegass girlfriend.18
Augusto further testified that the incident inculcated fear and paranoia in him and
his family. They hired security guards, and felt fear whenever their security
guards were not around. He does not allow his son to go outside their house
alone. The public prosecutor manifested at this point of his testimony that the
witness was teary eyed and can hardly talk.19
The parties agreed to dispense with the presentation of prosecution witnesses
Police Officer (PO) 3 Erma Jabal and PCI Rolan Magno after the defense agreed
to admit the affidavits and/or documents prepared and signed by these officers
upon the admission of the prosecution that said officers had no personal
knowledge of the alleged kidnapping incident.20
Only accused-appellant Niegas was presented for the defense. He testified that
he was washing the car of his employer, Augusto, when Fernandez approached
him and told him to buy pandesal. He initially suggested to Fernandez that she
walk to a nearby bakery, but Fernandez insisted that they buy at Pugon de
Manila. He drove Fernandez and James to Pugon de Manila using his
employers Toyota Revo. When they reached the place, Fernandez gave him
money and asked him to buy the pandesal. However, when he alighted from the
vehicle, a man approached and poked a gun at him. The mans four companions
entered the vehicle. Two of them flanked him, while the other two flanked
Fernandez and James at the back seat.21
Accused-appellant Niegas resisted the unknown men and inquired about their
intentions. The latter replied that they were arresting him and taking him to the
precinct. He and Fernandez were blindfolded and forced to lie down. They were
detained for several days, until they were released at Susana Heights. He lost
count of how many days they were detained. Since he was still afraid and was
threatened by the men who kidnapped them, he refused to go with Fernandez
back to Augustos home. He instead went home to his province in Leyte.22
Accused-appellant Niegas claims that he never asked for ransom money from
Augusto.1wphi1 He did not report the incident to the police because he cannot
identify the men who kidnapped them. He cannot contact Augusto because his
wallet was taken during the kidnapping.23
On June 26, 2008, the RTC of Mandaluyong City rendered its Decision finding
accused-appellant Niegas guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The
dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused ALLAN
NIEGAS y FALLORE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom and is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the victims
JAMES AUGUSTO T. MANIKIS and MILA ROSE N. FERNANDEZ the amounts
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) each as moral damages and
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) each as exemplary damages.24
The trial court held that Fernandezs narration of the kidnapping was
straightforward, spontaneous, and contained such details which could not have
been the result of a deliberate afterthought. The trial court noted that her
description of the interior of the house was eventually confirmed by the PACER
when they conducted a backtracking operation. This backtracking operation was
part of the testimony of PO3 Erma Jabal which was stipulated upon by the
parties. The elements of the crime of kidnapping were thus sufficiently
established by the testimony of Fernandez, while the extortion of ransom was
established by the testimony of Augusto.25
On June 25, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
According to the appellate court, Fernandezs identification of accused-appellant
Niegas was positive and unequivocal. Furthermore, there was no evidence of ill
motive on the part of either Fernandez or Augusto, making their respective
testimonies worthy of full faith and credit. The Court of Appeals likewise noted
that accused-appellant Niegas deliberately fled and went home to his province
where he was apprehended. Accused-appellant Niegass one-year flight is
further evidence of his guilt.26
Hence, the defense filed this appeal, where accused-appellant Niegas adopts
the Brief he submitted to the Court of Appeals containing the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS CRIMINAL CULPABILITY.27
In People v. Pagalasan,28 this Court synthesized the applicable provision and
elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when

the accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. (As amended by RA No. 7659).
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping
must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a
minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is immaterial.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim
under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof
of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or
knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent.
(Citations omitted.)
Accused-appellant Niegas contends that the narration by Fernandez does not
show that he kidnapped Fernandez and James. He highlights the statements by
Fernandez on cross-examination that (1) he did not force Fernandez to ride with
him, and he did not poke a gun at her; (2) he did not ask for money from Augusto;
(3) neither he nor the other persons who boarded the vehicle told Fernandez
that "this is a kidnap"; (4) Fernandez was not tied or struck by him while they
were going to Calamba; and (5) he did not molest Fernandez or hurt James.29
Accused-appellant Niegas further points out that, as confirmed by Augusto in his
testimony, it was not him who demanded or received the ransom money.30
Accused-appellant Niegass contentions are bereft of merit.
The testimonies of Fernandez and Augusto, which were believed by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, clearly attribute all the elements of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention to accused-appellant Niegas and his
companions, collectively. Specifically, Fernandezs and Augustos testimonies
proved that the offenders detained Fernandez, a female, and James, a minor,
for more than three days, for the purpose of extorting ransom. The mere
circumstance that accused-appellant Niegas did not personally perform all the
acts necessary to consummate the crime is irrelevant when conspiracy is
proven, since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.31
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.32 While it is mandatory to
prove it by competent evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy
it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.33 On this point, accused-appellant Niegas argues that mere driving and
allowing other men to board their vehicle are not sufficient to establish
conspiracy.34 The records, however, reveal otherwise. Accused-appellant
Niegass acts unequivocally show that he was complicit in the joint purpose and
design of the kidnapping of Fernandez and James:
1. Instead of driving Fernandez and James home, accused-appellant
Niegas kept on driving and only stopped to allow an unknown man to
board the vehicle. He later let several other men to board;
2. When they reached their destination, it was accused-appellant Niegas
himself who took Fernandez and James into the concrete house.
Accused-appellant Niegas told them that she should follow their
instructions if she wants to go home alive;
3. When Fernandez attempted to escape, it was accused-appellant
Niegas who caught her and pushed her towards the room;
4. When Fernandez tried to shout upon seeing an old person, accusedappellant Niegas told her he will kill her if she does that.
Moreover, after the incident, accused-appellant Niegas did not report what
happened to the authorities or even try to contact Augusto to explain his alleged
non-participation in the incident. Instead, he went home to his province and it
took the authorities one year to apprehend him. Accused-appellant Niegass
excuse that he lost his wallet and therefore cannot contact Augusto is absurd,
as it is inconceivable for someones personal driver for at least half a year to
simply forget the address of his employer or to fail to communicate with the latter
in some way and seek permission to return to the province if he is indeed
innocent. We have held on several occasions that the flight of an accused is

competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked
flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.35
As stated above, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the
testimonies of Fernandez and Augusto to be straightforward and credible. The
records are likewise devoid of any evidence to show that either Fernandez or
Augusto had any ill motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant Niegas.
We have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially
those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record. Since it was the trial court that was able
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, it is consequently in a better position
to determine which of the witnesses are telling the truth.36
In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to reverse the Decisions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals finding accused-appellant Niegas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
trial court likewise correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. While the
penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code is death, Republic Act No. 9346 has proscribed the
imposition of death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion
perpetua.
The trial court awarded each victim One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each
as exemplary damages. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the moral damages
awarded to James is increased to P200,000.00 considering his minority,37 and
the exemplary damages awarded to both victims is increased to P100,000.00.38
Accused-appellant Niegas is likewise rendered additionally liable for
P100,000.00 in civil indemnity to both victims.39
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of
accused-appellant Allan Niegas y Fallore is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The moral damages awarded to James Augusto T. Manikis is
INCREASED from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00;
2. The exemplary damages each awarded to James Augusto T. Manikis
and Mila Rose Fernandez are both INCREASED to P100,000.00;
3. Accused-appellant Allan Niegas Fallore is likewise ORDERED to pay
James Augusto T. Manikis and Mila Rose Fernandez P100,000.00 each
as civil indemnity;
4. Accused-appellant Allan Niegas Fallore is likewise ORDERED to pay

James Augusto T. Manikis and Mila Rose F emandez interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of damages
awarded commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 201445
November 27, 2013

vs.
HERMENIGILDO MAGLENTE y MEDINA alias "JUN MAGLENTE" and
ROLANDO VELASQUEZ y GUEVARRA alias "RANDY," AccusedAppellants.
DAN MAGSIPOC CANCELER and PABLO INEZ alias "KA JAY," Accused.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03256, which affirmed with modification the
Joint Decision2 dated December 21, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City, Branch 59, finding Hermenigildo Maglente y Medina (Maglente)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder (Criminal Case No. 00032) and Frustrated Murder Criminal Case No. 00-033).
Maglente, together with Dan Magsipoc y Canceler (Magsipoc), John Doe, Peter
Doe and Charlie Doe, was charged with Murder3 and Frustrated Murder4 under
two separate Informations. Maglente pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him.
The Informations were subsequently amended5 to include accused Rolando
Velasquez y Guevarra (Velasquez) and Pablo Inez (Inez), who also pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. Inez died while the case was pending, and the case
against him was consequently dismissed. Magsipoc, meanwhile, remained at
large.
Evidence for the prosecution
Crisanta De Leon (De Leon), testified that at around 5:00 p.m. of August 6, 1999,
she and her co-teacher Regina Manalili (Manalili) were walking along Jesus
Street going to Lakandula Street along Balibago. They saw a kinky-haired man
(later identified in court as Maglente) standing at the corner of said streets,
holding a revolver as if waiting for someone. A white Nissan Safari van then
passed along and had its path blocked by a red Toyota Corolla car. Maglente
and two other armed men then went to the front of the van and simultaneously
riddled it with bullets at a close range of about 1 to 1 meters away6. The vans
driver lost control of the van causing it to head towards an apartment and destroy
its fence. The red Toyota Corolla then disappeared. When the shooting erupted,
De Leon and Manalili hid behind a big fence. Maglente followed and looked at
them. Then, another man holding a shotgun came from across Lakandula Street
towards Maglente and told the latter, "tara na!" Both men then left the crime
scene going south towards Manila.7
Pepe A. Mendoza (Mendoza), meanwhile, was the driver of the van and a
security aide of Benito Chua, the father of the deceased victim Victor Benito
Chua (Chua). On the day of the incident, August 6, 1999, Mendoza
accompanied Chua to different banks to withdraw money. While they were
travelling towards Balibago in Angeles City, their van was intercepted at
Lakandula Street by an old faded maroon car. Three (3) men suddenly appeared
and drew guns. He shifted gear as he saw them poke their guns at them. He
then lost consciousness and could not tell anymore who among the men
particularly shot him. Upon regaining consciousness, Mendoza was informed
that there were seven (7) bullets in his head, three (3) of which have already
been removed.
Mendoza and Chua were rushed to the hospital where Chua was pronounced
dead8 due to "hemorrhage, massive, traumatic intracranial, secondary to
multiple gunshot wounds."9 Mendoza, on the other hand, was immediately
operated on. In his medico-legal certificate, Dr. Joven G. Esguerra reported on
the injuries sustained by Mendoza, to wit:
1. Emergency E Craniotomy done
2. Gunshot wounds, right temporal and right mandibular areas
3. slug recovered upon opening of skin at mandibular area
4. Craniotomy allowed evacuation of intracerebral hematoma
REMARKS:
Barring complications or involvement of other structures not apparent at the time
of the examination, the above-named injuries will require medical attendance for
1 to 2 months.10
During trial on the merits, Maglente was positively identified by De Leon as the
one who held the revolver while waiting along Jesus and Lakandula Streets, and
also as one of the armed men who fired at the van and the victims.11 Initially,
however, De Leon identified Magsipoc as the one holding the revolver. On crossexamination, she rectified her previous statement and identified Maglente as the
gunman who fired at the van. De Leon also identified Maglente among the
pictures presented by SPO3 Danilo DG Cruz (SPO3 Cruz) during his follow-up
investigation of the case. Mendoza, on the other hand, identified Velasquez as
one of the men who positioned in front of the Nissan Safari van and who fired at
them.12
Evidence for the Defense

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of accused
Velasquez who interposed an alibi that he was at home with his family during
the time of the incident, and that he came to know about Chuas death through
his uncle. His wife Leda corroborated his statement. Maglente, on the other
hand, merely denied that he is one of the assailants.
RTC Decision
In its Decision dated December 21, 2007, the RTC convicted Maglente and
Velasquez of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder, viz:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused HERMENIGILDO
MAGLENTE y MEDINA alias "Jun Maglente" and ROLANDO VELASQUEZ y
VERGARA alias "Randy" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Murder and Frustrated Murder qualified by treachery defined and penalized in
Articles 248 and 250 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively, and there being
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation to be considered against
the accused, hereby sentences them as follows:
1. in Criminal Case No. 00-032 for Murder, for each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to jointly and severally pay the heirs of
victim Victor Benjamin Chua the following sums:
a) Seventy-five thousand [pesos] (P75,000.00) as civil
indemnity,
b) Eight hundred ninety thousand pesos (P890,000.00) for
actual damages, and
c) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages;
and to pay the costs of suit.
2. in Criminal Case No. 00-033 for Frustrated Murder, for each of them
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from [sic] Ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as the minimum term to Nineteen (19) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term; to jointly
and severally pay victim Pepe A. Mendoza actual damages in the
amount of Seven hundred sixty nine thousand ninety-eight pesos and
twenty[-]four centavos (P769,098.24); and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC gave full faith and credence to the evidence of the prosecution and
convicted Maglente and Velasquez of the crimes charged. The RTC found that
treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength and
conspiracy attended the commission of the crimes based on the following
circumstances: (1) the lack of opportunity for Mendoza and Chua to put up any
defense against the successive bursts of gunfire hailed against them at close
range by all the accused, while they peacefully travelled along Balibago in
Angeles City in a Nissan Safari;14 (2) the suddenness of the attack and its being
well-planned; (3) the sufficient lapse of time for all of the accused to reflect upon
the consequences of the attack prior to it commission;15 and (4) the fact that all
the accused acted in concert before, during and after the commission of the
offense, thus, making them co-principals in the commission of the crimes. The
RTC also brushed aside the alibi interposed by Velasquez and ratiocinated that
alibi as a defense will not prevail over the positive identification of the accused,
especially when the victim has no motive to falsely testify against the accused.16
Maglente and Velasquez filed Notices of Appeals, which was given due course
by the RTC in its Order17 dated March 3, 2008.
CA Decision
The CA affirmed18 the findings of the RTC and accorded full faith and credence
to the evidence of the prosecution. The CA explained that De Leons positive
identification of Maglente both in open court and in the pictures shown to her by
the police authorities rectified whatever confusion she had in initially identifying
Magsipoc as the gunman during direct examination. The CA also found that the
integrity of De Leons testimony was reinforced by the fact that she is a
disinterested witness who described in detail what she personally witnessed
without any false motive or purpose to favor either of the parties in the case.
As to Mendoza, the CA ratiocinated that being a victim interested in the
vindication for a crime committed against him makes it unnatural for him to
falsely point against someone other than a real culprit.19 Lastly, the CA stressed
that witnesses are not expected to be consistent in every detail of an incident
with perfect or total recall as differences in recollections, viewpoints or
impressions are inevitable.20
The CA, however, modified the RTC decision and ruled that evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated. The CA found no evidence to establish
the time when the malefactors determined to commit the crime or that sufficient
time has lapsed between such determination and the execution of the crime
intended to be committed.21 Abuse of superior strength, on the other hand,
cannot be separately appreciated because it was necessarily absorbed in
treachery.22
The CA also modified the award of damages, except as to the moral damages.
Thus, the CA Decision dated June 30, 2011 provided for the following dispositive
portion:
Dissatisfied, Maglente brought his conviction for review to this Court, anchored
on the sole issue of whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs judgment
convicting him of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder.24
WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Angeles City (Branch 59), dated 21 December 2007, is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
The Courts Ruling
(1) In Criminal Case No. 00-032 for murder a) The trial courts award of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) by way of civil indemnity is reduced to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
b) Exemplary damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
is awarded to the heirs of the deceased victim, in addition to the
moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and c)
Actual damages of Eight Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos
(P890,000.00) is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
(2) In Criminal Case No. 00-033 for frustrated murder
a) The penalty imposed by the trial court is modified and
appellants are sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum;
b) Complainant Pepe A. Mendoza is awarded civil indemnity in
the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), moral
damages of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) and
another Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages;
c) The actual damages of Seven Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand
Ninety-Eight Pesos and Twenty-Four Centavos (P769,098.24),
awarded by the trial court, is reduced to One Hundred TwentyNine Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and Eleven
Centavos (P129,548.11).
SO ORDERED.23
The appeal is devoid of merit.

Maglentes argument is centered on the alleged uncertainty over his
identification by De Leon as one of the assailants, and the absence of testimony
from Mendoza and Chuas father identifying him as such. On this point, the Court
has consistently abided by the rule that the trial court is in a better position to
adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is affirmed by the
CA, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case.25 The Court finds no reason to depart from the
assessment of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, as this is supported by the
records of the case.
Thus, it was the finding of the RTC that at first, De Leon, indeed pointed to
Magsipoc as the one who stood at the corner of Jesus and Lakandula streets,
and one of those who fired at the van. Nevertheless, the RTC further found that
De Leon was able to positively identify Maglente during cross-examination and
during the investigation conducted by SPO3 Cruz one week after the incident.
The CA also made a similar finding and concluded further that "[De Leons]
seeming confusion in pointing to Hernando Magsipoc during the direct
examination was forthwith rectified by her during the cross-examination where
she made a positive identification of Maglente."26 The CA also stated that "the
fact that De Leon identified only Maglente and not Velasquez, and Mendoza did
not point to Maglente and was able to see only Velasquez during the incident
does not undermine their credibility nor destroy the essential integrity of their
respective testimonies."27 It should be stressed that De Leon had already
identified Maglente during the follow-up investigation conducted by SPO3 Cruz
one week after the incident, and her testimony during cross examination merely
confirmed her previous identification of Maglente. The well-settled rule is that
where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated
by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit,28 which the Court finds application
in this particular case. Maglente also denies the existence of conspiracy,
claiming that there was no proof that he acted in furtherance of a common design
and purpose entertained by the other assailants.29 Conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to
commit it.30 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or
after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough
to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.31 Here, prior to the commission
of the crime, De Leon and Manalili saw Maglente holding a revolver and standing
in the corner of Lakandula and Jesus Streets waiting. As the Nissan Safari
passed by, another car blocked its path and Maglente and other armed men
simultaneously riddled the van with bullets. As aptly explained by the CA:
Such mode and manner in which the offense was committed likewise evinces a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent, all showing
that appellants conspired with one another. Indeed, direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary since conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the accused before, during and after the crime, which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.
Significantly, where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.32
(Citations omitted)
Maglente also assails the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
He insists that there is no evidence showing that the perpetrators deliberately
and consciously adopted means in order to ensure their safety from any defense
that could be put up by the victims.33
"The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims."34
Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely:
(a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.35
The established facts easily demonstrate the existence of treachery in this case.
The perpetrators waited for the victims van in ambush, with Maglente standing
at the corner with his gun drawn. Thereafter, a car blocked the vans path and
the perpetrators started shooting at the van and its passengers. The means
employed by the perpetrators show that it was employed to discount any
possibility of retaliation or escape, and that such means or method was
deliberately employed. As found by the CA:
[A]ppellants attack came unexpectedly when appellants suddenly blocked the
way of the victims who were unsuspecting of appellants plan to attack. At a spur
of a moment [sic], appellants, armed with firearms, positioned themselves in
front of the van of the helpless, unarmed and surprised victims, and began
shooting at them. From the legal standpoint, treachery was attendant as the
manner of the attack and the means employed by appellants obviously
manifested the intention of ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to
them and to deprive the victims of any real chance to defend themselves.36
The Court also agrees with the CA that abuse of superior strength, which was
alleged in the information, is already absorbed in treachery.
Moreover, the CA correctly deviated from the RTCs finding regarding the
existence of evident premeditation. According to the CA, the records did not
show sufficient evidence to support the existence of the "time when appellants
determined to commit the crime and that sufficient lapse of time existed between
such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the
circumstances of their act."37 To properly appreciate evident premeditation as
an aggravating circumstance, it is indispensable that the fact of planning the
crime be established. Particularly, evidence must show how and when the plan
to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.
Absent such proof, evident premeditation cannot prosper. In this case, the
records are bereft of evidence proving how and when the plan to attack the
victims was hatched up.
As to the credibility of the testimonies of De Leon and Mendoza, the Court finds
them straightforward and consistent with each other. Their combined
declarations established beyond reasonable doubt Maglentes identity as one of
the malefactors of the crimes charged. Consequently, Maglentes bare denial,
without more, does not deserve consideration and cannot overthrow the positive
identification made by De Leon. Time-tested is the rule that between the positive
assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused,
the former indisputably deserves more credence and evidentiary weight.38
Penalties Imposed and Award of Damages
Criminal Case No. 00-032 for Murder
Treachery having qualified the killing of Chua to Murder, the imposable penalty
against Maglente, therefore, is reclusion perpetua to death as provided in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). There being no other circumstance to
aggravate or mitigate the crime, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The same shall be without eligibility
for parole, as provided in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.39
On the award of damages.
Actual damages are recoverable only when the injured party proves the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty based upon competent proof.
In this case, only a certification40 issued by the sales manager of the memorial
park was presented to substantiate the claim for actual damages in the amount
of P840,000.00. The official receipts adduced, however, showed only the total
amount of P50,000.00. Hence, the CA correctly reduced the same to that
actually proven by the receipts presented.41
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.0042 was also correctly awarded by

the CA. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably
and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victims family.43 Meanwhile, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
was also properly awarded.44
As to the civil indemnity, the Court deems it proper to reinstate the amount
awarded by the RTC, which is P75,000.00, as civil indemnity as such amount is
mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission
of the crime.45
Criminal Case No. 00-033 for
Frustrated Murder
Article 61, paragraph 2 of the RPC provides that the penalty of frustrated murder
is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion
temporal. Reclusion temporal has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years. There being no modifying circumstance in the commission
of the frustrated murder and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal
in its medium period, and the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the full range of prision mayor , which is one degree lower than
reclusion temporal , ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. Hence, the modification made by the CA as regards the penalty imposed
in this case, that is, from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum , is
proper. And conspiracy having been proven, each of the accused shall be
sentenced to suffer such imprisonment.46
It should be noted, however, that since accused Velasquez no longer interposed

an appeal before the Court, his liability shall be limited to the amounts awarded
by the CA, since the latter's Decision has become final and executory with
respect to him.51
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 03256 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 00-032 for Murder, the civil indemnity in favor
of the heirs of the victim Victor Benito Chua is increased to Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00); and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 00-033 for Frustrated Murder
a) Moral damages in favor of the victim Pepe A. Mendoza is
increased to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00);
b) The award of exemplary damages is reduced to Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); and
c) The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 is
deleted.
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.52
In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals IS AFFIRMED.
The Court also sustains the CAs award of actual damages in the amount of
P129,548.11, instead of the amount of P769,098.24 awarded by the RTC, as
the official receipts adduced by the prosecution to prove Mendozas
hospitalization expenses proved only such reduced amount.47
The Court, however, modifies the amount of moral damages and exemplary
damages awarded in favor of the victim Mendoza to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence.48 Thus, the modified amounts of P40,000.00 as moral damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages are hereby awarded.1wphi1
Lastly, civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 awarded by the CA is deleted
in view of existing cases that no longer grant the same in the crime of frustrated
murder.49
All the sums of money awarded to the victims and their heirs will accrue a six
percent (6%) interest per annum from the time o this Decision until fully paid.50
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 189833
February 5, 2014

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano
(Morilla) from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction
and that of his co-accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court,
sentencing them2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P10,000,000.00 each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel
Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the
Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicate crime group as they all help one another, for purposes of
gain in the transport of illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually aiding and abetting one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of two (2) motor vehicles,
namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate
to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon Province,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is commonly known
as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight
(503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever.3
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City4 on 1 August 2007 convicted
Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan,
Quezon, of illegal transport5 of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty
eight (503.68) kilos. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the
prosecutions failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense
charged. The dispositive of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan
are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately released from custody unless
held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as
representative sample which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory
is ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles
driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other
an ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as the police officers have already
acquired prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for
transportation of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the
information turned out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their
motor vehicles more than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to
transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only
accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his
fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack
of knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that
he was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with
Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not
bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an
accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they
were caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles
driven by each of them. Absent any convincing circumstance to corroborate their
explanations, the validity of their apprehension was sustained.8
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the
testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that
the two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van
driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which
was ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the
police officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police
officers. Through the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several
sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks
contained narra wooden tiles.
conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove
his culpability as alleged in the Information.15
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the
car for further inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white
crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request
Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he
was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass.9 His
request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of
the sacks turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.10 This
discovery prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The
police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop.
They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives
noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the
ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the
vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter
but the same was rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were
likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
We dismiss his arguments.
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the
trial court for failure on the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Dequillas and Yangs mere presence
inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also
conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.12
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld
the finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent
to transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board
their respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally transport
methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to
drive the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor
Mitra, who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.13
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the
illegal contents of the sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden
tiles was implausible due to the obvious disparity of texture and volume.14
Courts Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be
convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans allegation of
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure16 to substantiate his argument that he should have been
informed first of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed
out that the Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the
statement "the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the
Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicated crime group as they all help one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport x x x." He argued that
conspiracy was only inferred from the words used in the Information.17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information,
at this point, is deemed to have been waived due to Morillas failure to assert it
as a ground in a motion to quash before entering his plea.18
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his
defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate
courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.19
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.20 To determine
conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group
involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent
of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from
proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are
parts of some complete whole.22 In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a
common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with
several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila.
Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police
operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was
requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules
scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If
indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have
told the police officers that he was with the mayor.
etc. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, does not appear to have any definite
extent or duration and carries no accessory penalties.29
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People,30 thus:
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used
under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to
another."23 It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the
ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going
to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is
malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The
fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.24
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate
court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be
recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No.
1683. The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced new
amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15
was changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty
provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of
the dangerous drugs involved.
In a similar case of People v. Libnao,25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal
transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a
bag full of marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a passing
tricycle at a checkpoint.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion
perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that
R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to
the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.1wphi1
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks
and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in
driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425,26 the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging
from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand
to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683,27 the
penalty was amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic
Act No. 7659,28 where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to
be paid by each of the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua
following the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive
application of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at
least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also
carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification,
"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a)
that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than
the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded
retroactive application, x x x."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused,
have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the penalty imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of
imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine
imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to
him.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
13 July 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as
Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of

P10,000,000.00 by each of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 196735
May 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER
SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN
ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research
personnel should feel safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably
solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully nurtured and debated.
Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced
concepts of perverse brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist
because of past impunity. This has resulted in a senseless death whose justice
is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted.
It is even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present
themselves courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for
hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and
suffer the legal consequences of their actions. They must do so for there is an
individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family.
Excruciating grief for them will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the
afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at
the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was
filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo,
George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict
Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 219. The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise,
conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats,
lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of DENNIS F.
VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and clubbing him on
different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of
Sigma Rho fraternity members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,3
and Leandro Lachica,4 and the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members Mervin Natalicio5 and Amel Fortes.6 Only 11 of the accused stood
trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal
Gaston, Jr., Felix Tumaneng,7 and Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the
Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they
were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.8 Suddenly,
Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked
around when Venturina shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging
toward them.10 The men were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and
their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts.11 Within a few
seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead
pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and
contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.15 Just before
reaching it, he looked back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L.
Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion was.16 Both of
them did not have their masks on.17 He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and
Medalla because he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his friend.18 The attack lasted
about thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds.19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked
to his left when Venturina shouted.20 He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20)
men, most of who were wearing masks, running toward them.21 He was
stunned, and he started running.22 He stumbled over the protruding roots of a
tree.23 He got up, but the attackers came after him and beat him up with lead
pipes and baseball bats until he fell down.24 While he was parrying the blows,
he recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L.
Soliva since they were not wearing any masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds,
they stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four
(4) to five (5) men coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group
also beat him up.28 He did not move until another group of masked men beat
him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.30 Several
bystanders brought him to the U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a
week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures.31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked
back when Venturina shouted and saw a group of men with baseball bats and
lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of cloth around their heads.32 He ran
when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of
cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes.33 While running and parrying
the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette
Fajardo because their masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded his attackers
and ran to the Main Library.35 He then decided that he needed to help his
fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House.36 There, he saw
Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up
with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.38 When
they saw him, they went toward his direction.39 They were about to hit him when
somebody shouted that policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran
away.40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his
car so they could bring Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought the
car over, other people, presumably bystanders, were already loading Venturina
into another vehicle.42 They followed that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where
they saw Natalicio.43 He stayed at the infirmary until the following morning.44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood

up when he heard someone shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging
toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball bats.46 Most of them had pieces
of cloth covering their faces.47 He was about to run when two (2) of the attackers
approached him.48 One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed
him with a bladed instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the blows from the
lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm.50
He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he
looked back to Beach House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren
Zingapan, and George Morano.52 He decided to go back to the canteen to help
his fraternity brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity
brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them.54 He ended up going to their
hang-out instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers.55 They then
proceeded to the College of Law where the rest of the fraternity was already
discussing the incident.56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the
group of attackers coming toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo
Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina.58 He was also able to see Warren Zingapan and
George Morano at the scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education,
boarded a jeepney to the College of Law to wait for their other fraternity
brothers.60 One of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that he
received information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing
of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM North.61 Lachica and his group
then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63
Lachica saw Robert Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain
Carlo Taparan.64 They had no choice but to get away from the mall and proceed
instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a meeting.65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims
to lodge their complaints with the National Bureau of Investigation.66 Their
counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the victims would be giving
their statements before the National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give
the U.P. Police copies of their statements. In the meantime, Venturina was
transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8, 1994.
He died on December 10, 1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was
conducted on the cadaver of Dennis Venturina.68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, found that Venturina
had "several contusions located at the back of the upper left arm and hematoma
on the back of both hands,"69 "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the
head,70 generalized hematoma on the skull,"71 "several fractures on the

head,"72 and "inter-cranial hemorrhage."73 The injuries, according to Dr.
Victoria, could have been caused by a hard blunt object.74 Dr. Victoria
concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.75
Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified
that the identities of the attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks.
He, however, admitted that he did not see the attack; he just saw a man sprawled
on the ground at the time of the incident.
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston

executed their respective affidavits76 before the National Bureau of
Investigation and underwent medico-legal examinations77 with their
medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that
Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above the left
ear, and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion on the left
leg and thigh,"78 all of which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object.
These injuries required medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty
(30) days from the date of infliction.79
Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying
a cigarette at a vendor located nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole
incident. He testified that ten (10) men, wearing either masks of red and black
bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby.
He also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two
(2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to help
him, but the attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then
saw students helping those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one
of the injured victims, which he later found out to be Amel Fortes.
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right
leg which could have been caused by a blunt instrument."80 These injuries
required hospitalization for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from date
of infliction.81 He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on
the left forearm which could possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard
surface and would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical attention."82 He
found on Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm
and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."83 On Christopher
Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior chest, left side, left
forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left
side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."84
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban,90
testified that she and her friends were in line to order lunch at the Beach House
Canteen when a commotion happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen
(18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask
fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz Perez,91 corroborated
her story that the masked men were unrecognizable because of their masks.
Perez, however, admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to
make a statement.
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief,

the court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the
ground that he was not identified by the prosecution's witnesses and that he was
not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the prosecution.85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own
statement of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot
patrol with another member of the U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of
the incident. They were near the College of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when
he vaguely heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place where
the alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped by
bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service vehicle of the
Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name was, and he replied that he
was Mervin Natalicio. When he asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not
able to reply but instead told him that his attackers were wearing masks. Oscar
Salvador87 corroborated his testimony.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified on substantially the same

matters as Panganiban and Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying
on the ground who was being beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked
men. She also stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while
some were wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any mask fall off
the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s
motlier, her son was in Pampanga to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the
incident. She alleged that her son went to Pampanga before lunch that day and
visited the school where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not been feeling well since
December 5, 1994. He said that he could not have possibly been in U.P. on
December 8, 1994 since he was absent even from work. He also testified that
he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified
by Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time
since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another classmate, Michael Vibas,
were working on a school project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he
could not have participated in the rumble as he had an injury affecting his
balance. The injury was caused by an incident in August 1994 when he was
struck in the head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was corroborated by
Jose Victor Santos96 who stated that after lunch that day, Medalla played darts
with him and, afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with
his girlfriend and another friend in Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They
went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight to their fraternity hang-out
where he was told that there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met
several Sigma Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-out. They
were also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans
and just go home. Anna Cabahug,98 his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the
incident. He claimed to have gone to SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding
but ran into a fraternity brother. He also alleged that some Sigma Rhoans
attacked them in SM North that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision100 with the finding
that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor
Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.101 The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo
Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and
Raymund Narag.102 The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived
by the court until his apprehension.103 The trial court, m evaluating the
voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that
of the ten accused, some were sufficiently identified and some were not. The
Court believes that out of the amorphous images during the pandemonium, the
beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers etching
an indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution
eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers rush towards them
wielding deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and
bladed ones, and pounce on their hapless victims, run after them, and being
present with one another at the scene of the crime during the assault. Although
each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting
Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and
every single accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to
make sure that no one else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness
named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not
see who delivered the blows against them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was
brought to this court on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of
the Rules on Appeal,105 the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals.106
In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several Times107 before
it was eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the
writing of the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five,
affirmed108 the decision of the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members
concurring109 an one (1) dissenting.110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants attacked private complainants and
caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties,
the issue may be further refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when
the information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of
the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove
that the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that accused-appellants were
sufficiently identified.
I
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. They argue that the prosecution should not have included the
phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since
they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing
masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law."111 This includes the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and "to be informed of the
nature and accusation against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor
against the accused, in compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110,
Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his
defense, precluding surprises during the trial.114
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their
constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged
must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance,
even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.115 It was, therefore,
incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like
nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he
carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove
that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from
including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.116 What is important in
alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a
concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the
information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the
commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal
their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not
wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy
presupposes that "the act of one is the act of all."117 This would mean all the
accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was
evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be
sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been alleged and that there are
sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are given great weight and credence on review. The rationale
for this was explained in People v. Daniel Quijada,118 as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial
court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere
or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia
Labarias,120 this court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the
reasonable assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence
before it, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal much of
themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception that makes the rule
is where such findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted
with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were
reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize
a judicial decision.121 (Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the
presumption is always in favor of innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two
(42) witnesses for the defense were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an
eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted
five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said
that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in basis"
that it was arrived at without a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence
presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value,
there is also nothing that precludes this court from coming to its own conclusions
based on an independent review of the facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently
identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of
the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. In its decision, the trial court
stated that:
stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay,
Denoista, and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston could have named any of
the accused as the one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed
him but he frankly said their faces were covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was
repeatedly beaten by several groups but did not name any of the accused as
one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified were those leading
the pack with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and the two others who
he saw standing while he was running away. He added that he saw some of the
accused during the attack but did not know then their names.122 (Emphasis
supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident,"123
there would be slight inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano
Cabrillas,124 it was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a
crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness
may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence
even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it
could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.125
(Emphasis supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and
Medalla;126
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals
permanently behind bars, not one testified against all of them. If the prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting
Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and
every accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make
sure no one would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one
or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered
the blows against them.
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva;127 and Fortes was
able to identify Feliciano, Medalla, and Zingapan.128 Their positive identification
was due to the fact that they either wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin
Asuncion, testified to have seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose
any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he did not have the opportunity
to see and identify the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two-inch
cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it.
Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized, was severely beaten by
three waves of attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of
them. He added, however, that he would be able to recognize those he saw if
he would see them again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but he
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the
looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime
was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements
thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.129
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a

crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the event
that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended. It has also been
previously held that:
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have
lost their masks. It had been testified by the victims that some of the assailants
were wearing masks of either a piece of cloth or a handkerchief and that
Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133 had masks on at first but

their masks fell off and hung around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during crossexamination who observed that some of the attackers were wearing masks and
some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in
the Beach House Canteen, and then running towards different directions, is it
not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence
of mind to take a look at their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive
identification, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be
credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony
credence while Gaston's testimony was found to be "hazy." This argument is
unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of
the Scintilla Juris members identified by Mangrobang "should not be.
misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of Mangrobang was an absolute
fabrication."135 The court went on to state that they "were exonerated merely
because they were accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by
Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were [sic] not
corroborated and their alibis, not refuted."136 There was, therefore, no basis to
say that Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that the evidence presented
was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy"137 by the trial
court only with regard to his identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston
testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with Zingapan moving and Morano
staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano were
running after him. Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who
was with Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the trial court found that there
was doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into
an acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the court still did not" impute doubt in their
testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its
decision was brought about only upon a thorough examination of the evidence
presented: It accepted that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
victims but that these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that
"[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no
person with perfect faculties or senses."'138
Evidence as part of the res
gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139 when he arrived
at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not
recognize the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be
evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x
x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously discussed the
admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence
as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a
school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the
bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in
fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to
ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective
points of reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of
how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a
crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different
impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little
persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring
at different vantage points and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo,
one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had
their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who
witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the
former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their
account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than
that of the victims.
The belated identification by
the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the
U.P. Police or the Quezon City Police but instead executed affidavits with the
National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident gives doubt as
to the credibility of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on their way to the U.P.
Infirmary, he interviewed the victims who all told him they could not recognize
the attackers because they were all wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang147
testified to the effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio
answered that he did not know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival
fraternities. While this court does not condone their archaic and oftentimes
barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are certain practices that are unique
to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their
attackers but chose not to disclose it without first conferring with their other
fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho after
the incident, which showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris
in SM North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not
have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr.
Mislang does not make the police officer or the doctor's testimonies more
credible than that of the victims. It should not be forgotten that the victims
actually witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera,
and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after
the incident also does not affect their credibility since most of them had been
hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they
decided to wait until all of them were well enough to go to the National Bureau
of Investigation headquarters in order to give their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their
senior "brads" and their legal counsel that they executed their sworn statements
before the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead
of to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed
the National Bureau of Investigation more equipped to handle the investigation.
This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were
merely following the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is
better equipped than the U.P. Police to handle the investigation of the case. As
stated in the U.P. College of Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their
station is located in front of the College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and
protect lives and property, enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City
Ordinances, and University Rules and Regulations including policies and
standards; and to perform such other functions relative to the general safety and
security of the students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus.
x x x.148 (Emphasis supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus
security. They are by no means an actual police force that is equipped to handle
a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternity-related violence in U.P. has also
increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have desensitized the
U.P. Police in such a way that would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of
their investigations. The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation,
therefore, is understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the victim.149 In People v. Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a
witness destroys the defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have
always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they
can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial,
like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes selfserving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the
accused-appellants merely offered alibis and denials as their defense. The
credibility of the victims was upheld by both the trial court and the appellate court
while giving little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no
reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
circumstances:
men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes
and baseball bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which
resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense
committed against Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took
advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The appellate
court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission
of the offense.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the
victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was
present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy
makes all of the accusedappellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
It has been stated previously by this court that:

[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two
elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.154 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty
of the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio,
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston,
Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the
accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and
Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang
"were no longer chased by the attackers,"157 it concluded that accusedappellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting harm to
them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make
them suffer pain by slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out that the wound
inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of
slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled

that contrary to the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In
particular, they ruled that although the attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t
was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see them"155 and that
"there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in
the canteen could have helped the victims."156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch
on campus. They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected
to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and
baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a
situation where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible
for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less
than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able
to help them until after the incident.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy
among the accused-appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis
finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused,
regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless
of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing
rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to
accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable
for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability

upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without
taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with
the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common
agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and
intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band
or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the
accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall
not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of
each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.162 (Emphasis
supplied)
of one senseless act of bravado. There is now more honor for them to accept
their responsibility and serve the consequences of their actions. There is,
however, nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully
compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be
the last. Perhaps this case and many cases like it can empower those who have
a better view of masculinity: one which valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in
more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It
colors the stories of many who choose to expend their energy in order that our
people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an immature
and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture that retards
manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident
wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes,
all in agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims.
Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at
the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment
of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when
the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish
between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the
respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the
death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only
of slight physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the
swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only
Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica,
Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment
the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent
to kill.1wphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang,
Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on
the five other lives whose once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158

dated November 26, 2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants
Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L.
Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the
MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134,
Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 195668
June 25, 2014

vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA
DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO, Accused,
dismissed after the complainants did not revive them within two years, as
provided in Section 8,6 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Trial on the merits ensued as to the remaining cases (Criminal Case No. 041562, for illegal recruitment; and Criminal Case No. 04-1564; Criminal Case No.
04-1566; Criminal Case No. 04-1567; Criminal Case No. 1569 and Criminal
Case No. 04-1574, for estafa).7
MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against
whom the State establishes a conspiracy are each equally criminally and civilly
liable. It follows, therefore, that as far as civil liability is concerned each is
solidarily liable to the victims of the illegal recruitment for the reimbursement of
the sums collected from them, regardless of the extent of the participation of the
accused in the illegal recruitment.
The Case
Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero seeks the review and reversal of the
decision promulgated on August 26, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment committed in large scale amounting
to economic sabotage under the judgment rendered on January 14, 2008 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 133, in Makati City.2
Antecedents
On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the
RTC two informations3 charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones,
Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with illegal recruitment as defined and
penalized under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act of
1995), and 11 informations4 charging the same accused with estafa as defined
and penalized under Article315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only
Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other accused having remained at
large.
Six cases charging estafa (Criminal Case No. 04-1565, Criminal Case No. 1568,
Criminal Case No. 1570, Criminal Case No. 1571 and Criminal Case No. 1572
and Criminal Case No. 1573) and one of the two charging illegal recruitment
(Criminal Case No. 04-1563) were provisionally dismissed because of the failure
of the complainants to prosecute.5 The seven cases were later permanently
The CA recounted the transactions between the complainants and the accused,
including Inovero, in the following manner:
Regarding Criminal Case No. 04-1562, the prosecution presented the five (5)
private complainants as witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment,
namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"), Danilo Brizuela ("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre
("Aguirre"), Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella ("Marbella"), and
Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA").
Baful testified that on May 20, 2003 she, together with her sister-in-law, went to
Harvel International Talent Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509
Cityland Condominium, Makati City upon learning that recruitment for caregivers
to Japan was on-going there. On said date, she allegedly met Inovero; Velasco,
and Diala, and saw Inovero conducting a briefing on the applicants. She also
testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager, directed her to submit certain
documents, and to pay Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as
training fee, as well as Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as placement and
processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo physical examination.
On June 6, 2003, after complying with the aforesaid requirements and after
paying Diala the amounts of Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten
Thousand pesos (P10,000.00), Baful was promised deployment within two (2)
to three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her and her coapplicants on what to wear on the day of their departure. However, she was
never deployed. Finally, she testified that she found out that HARVEL was not
licensed to deploy workers for overseas employment.
Brizuela, another complainant, testified that he went to HARVELs office in
Makati on February 7, 2003 to inquire on the requirements and hiring procedure
for a caregiver in Japan. There, Diala told him the amount required as processing
fee and the documents to be submitted. And when he submitted on March 7,
2003 the required documents and payments, it was, this time, Paulino who
received them. He claimed that he underwent training and medical examination;
he likewise attended an orientation conducted by Inovero at which time, he and
his batchmates were advised what clothes to wear on the day of their departure;
he was assured of deployment on the first week of June 2003, however, on the
eve of his supposed "pre-departure orientation seminar," Paulino texted him that
the seminar was cancelled because Inovero, who had the applicants money,
did not show up. He testified that he was not deployed. Neither was his money
returned, as promised.
during orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied receiving any money

from the complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor.8
On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that Inovero was the one who

conducted the orientation, and represented to all the applicants that most of the
time, she was in the Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants visa.
On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five
counts of estafabut convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale as defined and penalized by Section 6 and
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995), disposing thusly:
Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that she went to HARVEL on
May 22, 2003, to apply as caregiver in Japan; there, Diala informed her that
Inovero was oneof the owners of HARVEL and Velasco was its President; she
paid Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), and submitted her documents,
receipt of which was acknowledged by Diala; despite her undergoing medical
examination and several training seminars, she was however not deployed to
Japan. Worse, she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers.
Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to HARVELs office on
May 28, 2003 to apply as caregiver in Japan, and Diala required her to submit
certain documents, to undergo training and medical examination, and to pay
Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as placement and processing fees.
However, after complying with said requirements, she was never deployed as
promised.
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for the
position of janitress at HARVEL sometime in December 2002; just like the rest
of the complainants, she was required to submit certain documents and to pay
a total amount of Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as processing fee; after
paying said fee, Diala and Inovero promised her and the other applicants that
they will be deployed in three (3) months or in June 2003; however, the promised
deployment never materialized; she later found out that HARVEL was not even
licensed to recruit workers.
[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and Employment Officer at the
POEA Licensing Branch. She testified that she prepared a Certification certifying
that neither HARVEL nor Inovero was authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment as per records at their office.
In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations hurled against her. As
summarized in the assailed Decision, she claimed that she is the niece of
accused Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied working there. Explaining
her presence in HARVEL, she alleged that she worked for her uncle, Velascos
husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least two or three times a week,
she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle. She also testified
that her alleged errands mainly consisted of serving food and refreshments
Judgment of the RTC
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforestated cases as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 04-1562, accused Maricar Inovero is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale defined and
penalized under Sections 6 and 7, II, of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known
as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. She is likewise ordered to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Criminal Case No. 04-1563 also for illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby
ordered dismissed to its finality for failure of complainants Alvin De Leon,
Roderick Acuna, Agosto Vale and Marina Viernes to revive said case despite
the lapse of two years from its provisional dismissal.
Criminal Cases No. 04-1564, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571 and 1574 are hereby
ordered DISMISSED for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence
to prove all the elements of the said offense.
Criminal Cases Nos. 1565, 1568, 1570, 1572 and 1573 also for estafa [are]
hereby ordered dismissed to its finality for failure of complainants Agosto Vale,
Alvin De Leon, Roselyn Saruyda, Roderick Acuna and Marina Viernes to revive
said cases despite the lapse of two (2) years from its provisional dismissal.
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, she shall be credited in the
service of her sentence with the full time during which she has undergone
preventive imprisonment if she agrees voluntarily to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, with four-fifths
thereof.
Meanwhile, considering that the accused Ma. Harleta B. Velasco, Marissa Diala
and Berna Paulino are still at large, let alias warrants of arrest be issued against
them. In the meantime, let the cases filed against them be archived, which shall
be revived upon their apprehension.
SO ORDERED.9
protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following
circumstances contrarily convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.
Decision of the CA
Inovero appealed, contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH [HER] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10
On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The January 14, 2008
Decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero
was the one who conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed them,
among others, on how much their salary would be as caregivers in Japan; and
what to wear when they finally will be deployed. Second, when Diala introduced
her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo as one of the owners of HARVEL,
Inovero did not bother to correct said representation. Inoveros silence is clearly
an implied acquiescence to said representation.
Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela,
represented herself as the one expediting the release of applicants working visa
for Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEAs Versoza Inovero
had no license nor authority to recruit for overseas employment.
SO ORDERED.11
Issue
In this appeal, Inovero insists that the CA erred in affirming her conviction by the
RTC because she had not been an employee of Harvel at any time; that she
could be faulted only for her association with the supposed illegal recruiters; that
in all stages of the complainants recruitment for overseas employment by
Harvel, they had transacted only and directly with Diala; and that the certification
from the POEA to the effect she was not a licensed recruiter was not a positive
proof that she engaged in illegal recruitment.
Ruling of the Court
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC,
stating:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1)
that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as
defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities
under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused had not complied with
the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to
the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers;
and (3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons.
In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without
authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes. In Our view, despite Inoveros
Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found
that Inovero committed illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private
complainants the impression that she can send them abroad for employment
purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or authority to do so.12
It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on the
findings of fact by the trial court which are conclusive and binding once affirmed
by the CA on intermediate review. The bindingness of the trial courts factual
findings is by virtue of its direct access to the evidence. The direct access affords
the trial court the unique advantage to observe the witnesses demeanor while
testifying, and the personal opportunity to test the accuracy and reliability of their
recollections of past events, both of which are very decisive in a litigation like
this criminal prosecution for the serious crime of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale where the parties have disagreed on the material facts. The Court
leaves its confined precinct of dealing only with legal issues in order to deal with
factual ones only when the appellant persuasively demonstrates a clear error in
the appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the appellate courts. This
demonstration was not done herein by the appellant. Hence, the Court upholds
the CAs affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court.
All that Inoveros appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal
recruitment of the complainants. But the complainants credibly described and
affirmed her specific acts during the commission of the crime of illegal
recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than her mere
denial.
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative

assertion of the fact.1wphi1 Thus, courts both trial and appellate have
generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable
caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the
recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an
excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of
consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and self-serving
negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.13 It is no different here.
We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the
illegal recruitment charged against her. Strong and positive evidence
demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her coaccused in the recruitment of the complainants. The decision of the CA amply
recounted her overt part in the conspiracy. Under the law, there is a conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony, and decide to commit it.14
The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing
fees, respectively as follows: (a) Baful P28,500.00; (b) Brizuela P38,600.00;
(c) Aguirre P38,600.00; (d) Amoyo P39,000.00; and (e) Marbella
P20,250.00. However, the RTC and the CA did not adjudicate Inoveros personal
liability for them in their judgments. Their omission needs to be corrected,
notwithstanding that the complainants did not appeal, for not doing so would be
patently unjust and contrary to law. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing
tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a
matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal law that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable.15 Civil liability includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.16 To enforce the civil liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be
instituted with the criminal action the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged unless the offended party waives the civil
action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.17 Considering that the crime of illegal
recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the
accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return
of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees.18 Hence,
Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the
sums paid.
That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the
CA was not disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People19 that it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless
there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of
its recovery," because:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment,
if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted
by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the
fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard
compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant
of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because
the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the
duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs
that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established
facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for
only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to
the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then
be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal
cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution
and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in
manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should
also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do
justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by
separate actions has been reserved or waived.20
What was the extent of Inoveros civil liability?
The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime
requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation.21 As a co-conspirator, then, Inoveros civil liability was similar to that
of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate
in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if
done for their benefit.22 They are also referred to as those who act together in
committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing
a single injury.23 Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are
each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they
had performed the wrongful act themselves. As regards the extent of their
respective liabilities, the Court expressed in Far Eastern Shipping Company v.
Court of Appeals:24
(a) Noveza Baful - P28,500.00;
x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an

efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may
be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or
all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person was not same. No actors negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
acts. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though
his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
(d) Annaliza Amoyo - P39,000.00; and
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since

both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. x
xx
It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her
individual participation in the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of
the others.25 Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be
apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an
apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly
and severally liable for the whole amount.26 Hence, Inoveros liability towards
the victims of their illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she
actually received the amounts paid or not, and notwithstanding that her coaccused, having escaped arrest until now, have remained untried.
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the damages may be
adjudicated in criminal proceedings in the discretion of the court. The Court
believes and holds that such liability for interest attached to Inovero as a
measure of fairness to the complainants. Thus, Inovero should pay interest of
6% per annum on the sums paid by the complainants to be reckoned from the
finality of this judgment until full payment.27
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26,
2010, subject to the MODIFICATION that appellant Maricar B. Inovero is ordered
to pay by way of actual damages to each of the complainants the amounts paid
by them for placement, training and processing fees, respectively as follows:
(b) Danilo Brizuela - P38,600.00;

(c) Rosanna Aguirre - P38,600.00;
(e) Teresa Marbella - P20,250.00.

plus interest on such amounts at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Inovero shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 191723
July 23, 2014

vs.
ROLANDO LAS PIAS, JIMMY DELIZO AND MERWIN LAS PIAS,
Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
This ordinary appeal seeks to reverse the consolidated December 22, 2009
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00401 and CA-G.R.
CR No. 28975, which affirmed the July 21, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 53, Sorsogon City, in Criminal Case No. 2001-5445,2 and
the Decision dated May 28, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 52, Sorsogon City, in
Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448.3
The Facts of the Case
In an Information dated July 25, 2001 docketed as Criminal Case No. 20015445, the public prosecutor charged Renato, Rolando, Armando, Gilberto,
Merwin, Freddie, Salvador, all surnamed Las Pifias, and Jimmy Delizo with
frustrated murder committed as follows:
That on or about 2:00 x x x in the morning of May 2, 2001 at the fishpen in the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, th[e] above-named accused with treachery,
conspiring[,] confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one ROGER
ARINGO thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries, to wit:
= Gunshot wound face right side[;]
= Gunshot wound chest right side, contusion[;]
= Gunshot wound buttock left[.]
which injuries could have caused the death of said Roger Aringo, thus accused
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Murder, as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Roger Aringo, which prevented
his death, to his damage and prejudice.4
In three other Informations all dated July 25, 2001, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448, the public prosecutor charged the
same persons above-enumerated with three counts of murder, to wit:
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDGARDO
ARINGO, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries on the different parts
of his body which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.5
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one BENJAMIN
ARINGO, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injury which caused his death,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one CARLITO
LASALA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injury which caused his death,
Of the eight accused, only Rolando Las Pias, Merwin Las Pias, and Jimmy
Delizo were apprehended8 and held for trial. The rest remained at large.9
Though the charges of Frustrated Murder and three counts of Murder emanated
from the same set of facts, they were tried separately. Criminal Case No. 20015445 for Frustrated Murderwas raffled to RTC-Br. 53, while Criminal Case Nos.
2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448 (all for Murder) were raffled to RTC-Br.
52, both in Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Of the four, only Roger remained alive by daybreak and was eventually rescued
by a passing fisherman. He was broughtto the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital for
treatment.18 Initially, only the bodies of Benjamin and Carlito were recovered
from the platform. But four days later, Edgardos body was found floating in the
water.19
Upon their arraignment, the three accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged.10
Dr. Antonio Lopez (Dr. Lopez) testified and presented a medical certificate on
Rogers condition. He explained that Roger suffered gunshot wounds on the
right side of his face, his left chest, and in his left buttock; that he lost his eyesight
in the left eye; and that his wounds were not immediately fatal but could have
led tohis death if neglected. Dr. Lopez further testified that he could only remove
the bullet lodged in Rogers chest, but not the one stuck behind his left eye and
left buttock.20
In Criminal Case No. 2001-5445, toprove the charge of Frustrated Murder, the
prosecution presented the victim, Roger Aringo (Roger), Dr. Antonio Lopez
(attending physician), Rowan Estrellado (National Bureau of Investigation [NBI]
special investigator)11 and Atty. Tomas C. Enrile (a lawyer and executive
officerof the Naga City NBI).12
In Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448, to establish the
indictment for three counts of Murder, the prosecution again presented Roger,
Susan Aringo (Edgardo Aringos wife), Gleceria Lasala (Carlito Lasalas wife),
Catalino Aringo (father of the Aringo brothers), and Dr. Salve Sapinoso
(municipal health officer of Castilla Rural Health Office).13
From the testimony of Roger, the prosecution established that on the night of
May 1, 2001, he and his brothers, Edgardo and Benjamin, and their cousin,
Carlito Lasala, were at Edgardos fishpen located within the coastal waters of
the town of Castilla, Sorsogon. The fishpen was supported by four wooden posts
arranged in a square. On top of the posts was a 9 to 10-meter bamboo platform
about four to five meters above the sea. While on the platform, they lighted three
pressure lamps in the middle of the fishpen to attract the fish. After checking the
fishnet and eating supper, they took turns in resting and watching.14
At around 2:00 a.m. of May 2, 2001, while Roger was on guard duty and the rest
were sleeping, the eightabove-named accused arrived on board a "sibidsibid,"15 a long wooden boat mobilized by paddles. The accused then climbed
up the platform and opened fire at the Aringo brothers and Carlito.16
Specifically, Roger narrated thathe saw accused Armando and Rolando shoot
Edgardo and Benjamin, while he witnessed Jimmy, Merwin and Freddie shoot
Carlito. He likewise witnessed Armando slash the throat of Edgardo after the
latter was incapacitated, and throw his (Edgardo) body into the sea. As for
himself, Roger testified that his assailants were accused Renato, Salvador and
Gilberto; and thathe sustained gunshot wounds on his right cheek, left chest,
and left buttock. The carnage finally ended when the accused thought that the
three Aringo brothers and Carlito were all dead; and then they boarded their boat
and left towards Sorsogon. Roger recognized all the accused because they used
to be neighbors at Sitio Dulungan, Brgy. Libtong, Castilla, Sorsogon.17
Dr. Salve Sapinoso testified thatshe conducted the post mortem examination on
the remains of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, and issued their death
certificates.21
Rowan Estrellado, who was the assigned investigator of the NBI, testified that
he took the sworn statements of Roger, Susan Aringo, Catalino Aringo, and
Gleceria Warde Lasala;22 while it was Atty. Tomas C. Enrile who administered
the oaths of said witnesses.23
The wives of the deceased and the father of the Aringo brothers testified on the
circumstances surrounding the incident and its discovery, how they felt on the
loss of their loved ones, their family background, and the burial and
hospitalization expenses.24
On the other hand, the defense presented the same set of witnesses for the
frustrated murder case and consolidated murder cases,25 i.e., Gilberto Jesalva
(Gilberto), Rodel Lato (Rodel), Lito Bojorque (Lito), Serafin Deocareza (Serafin),
Leonora Delizo (Leonora), Rolando Las Pias (Rolando), Merwin Las Pias
(Merwin), Blandino Diaz (Blandino), and Jimmy Delizo (Jimmy). Gilberto, the
chief barangay tanodof Barangay Bitan-o, Sorsogon City, testified that he and
accused Rolando were with the other barangay tanoddoing patrol duty on May
1, 2001. At around 11:45 p.m., Rolando asked permission to leave to unload the
truck containing cargoes of shellfish locally known as "badoy" that arrived from
Naga City. At about 12:45 a.m., they came upon Rolando still unloading the
cargoes with the other workers.26
Blandino, the barangay captain, testified that at 11:00 p.m. on May 1, 2001, he
saw the accused Rolando in the barangayhall and then left after 30 minutes. He
later learned that he was unloading cargoes from a delivery truck.27
Rodel testified that he was in the business of buying and selling cooked "badoy."
He stated that at around midnight to 1:00 a.m. on May 2, 2001, there was a
delivery of "badoy" from Naga City. When the delivery truck arrived at his house
in Barangay Bitan-o, his supervisor and all around caretaker Rolando woke him.
In turn, Rodel woke up Merwin, who was the designated cook. He saidthat
Rolando and Merwin never left the premises until they were arrested.28
Lito, another cook,corroborated Rodels testimony on Rolando and Merwins
whereabouts in the early morning of May 2, 2001.29
Serafin, who testified for accused Jimmy, stated that he, Jimmy, and their
companions went fishing in the morning of May 1, 2001 until 4:00 p.m. After
getting their respective shares, they decided to have a drinking session in his
house at 7:00 p.m. and ended at midnight of May 1, 2001. According to him,
Jimmy was so drunk that he needed to be escorted home.30 Jimmys wife,
Leonora corroborated Serafins testimony and the two of them brought Jimmy
home.31 When it was their turn to testify, accused Rolando, Merwin and Jimmy
corroborated the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
RTC-Branch 53 Decision in Criminal Case No. 2001-5445 for Frustrated Murder
In its July 21, 2004 Decision, RTC-Branch 53 convicted the accused appellants
of the crime charged. The fallo of said decision provides:
The RTC found Rogers testimony tobe credible, spontaneous, and

straightforward having stood his ground despite the lengthy and intensive crossexamination.33
In contrast, the RTC did not believethe accused-appellants defense of alibi
because it was not established with clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the fishpen when the offense was
committed especially so that the coastal Barangay Bitan-o was along the same
coastline as Barangay Poblacion and Bagalaya of Castilla; and the fishpen
involved in the incident was off-shore of these barangays. In fact, it was
established that from Barangay Bitan-o to the two other barangays, one can
travel by boat in one hour or less.34
In addition, the RTC held that the defense of alibi becomes unworthy of merit
where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives and not
by credible persons. Here, accused-appellants Rolando and Merwins alibis
were supported by each other and their friends, while accused-appellant
Jimmys alibi was supported by his wife and his drinking buddy.35 Of the three
qualifying circumstances alleged in all the Informations, i.e., treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, the RTC held that only the
circumstance of treachery was proved, that is, the means of execution gave the
victims no opportunity to defend themselves, and the accused deliberately and
consciously adopted said means.
Premises considered, the court believes that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the offense charged of Frustrated Murder was committed
and that the accused Rolando Las Pias, Merwin Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo
are guilt[y] thereof.
The RTC also concluded that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime
all the accused arrived together, all were armed with short firearms, and all
participated in the shooting; and after the attack, they all left together the overt
acts of the eight accused showed a common design and purpose to kill the
victims in this case. Thus, the act of one was the act of all.36
For the pain that Roger Aringo suffered by reason of the assault on him and the
injuries he sustained he is entitled to moral damage in the amount of
P25,000.00. No credible evidence was adduced for the medical expenses.
RTC-Branch 52 Decision inCriminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and

2001-5448 for Murder
The imposable penalty for Frustrated Murder is Reclusion Temporal. Applying

the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby imposes upon the said
accused the penalty of imprisonment for the period from eight (8) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and orders them to pay
jointly and severally Roger Aringo P25,000.00 as moral damage[s] and to pay
the cost of suit.
The period of their detention shall be credited in their favor.
The case against the other accused is ordered archived. Issue a standing
warrant for their arrest.32
In a joint Decision dated May 28, 2004, RTC-Branch 52 found the accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed in
conspiracy with each other.
Similar to the finding of RTC-Branch 53, RTC-Branch 52 held that Rogers
testimony as the lone eyewitness was credible, and his positive identification of
the accused-appellants prevailed over the latters defense of alibi. The RTC also
determined thatthe accused-appellants failed to prove the physical impossibility
to be at the place and time of the incident.37
The dispositive portion of the joint Decision of RTC-Branch 52 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Rolando Las

Pias, Merwin Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo each guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in Criminal Case No.
2001-5446, Criminal Case No. 2001-5447 and in Criminal Case No. 2001-5448
and the Court hereby sentences each of them to an imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua for Crim. Case No. 2001-5446, for Crim. Case No. [2001-]5447 and
for Crim. Case No. 2001-5448 and to pay the heirs of Edgardo Aringo, Benjamin
Aringo and Carlito Lasala as civil indemnity, at P50,000.00 each, jointly and
severally the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY [THOUSAND]
(P150,000.00) Pesos, also the amount of Ninety Thousand (P90,000.00) Pesos,
at P30,000.00 each victim, as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused being detained, their detention shall be credited in full in the service
of their sentence.
The case against accused Renato Las Pias, Armando Las Pias, Gilberto Las
Pias, Freddie Las Pias,and Salvador Las Pias are hereby ordered archived[.]
Let issue an alias warrant of arrest of them and the same be coursed thru the
Central,Regional, Provincial and Local PNP Command for service.38
The accused-appellants appealed the foregoing decisions to the Court of
Appeals. They prayed for their acquittal in the Murder cases; and either a similar
acquittal in the Frustrated Murder case, or a downgrading of the charge to
Attempted Murder.39
In its consolidated40 December 22, 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decisions of RTC-Br. 52 and Br. 53, viz:
And in an attempt to discredit Rogers eyewitness account pertaining to the

murder of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, the accused-appellants alleged that
he (Roger) did not really see what transpired as his left eye was blinded when
the bullet that entered his right cheek eventually ended behind his left eye. But
the Court of Appeals discredited said argument on account of the testimony of
Dr. Lopez, Rogers attending physician, that Rogers right eye remained visually
unimpaired.43
This case is now before the Court in view of the Notice of Appeal interposed by
the accused-appellants from the consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Courts Decision
The parties waived the filing of supplemental briefs and adopted their Appeal
Briefs earlier filed with the Court of Appeals.
The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the
criminal cases on the following assignment of errors: (i) that the trial court gravely
erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder despite the insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution; (ii)
granting arguendo,that the accused appellants committed an offense, they can
only be held liable for attempted murder; and (iii) that the trial court gravely erred
in not giving credence to the accused-appellants defense of alibi.44
In essence, the accused-appellants attack the consolidated disposition of the
Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for frustrated murder and three counts
of murder on the ground that the prosecution failed to discharge its function of
proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They make an issue out of Rogers
delay in reporting the crimes to the authorities, and his supposed physical
inability to observe the entire commission of the crimes. In a nutshell, they raise
reasonable doubt in view of the issues identified by the accused-appellants that
hinge on the credibility of Roger as an eyewitness.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions appealed from are affirmed.41

The appeal fails.
The Court of Appeals did not disturb both trial courts rulings since the
convictions of the accused-appellants for frustrated murder and three counts of
murder were based on the narration of a credible eyewitness, which was
independently assessed by the two trial courts.42
Particularly, in sustaining that the acts committed against Roger amounted to
frustrated murder, the Court of Appeals held that downgrading the charge to
attempted murder insteadwas not supported by expert medical opinion. On the
contrary, the attending physician explained that the injuries sustained by Roger
would haveled to his death if his injuries were neglected or medically
unattended.
After a review of the records, the Court sustains the conviction of the accusedappellants for Frustrated Murder and three counts of Murder.
The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses on the witness stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the
trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies before it.
It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses enjoy, asa rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have
the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.45
With respect to this case, the Court nevertheless carefully scrutinized the
records but found no indication thatthe trial and the appellate courts overlooked
or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of this
case. The two trial courts and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of Roger who was
an eyewitness to the crime and was himself a victim of the shooting.
Rogers testimony does not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency
that could possibly detract from his credibility. The accusedappellants were
directly identified by Roger as three of the eight perpetrators of the crimes
charged. Roger saw the shooting of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, and was
categorical and frank in his testimony. His testimony was the same with respect
to his own experience at the hands of the other accused. From his direct and
straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits, viz:
Q: Who was with you?

A: I was with Eduardo46 Aringo.
Q: What happened to this [Edgardo] Aringo?
A: He was shot.
Q: Do you know who shot this [Edgardo] Aringo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you be able to tell the Court?
[Direct Examination]
A: [They] were Armando Las Pias and Rolando who shot him.
Q: By 2:00 oclock in the early morning of May 2, 2001, do you recall of any
unusual incidentthat took place?

A: It was a caliber .38.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After this [Edgardo] Aringo was shot, what happened to him, if you know?
Q: What is that incident?
A: After he was shot heturned his body on his side.
A: At around 2:00 oclock persons arrived in our place.
Q: What happened to him after that?
Q: What did you do if you did anything?
A: After he was shot he felt his body.
A: We did nothing.
Q: And did these people do if they did anything?
A: When he was already dead Rolando kept on holding him
A: Upon arrival in our place theyimmediately fired their guns aiming at us.
Q: Who was this Rolando?
INTERPRETER:
A: There were several rounds of gunfires and some of our companions fell dead.
Q: By the way, in what particular part of that fishpen were you staying on that
particular date and time?
A: At the upper portion of the fishpen.
Witness pointing to a man in court wearing white T-shirt who identified himself
as Rolando Las Pias.
Q: What did this Rolando Las Pias do to Edgardo Aringo if Rolando did anything
to him?
A: The accused was holding [Edgardo] Aringo on his body.
A: On my right portion. They were positioned at the right portion.
Q: You made mentioned (sic) of another companion as Benjamin Aringo, what

happened to this Benjamin Aringo?
Q: Were they on the water or at the palicede?

ATTY. OLIVAR:
A: He was shot on his head.

Leading, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know who shot Benjamin Aringo?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
They were positioned at the upper portion of the palicede.
Q: Could you be able to tell the Court?
ATTY. LAGUNA:
A: It was Jimmy Delizo, Merwin Las Pias and Freddie Las Pias.
Q: What about you, what happened to you?
A: I was also shot/fired upon.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you recall who shot you?
Q: What is that?
A: Yes, sir.
A: It was a caliber [.]38.
Q: Could you tell the court?
Q: What is your distance to Benjamin Aringo at that time?
A: Renato Las Pias, Salvador Las Pias and Gilberto Las Pias.
A: Three (3) arms length.
Q: And in what part of your body were you hit?
Q: You also made mentioned (sic) another companion as Carlito Lasala, what
happened to Carlito Lasala?
A: He was also shot.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to his right che[e]k; witness pointing below the left side of his
nipple and also at the buttocks.
Q: Who shot Carlito Lasala?

ATTY. LAGUNA:
A: Merwin Las Pias, Freddie Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo.
Q: After you were shot, what happened afterwards, if you can still recall?
Q: What weapon was used?
A: It was also a caliber [.]38.
A: After I was shot they left me, and they went to my companion [Edgardo] Aringo
and held him.
Q: When your companions were shot, where were the assailants located?
Q: After they held him, what happened?
A: After they held him he was thrown into the sea.

Q: After this person you mentioned was thrown to the sea, what happened if
there was anything else that happened?
A: After Edgardo Aringo was thrown into the sea, they left already.47
A: Armando Las Pias, Renato Las Pias, Rolando Las Pias, Salvador Las
Pias, Freddie Las Pias, Gilberto Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo. Yes, sir. They
were quick ("listo") in their climbing on the fishpen.
Q: Where were they when they started firing their guns, were they already on
top of the fishpen; while they were climbing?
[Cross Examination]
A: Some were firing while already on the top of the fishpen and some were firing
while still climbing.
Q: What was your reaction when you saw these persons climbing the pole going
to the top of the fishpen?
Q: And who were those who were firing who were already on top of the fishpen?
A: We were not able to do anything.
A: Renato Las Pias, ArmandoLas Pias, Rolando Las Pias, Gilberto Las
Pias, SalvadorLas Pias and Jimmy Delizo.
Q: Where were the assailants when you said they shotyou? Were they in the
climbing position; were they still in the boat or were they in the fishpen already?
Q: And who were those firing while still climbing?
A: Some of them were on the boat,some were climbing and they were firing
shots while climbing.
A: Merwin Las Pias who was firing while still climbing.48

[Direct Examination in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446 to 5448]
Q: So no one was on top of the fishpen and firing shots?

A: There [were] already on top of the fishpen.
Q: Can you tell us who were those on the boat firing?
A: Merwin Las Pias and some of his brothers were already at the upper portion
of the fishpen.
Q: Who were the ones who first reached the top of the fishpen?
A: Renato Las Pias, Armando Las Pias, Rolando Las Pias, Freddie Las
Pias, Salvador Las Pias,Gilberto Las Pias and Jimmy Delizo.
Q: The question of the court was that you said a while ago that when they
arrived some were climbing, some were still left on the boat and some have
reached already the top of the fishpen. The question of the court is that when
you saw these actions of the accused whom did you see were the first ones who
reached the top of the fishpen?
Q: Now, after [Edgardo] was shot, what happened to him, if there was anything
that happened?
A: After [Edgardo] was shot, Rolando Las Pias helped him while Armando
slashed the throat of [Edgardo] and then he was thrown overboard.
Q: But would you be able to describeto this court how the throat of this [Edgardo]
was slashed?
A: While [Edgardo] was lying on his back he was held by Rolando this way
(witness stood up and placed his two hands downward as if pinning down
something) while Armando slashed his
([Edgardo]) throat.
Q: Did you see the weapon used in slashing the throat of [Edgardo]?
A: Yes, sir.
A: The persons that I have named.
Q: What was that?
Q: You name the first ones?
A: A knife.
Q: Would you be able to tell thiscourt how long is that knife?

A: About this size (witness demonstrated by placing his hands apart from each
other with the length of about 1 and feet.)
Q: Now, what happened next to [Edgardo] after his throat was slashed?
A: He was already dead, but still his throat was slashed and then after that, he
was thrown to the sea.49
The three Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447
and 2001-5448 charged the accused-appellants with the crime of Murder, for
shooting and killing Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, which circumstance was
attended by treachery defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz:
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
circumstances:
men, or employing means toweaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity[.]
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be
established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo,
Benjamin and Carlitowere shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three
of the eight perpetrators who killed them; (3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlitos
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by
prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin and
Carlito were neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, donein a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.51 In order for treachery
to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms
of attack employed by him.52 These elements are extant in the facts of this case
and as testified to by Roger above-quoted.
To emphasize, the victims, Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, were caught
off guard when the accused, including the accused-appellants, in the dead of
night, arrived at the fishpen and climbed the same, and without warning, opened
fire at the sleeping/resting victims to disable them. Upon disabling the victims,
the accused and the accused-appellants continued shooting at the victims
accused Armando and accused-appellant Rolando shot Edgardo and Carlito;
accused-appellants Jimmy and Merwin and accused Freddie shot Benjamin;
and accused Renato, Salvador and Gilberto shot Roger. Accused Armando
even slashed Edgardos throat after shooting him and threw his body out to the
sea53 the stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was
carried out gave the four victims no chance at all to evade the bullets and defend
themselves from the unexpected onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that the
collective acts of the accused and the accused-appellants reek of treachery.
Conspiracy
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Codestates that "conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it."54 It does not need to be proven by direct evidence and
may beinferred from the conduct before, during, and after the commission of
the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments as in conspiracy. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.55
That there was conspiracy among the accused and accused-appellants is a
matter not in issue. Both trial courts and the Court of Appeals deduced the
conspiracy among the accused/accused-appellants fromthe mode and manner
in which they perpetrated the killings. This Court is satisfied that their deduction
was warranted. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their conduct
before, during, and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy. In
thiscase, all the accused/accused-appellants were convincingly shown to have
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed
victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their
going together to the fishpen located offshore on board the same boat,but also
from their joint attack commenced simultaneously, firing successive shots at the
four victims and immediately followed by clambering upthe platform and
resuming their shooting of Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. It was also
significant that they fled together on board the boat that they arrived in as soon
as they had achieved their common purpose. Their conduct before, during,
and after the commission of the crime indicated a joint purpose, concerted
action, and concurrence of sentiments. Hence, conspiracy attended the
commission of the crimes.
As to the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2001-5445, the accusedappellants were indicted with the crime of Frustrated Murder for shooting Roger,
which was also attended by treachery, punished by Article 250 also of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 248 thereof, reading:
Article 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder or homicide. The courts, in
view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated
crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding
articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under
the provisions of Article 50.
In the same way that the murder was proved, to establish frustrated murder, the
prosecution must show that the accused performed all the acts of execution
which would kill the victim, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the offenders will.56 Here, the only survivor, Roger,
recounted that accused Renato, Salvador and Gilberto shot him on the face,
chest and buttock using a .38 gun and then left him for dead. Had it not been for
the timely medical treatment of his injuries, they would have been fatal. As
confirmed by Dr. Lopez, who testified that:
ATTY. LAGUNA:
Q: Mr. witness, your first finding here is "gunshot wound face right side, how
were you able to find this out?
A: There is a bullet hole on the face right side.
Q: What happened to the bullet?
A: Together with that we took anx-ray examination of the skull and we found the
bullet just behind the orbit of the left eye.
Q: To your knowledge, doctor, where is that bullet now?
A: I dont know. We refer the patient for that purpose to the BRTH.
Q: What is that BRTH?
A: In Legaspi City Bicol Regional Training Hospital.
Q: As a doctor, would you be able tosay whether or not this particular wound is
fatal?
A: That particular wound may not be immediately fatal but it could lead to the
death of the patient if neglected.
Q: And when you say neglected, what do you mean by that, doctor?
A: Without medical attention or assistance extended to the patient.57
Thus, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that frustrated murder
was committed. In view of the preceding discussion, there is no more reason to
entertain the issue raised by the accused-appellants that the charge of frustrated
murder be downgraded to attempted murder. And although only the three
accused-appellants were apprehended, they shall be held liable for the acts
oftheir five other co-accused since the prosecution similarly established
conspiracy with respect to the frustrated murder case the act of one is the act
of all.
Defenses of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail
in light of the positive identification made by one of their victims, Roger. Alibi and
denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused
as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony.58 The accused-appellants alibis that they were at different places at
the time of the shooting, and that family members and or their friends vouched
for their whereabouts are negative and self-serving assertions and cannot not
be given more evidentiary value vis-vis the affirmative testimony of a credible
witness. The accused-appellants and Roger, at one point,resided in the same
barangay and, are, therefore, familiar with one another. Therefore,Roger could
not have been mistaken on the accused-appellants identity, including the five
other accused who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility
involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present
at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.59
Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted
requirements. As held by the Court of Appeals, "[j]udicial notice was taken of the
fact that Barangay Bitan-o in Sorsogon City where the accused claimed they
were at the time of the shooting and the area of the sea adjacent to the
municipality of Castilla where the incident took place are neighboring sites that
can be negotiated with the use of a banca in one hour or less."60 Certainly, the
distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at
the fishpen, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be,
unnoticed.
prision mayor,which is correctly within the range of prision mayor under the
Revised Penal Code, the Court will no longer disturb the minimum term fixed.
However, the maximum term must be taken from reclusion temporal in its
medium period, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Finally, the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecutions
witnesses to discredit their testimonies.1wphi1 Absent any reason or motive for
a prosecution witness to perjure himself, the logical conclusion is that no such
motive exists, and his testimony is, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.61
In Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446 to 5448 (for three counts of Murder), the RTC
awarded in each case the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P30,000.00 as moral damages to the victims heirs. But to conform to recent
jurisprudence, the foregoing awards must be raised as follows: P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and another P75,000.00 as moral damages.63 The Court notes,
however, thatboth the RTC and the Court of Appeals overlooked the award of
exemplary damages. When a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is
justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code.64 Thus, conformably with the
above, the legal heirs of each victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.65
The Penalties
From the foregoing discussion, the Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellants are guilty of three counts of Murder and Frustrated
Murder.
For Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448 (for Murder), the
prosecution successfullyestablished the presence of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery in the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. The crime of murder
qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion perpetuato death. There
being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
felony, the accused appellants were correctlymeted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, for each separate count of Murder, conformably to Article 63(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, for Criminal Case No. 2001-5445 (for Frustrated Murder), the
indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court in this case is eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5)
months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The period is
incorrect in sofar as the maximum penalty is concerned.
Article 61, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
frustrated murderis one degree lower than reclusion perpetuato death, which is
reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporalhas a range of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no modifying circumstance in the
commission of the frustrated murder and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximumof the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion
temporal in its medium period, and the minimumof the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor, which is one degree lower
than reclusion temporal, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years.62 Since the RTC imposed the minimum term of 8 years and 1 dayof
The Proper Indemnities
And in Criminal Case No. 2001-5445 (for Furstrated Murder) the RTC awarded
to Roger P25,000.00 asmoral damages. But current jurisprudence dictates that
the samemust be increased to P40,000.00.66 Moreover, Roger is also entitled
to exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00, in view of the presence of
treachery as above reasoned.
Further, an interest at the rate ofsix percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed
on all the damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment
until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.67
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals consolidated
Decision dated December 22, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00401 and in CAG.R. CR No. 28975, affirming the Decisions promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon,Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446
(Murder), 2001-5447 (Murder), 2001-5448 (Murder), and Branch 53 in Criminal
Case No. 2001-5445 (Frustrated Murder), finding accused-appellants Rolando
Las Pias, Jimmy Delizo and Merwin Las Pias GUILTYbeyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of Murder and Frustrated Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONas follows:
In Criminal Case Nos. 2001-5446, 2001-5447 and 2001-5448, where the
conviction of the accused-appellants for three separate counts of Murder and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of Murder, are AFFIRMED
(1) The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;

In Criminal Case No. 2001-5445, the conviction of the accusedappellants for
Frustrated Murder is likewise AFFIRMED. But while the Court affirms their
conviction, the indeterminate penalty to be imposed instead is eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Further, the amount of damages awarded are adjusted
The accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay legal interest on all damages
awarded in this case at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 207949
July 23, 2014

vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON,
MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON,
Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accusedappellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron
(Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron
(Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick)
dropped his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in
Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another
brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped.2 Records show that three
(3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a
bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark
green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message,
Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At around 10 oclock in
the morning of the same day, he received a phone call from Edwins kidnappers
who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who
demanded the payment of ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had P50,000.00. On May
19, 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to
release Edwin in exchange for the amount of P110,000.00. Roderick was then
instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to
Batangas to deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him
to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light
when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another
call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at
the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled
up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the
men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to
their car and drove away.6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin,
headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor
Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an
employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he
was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off
Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the
condition that he will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave
information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June
12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the
PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas,
which Roderick identified.9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10
which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private
persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and
deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose
of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was made as a
condition of the victims release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the
victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and interposed the
defenses of denial and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that
on said date and time, they were in their respective houses when they were
taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to Camp Crame,
and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for
himself, averred that at around 8 oclock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while
walking on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following him.
Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded him inside,
blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was
made to sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty.
Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate
of Death13 with Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that
he died on May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants
of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses which clearly established that it was the
accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and,
consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accusedappellants respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not substantiated.
It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, which is punishable by death. However, in view of the
suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the
RTC found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the
accused-appellants individual participation was geared toward a joint purpose
and criminal design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
prove that the victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually
killed,19 a fact which is supported by the subject certificate of death, it did not
consider said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs
conviction of accused-appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to clearly
establish all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense,
any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating public authority; (3)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public
officer.21 It likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the
brother of the victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the
same purpose or common design, and they were united in its execution.23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants claims of torture were never

supported, and that Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and
was afforded competent and independent counsel in its execution.24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants
are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for
the trial court to determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing that the
trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the
judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
high respect by the appellate court.25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which they found to be straightforward
and consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly established that
accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took the victim Edwin and
deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of
extorting ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or
misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling
reason to disturb its factual findings on this score.1wphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the
Court likewise finds the conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the
CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and
when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is
collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the
extent of their respective participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not
essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the
acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and
community of interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case
clearly show that accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the
commission of the crime and that their acts emanated from the same purpose
or common design, showing unity in its execution,29 the CA, affirming the trial
court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the
ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accusedappellants have
committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victims (i.e.,
Edwins) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information,30 and (b)
clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was
not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be
considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal,
as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the
appealed judgment.31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA
7659, Article 267 of the same Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when
the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32

In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous
crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and
sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the
accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with
murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special
complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated
the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the
killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied;
citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction must be
modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of
death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the
imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could,
as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not
eligible for parole.34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil
indemnity as well as damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v.
Quiachon,35 the Court explained that even if the death penalty was not to be
imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award
of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
crime.36 In the present case, considering that both the qualifying circumstances
of ransom and the death of the victim during captivity were duly alleged in the
information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00
must therefore be awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this
case. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock
and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral
damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in
this case, that the kidnap victims family suffered mental anguish, fright, and
serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such,
and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the
confluence of the aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others
from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed
on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accusedappellants herein are
equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family
of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1) P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 209373
July 30, 2014
JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAOJAN, Petitioners,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209414
Nissan with a total value of P40,000.00, belonging to the City government of

Ilagan, represented by Atty. Rommel Abragan of the City Legal Office, Iligan
City, withoutthe consent and against the will of the said owner in the aforesaid
sum of P40,000.00, Philippine Currency.2
During the arraignment held on February 16, 2006, accused petitioners entered
a plea of not guilty tothe offense charged. Pre-trial was then conducted and
closed on July 25, 2006. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
ANECITO TANGIAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This treats of the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
in relation to Rule 125 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN, dated
January 21, 2013 and September 10, 2013, respectively. Said rulings affirmed
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision convicting petitioners of qualified theft.
The Facts
Petitioners Joel Yongco, Julieta Lafiojan, and Anecito Tangian, Jr. were
employees of the City Government of Iligan. Tangian worked as a garbage truck
driver for the city, while Yongco and Laojanwere security guards assigned to
protect the premises of the City Engineers Office (CEO). On November 14,
2005, an Information was filed before the RTC, Branch 5 in Iligan City, Lanao
del Norte charging the three with Qualified Theft. The information docketed as
Crim. Case No. 12092 reads:
That on or about April 16, 2005, in the City of Ilagan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then regular and
casual employees of the City government as drivers and helpers respectively,
of a garbage truck with Plate No. 496, conspiring and confederating togetherand
mutually helping each other, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon them
by the city government, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following articles, to
wit: one (1) unit transmission, boom, differential of Tamaraw and l-beam of
The prosecution presented as one ofits witnesses a casual employee of the city
government, Pablo Salosod,who testified that on April 16, 2005 at around 1:30
a.m., while attending a wake at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, he was fetched
and requestedby petitioner Tangian to accompany him to the CEO. At the office
garage, Salosod and his fellow garbage collectors were allegedly directed by
petitioners Tangian and Yongco to load car parts that petitioners considered
aswaste items, the subject items of the theft, on the truck driven by Tangian.
They then drove to Tominobo, Iligan City where the materials were unloaded in
front of Delfin Junk Store, and before the truck left the shop, Salosod allegedly
saw petitioner Laojan giving a thumbs-up sign to Tangian. On the way back,
Tangian allegedly confessed to Salosod that it was Laojan who requested that
the items be brought at the junk shop. Another employee, Rommel Ocaonilla,
corroborated the testimony of Salosod.
Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified witnessing the
unloading of the items in front of the junk store, after which, Laojan covered the
items up with a sack. The following morning, he allegedly saw Laojans brotherin-law, who coincidentally works at the shop, take the items inside.
Witnesses Dioscoro Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao, employee and consultant
of the city government, respectively, testified that they conducted investigations
relative to the incidentand found out that the items stolen consisted of one
Nissan transmission,one unit boom, one Nissan I-beam, and one differential of
Tamaraw, with total valuation of PhP 12,000. Upon their investigation, they
recommended tothe city legal officer the filing of the present criminal case
against the three petitioners.
In defense, petitioners testified intheir behalves. Their testimony is summarized
by the CA in the Decision now on appeal in the following wise:
Joel Yongco, 34, single, x x x and a casual employee, testified that, on August
9, 2004, he was issued a Job Order and detailed at the Civil Security Unit (CSU).
He was assigned to guard the building installation of the CEO. On April 15, 2005,
he was on duty with his companion, one Mr. Quintana. They relieved Laojan
and one Mr. Enumerables. Laojan gave him (Yongco) four gate passes and
saidthat the area would have to be cleared because the "Bacod" Iliganvehicle
would be arriving. Yongco read the entries on one of[the] gate passes.
Theyread: "Loaded assorted scraps with remark to be thrown atthe dump site."
At the bottom of the gate pass was the "note" of EngineerCabahug with the
signatures of the guards, Laojan and Enumerables. From 5:00 PM to 12:00
midnight on April 15, 2005, there was only one shipment of scrap iron to the
dump site. The dump truck driven by Tangian entered the CEO premises at
around 11:00 oclock in the evening of the same date. Tangian went to the yard
where the scrap iron were situated and asked Yongco to accompany and help
him. Tangian gathered the scrap materials and the four of them (Tangian,
Yongco, and the 2 helpers of Tangian) loaded the said scrap to the dump truck.
At around 12:45 P.M., after loading the items, Tangian drove away without giving
a gate pass to the guards on duty. Yongco did not ask Tangian for a gate pass
because Yongco had one companion in the guard house to get the gate pass.
Julieto Laojan, 48, who was working in the CSU division for 20 years and
assigned to guard the CEO, testified that he was not on duty on April 15 and 16,
2005; he was on duty on April 14, 2005 at 7:00 A.M. up to April 15, 2005 of the
same time. When Yongco and Quintana relieved him on April 15, 2005 at 7:00
in the morning, he gave the four gate passes which were used to ship
outassorted scrap irons to them to be kept for the file. Engineer Cabahug was
the one who directed the removal of the scrap iron because the area of the CEO
would have to be cleared since new trucks for the government were coming. His
house, which was along the national highway, was about 40-50 metersaway
from Delfin Junk Store. He knew Oliveros Garcia who was a kagawad of
Tominobo, Iligan City. Aside from that, Garcia had filed an ejectment case
against him (Laojan), which was still pending in court.
xxxx
Anecito Tangian, Jr., 59, garbage truck driver at the City Engineers Office for
16 years, testified that his highest level of educational attainment was Grade I.
It was his tour of duty on April 15, 2005 at 9:00 oclock in the evening up to April
16, 2005 at 6:00 oclock in the morning. At around 5:30 in the morning of April
15, 2005, Laojan asked him to load scrap materials onto the garbage truck and
to bring them to the Delfin Junk Store in Tominobo. He asked Laojan if there
were any problems about the loading ofthe said items. Laojan answered that
there were no problems about the loading of the same, that the City Garbage
would have to be cleared considering that "BACOD" trucks would be arriving at
thatarea. He followed Laojan because the latter was the guard at the City
Garage. When hearrived for duty at the City Garage at around 9:00 in the
evening, Yongco asked him if Laojan already informed him about the loading
of the items. After that he checked up the garbage truck while Yongco and the
two helpers were loading the items. He did not know how many items were
loaded because he only helped the three of them during the loading of the
differential. After loading the scrap materials, Tangian and the two helpers drove
away from the City Garage. They dropped by the Cosmo Funeral Homes for
more than an hour before they proceeded to Tominobo. When they reached
Delfin Junk Store, Laojan gave a thumbs-up sign to Tangian, which meant
okay. He then left and started his work collecting garbage.3
On April 11, 2008, the RTC held petitioners liable for qualified theft via
conspiracy. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Julieto
Laojan, Anecito Tangian, Jr., and Joel Yongco GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft defined and penalized under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and the said accused are
hereby sentencedto a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, eight (8)
monthsand twenty (20) days of prision correccionalmaximum as the minimum
term, to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayormaximum, as the
maximum term, of their indeterminate sentence including the accessory
penalties thereof.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners, in their appeal, prayed that the CA reverse the RTC
Decision. Petitioner Tangian reiterated in his Brief that he should not be
considered as a conspirator since he merely innocentlyobeyed Laojans
instructions on the assumption that the latter was his superior and that Laojan
was authorized to get rid of the scrap materials in the CEO premises and that
he had no criminal intent whatsoever.
In their joint brief, Yongco and Laojan also disclaimed the existence of a
conspiracy. Yongco, in his defense, argued that Tangian and his two other
helpers asked for his assistance which he extended ingood faith, in view of
Laojans statement earlier that day that the office garage has to be cleared.
Laojan, on the other hand, insisted that he cannot be considered as a
conspirator since he was not present at the time of taking, and that the mere
giving of a thumbs-up sign to Tangian when the latter delivered the materials to
the junk shop does not amount to conspiracy.
On January 21, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying petitioners
appeals. In affirming the RTC Decision in toto, the CA ruled that there was
indeed conspiracy because Tangian could nothave taken out the items without
a gate pass, but with the security guard Yongcos participation, he was able to
do justthat. The CA also ruled that it is implausible that Tangian would just leave
the items in front of the junk shop unattended. Thus, the appellate court
appreciated the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Laojans
presence was not merely coincidental and that his thumbs-up and his
subsequent act of covering the materials with sacks indicate that the plan was
for him to receive the said items. Petitioners, via motion for reconsideration,
sought the CAs reversal of the Decision only for the appellate court to deny the
same through its challenged Resolution dated September 10, 2013.
Not contented with the adverted Decision of the CA as reiterated in the
Resolution, petitioners Yongco and Laojan jointly filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari while petitioner Tangian separately filed his own.1wphi1 The two
petitions were later consolidated by this Court for resolution herein.
The Issue
As with most criminal cases, the main issue in the instant case is whether or not
the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction. Central to resolving this issue
is determining whether or not there indeed existed conspiracy between
petitioners in committing the offense charged.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are bereft of merit.
Article 310, in relation to Art. 308,of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines
Qualified Theft, thusly:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where

trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fishupon the same or shall gather
fruits, cereals, or other forestor farm products.
xxxx
ART. 310. Qualified Theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle
or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fishtaken from
a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance. (emphasis added)
Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified Theft,
committed with grave abuse of discretion, can simply be enumerated as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.5
As correctly observed by the appellatecourt, all of the elements of Qualified Theft
are present in this case, viz:
There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential
assembly, and I-beam) which are the subject matter of this case belong to the
CEO of Iligan City.1wphi1 There is no dispute that these items, although
considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste
by the proper authority or office. Nor have they been marked for proper disposal.
Unless properly disposed in accordance with Section 379 of the Local
Government Code, these items are still government properties or owned by the
City of Iligan.
There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and
were already under completeand effective control of the persons taking the
same. This is because these items were loaded onto the garbage truck driven
by Tangian and brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store.
Apparently, the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of
Iligan City because there was no gate pass issued to that effect. Evidence shows
that when the garbage truck left the premises of the CEO, no gate pass was
surrendered by Tangian. Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate pass on the
pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Since these items
werebrought to the junk store, intent to gain becomes obvious. The presumption
of animus lucrandihas not been overturned.
It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of
confidence. The accused in this case, itbears stressing, were guards and drivers
with access tothe entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words,they
enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their employer (the City
ofIligan) to haveaccess throughout the CEO premises on account of their
respective duties. More so since the primary function of the CSU is to guard the
properties, including the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence
that was gravely abused by them that makes the theft qualified.6
Concisely stated, the fact of taking without consent is indubitable. Indeed,
petitioners hinge their plea for acquittal and supporting argument primarily on
their lack of criminal intent and the observed conspiracy.
Addressing the issue head on, We uphold the findings of the appellate court. No
error can be ascribed to the CA when it determined the existence of conspiracy
between and among petitioners in this case.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it.7 Well-settled is the rule that in
conspiracy, direct proof of a previousagreement is not necessary as it may be
deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated.8 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or
after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough
to reveal a community of criminaldesign, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently
made by evidenceof a chain of circumstances.9
In the case at bar, even though there is no showing of a prior agreement among
the accused, their separate acts taken and viewed together are actually
connected and complementedeach other indicating a unity of criminal design

and purpose.10
Tangians complicity in the illicit deedwas manifest from the fact, as he himself
admitted, that he was the one who personally transported the stolen items from
the CEO to the junkshop. His claim that he was not aware of any irregularity in
the act he performed is rendered dubious by his 16 years of service as truck
driver for the City of Iligan. To be sure, his record of service argues against his
claim of ignorance of the standard protocol that a gate pass to be issued by the
CEO property custodian should first be secured before taking out items from the
CEO compound, including alleged waste materials. He should also know better
than to assume that Laojan can authorize the withdrawal of items without the
requisite gate pass since Laojans duty, as security guard, is precisely to
prevent the same.
Similarly, Yongcos claim of good faith is belied by his own admission that he
knew of the office procedure that a gate pass is required every time something
is taken out of the CEO premises. In fact, four gate passes were given to him
that morning by Laojan, covering waste materials withdrawn during the latters
shift. At the very least, this should have reminded him of his duty to demand a
gate pass for property leaving the CEO premises. Neither memory lapses
orlapses in the performance of his duty will explain Yongcos failure to demand
a gate pass.The only viable explanation is that he was in connivance with other
petitioners.11
Lastly, the RTC, with valid reason, tagged Laojan as having instigated and
marshalled the entire scheme. To quote the trial court:
x x x As shown above, it appears that Laojan broached the idea to Yongco that
the items subject of this case will be withdrawn under the pretext of clearing the
CEO scrap yard of unserviceable waste materials. Then Laojan gave Yongco
4 gate passes apparently to be used to coverup or camouflage the actual
withdrawallater that evening. Then Laojan told Tangian to load the items under
the same ploy of clearing the scrap yard of unserviceable waste materials and
that they will not encounter any problem. Finally, Laojan was seen by Brgy.
Kag. Oliveros Garcia at 1:30 oclock in the morning of April 16, 2005 receiving
the items as they were dumped near the Delfin Junk Store,Tominobo, Iligan City.
After the items were dumped, Laojan then gave Tangian the "thumbs-up" sign,
meaning everything is okay clear proof of meeting of minds between Tangian
and Laojan, and their collusion to steal the items under the pretext of disposing
unserviceable waste materials. This non-verbal "thumbs-up" sign was also
seenby the truck helper Salosod.12 x x x
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once conspiracy is established, all
the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or
degree of their participation.13 The guilt of one is the guilt of all. It is common
design which is the essence of conspiracyconspirators may act separately or
together in different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result.
The character and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by dismembering
it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a wholeacts done
to giveeffect to conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts.14 Applying this
doctrine in the case at bench, it can reasonably be concluded that despite
Laojans lack of physical participation in hauling the items to Tangians truck
and bringing them to the junk shop, he can still be liable for Qualified Theft via
conspiracy. All told, there is no cogent reason for us todisturb the findings of the
appellate court, affirmatory of those of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The CA's January 21, 2013 Decision and September
10, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 205298
September 10, 2014
EOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and
samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several
lacerations on the different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all
the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but
which,nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical
intervention applied on him that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and
damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 dated 31 July
2012 and Resolution3 dated 11 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 33776, affirming the Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos.
L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.
The Facts
Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (p~titioner) was charged, in conspiracy
with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso
Bni for frustrated homicide and homicide.
The Information5 in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused in conspiracywith each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations
and contusions on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performedall
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical
intervention applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and
damage of the said Robert dela Cruz.
accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information7 was filed when the
victim Freddie dela Cruz died:
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his
body, which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Freddie dela Cruz.
Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested.
Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and remainat large. Petitioner, Pedro and
Narciso all pled not guilty to the charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina
dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata
V. Fernandez.
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and Pedro Quintos.
Narciso Buni jumped bail before he could testify. Petitioners sister was also
scheduled to testify, but since her testimony would only be corroborative, the
prosecution admitted her testimony.8
The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie
dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were
walking along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on
their way to the town proper when they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly
Quintos, Lando Quintos,Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a
samurai, Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was
holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and
Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up
with them.
Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz withthe samurai, but the latter parried the attack
with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz attempted to gain control of the samurai, but
Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert
dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.
Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter
to fall face up. Petitioner joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while
defending himself with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a
few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruzs chest with the
same stone he usedto hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards
Robert dela Cruz. Pedro pulledFelomina dela Cruzs hair, slashed her nape with
the samurai, and then kicked her to the ground.
Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the
dela Cruzes because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left
when they were done, and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the
victims and call for help.
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the
hospital. They were treated for the injuries sustained from the attack.
After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz diedfrom his injuries. Before he died, Freddie
dela Cruz identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.
The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15
January 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo
Oyando came to the Quintos house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the
front portion ofthe house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert dela Cruz
punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to
Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was
holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz
approached the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got
slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the
ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting
with Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his
brother Lando. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not
remember how many times hehacked Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified
him, and Pedro went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and
Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution.
Petitioner was found guilty for the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela
Cruz. However, the trial court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the
wounds of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the appreciation
of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.9
The dispositive portion ofthe Joint Decision dated 20 October 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion
temporalwhich is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is
Prision Mayorin its full extent, the range of which is from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor
of the accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL,
as maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the
amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are
meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day of
arresto mayoras minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccionalas maximum.
The Issues
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in
the amount of Php 1,650.00and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day or
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the conviction, despite the
prosecutions failure to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of conspiracy should
not be leftto conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to present
evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance
ofa common design to kill.12
The Courts Ruling
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages
in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php
15,000.00.
The petition is unmeritorious.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone
preventive imprisonment,they shall be credited in the service of their sentences
with the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the
conditionsprovided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
The review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to

questions of law. This Court does not weigh all over again the evidence already
consideredin the proceedings below.13 The narrow ambit of review prescribed
under this rule allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of course,
admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual
milieu justifies relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or
conjectures, or overlooked undisputed facts which, if duly considered, lead to a
different conclusion.14
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court gravely erred in convicting them despite the
prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint
Decision dated October 20, 2010of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 39, inCriminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition.
Review of Questions of Fact Improper
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts, alleging that had the said courts given weight to the defense evidence,
conviction would not have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court
to review the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings
below.
A question of law arises when there isdoubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.15 For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.16 Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.17
Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo
indulged in conjectures and surmises. However, a careful reading of the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts shows that such is not the case here.
The discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence from both sides,
weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the
evidenceof the prosecution and the defense alike.
Uniform findings of factof the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect,
and in the absence of any compelling reason to deviate therefrom, are final and
conclusive upon this Court. We thus proceed with our review without disturbing
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. His argumentrevolves mainly on self-defense, defense of
relatives and absence of conspiracy.
We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution
witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively
and consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events.
Their testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors
who attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the
statement ofFreddie dela Cruz before the latter died.
We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible.
The assessment ofthe trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court,
and noneof the exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial court
found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any motive to testify falsely
against the accused.
Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and
hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking self-defense. Because of Pedros
admissions, he and his co-conspirators assumed the burden to establish such
defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, the same
admissions would lead to their conviction.18
We held in People v. Nugas:
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the States evidence,
because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence
ofthe crime, and establishing selfdefense does not require orinvolve the negation
of any of the elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression
amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused
claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least

any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression.19
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of
their brother Lando.20 The defense of relatives argument likewise fails in light
of the lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. For the accused to
be entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete or incomplete,
it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if
there is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.21
The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-taken:
We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants allegations that they were
acting in self-defense because the victims were committing unlawful aggression.
We foundthe following loopholes:
First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the
brothers of Pedro tocome out of the house. No actual sudden or imminent attack,
however, was performed. It has been ruled that mere intimidating or threatening
words, even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression. Thus, in People
vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and
convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the partof the victim. The unlawful
aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least
imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked
is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means
enough. Unlawful aggressionpresupposes an actual or imminent danger on the
life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening attitude
of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers
to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is
clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance
or posture.
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers
to go out, but then, Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes
had some anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela
Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina
to allegedly get a bolo which was in Felominas possession and concealed under
a towel. Ifthis is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm himself
to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedros narration, itcannot be
definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants
with the determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.
forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered
almost similar lacerated wounds.
Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos
who was lying on the ground and being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela
Cruz. According to him, he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab Lando.
Pedro would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also involved in the
fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that
it was he alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his
brothers, including Lando, were "just there, sir, pacifying."
It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of
the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a
determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained,
the wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate
accused-appellants claim of self-defense.
Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accusedappellants did not report the incident to the police. During crossexamination,
Pedro admitted that:
Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that
happened on January 15 as what you are telling now?
A: No sir.
Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were
treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or even to your barangay the alleged
incident which you are now narrating, am I correct?
A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I
was brought directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who
vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident tothe
police. Pedros alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did notprevent
them from doing so. Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando;
not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the police
to report the alleged attack upon them by the delaCruzes. This omission,
therefore, casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims
negate[s] the accused-appellants claim of self-defense. According to the
medical certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest,
septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was
further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation of left and right hand."
Meanwhile, with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr.
Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the
We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the

prosecution and this Court believes that the version of the latter is more credible
and consistent with the truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they
attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case against the
accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.22
Existence of Conspiracy
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his
participation in the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also
argues that his mere presence during the said attacks does not by itself show
concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.
Petitioners presence during the commission of the crime was wellestablished
as he himself testified to that fact.1wphi1 Assuming that he was merely present
during the attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from
criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or
detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof.23
Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it
indicate the lack thereof Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the
acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.24 In fact, the prosecution
established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela
Cruz.
In People v. De Leon,25 we held:.
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to
achieve their. common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.
The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz
and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and
design in the commission of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and appellate
courts,.establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all
of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter
were retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a
different task. After the attacks, all the accused left the felled dela Cruzes for
dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of
one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was
in order.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CAG.R. CR No. 33776.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
G.R. No. 207629
October 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL VILLALBA Y

DURAN AND RANDY VILLALBA Y SARCO, Accused-Appellants.
Amora),11 the investigator assigned to the case and the apprehending officer of
accused-appellants.
Before the Court is the Decision1 dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00844-MIN, which affirmed, with modifications
as to the amount of damages imposed, the Judgment[2 dated February 18, 2010
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33, in Criminal Case
No. 11736, finding accused-appellants Arnel Villalba y Duran (Arnel) and Randy
Villalba y Sarco (Randy) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of
Maximillian Casona y Lacroix (Maximillian).
The documentary exhibits of the prosecution consisted of the respective Sworn

Statements, all dated May 1, 2006, of Josephine, Homer, and Frederick;12 the
police blotter entry dated April 29, 2006 which reported Maximillian's stabbing
and death;13 the police blotter entry dated April 30, 2006 which reported the
subsequent arrests of accused-appellants for illegal gambling and concealment
of deadly weapon;14 the Affidavit of Apprehension dated April 30, 2006 jointly
executed by P/Insp. Amora, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Antonio A. Claros,
Police Officer (PO) 3 Rey Gabrielle B. Maderal, and PO2 Judan Q. Alvizo;15
three photographs depicting Frederick's identification of accused-appellants as
Maximillian's assailants;16 a sketch and description of the puncture wounds
found on Maximillian's body prepared by Dr. Urag;17 Maximillian's Certificate of
Death;18 and the hospital and burial expenses in the total amount of P55,225.60
incurred by Josephine.19 These exhibits were all admitted in evidence by the
RTC in its Order dated February 29, 2008.20
In the Information dated May 1, 2006 filed with the RTC, accused-appellants
were charged as follows:
The prosecution's evidence established the following version of events:
DECISION
That on or about the 29th day of April 2006 at 2:30 o'clock in the morning, more
or less, at Capitol Avenue, near Gaisano Mall, Butuan City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab
one MAXIMILLIAN CASONA Y LACROIX, with the use of an ice pick, hitting the
latter at his left breast and left portion of his stomach, which directly caused his
death incurring damages which maybe proven in Court.3
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty during their arraignment on August 8,
2006.4
At the pre-trial conference held on July 19, 2007,5 the parties stipulated only as
to the time and place of the stabbing incident, i.e., at around 2:00 in the early
morning of April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano Mall in Butuan City. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of three persons who witnessed the
stabbing incident: Maximillian's widow Josephine B. Casona (Josephine),6
Homer Ferdinand B. Hermosura (Homer),7 and Frederick L. Apolinario
(Frederick).8 The prosecution also called to the witness stand the physicians
who attended to Maximillian before his death, namely, cardiologist Dr. Annalisa
A. Gonzalez (Gonzalez)9 and surgeon Dr. Edesio C. Urag (Urag).10 Last to testify
for the prosecution was Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Inocencio T. Amora (P/Insp.
Maximillian, a college instructor, attended a farewell party for his students at

Moff s Restaurant and Cocktail Lounge along JC Aquino Avenue in Butuan City
on the night of April 28, 2006. Maximillian was accompanied by his wife
Josephine and their friends Frederick, Homer, and Homer's wife Marilou.
Around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, Josephine begged Maximillian that
they already go home. Josephine reminded Maximillian of the lateness of the
hour and of the great amount of liquor that he had already consumed.
Maximillian still did not want to leave, but Josephine insisted. Angry, Maximillian
rushed out of the restaurant and headed towards the direction of the Gaisano
Mall in Butuan City. Josephine asked Frederick to catch up with Maximillian.
Josephine, Homer, and Marilou then trailed about 10 meters behind Maximillian
and Frederick.
When they turned the corner of JC Avenue and Capitol Drive, Maximillian and
Frederick chanced upon accused-appellants and their girlfriends, Maximillian's
group and accused-appellants' group did not know each other prior to the early
morning of April 29, 2006. Maximillian suddenly ordered accused-appellants to
wear their shirts, and then asked accused-appellant Arnel, "How much is that?"
referring to accused-appellant Arnel's girlfriend. Frederick intervened and told
accused-appellant Arnel, "Brod, don't mind him. He is a little bit drunk." Accusedappellant Arnel replied, "That was nothing, Kuya." However, Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel continued to stare at each other. Moments later,
Maximillian tried to get hold of accused-appellant Arnel's left arm but the latter
was able to wave away Maximillian's hand. Accused-appellant Randy blocked
Maximillian's way and held Maximillian's hand/s as accused-appellant Arnel hit

Maximillian on the chest and abdomen. At this point, it appeared to eyewitnesses
Frederick, Josephine, and Homer that Maximillian was just being boxed by
accused-appellant Arnel. Frederick tried to break the scuffle, as Josephine and
Flomer, who were only five meters away, came running to help. Accusedappellants stepped back and then ran away. Despite telling Josephine that he
was stabbed, Maximillian still chased accused-appellants, with Frederick and
Homer at his heels. Stones were thrown their way but none of them were hit. All
of a sudden, Maximillian fell to the ground. Josephine checked Maximillian's
body yet found no blood or wound. Assuming that Maximillian was simply drunk
and in pain because of the fist fight, Josephine, with the help of Frederick and
Homer, brought Maximillian home on board a motorized "trisikad." During the
ride home, Maximillian was unconscious but snoring heavily. However, when
they were already at their house, Josephine felt that Maximillian had no more
pulse and his eyes had turned white. Josephine, again with Frederick and
Homer, rushed Maximillian to Manuel J. Santos Hospital.
Maximillian arrived at the hospital at around 3:00 in the morning of April 29, 2006.
Dr. Gonzalez, the attending physician at the emergency room, noticed that
Maximillian was already unresponsive and had no more heartbeat. Dr. Gonzalez
performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation and was able to revive Maximillian. Dr.
Gonzalez conducted close physical examination of Maximillian's body and
discovered two hardly visible stab wounds located at the latter's left chest and
abdomen. Dr. Gonzalez immediately referred Maximillian to Dr. Urag, a surgeon.
As a result of his own examination, Dr. Urag reported that Maximillian's stab
wounds both had a lateral width of about 3-5 mm, and that the stab wound on
Maximillian's chest penetrated the pericardium of his heart, which caused the
entry of fluid into the said organ. The delay in the discovery of the fatal chest
wound and the lack of hospital facilities rendered it too late to save Maximillian.
Resultantly, Maximillian died of "Cardio Pulmonary Arrest secondary to
Pericardial Tamponade secondary to penetrating stab wound left chest." Dr.
Urag called Maximillian's wounds as puncture wounds, which could be caused
by any sharp instrument or bladed weapon, or even nails.
Josephine reported Maximillian's stabbing and death to the police on April 29,
2006. P/Insp. Amora, then the Chief of the General Investigation Section of the
Butuan City Police Office, took charge of the investigation of Maximillian's case.
P/Insp. Amora conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime and was
able to identify accused-appellants as the suspects. The following day, April 30,
2006, P/Insp. Amora came upon information that accused-appellants were in Pl Barangay Imadejas Subdivision, Butuan City. P/Insp. Amora proceeded to the
given location and there found accused-appellants playing and betting on a
game of cards. The police immediately arrested accused-appellants for illegal
gambling and brought them to the police station. Upon being informed of
accused-appellants' arrest, Josephine and Frederick arrived at the police station

and identified accused-appellants as Maximillian's assailants.
Accused-appellants testified in their own defense.
Accused-appellant Arnel21 while admitting his presence at the time and scene of
the crime, narrated a different version of the events surrounding Maximillian's
stabbing.
According to accused-appellant Arnel, at around 2:30 in the morning of April 29,
2006, he was with his girlfriend Jenny and friends Johndale and Tata in the
vicinity of Gaisano Mall, waiting for a tricycle. When Jenny was about to board a
tricycle, four persons, who all looked drunk, came out of a store. One of these
four persons, who turned out to be Maximillian, approached and asked accusedappellant Arnel how much was the girl he was with. Maximillian's crude remark
angered Jenny, who immediately left with Tata, on board the tricycle. A
companion of Maximillian approached accused-appellant Arnel and requested
him to bear with Maximillian who was already drunk. Accused-appellant Arnel
expressed that he understood the situation. However, Maximillian suddenly
blocked the way of accused-appellant Arnel and Johndale. Maximillian punched
accused-appellant Arnel, hitting the latter on the neck, just below his left ear.
Johndale was able to run away. Accused-appellant Arnel asked Maximillian why
the latter hit him. Instead of answering the question, Maximillian threw back
another question, asking if accused-appellant Amel was brave. Accusedappellant Arnel looked for a stone to throw at Maximillian to fend off the latter,
but saw none. What accused-appellant found and grabbed as a weapon to
defend himself was a barbeque stick, about six inches long. Accused-appellant
Arnel stabbed Maximillian once with the barbecue stick on the left side of the
body, after which, the barbecue stick broke. When stabbed, Maximillian did not
show any reaction but just walked away from accused-appellant. At that point,
Maximillian's three companions also began to attack accused-appellant Arnel.
After their attack, Maximillian's three companions left. Accused-appellant Arnel
sat down for a while near Gaisano Mall, then went home. The following day,
accused-appellant Arnel was apprehended by the police. Accused-appellant
Arnel was surprised to learn from the police that Maximillian had died. Accusedappellant Arnel insisted that he had no intention of killing Maximillian and denied
any knowledge of how Maximillian sustained the second stab wound. Accusedappellant Arnel further clarified that it was his friend Johndale, not his cousin
accused-appellant Randy, who was with him when he encountered Maximillian
the early morning of April 29, 2006.
Accused-appellant Randy22 narrated on the witness stand that he was at his
house in Barangay Doongan with his wife and children in the early morning of
April 29, 2006. Accused-appellant Randy knew nothing about Maximillian's
stabbing and death. Accused-appellant Randy was with his wife at the house of
a traffic aide called Puspus in Lower Doongan when he was accosted by the
police. The police asked accused-appellant Randy for the whereabouts of his
cousin accused-appellant Arnel. When accused-appellant Randy answered that
he did not know, the police immediately arrested him and brought him to the
police station. At the police station, the police promised that they would drop the
charges against accused-appellant Randy if the latter would reveal where
accused-appellant Arnel was. Accused-appellant Randy thus told the police that
accused-appellant Arnel was in Pareja Subdivision. Accused-appellant Arnel
was indeed found and arrested in Pareja Subdivision and was also brought to
the police station. Accused-appellants were then presented before a witness to
Maximillian's stabbing. The witness was wearing a cap and a cover on his face.
The witness first pointed only at accused-appellant Arnel, but after some
coaching from the police, the witness also pointed at accused-appellant Randy.
On February 18, 2010, the RTC promulgated its Judgment convicting accusedappellants as charged. The trial court found that the prosecution had duly
established the essential elements of murder, and rejected the uncorroborated
claim of self-defense of accused-appellant Arnel and defenses of denial and alibi
of accused-appellant Randy. The trial court held that Maximillian's killing was
murder given the presence of the qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and treachery, but not evident premeditation. The RTC sentenced
accused-appellants thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Arnel Villalba
and Randy Villalba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with no mitigating circumstance.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, banning the imposition of the death penalty,
said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
without possibility of parole. The accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs
of Maximillian Casona the amounts of SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND
(P75,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity, TWENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND
(P25,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages, FIFTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY[-]FIVE PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P55,225.60) as
actual damages, FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages,
and TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS as attorney's fees.23
Accused-appellants appealed their conviction before the Court of Appeals,
based on the following grounds:
[I] THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
TREACHERY
AND
EVIDENT
PREM[E]DITATION
[II] THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE TFIE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
[III] THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
EXISTENCE OF SELF-DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ARNEL VILLALBA.24
On September 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision
affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for murder. Like the RTC, the
appellate court gave scant consideration to accused-appellants' unsubstantiated
defenses. The appellate court likewise agreed with the finding of the RTC that
treachery attended Maximillian's killing, reasoning thus
The court a quo for its part, had this to say about its finding of treachery:
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the
victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People v. De Guzman,
G.R. No. 173197, April 24, 2007).
Thus, there was treachery when accused Randy Villalba held the hand of the
victim who was drunk while his co-accused Arnel Villalba simultaneously boxed
and stabbed the deceased, thereby insuring its execution to kill the victim without
risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Treachery qualifies the killing to murder (Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code).
We agree with the court a quo.
Jurisprudence abounds in holding that an altercation between the victim and the
accused immediately before the attack upon the victim does not necessarily
negate the presence of treachery. This was reiterated in People v. Jabian [G.R.
No. 132913-14, April 4, 2001], viz:
Accused-appellant Jabian's suggestion that an argument between the parties
preceded the slaying as testified to by Ruel Lipalam, coupled with the fact that
the attack was frontal, as shown by location of the wound, and that therefore the
killing of Jose Sammy was not sudden or unexpected as to negate a finding of
treachery, cannot be sustained. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Thus, it has been held that the fact that the attack was preceded by a
fight, or even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person does not
negate treachery. In this case, accused-appellant Jimmy Magaro held both arms
of the victim behind his back, effectively rendering the latter incapable of
defending himself while the other accused stabbed him in the chest. As correctly
pointed out by the trial court, the victim was "a virtual
sitting duck when stabbed by Jabian because he was hand clasped by Magaro
in order to be so stabbed, without any risk whatsoever to the two accused arising
from any useful defense which Jose Sammy might make."
In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that treachery
attends the killing of a person who is drunk, unarmed, has no opportunity to
defend himself and the attack is sudden.
In the case at hand, it was established by the prosecution witnesses that
appellant Randy held an intoxicated Maximillian while appellant Arnel stabbed
him. Consequently, at the time of the attack, the victim was not in the position to
defend himself. Clearly then, the court a quo's finding of treachery is justified. At
the same time, this collaborative manner of the attack supports the finding of
conspiracy.25
The Court of Appeals though modified the amount of damages awarded. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The RTC Decision in
Criminal Case No. 11736 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS;
1. Moral damages are awarded in the increased amount
of Php75,000;chanrobleslaw
2. Exemplary damages are awarded in the increased
amount of Php30,000; and
3. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages
from April 29, 2006 up to the finality of this Decision,
and interest at 12% per annum on these damages from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid shall
likewise be paid by accused- appellants to the heirs of
Maximillian Casona.26
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Court gave the parties the opportunity to file their respective supplemental
briefs[27 but the parties manifested that they had already exhausted their
arguments before the Court of Appeals.28
Accused-appellant Arnel asserts that he cannot be adjudged criminally liable for
the resulting death of Maximillian as he only stabbed Maximillian in self-defense.
Accused-appellant also argues that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify
the killing of Maximillian to murder, as even the prosecution admits that
provocation and aggression came from Maximillian and that an altercation
between accused-appellant Arnel and Maximillian preceded the stabbing.
Accused-appellant Randy insists on his alibi, i.e., that he was at home with his
family and not in the company of accused-appellant Arnel on April 29, 2006 near
the Gaisano Mall.
The Court finds partial merit in the instant appeal.
At the outset, the Court bears in mind the following pronouncement in People v.
Gerolaga29:
In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and details
of appealed cases with meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the
findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great respect by appellate tribunals,
still, the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to ensure that
the trial court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the
innocence of the accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent
with the doctrine that all doubts must be resolved in their favor. Indeed, it is far
better to set free a thousand guilty persons than to unjustly punish an innocent
one.
The Court, after a meticulous review of the records of the case, finds bases to
downgrade accused-appellant Arnel's crime from murder to homicide and to
absolve accused-appellant Randy of any criminal liability for Maximillian's death.
The Court begins with the undisputed facts: Maximillian and Frederick, followed
by Josephine, Homer, and Marilou, chanced upon accused-appellant Arnel, his
girlfriend Jenny, and two other companions, somewhere along Capitol Drive,
near the vicinity of Gaisano Mall in Butuan City, at around 2:30 in the morning
of April 29, 2006. These two groups did not know each other prior to April 29,
2006. Maximillian addressed an insulting remark towards Jenny causing tension
between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel. A scuffle ensued between
the two men and accused-appellant Arnel eventually stabbed Maximillian on the
chest with a sharp instrument, causing a puncture wound that penetrated
Maximillian's heart and ultimately caused Maximillian's death.
Prosecution witnesses Josephine and Frederick had positively identified both

accused-appellants at the police station soon after accused-appellants' arrest.
The same prosecution witnesses, together with Homer, would again positively
identify both accused-appellants in open court during trial. Hence, accusedappellant Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's stabbing was
duly established. Accused-appellant Randy was not able to attribute any ill
motive on the part of the three prosecution witnesses that could have impelled
them to testify against him. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and
categorical declarations on the witness stand, under the solemnity of an oath,
deserve full faith and credence. It necessarily prevails over alibi and denial,
especially when neither alibi nor denial is substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.[30 Nonetheless, accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and
place of Maximillian's stabbing does not necessarily mean that the former should
bear criminal liability for the latter's death, as the Court will subsequently discuss
herein.
The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillian's murder, alleging
that accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy with each other, and with abuse of
superior strength, treachery, and/or evident premeditation, stabbed Maximillian
with an icepick.
On conspiracy
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need
not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert,
each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim.31
There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill
Maximillian. To recall, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group
completely met by chance that fateful early morning of April 29, 2006 near
Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The events
swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to
Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of
Maximillian.
The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out
because the former tried to grab the latter's arm. It was at this point that
prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy block Maximillian's way
and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified that accused-appellant Randy
held only Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-appellant
Randy held both of Maximillian's hands; but neither of these witnesses was able
to describe the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee was
impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given the
circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy so
acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill
Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant
Randy was merely stepping in to stop Maximillian from further attacking his
cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that accused-appellant
Randy had prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp
weapon with him or that accused-appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.
In fact, there is no strong evidence of the weapon accused-appellant Arnel used
in stabbing Maximillian. None of the prosecution witnesses actually saw
accused-appellant use an ice pick or any other weapon. Josephine, Homer, and
Frederick did not even know that Maximillian was stabbed, believing that he was
just punched by accused-appellant Arnel.
For his part, accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted
that he used only a barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick,
with a sharp end, could cause a puncture wound consistent with that which killed
Maximillian. That accused-appellant Arnel used a barbecue stick he found in the
area as weapon shows that he acted instantaneously and spontaneously in
stabbing Maximillian, thus, further negating the possibility that he conspired with
accused-appellant Randy to commit the stabbing.
On the qualifying circumstances for murder
The prosecution likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the
alleged circumstances which would qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, already found that there was no
evident premeditation. The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of
his act.32 As the Court already discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
events leading to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel
happened swiftly and unexpectedly, with accused-appellant Arnel
instantaneously and spontaneously stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue stick

he found in the area. Accused-appellant Arnel clearly had no opportunity for cool
thought and reflection prior to stabbing Maximillian.
Unlike the RTC and the Court of Appeals, however, the Court finds no treachery
in accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. That accused-appellant
Randy was present or that Maximillian was unarmed and drunk at the time of
the stabbing are not sufficient to constitute treachery. Neither do said
circumstances constitute abuse of superior strength.
Treachery is defined under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing the means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
Based on the above definition, two conditions must be present in order to
constitute treachery: (1) the employment of such means of execution that gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the
means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Jurisprudence,
however, has qualified that the suddenness of the attack, the vulnerability of the
position of the victim at the time of the attack, or even the fact that the victim was
unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous, to wit:
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the
wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the
time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not
by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby
he gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally
fell and was rendered defenseless. The means employed for the commission
of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been
consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the
risk of retaliation from the intended victim. For the rules on treachery to
apply, the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused,
unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the part of the latter.
Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that
the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as
conclusively as the crime itself.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
The elements of treachery are wanting in this case. At the risk of sounding
repetitive, the Court once more emphasizes the swiftness of the events that took
place on April 29, 2006 when Maximillian's group unexpectedly came upon
accused-appellants' group. The tension and physical violence between

Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel quickly escalated from a verbal
exchange, to a physical scuffle, and then to the stabbing of Maximillian by
accused-appellant Arnel. Accused-appellant Arnel merely found a barbecue
stick in the area which he used to stab Maximillian. The barbecue stick could
hardly be a weapon of choice and accused-appellant Arnel obviously used it only
in desperation. Moreover, it cannot be said that Maximillian did not expect at all
some form of attack from accused-appellant Arnel. Maximillian provoked
accused-appellant Arnel by making a crude remark about the latter's girlfriend,
then grabbing accused-appellant Arnel's arm, and taunting accused-appellant
Arnel if he was brave. It would appear that Maximillian was, in fact, spoiling for
a fight. In addition, as the Court previously observed herein, it cannot simply
assume in the absence of proof that accused-appellant Randy held Maximillian's
hand/s to prevent the latter from retaliating as accused-appellant Arnel stabbed
Maximillian. Accused-appellant Randy could just as well be holding Maximillian's
hand/s to stop Maximillian from further attacking accused-appellant Arnel during
the scuffle. Lastly, the Court is unconvinced that accused-appellant Arnel took
advantage of Maximillian's drunken state. No clear and convincing evidence has
been presented to show the degree of Maximillian's intoxication or if it had even
affected his strength and intelligence.
As for abuse of superior strength, it is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation
of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there
were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the
crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of
the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had
the deliberate intent to use this advantage.34
In the case at bar, Maximillian was with Frederick when they first chanced upon
accused-appellants, an even match of two against two, therefore disputing any
allegation of inequality of forces between the two sides. Moreover, given the
doubts as to accused-appellant Randy's actual participation in the stabbing, it
cannot be said that the two accused-appellants had used their combined
strength against Maximillian to ensure the latter's death.
Without any qualifying circumstance, the stabbing and death of Maximillian is a
homicide rather than a murder.
The respective criminal liabilities of accused-appellants
In the absence of conspiracy, the respective criminal liability of accusedappellants would depend on the precise participation of each in the crime.
Accused-appellant Arnel had already admitted to stabbing Maximillian with a

barbecue stick, which eventually caused the latter's death. Unless he is able to
prove to the satisfaction of the Court his claim of self-defense as a justifying
circumstance, accused-appellant Arnel's conviction for the crime of homicide
becomes inevitable.35
It is a hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of
evidence shifts to the appellant to prove the elements of that claim, i.e., (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.36
Accused-appellant Arnel failed to establish the unlawful aggression of
Maximillian at the time he stabbed the latter.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is
unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim
must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual
peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful
aggression.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, accused-appellant Arnel's contemplated threat to his life or limb
when he stabbed Maximillian was not real or imminent. Maximillian merely
uttered insulting remarks to accused-appellant Arnel and the latter's girlfriend,
Jenny. Accused-appellant Arnel even admitted that Frederick, Maximillian's
companion, immediately intervened and apologized for Maximillian's unruly
conduct. Granting that Maximillian did punch accused-appellant Arnel and hit
the latter below his left ear, accused-appellant Arnel could have simply hit
Maximillian back. Instead, accused-appellant Arnel used a barbeque stick to
stab Maximillian on the chest, which was evidently not commensurate, and well
overboard, as compared to the aggression exhibited by Maximillian to him.
The penalty prescribed by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime
of homicide is reclusion temporal. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view
of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of
the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term
which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; and that the minimum should be
within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. In the instant case, the Court sentences accused-
appellant Arnel to imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum,

to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to the civil indemnity and damages, based on current jurisprudence, the Court
orders accused-appellant Arnel to pay Maximillian's heirs the amount of FiftyFive Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos and Sixty Centavos
(P55,225.60) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
as moral damages, and another Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
civil indemnity.
Absent any evidence that accused-appellant Randy acted with criminal intent in
holding Maximillian's hand/s at about the same time that accused-appellant
Arnel stabbed Maximillian, the Court absolves accused-appellant Randy of any
criminal and civil liability for Maximillian's death.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of accused-appellants is
PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Court finds accused-appellant ARNEL VILLALBA y DURAN GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, for which he is SENTENCED
to imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Maximillian Casona the amounts of P55,225.60 as actual damages, P75,000.00
as moral damages, and another P75,000.00 as civil indemnity plus interest on
all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
decision until fully satisfied.
The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant RANDY VILLALBA y SARCO on the
crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, CJ., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 191060
February 2, 2015

vs.
TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR., EDGARALLEN ALVAREZ, ROD EL
CABALLERO, LUIS EVANGELISTA, RICKY BARRIAO, LITO GUALTER,
TESS GUALTER, BOGS EVANGELISTA, alias THEO, alias NONONG, alias
JOHNY and JOHN DOES, Accused,
EDGAR ALLEN ALVAREZ and RODEL CABALLERO, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero),
together with the accused who remain at-large, were charged with the crime of
murder1 for the fatal shooting of Nicanor Morfe Agon (Agon).2 During the
arraignment, appellants entered separate pleas of not guilty.3 After trial, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 2, rendered a Decision4
dated May 11, 2007 finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, accused EDGAR ALLEN ALVAREZ
and RODEL CABALLERO, are hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
qualifying and/or aggravating circumstance of treachery and evident
premeditation and both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Theyare further ordered to pay the heirs of Nicanor
Agon y Morpe jointly and severally the amount of P100,000.00 as civil liability
and to pay the costs. Considering that accused Tomas Dimacuha, Jr., Luis
Evangelista, Ricky Barriao, Alias Joey, Alias Theo, Alias Nonong, Alias Johny
and John Does are still at large, let the charges against them be archived subject
to revival upon their apprehension.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his
information of the procedural lapses in the selection of George Vitan as
prosecution witness and for his appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In a Decision6
dated October 8, 2009, the CA affirmed withmodifications the ruling of the RTC,
viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED

insofar as the Accused-Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez and Rodel Caballero are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are penalized with
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. However, the award of civil indemnity is
REDUCED from One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellants are
ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally,the heirs of Nicanor Morfe Agon the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages and
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) as exemplary damages. Costs
against the Accused-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this appeal.
In a Resolution8 dated August 16, 2010, the Court directed the parties to file
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. Both, however, opted to
adopt the briefs they submitted before the CA as their supplemental briefs.9
Appellants insist that the evidencewas insufficient to warrant their conviction.
First, the witnesses for the prosecution did not testify on the material allegations
stated in the complaint sheet and the sworn statements, thereby depriving them
of the opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses. Second, there was no proof
that Agon and the person referred to in the death certificate are one and the
same. Third, the prosecution failed to present in court the murder weapons, as
well as the slugs. Fourth, there was no testimony proffered on the caliber of the
gun used in shooting Agon. And lastly, appellants maintainthat they were denied
due process when the RTC ordered the discontinuance of their presentation of
additional witnesses.
The Court is not convinced.
The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him orher; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.10 These requisites have been
established by the prosecution.
The gunman himself who testified for the prosecution, George Vitan (Vitan),
testified that his group "Black Shark" killed Agon. One of the responding
policemen PO2 Arnold Abdon, for his part, testified that he went to the hospital
where Agon was taken and the latter was already dead when he arrived. Further,
the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, testified on the post-mortem
examination he conducted upon Agon which showed that the latter sustained six
gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal. The element therefore that a person
was killed is obtaining in this case.
That appellants killed Agon was established through the prosecution witnesses
composed of Vitan and two other self-confessed former members of "Black
Shark", Arnel Balocon and Romulo Gasta. Their testimonies pointed to
appellants as among those who planned and executed the killing of Agon.
The fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance
listed under Article 248 and notably, alleged in the Information. For treachery to
be properly appreciated, two conditions must be present: (1) at the time of the
assault, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed
by him.11 These conditions were present in the killing of Agon. The assault upon
Agon was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying him the opportunity to protect
or defendhimself. He was unarmed and unaware of the plot of appellants to kill
him. Moreover, the means, method or manner of execution of the attack was
deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants, the same being in
accordance with their groups plan to liquidate Agon. As aptly ruled by the RTC:
The prosecution evidence show that herein accused, together with their group
deliberately executed their aggression without any risk arising from their victim,
who was caught unaware, helpless and defenseless. At the time the group
commenced their aggression, Nick Agon was entirely unsuspecting, as he was
on board his Mitsubishi Pajero traversing a narrow street leading to the highway.
He (Agon) was surprised when Theo and George Vitan suddenly approached
from the right side of his vehicle and promptly fired at him successively. This
manner purposely adopted by the duo coupled with the help given by their
comrades to ensure the commission of the crime clearly constitutes treachery;
x x x.12
Finally, the killing of Agon was neither parricide nor infanticide.
All the elements of the crime of murder being present in this case, the RTC and
the CA thus correctly ruled in finding appellants guilty of the said crime.
It must be noted as wellthat the evidence adduced by the prosecution is also
sufficient to establish the presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, which has the following elements: (1) the time when the offender
determined to committhe crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.13 Vitan testified that the plan to kill Agon was
conceived a day before the victim was fatally shot. Appellants and their cohorts
therefore, had adequate time to reflect on the consequences of their
contemplated crime prior to its execution. The period of time when appellants
planned tokill Agon and the time when they implemented such plan afforded
them the opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the
murder they committed.
The lower courts finding of conspiracy must also be sustained. There is
conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide
to pursue it."14 Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellants
conspired to murder Agon. Vitan testified that onFebruary 21, 2004, he, the
accused and appellants agreed to murder Agon. In accordance with their plan,
they proceeded the next day, February 22, 2004, to the cockpit arena, a place
which they knew that Agon would be at on that particular day. Upon their arrival
thereat, the members of the group which included appellants positioned
themselves according to their plan and waited for Agon to leave. Later on,
Caballero signaled Vitan and the other alleged gunman, accused Theo (Theo),
that the target had left the arena and that his vehicle was already approaching
their position. When Agons vehicle came, Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan,
Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of the back-ups, and the rest of the group
then fled the scene of the crime. Clearly, there was unity of action and purpose
among the members of "Black Shark," which include appellants in killing Agon.
Conspiracy having been established, evidence as to who delivered the fatal blow
is no longer indispensable. Hence, it is immaterial if Caballeros role was merely
to signal the gunmen and Alvarezs, to act as back-up. Each of the offender is
equally guilty of the criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all.15
Anent appellants claim of denial of due process since their presentation of
additional witnesses was disallowed by the RTC, the Court finds that the CA had
already amply and correctly addressed this issue, thus:
x x x We find that the RTC had every reason to discontinue the presentation of
evidence by the Accused-Appellants. They sought postponements, to reiterate,
not only once or twice, but on many instances. Considering that the RTC and its
entire staff had to travel outside the province of Batangas, and the fact that the
Accused-Appellants intended to present other witnesses, they should have
therefore been more discerning in seeking the resetting of the trial proceedings
to avoid unreasonable delay.
As the RTC correctly held, the concept of speedy trial is available not only to the
accused but also the State because, while an accused does have rights, let it
not be forgotten that the aggrieved also have the same rights. Thus, the
Accused-Appellants were not denied due process considering that they were
able to testify on their own behalf and thatit is within their power, which they
miserably failed, to ensure that they are able to present their case without
delay16
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.20 It must also be added that appellants are
not eligible for parole.21
In the same vein, appellants other arguments, i.e., that there was no testimony
respecting the complaint sheet; that the murder weapons and the slugs were not
presented in evidence; and that the medico-legal officer who conducted the postmortem examination on Agon did not testify on the identity and caliber of the
firearms used in the killing, do not deserve credence. The non-presentation of
such items and testimonies is not indispensable to the successful prosecution
of the appellants since they are not elements of the crime of murder.17
With respect to damages, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages awarded by the CA must be icreased to P100,000.00 each
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.22 Moreover, temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 must also be awarded in view of the absence of evidence
of burial and funeral expenses. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be
imposed on all the awards of damages from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.23
As to the alleged failure of the prosecution witnesses to testify on their sworn

statements, suffice it to say that the failure of the prosecution witnesses to
reiterate the contents of their sworn statements during trial does not affect their
credibility and render the sworn statementsuseless and insignificant, as long as
they are presented as evidence in open court. The sworn statements and the
open court declarations must be evaluated and examined together to obtain a
thorough determination of the merits of the case. The presentation of these
sworn statements during the trial and the attestation of the prosecution
witnesses thereto render the same admissible in evidence. Moreover,
appellants contention that they were denied the opportunity to cross-examine
the prosecution witnesses on the contents of their sinumpaang salaysay(s) has
no factual basis. The records reveal that they cross-examined the witnesses
after the prosecutions direct examination.
WHEREFORE, the October 8, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR.

CR-H.C. No. 03048 affirming the conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch 2 of appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez and Rodel Caballero
of the crime of murder for which they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that (1) appellants are
not eligible for parole; (2) the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages to the victim's heirs are each increased to P100,000.00; (3)
appellants are further ordered to pay the victim's heirs temperate damages in
the amount of P25,000.00; and, (4) all damages awarded shall earn interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid .
It must be noted that in the face of the glaring evidence against them, appellants
could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi.As consistently ruled by the
Court, denial and alibi are disfavored on account of the facility with which they
can be concocted to suit the defense of an accused. Being negative defenses,
they must be corroborated and substantiated by clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, they would merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater value
in evidence than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters.18 In this case, appellants failed to proffer corroborative evidence in
spite of the opportunities providedto them. Hence,their self-serving testimonies
of denial and alibi cannot prevail over Vitans positive identification of them as
perpetrators of the crime. Indeed, their defenses do not deserve any weight in
evidence.
Going now to the imposable penalty, the crime of murder is punished by
reclusion perpetuato death.1wphi1 The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling
that the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder.
However, with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation also found
to be present, the greater penalty of death is the imposable penalty pursuant to
Article 6319 of the RPC. Nevertheless, in lieu of death penalty, the imposition
upon appellants of the penalty of reclusion perpetuain this case is proper
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 168539
March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of
the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which
quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of
Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3
in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the
various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for
alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent,
who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering
into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause
against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the
issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before
the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and
taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a
Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was
awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement
substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the
construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by
Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and
(c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more
beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to
show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and
the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased,
and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his
voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction
over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged
to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed
against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the
show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of
which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22,
2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a
private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already
deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information
filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE
GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE
IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held
liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this
Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether
herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is

no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution
against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does
not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only
thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly
violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have
been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not
require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the
public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already
died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by
any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that
everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or
furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or
written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is
alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or
more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18
Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire
alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons.
Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So
long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of
a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information
filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's
Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the
other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State
and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons
alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the
death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who
conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21
as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under
Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to
the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long
as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent
design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the
public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes
pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In
stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs.
Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty
therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many
cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other
evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and
its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective
active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is
the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when
two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the
physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when
two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible
for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."
The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in
one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate
liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of
which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in
view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they
are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the
accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall
not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of
each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn
within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his
moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or
impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any
one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the
common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability
emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the
conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their
evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must
be held solidarily liable.22
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this
Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional
liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No.
28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's
act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in
posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his
body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the courts
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail,
demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he
thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown
vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the
trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent

Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the
SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement)
which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a
Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground
that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution
questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution
dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error
on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January
11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No.
168919 should be applied in the instant case.
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to

the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate
purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also
covered other matters which called for respondent courts exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said courts jurisdiction
over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question
the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his
Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government.
More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain
public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being
charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then
Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan.
However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is
already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving
herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but
on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere
incidents in the main case and the main case has already been pending for over
nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would
further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote
respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Justifying circumstances
G.R. No. 140544
December 7, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELMER DAMITAN Y MANTAWEL, defendants-appellants.
CARPIO, J.:
In self-defense, the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
lies on the prosecution is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the
accused to prove the elements of his defense. It then becomes incumbent upon
him to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after he had admitted the killing.1
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision2 dated 14 September 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malaybalay, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 8965-98 finding Elmer
Damitan y Mantawel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Charge
On 15 June 1998, Elmer Damitan y Mantawel was charged in an Information3
for the crime of Murder which reads:
"That on or about the 27th day of April 1998, in the morning, at Sitio
Likoliko, Barangay Butong, Municipality of Quezon, Province of
Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery ,
armed with a sharp bladed weapon, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab LEON CAHAPON,
SR., inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which caused the
instantaneous death of LEON CAHAPON, SR., to the damage and
prejudice of the legal heirs of LEON CAHAPON, SR. in such amount as
may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659."
Arraignment and Plea

Upon arraignment, accused Damitan, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.4
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Trial
The prosecution presented Conrado Sumin-ao, Junine Cahapon and Trinidad
Cahapon as witnesses. The defense presented as its sole witness accused
Damitan himself who admitted having stabbed the victim Cahapon but invoked
the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
The prosecution presented as its first witness Conrado Sumin-ao, 61 years old,
a farmer and a datu chieftain of the Manobo tribe and resident of Butong,
Quezon, Bukidnon.5 He testified that on 27 April 1998, at around five o'clock in
the morning, he was at the barrio hall in Butong with the victim Leon Cahapon,
a purok leader in the sitio. They had agreed the day before to meet at the barrio
hall to transfer the basketball court.6 Cahapon's grandson Junine, who was
riding a horse, arrived at the barrio hall and asked his grandfather to fix the rope
of the horse. While victim Cahapon was fixing the rope of the horse, accused
Damitan arrived and suddenly stabbed Cahapon twice with a hunting knife about
ten (10) inches long.7
Witness Sumin-ao was more or less one (1) meter away from the victim when
the stabbing incident took place. He saw the first strike hit the victim's right breast
and the second hit the lower portion of the first stab wound. Witness Sumin-ao
testified that the "strike of Elmer came from behind towards the front" of
Cahapon.8 When victim Cahapon fell down after the first stabbing, witness
Sumin-ao held him. Accused Damitan stabbed victim Cahapon for the second
time while the latter was already lying down.9 Thereafter, Damitan surrendered
himself to the military detachment at BUSCO. Witness Sumin-ao went to the
barangay captain to report the incident.10
Prosecution witness Junine Cahapon, a 13-year old Grade 5 pupil and resident
of Sitio Likoliko, Butong, Quezon, Bukidnon is the grandson of the victim.11 He
testified that he went to the barrio hall and requested his grandfather to fix the
rope of his horse which was detached. He was about one and a half (11/2)
meters away from his grandfather when he saw accused Damitan stab his
grandfather at the right side of the breast.12
Trinidad Cahapon, the 60-year old widow of the victim, testified that she grieved
upon learning of her husband's death. Trinidad spent P27,000.00 for the burial
expenses of her husband.13
The testimony of Dr. Romeo Egang, the attending physician, was dispensed with
in view of the admission by the defense of victim Cahapon's Death Certificate
as proof of the fact of death. The cause of death was "Cardio-respiratory arrest,
blood loss due to stab wounds."14
The Issues
Hence, the present appeal. Accused-appellant Damitan raised the
following assignment of errors:

Accused Damitan admitted that he stabbed victim Cahapon but claimed that he
acted in self-defense. Thereafter, he went to the military detachment at BUSCO,
Butong, Quezon, Bukidnon to surrender.15
Accused Damitan testified that on 25 April 1998, at four o'clock in the afternoon,
while he was cooking supper at their yard, he saw the victim's wife shooing away
his chickens to the house of the victim. He told her that the chickens belonged
to him and in fact one of the chickens had a tie on its leg. On 26 April 1998, at
two o'clock in the afternoon, accused Damitan saw victim Cahapon catch his
chicken. This prompted accused Damitan to see Datu Sumin-ao to complain
against victim Cahapon who became angry and threatened the accused.
On 27 April 1998, at five o'clock in the morning, victim Cahapon went to
Damitan's house and, in a very harsh tone, challenged the accused to go down
from his house. While accused Damitan was going down the third step of the
"ladder", victim Cahapon boxed him twice, causing him to fall on his back.
Cahapon knelt on Damitan's belly and tried to stab the latter with a knife.
Damitan evaded the strike and was able to wrest the knife from Cahapon. Then,
Cahapon with his two hands choked Damitan who lost consciousness. Damitan
did not realize that he had stabbed Cahapon twice until the latter fell down.
Damitan ran away towards the military detachment at BUSCO to surrender.16
On cross-examination, Damitan testified that he used the knife of Cahapon to
stab the latter .17
Trial Court's Ruling
On 14 September 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused
Damitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Elmer Damitan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and (sic) defined and penalized
under the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being
no ordinary aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of his victim Leon Cahapon the sum of P50,000.00."
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON
THE PART OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."
The Court's Ruling
We find the appeal without merit.
In the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court failed to
appreciate the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He avers that the
elements of self-defense are present. He claims that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim Cahapon. It was Cahapon who called him in
a very harsh tone and challenged him to go down from his house. When
appellant was going down the "ladder", Cahapon allegedly boxed him.
Thereafter, Cahapon tried to stab him with a knife but he was able to disarm
Cahapon and then they struggled. Appellant further argues that the knife
belonged to the victim and he merely prevented or repelled the attack against
his person.
We uphold the trial court's rejection of appellant's plea of self-defense.
of his defense.18 However, appellant's version of the incident was
uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.19
There was no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were moved
by improper motive to testify against the appellant. Hence, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit. The rule is settled that
factual findings of the trial court are accorded great respect since the trial court
is in a much better position than an appellate court to properly evaluate the
evidence and observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of
testifying.20 The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and there is no reason to depart therefrom.
recognized principle that the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim
are important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.27
As found by the trial court and this Court, appellant Damitan went to the barrio
hall and suddenly stabbed victim Cahapon from behind. He was clearly identified
by prosecution witnesses Sumin-ao and Junine who were very near the victim.
Appellant was likewise not a stranger to the two (2) prosecution witnesses.
Sumin-ao knew appellant as a member of the same Manobo tribe of which
Sumin-ao is the datu chieftain.21 Appellant was also a neighbor of prosecution
witness Junine whose house is about thirty-five (35) meters from the house of
appellant.22 Junine saw appellant coming from the latter's house and walking
towards the barrio hall.23 Appellant, without uttering a word, suddenly stabbed
victim Cahapon at the right portion of his breast. The first strike came from
behind while victim Cahapon was facing the horse and fixing the rope. Then,
appellant stabbed victim Cahapon for the second time while the latter was lying
down.
We are not persuaded.
Self-defense as a justifying circumstance must satisfy the following

requirements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending
himself.24 The absence of unlawful aggression negates the existence of selfdefense.25 Here, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. To
constitute aggression, the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and
the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary.26 The victim
was facing the horse and fixing its rope when appellant attacked him. Indeed,
there was no real danger to appellant's life or personal safety.
It is difficult to believe appellant's claim that there was a scuffle between him and
the victim Cahapon after Cahapon had boxed appellant while the latter was
going down the "ladder". There were no bruises, contusions or marks on the
bodies of either of them.
Moreover, the presence of two (2) fatal stab wounds on the breast of victim
Cahapon negates self-defense. The victim was stabbed by appellant not once
but twice. The first hit the right breast of the victim while he was facing the horse
and fixing its rope, unaware of the deadly attack from behind. The second stab
wound was inflicted while the victim was already lying down and completely
defenseless. The nature, location and number of wounds inflicted by the
accused on the victim belie and negate the claim of self-defense. It is a
On the second assigned error, appellant argues that the mere fact the victim
was hit at the back is not enough to constitute treachery. Appellant insists that it
was the victim Cahapon who provoked him when Cahapon challenged him to
go down from his house. Appellant contends that if ever he is found guilty, he
should only be liable for the crime of Homicide and not Murder.
"The position and manner of the attack on the victim Cahapon clearly indicate
the presence of treachery. Appellant arrived at the barrio hall and, without a word
of warning, suddenly stabbed Cahapon twice. Cahapon was then fixing the rope
of the horse of his grandson and facing the horse when appellant stabbed him
from behind. Thereafter, while the victim was already lying down, appellant
stabbed him for the second time.
True, the stab wounds were frontal, i.e., at the right portion of the breast.
However, the evidence clearly established that appellant stabbed Cahapon from
behind. Witness Sumin-ao testified as follows:
"Q
Now at what point in time wherein he was stabbed by Elmer
Damitan while fixing the rope of the horse or before that time?
A
He was stabbed while he was fixing the rope of the horse.
Q
So when he was fixing the rope therefore, he was facing the
horse?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
And then this Elmer Damitan from where did he come wherein he
stabbed Leon Cahapon?
A
From his house.
Q
To the place where Leon Cahapon was stabbed how far is the
house of Elmer Damitan?
A
More or less fifteen (15) meters.
Q
So that, therefore, Datu Sumin-ao, when Leon Cahapon was
stabbed by Elmer Damitan his back was facing Elmer Damitan?
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Now how about you how far were you from Leon Cahapon when
he was stabbed by Elmer Damitan?
A
More or less one (1) meter.
Now were you facing each other?
We were side by side.
Now how many times did Elmer Damitan stab Leon Cahapon?
Twice.
Now the first stab of Elmer Damitan was Leon Cahapon hit?
Yes, ma'am'
Where was he hit?
Here. (Witness, pointing to his right breast).
How about the second hit where was he hit?
On the lower portion of the first hit.
Q
Now when this Leon Cahapon, Datu Sumin-ao, was stabbed by
Elmer Damitan you said that his back was facing Elmer Damitan and
then why is it that he was stabbed in front of his breast or chest?
A
Because the strike of Elmer came from behind towards the front
of Leon."28
Verily, the manner of attack by appellant was sudden and unexpected leaving
the victim Cahapon defenseless. By positioning himself at the back of the victim
and suddenly stabbing the latter from behind, appellant employed means and
methods which tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.29
And by stabbing the victim a second time when the victim was already lying
down, appellant employed means to insure or afford impunity.
Treachery qualified the killing of Cahapon to murder and pursuant to Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, the penalty for the crime
of Murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating
circumstance, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant Damitan to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On the third assigned error, appellant contends that the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated by the trial court. He
argues that after the stabbing incident, he went to the military detachment at
BUSCO to voluntarily surrender.
We agree that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present in
this case. Appellant immediately surrendered himself to the authorities and this
fact is not disputed by the prosecution. However, since the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed upon appellant is an indivisible penalty,30 the same shall be
applied regardless of any mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.31
Finally, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed
judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not.32 In
finding appellant Damitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, the trial court properly awarded the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The rule is settled that civil indemnity ex delicto
can be awarded forthwith to the heirs of the victim by proof alone of such fact of
death.33 The trial court was likewise correct in not awarding actual damages
there being no proof presented to justify such an award, except the bare
testimony of the victim's widow that she spent P27,000.00 as burial expenses.34
However, we find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper
considering that the victim's heir suffered grief. Thus, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence,35 the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is granted to the
heirs of the victim Leon Cahapon, Sr.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant Elmer Damitan y Mantawel is further ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim Leon Cahapon, Sr. the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ; concur.
G.R. No. 202867
July 15, 2013

vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of
the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The
CA-Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal
Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias "Banok" (appellant) of
murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant of frustrated
murder.
The Facts
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gregorio Conde with said
unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect, middle third right forearm
1 cm. In diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused; that is by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio Conde which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag
pled not guilty in both cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution
presented four witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No.
2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obaana and Dr.
Edwin Jose Figura, the physicians at the Sara District Hospital where the victims
were admitted. The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant,
Demapanag, and the latters brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias

Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with
Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an Information3 which reads:
The prosecutions version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23

December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn
Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter,
Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their
house.

unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JUDY CONDE alias JOJO
with said unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting gunshot wounds on the
different parts of her breast which caused her death thereafter.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from
Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn
rushed to Gregorios aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other
accused were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already
dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was
pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment
of his gunshot wound.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4
which states:
Dr. Jeremiah Obaana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her
death was caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade
due to gunshot wound."5

Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident.
He found that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring one centimeter
in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation" in

his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23
December 2000. He claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio,
armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot
appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from
Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not
know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill,
which is approximately 14 kilometers away from the crime scene. This was
corroborated by Frederick, Demapanags brother.
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted of murder and frustrated murder.
The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTCs Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely
erred in convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu,
however, upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral
and exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a
distinction between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case No.
2001-1555 and the moral damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal
Case No. 2001-1555. It did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial
court should have awarded both, considering that they are two different kinds of
damages. For death indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to
the current judicial policy on the matter, without need of any evidence or proof
of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of the surviving family should be
assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable moral damages."9
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of
to reclusion perpetua together with accessory penalty provided by law, to pay
the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
sentences the said accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the necessary penalty provided
by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to
pay the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
Accuseds entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein
imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory
penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde P25,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(s) entire period of detention

crimes charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision

dated March 10, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo,
Iloilo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of the said
Joint Decision should now read as follows:
shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his
sentence.
Appellants claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the
shotgun accidentally fired is also implausible.

crime(s) charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation
In contrast, we find that the Condes account of the incident is persuasive. Both
the CA-Cebu and the RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were
credible and presented in a clear and convincing manner. This Court has
consistently put much weight on the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court.14 In People v.
Mangune,15 we stated that:
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that
appellant is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. We uphold
appellants conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify
the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the
award of moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially
in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and
inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and
the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the
witnesses were not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of
relevant facts, the same must be sustained by this Court.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Appellants feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly

rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v. Damitan,11
explained that:
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous

attack is one in which the victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend
himself or resist the attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely determined
by the type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was deliberately
chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and to render the victim
defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the accused.18
of his defense. However, appellants version of the incident was uncorroborated.
His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.12
Appellants failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony
and his unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio
before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as correctly
pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellants theory of self-defense is belied by the
fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorios alleged
unlawful aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant
claimed. And, when appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not
also inform the police that what happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.13
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant.
The use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly
treacherous, as it denies the victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and
not frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of
felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated
felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
xxxx
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony

directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma
formation at the anterior aspect right shoulder.22
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted

felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas
in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the
crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the
other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of
the crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would
have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails
to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victims
death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio
Conde was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined
Gregorio after the shooting incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court
what was the situation of the patient when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in
distress.
Court (to the witness)

Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should
be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall
be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under
Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.1wphi1
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium
period to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.
Award of damages
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of
damages imposed by the lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 20011555, this Court hereby awards P75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.24 The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages in the
foregoing case is sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay P40,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in relation to Criminal Case
No. 2002-1777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY
of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and
pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
G.R. No. 202847
October 23, 2013

vs.
ANTERO GAMEZ y BALTAZAR, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 which affirmed the Judgment3 dated May 9, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 convicting and
sentencing accused-appellant Antero Gamez y Baltazar accused-appellant) to
reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was accused of killing his own father, Apolinario Gamez
(Apolinario) through an Information articulating the following criminal charges,
viz:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 2004, in the Municipality of Burauen,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and wound one
APOLINARIO GAMEZ y AMORILLO, his father, with the use of a long bladed
weapon (sundang) and sickle (sarad) which the accused provided himself for
the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon Apolinario Gamez y Amorillo
multiple hacking and incised wounds on the different parts of his body which
were the direct and approximate cause of his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, he entered a "Not Guilty" plea. He thereafter desired to amend
his plea to "Guilty" during the pre-trial conference held on September 26, 2005
but the RTC denied the said plea bargaining. In view however of the accusedappellants invocation of self-defense, an inverted trial scheme ensued.5
Through the testimonies of the accused-appellant himself, Dr. Irene Astilla
Dacut, his attending physician, and eyewitness Bienvenido Buhalog, the
defense narrated the events that culminated into the encounter that claimed
Apolinarios life.6
The accused-appellant and 69-year old Apolinario had a less than ideal father
and son relationship with the former claiming that the latter did not treat him well
when he was a child. Their relationship got more strained when Apolinario
meddled with the accused-appellants personal relationship with his wife.
Apolinario apparently told the accused-appellant that his wife was being
unfaithful. The unsolicited information irked the accused-appellant.
On August 21, 2004, the accused-appellant had a drinking spree in his house at
Barangay Gamay, Burauen, Leyte, with his two brothers, Nicolas and Cornelio
from 12 noon until 3:00 p.m. As he was about to go out of the kitchen door, the
accused-appellant saw Apolinario standing at the doorway with a long bolo.
Apolinario appeared to be drunk.
To prevent any commotion, Nicolas held Apolinario but he was able to free
himself from his sons grip. The accused-appellant then spoke to Apolinario: " I
think that you are looking for me and I believe it is since last night ." An argument
ensued between them. In order not to prolong the spat, the accused-appellant
and his brothers took their father to his nipa hut about 500 meters away. But
before the accused-appellant could leave, he got into another argument with
Apolinario.
The accused-appellant then set out to the place where he gathered tuba while
his brothers went back to his house. After gathering tuba and tethering his
carabao, the accused-appellant proceeded home. He met Apolinario along a
pathway. With no one to pacify them, they decided to resume their quarrel.
The accused-appellant first remarked: "Father, what are the words that you
uttered?" to which Apolinario responded, "It is better if one of us will perish."
Apolinario then instantaneously hacked the accused-appellant with a long bolo
hitting him twice on the head for which he sustained a 5-centimeter long and
scalp-deep incised wound with fracture of the underlying bone and another 5cm long incised wound on the frontal right portion of his head.
The accused-appellant fell to his knees as Apolinario delivered another blow
which the former was able to parry by raising his left arm. The accused-appellant
was wounded on the left 3rd interdigital space posterior to his palm.
The accused-appellant then held Apolinarios hands, grabbed the bolo and used
the same to hack the latter several times, the count of which escaped the
accused-appellants consciousness as he was already dizzy. The accusedappellant thereafter left the scene and went home. His brother brought him to
the hospital upon seeing that his head was teeming with blood. He was
hospitalized for six (6) days before he was taken to the municipal hall by the
police officers.
The rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, on the other hand, principally
consisted of the testimony of Maura Anadia (Maura), Apolinarios daughter and
the accused-appellants sister. According to Maura, at around 4:30 p.m. of
August 21, 2004, she was with her father at their house located at Barangay
Gamay, Burauen, Leyte when his elder brother, the accused-appellant, arrived.
He was carrying a long bolo and a scythe was tucked on his waist.
He approached her and said: "Will you join the killing spree today including your
child that you are carrying? "before turning to Apolinario with this query: "What
are the stories that you were talking?"
Frightened, Maura ran away and hid at a grassy portion near the house. She
then saw her father flee but the accused-appellant gave him a chase. Apolinario
was able to run for about 20 m before the accused-appellant was able to catch
up.
The accused-appellant then hacked the unarmed Apolinario on the right side of
his head using the bolo. Apolinario fell down and the accused-appellant finished
him off by slashing his neck with the scythe. Maura thereafter left to report the
incident to the police.
The autopsy conducted on Apolinarios cadaver by Dr. Leonita Azores, MD,7
showed that he sustained two (2) fatal wounds one of which almost decapitated
his head while the other hit the parietal aspect thereof exposing the skin and
connective tissue. Apolinario also obtained two (2) incised wounds on his neck
and left forearm and two (2) lacerations on his fingers. He perished at the crime
scene.8
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment9 dated May 9, 2006, the RTC found that both the prosecution
and the defense deliberately withheld vital details of the incident. The
prosecution did not reveal that the initial unlawful aggression was committed by
Apolinario who, based on medical records, hacked the accused-appellant in the
parietal area of his head. The defense, on the other hand, concealed that
accused-appellant pursued the victim after the latter fled. These findings
completed the sequence of the incident and revealed that the accusedappellants claim of self-defense is unmeritorious.
The RTC held that when accused-appellant hacked and killed Apolinario, the
unlawful aggression which the latter initially perpetrated has already ceased
because he has already ran away for 20 m. Hence, accused-appellants act was
not self-defense but rather one of retaliation which, in turn, props up the
conclusion that he intentionally killed his father. The decretal portion of the RTC
decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ANTERO

GAMEZ y Baltazar GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
Parricide penalized under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code and considering
the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance without any aggravating to offset
it, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to
pay the Heirs of Apolinario Gamez Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death
and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since August 21, 2004
shall be credited with the full time during which he was deprived of his liberty if
he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he will be entitled to only fourfifths (4/5) thereof.10
Ruling of the CA
The CA adopted the RTCs findings and similarly concluded that the accusedappellant put up retaliation and not self-defense because the aggression
proffered by the victim has already ended when the accused-appellant attacked
him. From the time Apolinario ran away and was disarmed by the accusedappellant, the aggression originally heaved by the former has ceased. Hence,
when the accused-appellant chased and hacked Apolinario several times, selfdefense can no longer be invoked. The CA affirmed the conviction and sentence
rendered by the RTC as well as the award of civil indemnity but an additional
award of moral damages was granted for Apolinarios heirs. The CA Decision11
dated May 25, 2011 disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed May 9, 2006
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15, in CRIM.
CASE NO. Bn-05-03-4125, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Aside from
the civil indemnity already awarded, the accused is also hereby directed to pay
the heirs of Apolinario Gamez the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages
in accordance with the recent jurisprudence.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.12
The accused-appellant manifested before the Court that in the present review,
he is adopting the arguments contained in his Brief filed before the CA whereby
he argued that his guilt for the crime of parricide was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in ruling that he failed to prove
self-defense.
The Courts Ruling

The Court affirms the accused-appellants conviction.
The arguments proffered by the accused-appellant essentially attack the
evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of the prosecutions principal
witness, Maura, and its ruling that the same satisfactorily repudiate his claim of
self-defense.
This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the matter of assigning
values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not
reflected on the record. Hence, the corollary principle that absent any showing
that the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would
affect the final disposition of the case, appellate courts are bound to give due
deference and respect to its evaluation of the credibility of an eyewitness and
his testimony as well as its probative value amidst the rest of the other evidence
on record.13
We see no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets especially in
view of the accused-appellants failure to identify significant details, which if
considered, will alter the outcome of the trial courts judgment and the affirmation
accorded it by the CA. At any rate, an examination of the records at hand shows
that the factual basis of accused-appellants plea of self-defense cannot relieve
him from criminal liability.
Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission
by the accused that he committed the criminal act.14 Generally, the burden lies
upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. However, if the
accused admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of
evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his
part.15
In order to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following
requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.16
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, that can validly be invoked.17 "There is an unlawful aggression on

the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or
right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or
actual use of a weapon."18 It is present only when the one attacked faces real
and immediate threat to ones life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not
constitute aggression warranting self-defense.19
Here, the accused-appellant, miserably failed to discharge his burden of proving
that unlawful aggression justifying self-defense was present when he killed
Apolinario.
The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was not of the continuous kind as
it was no longer present when the accused-appellant injured Apolinario. As
testified by the accused-appellant himself, he was able to grab the bolo from
Apolinario. From that point on, the aggression initially staged by Apolinario
ceased to exist and the perceived threat to the accused-appellants life was no
longer attendant.
Hence, the accused-appellant was no longer acting in self-defense, when he,
despite having already disarmed Apolinario, ran after the latter for about 20 m
and then stabbed him. The accused-appellants claim of self-defense is further
negated by the fatal incision on Apolinarios neck that almost decapitated his
head, a physical evidence which corroborates Mauras testimony that after
stabbing Apolinario with the bolo, the accused-appellant pulled out the scythe
on his waist and used the same to slash Apolinarios neck. The use of a weapon
different from that seized from the victim and the nature of the injury inflicted
show the accused-appellants determined resolve to kill Apolinario.
When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification
to kill or wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in selfdefense but in retaliation against the original aggressor. Retaliation is not the
same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in selfdefense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.20
The CA was thus correct in upholding the findings and conclusions of the RTC,
thus:
Although, it is supported by the medical report, that the accused-appellant was
indeed initially attacked by the victim, the act of the accused-appellant of going
after the victim, who was already running away from the accused-appellant after
the latter has gained possession of the weapon, is anathema to the self-defense
theory invoked by the accused appellant.
xxxx
In the instant case, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witness that the victim tried to run away from the accused-appellant
but the accused-appellant ran after him. When the accused-appellant was able
to overtake the victim, the latter was hacked on the right side of his head. To
finish him off, the accused-appellant slashed the victims neck with the use of a
scythe until the victim (his own father) died. Thus, assuming arguendo that the
father was indeed the first aggressor, the aggression ceased the moment the
accused-appellant disarmed him and the victim tried to run away from the
accused-appellant. When the accused-appellant then continued to chase his 69
year-old father and hacked several times the already disarmed victim, selfdefense can no longer be invoked.21
In fine, there is no justifiable cause exempting the accused-appellant from
criminal liability and the courts a quo were correct in convicting him for parricide.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused.22 Here, it is an undisputed fact that
Apolinario was the accused-appellants father.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, the crime of parricide is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.1wphi1 It must be noted that the declaration of the
RTC in its Judgment dated May 9, 2006 on the presence of a mitigating
circumstance is not supported by any allegation or evidence on record.
Nonetheless, in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 934623 prohibiting the imposition
of death penalty, the courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to
reclusion perpetua.24
It must be emphasized, however, that the accused-appellant shall not be eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 which states that "persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua , or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua , by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended."25
The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of Apolinario is proper
and in line with current jurisprudence.26 Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof
of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for such
death.27 The award of P50,000.0028 as moral damages is likewise correct. Even
in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering, it
has been recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death brings
emotional pain and anguish.29
The Court finds that an award of exemplary damages in the amount of

P30,000.0030 is in order considering that the qualifying circumstance of
relationship is present in the crime of parricide.31
Lastly, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards
for damages an interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 25, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 finding the accused-appellant,
Antero Gamez y Baltazar, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Antero Gamez y
Baltazar is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Apolinario Gamez, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6) per annum from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVEDNIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 207818
July 23, 2014

vs.
ALEX DE LOS SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated September 17, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03790 which affirmed the Judgment2 dated
January 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch
11, in Criminal Case No. 1165-T, convicting Alex De Los Santos (accusedappellant) of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
dislodge thus enabling Catriz to run towards the nearest house. The accusedappellant, however, drew a "Rambo-type" knife, pursued Catriz and repeatedly
stabbed him until he fell. Pleading for his life, Catriz kneeled infront of the
accused-appellant and asked him to stop. His pleas were not heeded though
and the accused-appellant continued stabbing him until he fell again on the
ground. Upon seeing the lifeless Catriz, the accused-appellant jumped and
exclaimed: "Happy New Year, natayen ni Ferdie!" (Happy New Year, Ferdie is
dead!). The accused-appellant thereafter went to a nearby pump well and
nonchalantly washed his hands.4 Meanwhile, Bayudan ran towards a nearby
house for fear of his life.5
Dr. Yuaga testified that based on his post-mortem examination of the cadaver,
Catriz sustained 11 stab wounds, four (4) of which were in the mid extremity of
the heart area that could cause instantaneous death while two (2) were located
at the back portion ofhis body. Catriz also sustained one (1) incised wound on
the left scapula. His cause of death was "hypovolemic shock, secondary to
multiple stab wounds."6
The Facts
Accused-appellant was indicted for killing one Fernando A. Catriz (Catriz)
through an information articulating the following criminal charges, viz:
That on or about April 06, 2004, inthe Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ALEX De
LOS SANTOS y AGINAWAN armed with long bolo with intent to kill, with
treachery and treachery, (sic) did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hack FERNANDO A[.] CATRIZ, inflicting upon
him several hack wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his
death. CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a "not guilty" plea. Pre-trial
and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution presented the testimonies of
Reynaldo Bayudan (Bayudan), the victims nephew and an eyewitness to the
incident, and Dr. Exuperio Yuaga (Dr. Yuaga), Municipal Health Officer of Tuao,
Cagayan. The prosecution also adopted the testimony of Eduardo Archibido
which was presented during the hearing on the petition for bail. Taken together
with documentary evidence marked as Exhibits A to E, the evidence for the
prosecution showed that:
Catriz and the accused-appellant werebrothers-in-law. The formers wife was
the latters sister. At about 4:00 p.m. of April 6, 2004, Catriz and Bayudan were
at BarangayMungo, Tuao, Cagayan, unloading culled cob chickens from a
Toyota Tamaraw vehicle. While Bayudan and Catriz were transferring the
chickens into a cage beside the vehicle, the accused-appellant suddenly
appeared behind Catriz and hacked him on his right shoulder with a tabas(longbladed bolo). The impact from the blow caused the handle of the tabasto
The witnesses for the defense werethe accused-appellant himself and his uncle,
Joseph Aginawang (Aginawang). According to them, on the night of April 4,
2004, they had a drinking spree with Catriz. After consuming two bottles of gin,
Catriz asked the accused-appellant if he can till the family lot in Bagumbayan,
Tuao, Cagayan. When the accused-appellant answered that he cannot decide
on the matter since the land is family-owned, Catriz suddenly stood up and
slapped the accused-appellants face.
The accused-appellant did not takeoffense and simply left, while Catriz
summoned his wife and children, and headed home.1wphi1 Catriz, however,
returned between 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. looking for the accused-appellant but didnt
find him. Catriz was again unable to find the accused-appellant when he
returned the next day.
On April 6, 2004, at about 4:00 p.m., the accused-appellant saw Catriz unloading
chickens. He approached him and offered help, but Catriz pushed him away
causing the accused-appellant tostumble down. Catriz then tried to hack the
accused-appellant twice with a bolobut the latter was able to dodge the attacks.
On Catrizs third attempt, the accused-appellant got hold of a knife from the wall
of a nearby house and defended himself by plunging the same on Catriz. When
Catriz again attempted to hack the accused-appellant, the latter shoved the knife
against him once more. The accused-appellant failed to recall how many times
he stabbed Catriz because he got dizzy and lost touch with his senses.
Dazed with what he has just witnessed, Aginawang ran to the back of a house
towards a creek. The accused-appellant, on the other hand, proceeded towards
Ruling of the CA
the road where he met one Abe Ballesil who accompanied him, upon his
request, to the police station to surrender.7
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision8 dated January 7, 2008, the RTC sustained the testimony of
prosecution witness Bayudan, as corroborated by Dr. Yuagas post-mortem
examination, that the accused-appellant struck a hacking blow on Catriz from
behind. Treachery was also found to have attended the killing because while
Catriz was on a kneeling position begging for his life, the accused-appellant
continued to stabhim. At that moment, Catriz was totally helpless while the
accused-appellant was in no danger from any retaliation.
The CA affirmed the conviction and penalty meted upon the accused-appellant
adding that "the attitude and behavior of Catriz at that time certainly did not
constitute the unlawful aggression which the law requires." The CA further found
the defense version of the events unbelievable because the accused-appellants
claim that he was at a disadvantageous position from Catrizs relentless assault
is belied by the fact that the former was actually unscathed.The presence of a
knife which the accused-appellant picked up to repel Catrizs alleged attack was
likewise held highly specious since it seems tosuggest that knives are scattered
around the walls of houses in Mungo, Tuao, Cagayan. Thus, the CA ruled as
follows:
The accused-appellants allegation of self-defense was rejected because: (1) he

failed to claim it atthe earliest opportunity when he surrendered to the police
station; (2) the number and seriousness of the wounds he inflicted on Catriz
showed a determined effort on his part to kill the victim; and (3) he failed to
surrender the weapon to the police and he instead threw it away. Accordingly,the
RTC ruling was disposed as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered

by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case. The Decision dated January 7,
2008 rendered by Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court in Tuao, Cagayan in
Criminal Case No. 1165-T is hereby AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding

the herein accused ALEX DE LOS SA[N]TOS, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentencing him:
The accused-appellant is now before the Court pleading for his acquittal based
on the same and sole argument11 raised in his Appellants Brief12 before the
CA that the trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to his claim of selfdefense.
1. To suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua;

2. To pay civil indemnity/damages to the heirs of the victim Fernando
Catriz[;]
2.1 The amount of [P]50,000.00 as death indemnity;
2.2 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as moral damages;
2.3 The amount of [P]20,000.00 as nominal damages in lieu of
actual damages; and
2.4 The amount of [P]25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the accused-appellants conviction. It is immediately apparent
thatthe argument proffered by the accused-appellant essentially assails the
evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of the prosecutions principal
witness, Bayudan, and its ruling that the same satisfactorily repudiatedhis claim
of self-defense.
Basic is the rule that the matter ofassigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility
by the various indiciaavailable but not reflected on the record. Hence, the
corollary principle that absent any showing that the trial court overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the final disposition of the
case, appellate courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its
evaluation of the credibility of an eyewitness and his testimony as well as its
probative value amidst the rest of the other evidence on record.13
SO ORDERED.9
The Court sees no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets
especially considering the accused-appellants failure to pinpoint significant
details, which if considered, will alter the outcome of the trial courts judgment
and the affirmation accorded it by the CA.
Even an assiduous examination ofthe records of the case yields a similar finding:
the factual basis of accused-appellants plea of self-defense cannot relieve him
fromcriminal liability. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused
that he was in fact innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the victim,
but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such
defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige
of criminal aggression on his part.14 Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying
circumstance implies the admission by the accused that he committed the
criminal act.15 Thus, to escape criminal liability, the accused must prove by clear
and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the
second paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.16
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance ofself-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked.17 "There is an
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent
danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of a weapon."18 "It is present only when the
one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life."19
Here, the accused-appellant failed toprove that unlawful aggression was
initiated by Catriz.1wphi1 The physical evidence of Catrizs incised wound on
the left scapula belies the version ofevents adduced by the defense and is more
consistent with the narration of the prosecutions eyewitness Bayudan that the
initial blow came from the accused-appellant who suddenly emerged behind
Catriz and hacked him. The testimony of expert witness Dr. Yuaga further
confirmed that such incised wound could have been inflicted from behind.
The accused-appellantsclaim that Catriz boxed him first and then tried to hack
him with a bolois grounded on contradictory, hence, unreliable testimonies.
According to defense witness Aginawang, he saw Catriz push and then box the
accused-appellant. It is noticeable, however, from the accused-appellants own
narration that the detail relating to the punching is absent. Also, Aginawang
admitted oncross-examination that it was the accused-appellant who delivered
the first aggression by stabbing Catriz.20
Further, the Court agrees with the CAs observation that the presence of a knife
in the wall of the nearby house was highly dubious. The immediate availability
of a knife within the accused-appellants convenient reach in a public place at

the exact moment that he was allegedly being hacked by Catriz is too
inconceivable to warrant trustworthiness. The sequence of the narration of
eyewitness Bayudan is more rational and thus in accord with the spontaneity of
a truthful account that all the while, the accused-appellant had the knife in his
possession and he used it to continue stabbing Catriz when the first weapon he
used dislodged from its handle.
Further, the location, the number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on Catriz
indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. Based on Dr.
Yuagas post-mortem examination, 4 of the 11 stab wounds inflicted on Catriz
were in the mid extremity of the heart area sufficient to cause instantaneous
death. True enough, Catriz died of "hypovolemic shock, secondary to multiple
stab wounds." It has been repeatedly ruled that the nature, number and location
of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.21
In fine, the courts a quo were correct in finding that the accused-appellant failed
to discharge his burden of proving the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
The Court also upholds the findings of the courts a quo that the killing of Catriz
by the accused-appellant was attended with treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To
establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed."22
"The essence of treachery lies inthe attack that comes without warning, and the
attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its
accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the
attack madeit impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."23
It is evident in this case that, astestified by eyewitness Bayudan, the accusedappellant attacked Catriz whenthe latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate.
The accused-appellantcommenced his attack from behind Catriz and when the
latter eventually fell down to his knees begging for his life, the accused-appellant
continued stabbing him. Clearly, the accused-appellant took advantage of the
vulnerable position of Catriz to ensure the successful execution of the offense
without risk, and deny the victim the opportunity to defend himself.
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The two penalties being both
indivisible and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance to
consider, the lesser of the two penalties which is reclusion perpetuashould be
imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC.24 Hence,
the courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua.
Santos is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility

for parole and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Fernando Catriz, the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
plus interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
The accused-appellant shall pay the costs of suit.
The accused-appellant shall not beeligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of

Republic Act No. 9346 which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."25
The award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages were
correct. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim
and the culpability of the accused for such death.26 Despite the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering, the
award of moral damages is also proper in view of the recognized fact that death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part
of the victims family.27 The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary
damages since the killing was attended by treachery.28
However, in conformity with current jurisprudence, the amounts granted by the
courts a quoshall be increased to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity, P75,000.00 for
moral damages, and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages.29
The award of nominal damages mustbe deleted and replaced with temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00.30 Nominal damages are proper when
there is no proof of actual damages; and when it is granted, it is as if there was
in fact no damage at all.31 Temperate damages, on the other hand, are awarded
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty.32 There is no doubt that pecuniary expenses
were incurred in the funeral and burial of Catriz and the award of temperate
damages shall answer for the same.33
Lastly, all the monetary awards shall earn an interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annumfrom the date of finality of this Resolution until fully
paid.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 17, 2012
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03790 finding accused-appellant
Alex De Los Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is
herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Alex De Los
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 205298
September 10, 2014
EOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several
lacerations on the different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all
which,nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical
intervention applied on him that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and
damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 dated 31 July
2012 and Resolution3 dated 11 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 33776, affirming the Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos.
L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.
The Facts
Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (p~titioner) was charged, in conspiracy
with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso
Bni for frustrated homicide and homicide.
accused in conspiracywith each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations
and contusions on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performedall
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical
intervention applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and
damage of the said Robert dela Cruz.
In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information7 was filed when the
victim Freddie dela Cruz died:
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his
body, which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Freddie dela Cruz.
Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested.
Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and remainat large. Petitioner, Pedro and
Narciso all pled not guilty to the charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina
dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata
V. Fernandez.
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and Pedro Quintos.
Narciso Buni jumped bail before he could testify. Petitioners sister was also
scheduled to testify, but since her testimony would only be corroborative, the
prosecution admitted her testimony.8
The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie
dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were
walking along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on
their way to the town proper when they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly
Quintos, Lando Quintos,Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a
samurai, Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was
holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and
Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up
with them.
Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz withthe samurai, but the latter parried the attack
with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz attempted to gain control of the samurai, but
Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert
dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.
Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter
to fall face up. Petitioner joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while
defending himself with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a
few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruzs chest with the
same stone he usedto hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards
Robert dela Cruz. Pedro pulledFelomina dela Cruzs hair, slashed her nape with
the samurai, and then kicked her to the ground.
Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the
dela Cruzes because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left
when they were done, and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the
victims and call for help.
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the
hospital. They were treated for the injuries sustained from the attack.
After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz diedfrom his injuries. Before he died, Freddie
dela Cruz identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.
The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15
January 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo
Oyando came to the Quintos house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the
front portion ofthe house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert dela Cruz
punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to
Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was
holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz
approached the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got
slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the
ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting
with Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his
brother Lando. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not
remember how many times hehacked Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified
him, and Pedro went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and
Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution.
Petitioner was found guilty for the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela
Cruz. However, the trial court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the
wounds of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the appreciation
of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.9
The dispositive portion ofthe Joint Decision dated 20 October 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion
temporalwhich is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is
Prision Mayorin its full extent, the range of which is from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor
of the accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL,
as maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the
amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day of
The Issues
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in
the amount of Php 1,650.00and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day or
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the conviction, despite the
prosecutions failure to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of conspiracy should
not be leftto conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to present
evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance
ofa common design to kill.12
The Courts Ruling
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages
in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php
15,000.00.
The petition is unmeritorious.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone
preventive imprisonment,they shall be credited in the service of their sentences
with the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the
conditionsprovided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
The review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to

questions of law. This Court does not weigh all over again the evidence already
consideredin the proceedings below.13 The narrow ambit of review prescribed
under this rule allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of course,
admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual
milieu justifies relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or
conjectures, or overlooked undisputed facts which, if duly considered, lead to a
different conclusion.14
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court gravely erred in convicting them despite the
prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint
Decision dated October 20, 2010of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 39, inCriminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition.
Review of Questionsof Fact Improper
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts, alleging that had the said courts given weight to the defense evidence,
conviction would not have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court
to review the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings
below.
A question of law arises when there isdoubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.15 For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.16 Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.17
Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo
indulged in conjectures and surmises. However, a careful reading of the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts shows that such is not the case here.
The discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence from both sides,
weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the
evidenceof the prosecution and the defense alike.
Uniform findings of factof the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect,
and in the absence of any compelling reason to deviate therefrom, are final and
conclusive upon this Court. We thus proceed with our review without disturbing
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least
any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression.19
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of
their brother Lando.20 The defense of relatives argument likewise fails in light
of the lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. For the accused to
be entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete or incomplete,
it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if
there is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.21
Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. His argumentrevolves mainly on self-defense, defense of
relatives and absence of conspiracy.
We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution
witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively
and consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events.
Their testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors
who attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the
statement ofFreddie dela Cruz before the latter died.
The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-taken:

We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants allegations that they were
acting in self-defense because the victims were committing unlawful aggression.
We foundthe following loopholes:
We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible.
The assessment ofthe trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court,
and noneof the exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial court
found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any motive to testify falsely
against the accused.
First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the
brothers of Pedro tocome out of the house. No actual sudden or imminent attack,
however, was performed. It has been ruled that mere intimidating or threatening
words, even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression. Thus, in People
vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:
Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and
hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking self-defense. Because of Pedros
admissions, he and his co-conspirators assumed the burden to establish such
defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and

convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the partof the victim. The unlawful
aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least
imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked
is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means
enough. Unlawful aggressionpresupposes an actual or imminent danger on the
life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening attitude
of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers
to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is
clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance
or posture.
otherwise, the same admissions would lead to their conviction.18

We held in People v. Nugas:
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the States evidence,
because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence
ofthe crime, and establishing selfdefense does not require orinvolve the negation
of any of the elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression
amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused
claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers
to go out, but then, Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes
had some anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela
Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina
to allegedly get a bolo which was in Felominas possession and concealed under
a towel. Ifthis is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm himself
to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedros narration, itcannot be
definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants
with the determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.
forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered
almost similar lacerated wounds.
Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos
who was lying on the ground and being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela
Cruz. According to him, he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab Lando.
Pedro would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also involved in the
fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that
it was he alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his
brothers, including Lando, were "just there, sir, pacifying."
It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of
the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a
determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained,
the wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate
accused-appellants claim of self-defense.
Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accusedappellants did not report the incident to the police. During crossexamination,
Pedro admitted that:
Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that
happened on January 15 as what you are telling now?
A: No sir.
Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were
treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or even to your barangay the alleged
incident which you are now narrating, am I correct?
A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I
was brought directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who
vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident tothe
police. Pedros alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did notprevent
them from doing so. Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando;
not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the police
to report the alleged attack upon them by the delaCruzes. This omission,
therefore, casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims
negate[s] the accused-appellants claim of self-defense. According to the
medical certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest,
septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was
further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation of left and right hand."
Meanwhile, with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr.
Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the
We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the

prosecution and this Court believes that the version of the latter is more credible
and consistent with the truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they
attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case against the
accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.22
Existence of Conspiracy
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his
participation in the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also
argues that his mere presence during the said attacks does not by itself show
concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.
Petitioners presence during the commission of the crime was wellestablished
as he himself testified to that fact.1wphi1 Assuming that he was merely present
during the attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from
criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or
detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof.23
Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it
indicate the lack thereof Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the
acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.24 In fact, the prosecution
established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela
Cruz.
In People v. De Leon,25 we held:.
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to
achieve their. common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.
The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz
and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and
design in the commission of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and appellate
courts,.establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all
of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter
were retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a
different task. After the attacks, all the accused left the felled dela Cruzes for
dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of
one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was
in order.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CAG.R. CR No. 33776.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
G.R. No. 209346
January 12, 2015

vs.
ARNALDO BOSITO y CHAVENIA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 19 April 2013 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05289. The CA affirmed with
modification the Decision2 dated 29 September 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tabaco City, Al bay, Branch 15 in Criminal Case No. T-4696, convicting
appellant Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia (Bosito) of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Facts
Bosito was charged in an Information for murder, defined and penalized under
Article 2483 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information states:
That [on or] about 1:00 in the afternoon of June 11, 2007 at P-1, Barangay
Hacienda, San Miguel Island, City of Tabaco, Philippines, and within the
jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, the [above-named accused], with intent to kill
and with treachery, and while armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously attack, assault, and hack WILLY BERBA BONAOBRA,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal wounds which directly caused
his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, Bosito pleaded not guilty and invoked selfdefense.
On 14 January 2008, at the pre-trial conference, the following facts offered for
stipulation by the prosecution were admitted by the defense: (1) the identity of
Bosito; (2) that Bosito and the victim, Willy Berba Bonaobra (Bonaobra) knew
each other; (3) that Bosito was in Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco City on 11 June
2007; (4) that Bosito saw Bonaobra in Hacienda in the afternoon of 11
June2007; (5) that Bonaobra is already dead; (6) that Bosito hacked Bonaobra
several times at the house of Rosemarie Bongon in Hacienda, San Miguel, in
the afternoon of 11 June 2007; and (7) that Bonaobra did not die immediately at
the scene of the incident but expired at the hospital. The prosecution presented
the following witnesses: (1) Adonis Bosito (Adonis), Bositos nephew and the
eyewitness to the crime; (2) Vicente Bonaobra, father of the victim; (3) Dr.
Nicanor Manzano III, the attending physician of Bonaobra at the Bicol Regional
Training and Teaching Hospital where the victim was brought after the hacking
incident; (4) Atty. William Balayo, the lawyer who assisted Bosito when he gave
his extrajudicial confession; and (5) SPO1 Dennis Biron, the Investigator and
Blotter Custodian of Tabaco City Police Force.
The prosecution summed up its version of the facts from the testimony of Adonis,
the eyewitness tothe crime: Bonaobra arrived at the house of his sister
Rosemarie Bongon (Rosemarie) at around noon of 11 June 2007. After 30
minutes, Bosito arrived at Rosemaries house. Bosito stood beside Bonaobra
and watched a card game being played by other guests. Bonaobra offered
Bosito some peanuts which Bosito accepted.
At around 1:00 in the afternoon, without warning, Bosito hacked Bonaobra with
a boloas the victim was trying to sit. The blow to his head caused Bonaobra to
slump to the ground. He tried to crawl away but Bosito hacked him again and hit
him in the leg. Despite his injuries, Bonaobra was still conscious and continued
crawling. Bosito then positioned himself behind Bonaobra and hacked him in the
head two more times. Although already mortally wounded, Bonaobra still
managed to stand up and run away.
After Bonaobras escape, Adonis picked up a wooden post from the ground and
told Bosito to stop.However, Bosito waved his boloand told Adonis not to come
near him. Bositothen walked toward the direction of his house and threatened
Adonis and his companions that they would be next should they follow him.
Later, Adonis saw Bonaobra being boarded on a boat and found out that
Bonaobra was taken to a hospital. On 14 June 2007, Bonaobra died of aspiration
pneumonia due to sustained multiple hack wounds.
Adonis testified that Bonaobra did not provoke Bosito. Adonis suspected that
Bosito thought that Bonaobra came to Tabaco City to avenge Edgar Binas, who
was also hackedby Bosito three years earlier.
Dr. Nicanor Manzano III, the attending physician of Bonaobra when he was
brought to the hospital issued two medico-legal certificates showing that
Bonaobra sustained: (1) a skull fracture which caused brain evisceration; (2)
severe neck trauma; (3) thoracic area posterior trauma; and (4) left gluteal area
trauma. Dr. Manzano testified that all of Bonaobras wounds were to the back of
his head and the back side of his torso. Among all his wounds, the most fatal
was the first head trauma which caused Bonaobras brain tissues to come out
from his skull.
Atty. William Balayo testified that upon the request of PO2 Joel Zubeldia, he
assisted Bosito in executing his extrajudicial confession. Atty. Balayo ensured
that Bosito understood his constitutional rights and Bosito, having understood
the implication of his act, voluntarily gave his confession. Atty. Balayo stated that
Bosito admitted striking the victim only once. However, upon learning that
Bonaobra died in the hospital several days after due to multiple hack wounds,
Atty. Balayo decided not to assist anymore because of Bositos
misrepresentation.
SPO1 Dennis Biron brought to court and read into the records Police Blotter
Entries 062156, 062158 and 062189 and attested to the correctness of the
certification submitted in court as documentary exhibits.
The defense, on the other hand, presented (1) appellant Bosito; (2) Analisa
Balderama (Analisa), appellants sister; and (3) Walter Dumaguin, appellants
friend.
Bosito testified that while on their way to the rice field, he and his sister Analisa
passed by the house of Rosemarie Bongon where Adonis was having a drinking
spree with his brothers, Juan and Arnold, and Bonaobra. The group called on
Bosito to join them and when he approached them, Adonis struck him with a
piece of wood, hitting his wrist as he parried the blow. While still holding the
piece of wood, Bonaobra, together with Juan and Arnold, who were all drunk
and holding bladed weapons surrounded Bosito. Just as Bonaobra was about
tostab him, Bosito immediately pulled out his bolo and hacked the victim.
Bonaobra ran away and fell to the ground about a kilometer away from the crime
scene. The others scampered away. Bosito went home, left his bolothere and
surrendered himself to the barangay captain.
Analisa testified that she and her brother Bosito were on their way to the rice
field when they passed by Bonaobra, Adonis, Juan and Arnold on a drinking
spree at Rosemaries house. Adonis invited Bosito for a drink which the latter
refused. Bonaobra then pushed Bositoand struck Bosito with a bolo four times
but Bosito evaded these thrusts. They grappled for possession of the bolo which
Bosito eventually wrestled out of Bonaobras hand and hacked Bonaobra maybe
four times. She tried to pacify them but to no avail. Analisa stated that prior to
this incident, Bonaobra had been threatening Bosito for about seven months
already whenever Bonaobra was drunk. Walter Dumaguin, a fishpond operator
in Hacienda, San Miguel, testified that he was a friend of Bositoand visited him
in jail for about 10 minutes the day after the incident. Dumaguin did not give any
other relevant information.
In its Decision dated 29 September 2011, the RTC found Bosito guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The RTC accorded full faith and
credence to the testimony of Adonis and disregarded Bositos claim of self-
defense. The RTC stated that Adonis testified in a straight forward and candid
manner thatBosito mercilessly hacked Bonaobra four times, with his bolo. The
RTC stated further that Bositos version of self-defense was incredulous and
unbelievable since Bosito was unharmed and unwounded compared to the
number of hacked wounds sustained by the victim. The RTC declared Bosito
guilty of the crime of murder attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and abuse of superior strength due to the sudden and unexpected attack made
by Bosito which afforded no opportunity for Bonaobra to defend himself. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Willy BerbaBonaobra the
following:
a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P15,505.45 as actual damages;
d) P1,392,120.00 representing the loss of earning capacity.
SO ORDERED.5
Bosito filed an appeal with the CA and raised a lone error by the RTC:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SELF-DEFENSE [THEORY].6
In its Decision dated 19 April 2013, the CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the RTC. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate from the trial
courts factual findings and conclusion. The CA stated that Bositos plea of selfdefense has been rebutted by the positive and categorical testimony of
prosecution witness Adonis who had convincingly established that the unlawful
aggression emanated from Bosito and not from the victim. The CA added that
the trial court correctly accorded credence to Adonis whose testimony it found
spontaneous, straightforward, candid and evincing credence and belief. Further,
the CA ruled out the presence of illmotive on the part of Adonis to falsely
implicate his uncle.
The CA deleted the award of (1) actual damages of P15,505.45 since
jurisprudence holds that when actualdamages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000, the award of temperate damages of P25,000 is
justified in lieu of actual damages in a lesser amount; and (2) damages for loss
of earning capacity since no documentary evidence was presented by the
prosecution to substantiate the claim and the victim does not fall under any of
the recognized exceptions. Nevertheless, the CA granted the amount of P25,000
as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages of P15,505.45 supported by
receipts and P30,000 as exemplary damages pursuant to Article 22307 of the
Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ordering Appellant Arnaldo Bosito yChavenia to pay the heirs of the
victim temperate damages of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(Php25,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00);
2. Deleting the award of actual damages and damages for loss of
earning capacity; and
3. Ordering the payment of interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
computed from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid on the
total amount of damages adjudged in favor of the heirs of the victim,
the appealed 29 September 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco
City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. T-4696 is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant Bosito now comes before the Court, submitting for resolution the same
issue argued before the CA. In a Manifestation9 dated 28 February 2014, Bosito
stated that in lieu of supplemental brief, he is adopting the Appellants Brief10
dated 21 June 2012 submitted before the CA. Likewise, the Office of the Solicitor
General manifested that it no longer desires to file a supplemental brief and
instead adopts the Appellees Brief11 dated 12 November 2012 which it filed
before the CA.12
Appellant assails the decisions of the RTC and CA for not giving credence to his
contention of self-defense.
We agree with the RTC and the CA in ruling that the prosecution fully established
Bositos guilt for the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Adonis positively
identified Bosito as the person who hacked Bonaobra and caused his death.
Considering that Adonis and Bosito were blood relatives, Adonis was candid,
straightforward, spontaneous and firm in his narration of the events.
In the present case, Bosito would like us to believe that he acted in self-defense.
In his Appellants Brief, Bosito admitted hacking Bosito although in self-defense.
By invokingself-defense, appellant admits killing the victim and the constitutional
presumption of innocence is effectively waived. The burden of evidence then
shifts to the appellant that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal
liability.13 Thus, it is incumbent upon appellant to prove the elements of selfdefense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.14
Bosito claims that the unlawful aggression consisted of Bonaobras group
ganging up on him and attempting to stab him with a knife. However, aside from
Bositos self-serving testimony, the defense did not present any witness to
corroborate his testimony that Bonaobra pulled a knife and tried to stab him.
Likewise, Bosito failed to present the knife which he said he grabbed during the
tussle and kept in his possession. In People v. Satonero,15 we held that the
failure to account for the non-presentation of the weapon allegedly wielded by
the victim is fatal to the plea of self-defense.
Next, the means employed by Bosito to prevent or repel the supposed unlawful
aggression was beyond reasonably necessary. As correctly found by the trial
and appellate courts, the number, nature, and gravity of the wounds sustained
by Bonaobra reveal a determined effort to kill and contradict Bositos claim of
self-defense. The prosecutions evidence shows that Bonaobra sustained and
died from multiple hack wounds. The records show that after Bonaobra received
the first blow to his head, which proved to be the most fatal, Bosito still continued
to thrust his boloto the victim three more times. Even Analisa, Bositos sister,
who gave her testimony for the defense, confirmed that Bosito hacked Bonaobra
four times. Clearly, the means utilized was not reasonable under the
circumstances.
In People v. Obordo,16 we held that self-defense, to be successfully invoked,
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. Bosito failed to present
adequate evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-defense cannot

stand.
Further, we agree with the lower courts in appreciating treachery as a qualifying
circumstance.1wphi1 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the victim of any chance to defend
himself. Here, the sudden attack of Bosito with a bolo against Bonaobra while
they were watching a card game caught the victim by surprise. Bonaobra was
unprepared and had no means to put up a defense. Such aggression insured
the commission of the crime without risk on Bosito. Also, we agree with the trial
court when it held that abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in
treachery. Since treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the
former.17
In sum, we find no cogent reason to depart from the decision of the trial and
appellate courts. Bosito is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9346;18 and
with all the accessory penalties provided by law. As for damages, the CA
awarded these amounts: (1) P50,000 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000 as moral
damages; (3) P25,000 as temperate damages; and (4) P30,000 as exemplary
damages. To conform with recent jurisprudence,19 the amount of civil indemnity
awarded by the CA is hereby increased to P75,000. Moreover, the amounts of
damages awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS
the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 19 April 2013 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05289 WITH THE MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) appellant Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) the amount of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000; and
(3) appellant is ordered to pay interest on all damages at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 212565
February 25, 2015

vs.
BENJAMIN CASAS y VINTULAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Benjamin
Casas y Vintulan (Casas) assailing the Decision2 dated November 20, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 05313 which affirmed the
Decision3 dated November 4, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 160 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, finding Casas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide
under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively.
The Facts
Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the RTC charging Casas of the
Murder of Joel Tabile y Gulla4 (Joel) and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio5 Ruiz
y Ricardo6 (Eligio), the pertinent portions of which respectively read:
Crim. Case No. 136842
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of San Juan, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
in conspiracy with another person, whose true identity and present whereabouts
are unknown, with the use of a bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, with intent to
kill and by means of the qualifying circumstance treachery (sic), evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Joel Tabile y Gulla,
thereby inflicting upon the latter several stab wounds on the different parts of his
body, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Crim. Case No. 136843
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of San Juan, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
in conspiracy with another person, whose true identity and present whereabouts
are unknown, with intent to kill and by means of the qualifying circumstance
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, which qualifies

the crime to frustrated murder, with the use of a bladed weapon, a deadly
weapon, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo, thereby inflicting upon the latter several stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which ordinarily would have caused
his death, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely
medical assistance rendered unto said Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo, which prevented
his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.8
During arraignment, Casas entered a plea of not guilty. After which, joint trial on
the merits ensued.9
The prosecutions version of the facts is as follows:
On December 24, 2007, between 1 to 2 o clock in the afternoon, Casas,
accompanied by a certain "Ron-Ron" (Ron-Ron), went to a certain taho factory
located at 313 F. Roman Street, San Juan City, looking for a certain Jesus.
Failing to find the person he was looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck
it into a pail used for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an employee of the
tahofactory, confronted Casas, saying to the latter, "Benjie[(referring to Casas)],
bakit ang yabang mo? Kung hindi mo makita ang kalaban mo, dapat hanapin
mo na lang." Casas replied "Gusto mo ito? (referring to his knife)." Eligio told
Casas to get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron. Eligio and Casas
then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas took the knife from RonRon and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing. Casas, during his
continued pursuit of Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help Eligio
with the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on the floor,
and was prostrate. There and then, Casas stabbed him twice, the first blow
entering his back and exiting at the front of his torso, and the second blow hitting
the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed
him again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a
plastic stool and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing the latter to drop the knife
and cease the attack. PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that he
was riding his motorcycle on the date of the incident when he met PO3 Eduardo
Fronda (PO3 Fronda) who asked for assistance as the latter saw a bloodied
male. The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, who turned out to be
Casas, and asked him what happened. The latter replied that he had just
stabbed someone. After confirming that there was indeed a stabbing incident
nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas.10
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a demurrer to Evidence11 on
the basis of the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which the RTC denied in an Order12 dated December 30, 2010.13
With the demurrers denial, the defense changed its theory as Casas admitted
that he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but interposed self-defense to justify his
actions.14 In particular, Casas claimed that he was a former employee of the
taho factory and that on December 24, 2007, the date of the incident, his former
employer asked him to get the remainder of his salary. While at the factory, Joel
challenged him to a fight. Casas averred that he refused to accept Joels
challenge, but the latter took a knife and attacked him. During the alleged attack,
Casas posited that he suffered minor injuries when he disarmed and stabbed
Joel. Eligio and one Rolando Jaronel witnessed the fight, and when they saw
that Casas stabbed Joel they began to attack him also. In order to protect
himself, Casas repeatedly stabbed Eligio. He maintained that he did not intend
to kill Joel.15
The RTC Ruling
Accordingly, it ruled that Casas employed treachery in killing Joel, and thus
should be convicted for Murder.20
As for Eligio, the RTC opined that though Casass intent to kill the former was
present (as shown by the weapon he used, the number of wounds he inflicted,
his resolution to chase and harm Eligio after the latter fled, and the parts of
Eligios body that Casas injured), the circumstances that would qualify the case
to Murder were not attendant; therefore, Casas should be convicted only of
Homicide in such respect. The RTC also ruled that the said crime was only in its
attempted stage given that the prosecution was not able to prove that he
performed all the acts of execution which would consummate the Homicide,21
nor show the nature of Eligios wounds.22
Dissatisfied, Casas appealed23 to the CA.
In a Decision16 dated November 4, 2011, the RTC convicted Casas of the

following:
(a) in Crim. Case No. 136842, Murder (of Joel), thereby sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the concomitant
accessory penalties, and ordering him to pay the amounts of
P50,000.00 in civil indemnity, P12,500.00 in actual damages,
P37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity, P30,000.00 in moral damages,
P30,000.00 in exemplary damages, and costs; and
(b) in Crim. Case No. 136843,Attempted Homicide (of Eligio), thereby
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and six (6)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering him to pay
the amount of P14,000.00 as temperate damages, and costs.17
It declared that the evidence on record did not support Casass theory of selfdefense, observing that the victims showed no unlawful aggression towards
Casas. On the other hand, the prosecutions witnesses invariably testified that it
was Casas who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he
lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing, establishing that Casas was
the aggressor. Further, it was pointed out that Casas suffered only nine (9)
injuries, consisting of three (3) abrasions, one (1) contusion, and five (5) incised
wounds, which did not, collectively or individually, threaten his life at any time.18
Conversely, Joel was killed because of the stab wounds that Casas inflicted,
while Eligio was stabbed multiple times. As such, the second requirement under
Article 11 (1) of the RPC, i.e., the reasonable necessity of the means employed
to repel the unlawful aggression, was non-existent.19
Meanwhile, the RTC found that Casas stabbed Joel twice when the latter
slipped, fell, and lay prostrate, and in that position Joel could not defend himself.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated November 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTCs conviction
of Casas but modified the amounts awarded to P75,000.00 in civil indemnity,
P12,500.00 in actual damages, P37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity,
P30,000.00 in moral damages, and P30,000.00 in exemplary damages for the
Murder of Joel. As for the Attempted Homicide of Eligio, it awarded P25,000.00
in temperate damages, and P10,000.00 in moral damages, in order to conform
with recent jurisprudence.
Aggrieved, Casas filed the instant appeal.25
The issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not Casass conviction for the
crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide should be upheld.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liability.
Essentially, Casas, in a sudden change of theory from the denial of his demurrer,
banks on the justifying circumstance of self-defense in order to overturn his
conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide. The statutory basis
therefor is Article 11 (1) of the RPC which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, correctly pronounced that the above-mentioned
requirements were not present in this case. It is significant to point out that upon
invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Casas assumed the burden
of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is
because his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of
his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, which,
even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his admission.26
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either
Joel or Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless
the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to
self-defense.27 As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the
aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio,
then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing.28 Being
the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas
cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude,29 as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary
happened in this case.
It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and Casas does not
indicate that unlawful aggression was employed by the former against the latter
considering that Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in fact, proceeded
to flee. It is well-settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away if and
so such was the case with respect to Eligio unlawful aggression on the part of
the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor;
otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is committed. Retaliation is not the
same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the

injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in selfdefense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.30
Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was not proven,
Casass claim of self-defense falters and his criminal liability stands.
This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be
convicted of the crime of Murder with respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No.
136842, i.e., the death of Joel, considering the prosecutions failure to prove the
existence of treachery. The Court expounds. The elements of Murder that the
prosecution must establish are: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused
killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated in Article 248 is
treachery.1wphi1 Under Article 14 of the RPC, "[t]here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must be
shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted;31 indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.32
In People v. Se,33 the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the
sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest
provocation on the latters part. The victim must not have known the peril he was
exposed to at the moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the
victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he
met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated.34
In People v. Discalsota,35 the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated
in instances when the victim had the opportunity to flee or defend himself.36
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between Eligio and
Casas.37 Joel, seeing that Casas had stabbed Eligio, wanted to help the latter
by using a bamboo pole but slipped and fell.38 As he was lying prostrate on the
floor, Casas delivered the blows that ended Joels life. Under these
circumstances, it is the Courts observation that Joel was fully aware of the
danger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed with a knife
and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed
himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel was aware
of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there
being no showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joels
mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the assailants careful reflection, it does
not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure
that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas just
happened to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor when the former
caught up with him (Joel). Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of
Casas, as well as Joels obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts
this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Thus, insofar as
the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842 go, the Court downgrades the conviction
to the crime of Homicide. In consequence, Casas is instead meted with the
penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with all the concomitant accessory penalties, for the
Homicide of Joel.
The downgrading of Casass conviction in Crim. Case No. 136842 results in the
deletion of the award of P30,000.00 in exemplary damages.39 Further, keeping
with recent jurisprudence, the Court is impelled to increase the award of moral
damages from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00,40 as well as delete the award of
P12,500.00 in actual damages and, in lieu thereof, award temperate damages
in the higher amount of P25,000.00.41 The Court also perceives error in the
award of P37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity since the established formula
thereof was incorrectly applied.
The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows:42
Net earning capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living
Expenses (50% of gross annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the
age of the deceased).
Thus, operating under the established facts as found by the RTC that Joel was
22 when he was killed by Casas, and that he had monthly salary of 1,000.00 to
1,500.00 as a utility man,43 the loss of earning capacity is computed as such:
Net earning capacity = [2/3(80-22)] x [(1500 x 12) - ((1,500 x 12) x 50%)]
= [2/3(58)] x [P18,000.00 - P9,000.00]
= P348,000.00
Accordingly, the award of loss of earning capacity is increased from P37,200.00

to P348,000.00 as above-computed. Meanwhile, the civil indemnity award of
P75,000.00 stands.44
In similar light, the Court modifies the award of moral damages in Crim. Case
No. 136843from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 to conform with recent
jurisprudence.45
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on
all damages awarded, in both Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.46
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in
the Decision dated November 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC. No. 05313 with MODIFICATION in that, in Crim. Case No. 136842,
considering that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven,
accused-appellant Benjamin Casas y Vintulan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt only of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
with an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with
all the concomitant accessory penalties.
Further, in order to conform with existing jurisprudence, the following monetary
awards are MODIFIED: in Crim. Case No. 136842, (a) the award of P12,500.00
in actual damages is deleted and, in lieu thereof, P25,000.00 in temperate
damages is awarded; (b) the award of loss of earning capacity is increased from
P37,200.00 to P348,000.00; (c) the award of P30,000.00 in moral damages is
increased to P75,000.00; and (d) the award of P30,000.00 in exemplary
damages is deleted; and in Crim. Case No. 136843, the award of P10,000.00 in
moral damages is increased to P20,000.00. In addition, all awards for damages,
in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, shall bear legal interest at the rate of
six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
The rest of the CA Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 190340
July 24, 2013

vs.
ROGELIO RAMOS and MARISSA INTERO RAMOS, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The crime is attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery by attacking

a defenseless victim and with abuse of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment on June 29, 2006, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.5 After pre-trial, trial on the merits followed.
In convincing this Court to overturn their conviction for murder, appellants in this
case invoke self-defense, denial and alibi.
On appeal is the September 9, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CR-H.C. No. 02785, which affirmed with modification the February 28,
2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32
in Criminal Case No. A-5295. The RTC found the appellants Rogelio Ramos
(Rogelio) and Marissa Intero Ramos (Marissa) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, sentenced them to reclusion perpetua, and ordered them
to pay the heirs of the victim Ronald A. Abacco (Abacco) civil indemnity and
moral damages in the amounts of P75,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively.
Factual Antecedents
On June 28, 2006, appellants were charged with the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information3 reads thus:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ROGELIO RAMOS & MARISSA INTERORAMOS of the crime of MURDER with the Aggravating Qualifying circumstances
of treachery and abuse of superior strength committed as follows:
That on or about April 11, 2006 at about 7:00 pm or immediately thereafter, at
the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another by using their superior strength to
subdue the victim RONALD A. ABACCO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kill the said victim by attacking him with a bladed weapon, pulling
him to the ground to subdue him and while there on the ground and defenseless,
accused ROGELIO RAMOS hacked him several times while accused MARISSA
INTERO-RAMOS shouted, "kill him, kill him" thus causing massive injuries to
the body of the victim that caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs.
Eight witnesses testified for the prosecution: Dr. Arsenio Parazo (Dr. Parazo),
PO3 Aris De Guzman, Onofre Tandoc (Tandoc), Anthony Ramos (Anthony),
Ryan Roquero (Ryan), Gina Ramos (Gina), Adrian Ruther Abacco, and PO2
Eduardo Laroya. Their testimonies are summarized as follows.
In the evening of April 11, 2006, Rogelio threw stones at the house of his brotherin-law, Ramon Ramos, where Tandoc and his daughter, as well as Abacco, were
resting. After Tandoc warned Rogelio to stop throwing stones as he might hit his
daughter, Rogelio retreated to his house. After a while, Marissa went out and
shouted at them. Tandoc then suggested to Abacco that they leave the place to
avert further trouble. However, instead of leaving, Abacco, then unarmed,
approached the appellants house and asked Rogelio to come out so they could
talk. Rogelio and Marissa then opened their gate. As soon as the gate was
opened, Rogelio hacked Abacco twice with a samurai sword. When Abacco fell
to the ground, the appellants dragged him into their yard and banged his head
on the wall of their house. Abacco begged for his life crying out, "Tama na
bayaw, tama na, hindi ako lalaban."6 Despite this, Marissa hacked Abacco on
his back with a bolo while he was still on the ground. She then told Rogelio,
"Sige, patayin mo na yan!"7 Notwithstanding the plea for mercy, Rogelio still
hacked Abacco several times until the latter died.
Dr. Parazo who conducted the autopsy, testified that Abacco died of
hypovolemic shock or massive blood loss secondary to multiple hacked wounds
in different parts of the body, such as the head, neck, shoulders, forearms, and
back. He further testified that the injuries on Abaccos head and on his right hand
might have been caused by a sharp-edged instrument like a samurai sword,
bolo, or knife. The wounds were so deep that some of Abaccos bones such as
the scapula (shoulder blades) and the humerus (upper arm bone) were exposed.
The wound in the lumbar area (lower back) almost transected the spinal cord.9
Abaccos body bore 12 wounds.
The defense presented six witnesses: Basilio Tavora (Tavora), Elpidio Barroga,
William Bumanlag (Bumanlag), Dr. Emmanuel Soriano (Dr. Soriano), and
Marissa and Rogelio. Rogelio invoked self-defense while Marissa interposed

denial and alibi. Their testimonies are summarized as follows.
At about 7:00 p.m. of April 11, 2006, Rogelio was in his house with his live-in
partner Marissa. While Rogelio was taking a bath near their deep well, Abacco
threw stones at their house hitting the roof five times. Abacco then shouted at
Rogelio and challenged him to come out so they could talk. Rogelio then went
inside the house and told Marissa to call the barangay officials. At about 8:00
p.m., Marissa went out to seek the aid of the barangay officials. Abacco was still
outside shouting and challenging Rogelio. When Abacco stopped shouting,
Rogelio went out of the house to look for Marissa. As he reached the gate and
was about to go out of the compound, he was suddenly hacked on his right arm
by Abacco with a bolo. He stepped back since Abacco again swung at him with
his bolo. Rogelio went inside his house to get his samurai sword so that he could
defend himself. Abacco resumed his attack as soon as Rogelio came out.
Parrying the blow of Abacco, Rogelio was able to get a hold of Abaccos hand
as well as the bolo. He then hacked Abacco with the samurai sword several
times until he was dead.
Abacco was already lifeless when Kagawad Barroga arrived. Rogelio
surrendered to Barroga and told him that he killed the deceased out of selfdefense. Later on, Marissa arrived with the barangay officials.
Marissa corroborated the testimony of Rogelio. To bolster her defense of denial
and alibi, Marissa testified that after Abacco repeatedly challenged Rogelio, she
went to the house of Liwayway del Prado to ask someone to accompany her to
the house of a barangay kagawad.10 Bumanlag accompanied her to the house
of Kagawad Rafanan but no one was there. Marissa and Bumanlag then
proceeded to the house of Kagawad Tavora arriving there at about 9:00 p.m.
When Marissa told Tavora that Abacco was going berserk,11 Tavora refused to
go with them saying that the area is outside of his sector and instead advised
them to go to the municipal hall. However, they no longer got to the municipal
hall because when they passed by appellants house, they learned that Abacco
was already dead.
After hearing all the testimonies presented by both sides and receiving their
respective evidence, the RTC on February 28, 2007 convicted Rogelio and
Marissa of the crime of murder. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered adjudging both
accused Rogelio Ramos and Marissa Intero-Ramos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.
They are also ordered to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of Ronald Abacco of
STO. TOMAS, La Union in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand pesos* and
moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand pesos for a total of One
Hundred Twenty Five Thousand pesos.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC rejected the claim that Rogelio only acted in lawful self-defense. It held
that the elements of self-defense, specifically unlawful aggression on the part of
Abacco and reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression, were not established.
With respect to the element of unlawful aggression on Abaccos part, the RTC
ratiocinated thus:
Assuming arguendo that Ronald Abacco was indeed armed when he confronted
Rogelio Ramos at the latters house, Rogelio became the unlawful aggressor
from the time he was able to get hold of Abaccos hand and started hacking him.
At that moment, the unlawful aggression made by Abacco, if ever there was any,
ceased and evidently shifted to the accused Rogelio Ramos.13
Anent the element of reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression, the RTC held that the number of wounds sustained by the deceased
reveals that the means employed by Rogelio was unreasonable. In addition, in
comparison with Rogelios injuries which the attending physician and the RTC
found to be minor, the fatal wounds suffered by Abacco belie the claim of selfdefense.
As to Marissa, the RTC held that her claim of denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying her to
have participated in the commission of the crime.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. The
dispositive portion of the CAs assailed September 9, 2009 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the appellants Rogelio Ramos and
Marissa Ramos are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, additional P25,000.00
as exemplary damages, to the heirs of Ronald Abacco.
IT IS SO ORDERED.14
The CA held that the appellants failed to discharge the burden of evidence in
proving that Rogelio killed Abacco in self-defense. Instead, what Rogelio did was
an act of retaliation. With respect to Marissa, the said court ruled that her
defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper as it was not physically impossible for
her to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Assignment of Errors
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence.
To successfully invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the following
requisites must be present:
(1) unlawful aggression;
Not satisfied, the appellants now appeal to this Court adopting the same issues
they raised before the CA. They assert that the trial court gravely erred in:
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending

himself.17
X X X CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER, WHEN THEIR GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
X X X GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY INCREDULOUS
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTIONS EYEWITNESSES, AND IN
DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.
III
X X X RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. 15
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Rogelios claim of self-defense is unavailing.
Rogelio admits that he killed Abacco albeit in self-defense. "The rule consistently
adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admits that he is the
author of the death of the victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense, it
becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court."16 With this admission, the burden of evidence is shifted
to the appellant to prove that all the essential elements of self-defense are
present. He must show and prove by clear and convincing evidence that his act
was justified. Otherwise his conviction must be upheld and he cannot be
exonerated from criminal liability. On this score, the accused must rely on the
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no

unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is
unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim
must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual
peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful
aggression.18
In this case, appellants claim that Abacco went to Rogelios house and threw
stones at it, shouted at Rogelio, and challenged him to come out. When Rogelio
finally came out, Abacco suddenly hacked him with a bolo. And to defend
himself, Rogelio went inside his house, armed himself with a samurai sword, and
in parrying the blows of Abacco, hacked the latter to death. In essence, Rogelio
claims that the unlawful aggression originated from Abacco.
On the other hand, the prosecution witnesses stated that Abacco was unarmed
when he went to the house of Rogelio. They testified that Rogelio and Marissa
were crouching behind a gumamela bush before Rogelio opened their gate.
Thereupon, Rogelio dealt the first blow when he suddenly hacked Abacco with
a samurai sword twice.19
Ineluctably, Abacco cannot be considered as the aggressor. For one,
eyewitnesses attest that Abacco was unarmed when he went to appellants
house. Also, Abaccos act of going to their house and calling out Rogelio so they
may talk can hardly be considered as unlawful aggression under the law. Even
Abaccos injuries which proved to be multiple and fatal reveal that it was Rogelio
and Marissa who were truly the aggressors. In contrast, the injuries sustained
by Rogelio were minor requiring no special care or attention. Dr. Soriano, the
physician who attended to Rogelio, even testified in court on the possibility that
the wounds could have been self-inflicted.20 This Court is thus convinced that
Abacco was by no means the unlawful aggressor.
With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court finds that the
means employed by Rogelio is grossly disproportionate to Abaccos alleged
unlawful aggression. Abacco was violently slain and practically butchered. He
suffered multiple blows to the head, neck, arms, and back. The blade of the
samurai sword not only sliced through his flesh but penetrated and even
exposed his bones. In fact, one particular laceration almost transected his spinal
cord. Suffice it to say that a plea of self-defense is belied by the "nature, number,
and location of the wounds" inflicted on the victim "since the gravity of said
wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend."21 Here,
the wounds sustained by Abacco clearly show Rogelios intent to kill him and not
merely to prevent or repel an attack from him. Verily, the means employed by
Rogelio were unreasonable and excessive, thus, his plea of self-defense is
unacceptable.
Marissas defense of denial and alibi must likewise fail.
Marissa invokes the defense of denial and alibi. She claims that she was not
present at the crime scene at the time of the killing since she was at the house
of Barangay Kagawad Tavora to ask for aid in pacifying Abacco who was
challenging Rogelio.
However, for the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove (a) that
she was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime,
and (b) that it was physically impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime"22
during its commission. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility
of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the
crime was committed. She must demonstrate that she was so far away and could
not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity
when the crime was committed."23
In the case at bench, Marissa failed to satisfy these requisites. During trial, it
was shown that the distance between Kagawad Tavoras house and the house
of the appellants was only 400 meters. Surely, a distance of 400 meters is not
what jurisprudence contemplates when it refers to physical impossibility of the
accused to be present at the scene of the crime. We have previously held that
two kilometers,24 three kilometers,25 and even five kilometers26 were not too far
as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the crime scene.
The mere fact, therefore, that Marissa went to the house of Kagawad Tavora did
not preclude her presence at their house at the time the crime happened.
Moreover, Marissa was positively identified by eyewitnesses to be present at the
scene of the crime and to have participated in its commission. Time and again,
this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails over alibi
since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.27
Factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are
accorded respect especially when affirmed by the CA.
Appellants challenge the RTCs reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses claiming the same to be highly incredulous. They particularly question
the credibility of prosecution witnesses, husband and wife Anthony and Gina,
who they claim had testified against them for improper motives. They aver that
since they previously filed a complaint against Anthony for cutting down their
narra tree, the said spouses had every reason to falsely testify against them. By
virtue of their previous altercation, the testimonies of the said witnesses should
not be given weight as they are not considered credible witnesses.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. It is a wellsettled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of
witnesses are accorded utmost respect since trial courts have first hand account
on the witnesses manner of testifying in court and their demeanor during trial.28
The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of
the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of
credibility.1wphi1
Moreover in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of
discretion, and especially when the findings of the judge have been affirmed by
the CA as in this case, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed.29
Besides, even assuming that Anthony and Gina were indeed impelled by
improper motive, appellants failed to impeach Ryan, an eyewitness to the
incident who positively identified them as the assailants. As observed by the CA:
While the appellants question the credibility of the prosecution witness Anthony
Ramos, who allegedly had ill motive in testifying against them because appellant
Marissa had filed charges against him for cutting the narra tree in front of their
house, they failed to impute similar motive on the part of Ryan (Roquero) who
also witnessed the incident. x x x30
Treachery attended the killing of Abacco, hence, the crime committed is murder.
This Court is likewise convinced that treachery was employed by the appellants
in killing Abacco.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.31 This is exactly the
manner by which appellants committed the crime. As aptly depicted in the
assailed CA Decision:
As the victim lay on the ground, appellant Rogelio repeatedly hacked the victim.
Apart from the admission of appellant Rogelio, Anthony and Ryan, who
happened to pass by, also witnessed this incident. Furthermore, Anthony and
Ryan likewise saw appellant Marissa hack the victim at his back. Indisputably,
the appellants attacked the victim with treachery because the latter, who had
fallen to the ground and begging the appellants to stop, was in no position to
offer any defense to ward off the attack nor provide a semblance of risk to life or
limb of the attackers. x x x32
And as treachery qualifies the killing to murder,33 the crime committed in this
case is murder under Article 248 of the RPC.
Penalty and Award of Damages
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.34 "There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA properly
imposed upon appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article
63, paragraph 235 of the RPC."36
"Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following
may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorneys fees and expenses for litigation; and, (6) interest, in proper
cases."37 Hence, the Court finds as proper the RTCs awards to the heirs of
Abacco, as affirmed by the CA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.38 However, the P25,000.00 exemplary
damages awarded by the CA must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with
current jurisprudence.39 Also, as the prosecution was able to submit in evidence
receipts representing the expenses incurred in connection with Abacco's
burial,40 actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 must likewise be awarded.
"In addition and in conformity with current policy the Court also imposes on all
the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."41
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The September 9, 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02785 is AFFIRMED with
modifications. Appellants Rogelio Ramos and Marissa Intero Ramos are further
ordered to pay the heirs of Ronald A. Abacco (1) exemplary damages in an
increased amount of P30,000.00; (2) actual damages in the amount of
P40,000.00; and, (3) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the
monetary awards for damages from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 198110
July 31, 2013

vs.
WILSON ROMAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 28, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03972, which affirmed with modification
the Judgment2 dated June 10, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga
City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. IR-4231.
The Antecedent Facts
On November 11, 1996, Wilson Roman (accused-appellant) was charged with
Murder before the RTC of Iriga City, Branch 35. Upon arraignment on February
6, 2004, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.3 Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following as witnesses: Elena Romero (Romero),
Asterio Ebuenga (Ebuenga), Martin Borlagdatan (Borlagdatan), Elisea Indaya
(Indaya), Ramil Baylon (Baylon), SPO1 Medardo Delos Santos and Dr. Teodora
Pornillos (Dr. Pornillos). The defense, on the other hand, presented the
testimony of the accused-appellant and Delia Tampoco (Tampoco).
Prosecution witness Romero testified that in the morning of June 22, 1995, she
was at a wedding party in the house of a certain Andang Toniza in Barangay
Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur, when she witnessed the accused-appellant
hacks Vicente Indaya (victim) unrelentingly with a bolo. The victim was hit on his
head, nape, right shoulder, base of the nape and right elbow before he fell on
the ground and instantly died.4
Borlagdatan, who was also at the wedding party, testified that he was at the
kitchen, getting rice to be served for the guests, when he heard someone
shouting that somebody was hacked. When he went out to check what the
commotion is about, he saw the victim lying on his stomach, drenched in his own
blood, while the accused-appellant was standing in front of him, holding a bolo.
Borlagdatan tried to seize possession of the bolo from the accused-appellant but
the latter made a downward thrust, hitting his right thumb. He left the place and
proceeded to the nearby health center to have his wound treated.5
The testimonies of Ebuenga and Ramil Baylon, who were also in attendance at
the wedding party, corroborated the testimony of Borlagdatan.
Ebuenga testified that he was only two (2) feet away from the accused-appellant
and the victim when the former hacked the latter at the back of his head, nape
and left shoulder.6 Baylon, on the other hand, demonstrated in open court how
the incident transpired, with him acting as the accused-appellant and a court
employee as the victim. With the court employee had his back to Baylon, the
latter mimicked how the accused- appellant hacked the victim five (5) times. The
accused-appellant continued to hack the victim even when he was already on
his knees.7
Indaya, wife of the victim, testified that she learned of the incident from her sisterin-law, Consorcia Villaflor. They immediately proceeded to the crime scene and
saw her husband lying on his stomach, with five (5) hack wounds at the back of
his head. She further testified on the damages sustained by their family from the
untimely demise of the victim, who is a father to eleven (11) children and the
breadwinner of the household.8
Dr. Pornillos interpreted in open court the Necropsy Report9 executed by Dr.
Mario Baal (Dr. Baal), who conducted the post-mortem examination on the
cadaver of the victim. She testified that the victim sustained seven (7) hack
wounds. The first and second wounds were inflicted at the back of the head and
at the posterior lobe, respectively, while the third and fourth wounds were found
at the skull. The fifth and sixth wounds were inflicted at the left shoulder of the
victim while the seventh wound was at the back portion, above the waist and
along the spine. She further testified that the weapon used could be a bolo and
that the assailant was positioned at the back of the victim. She also confirmed
that the wounds could have been inflicted while the victim is already down on
the ground.10
The accused-appellant proffered a different version of the incident. He testified
that on June 22, 1995, he went to the house of his parents-in-law in Barangay
Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur to bring the bamboos he towed from San Isidro,
Balatan, Camarines Sur. On his way back, he met his close friend, Abundio
Belbis (Belbis), who cajoled him to come with him to a wedding party at
Barangay Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur. At the wedding venue, he saw the
victim having a heated exchange of words with his brother-in-law, Geronimo
Villaflor (Villaflor), who happened to be his friend. He pacified the two and told
Villaflor to leave. Thereafter, he joined Belbis and had some drinks. After twenty
(20) minutes, the victim suddenly appeared, loudly tapped their table and, while
pointing at him, exclaimed, "Son of a bitch, Ill kill you! Why are you pacifying
me? You are just like your friends." He stood up and turned to leave. While
leaving, however, he heard a woman shouting, "Wilson, you will be hacked!"
When he turned his head, he saw the victim running towards him with a bolo.
Seeing the impending attack, he moved back, making him lean on the fence, but
still he was hit on his left hand at the back of his palm. While wrapping his palm
with a towel, the victim hit him once again but he was able to dodge. He got mad
and lost control of himself so he pulled his bolo from the scabbard and hacked
the victim.11
testimonies of the accused-appellant and his witness, Tampoco, as to where the

bolo that was used in the crime came from.16 The accused-appellant testified,
thus:
"Q What did you do, if any?
Tampoco, on the other hand, testified that when she saw the victim aiming to
hack the accused-appellant, she shouted, "Wilson, you will be hacked!" With her
warning, the accused-appellant was able to move back and avoid the attack.
However, the victim moved and lunged at the accused-appellant again. The
accused-appellant was hit once but was, thereafter, able to seize possession of
the bolo from the victim and hacked the latter.12
On June 10, 2009, the RTC rendered a decision,13 finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused WILSON
ROMAN beyond reasonable doubt for the felony of murder, he is hereby
CONVICTED and sentenced to suffer imprisonment from twenty years and one
day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Vicente Indaya represented by Elisea B. Indaya the following amount:
1)For the death of Vicente Indaya Pesos:One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00); 2)actual Damages in the amount of Pesos: Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00); 3)Moral Damages in the amount of Pesos: Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00); and the cost of suit.
A I was able to pull my bolo out of the scabbard and hacked him."17
On the other hand, Tampoco testified:
"Q While Wilson Roman, the accused was in that position, what did Vicente
Indaya do if any?
A What Vicente Indaya did was to move to where I was standing and then
Vicente Indaya lunged at Wilson Roman.
Q Then after that what happened?
A Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo.
Q Before Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo held by Vicente Indaya, was
Wilson Roman hit by that bolo?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that accused Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo from the
victim, Vicente Indaya and Wilson Roman hacked Indaya, thats why he died?
SO ORDERED.14
A Yes, sir."18
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements
constitutive of the crime charged. Specifically, it was able to prove the identity of
the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime through the categorical
testimonies of Romero, Ebuenga, Borlagdatan and Baylon who personally
witnessed the hacking of the victim. Further, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was also sufficiently established by the consistent accounts of the
witnesses that the accused-appellant attacked and hacked the victim from
behind, while he was unarmed and defenseless, until he was down on the
ground.15
The RTC also dismissed the plea of self-defense proffered by the accusedappellant. It ruled that the accused-appellants bare claim that the unlawful
aggression initially came from the victim cannot stand against the overwhelming
evidence presented by the prosecution showing that it was him who attacked
and repeatedly hacked the victim to his death. It noted the variance between the
As regards the civil liability, the RTC ordered the accused-appellant to indemnify
the heirs of the victim with actual and moral damages.19
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC in a
Decision20 dated February 28, 2011, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court dated June 10, 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on
the damages. Accordingly, accused-appellant Wilson Roman is directed to pay
the heirs of Vicente Indaya the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of actual damages of

P50,000.00 is deleted.
The Issues
The issues for consideration of this Court in the present appeal are the following:
SO ORDERED.21
(1) Whether the accused-appellant may properly invoke self-defense;
The CA ruled that the RTC correctly dismissed the accused-appellants plea of
self-defense to extricate himself from criminal liability. It pointed out that the
eyewitnesses accounts confirmed that the accused-appellant was the unlawful
aggressor and not the victim. It was established during the trial that the victim
was only walking in the yard when the accused-appellant attacked him from
behind.
Further, the CA noted that the disparity of the wounds sustained by the accusedappellant and the victim militates against the claim of self-defense. While the
accused-appellant sustained a superficial cut at the back of his palm, measuring
an inch, the victim was inflicted with seven (7) hack wounds on his head, neck
and shoulder, all of which were mortal.22
The CA, however, modified the award of damages, ratiocinating thus:
In consonance with the Supreme Courts pronouncements, WE reduce the
award of civil indemnity given by the trial court from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00
while the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages is maintained.
As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim of murder are not entitled thereto
because said damages were not duly proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.
In the present case, no proof was presented that the heirs of Vicente Indaya
actually spent the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the court a quo. However,
under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as
it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although
the exact amount was not proved. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, the award of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.
Likewise, exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the offense
is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In
this case, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established, WE
award the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.23 (Citations omitted)
On March 10, 2011, the accused-appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office,
filed a Notice of Appeal24 with the CA, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
(2) Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists.

The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution was not able to establish
his guilt beyond moral certainty. He argues that he should not be held criminally
liable for the death of the victim as he only acted in self-defense from the
unlawful aggression exerted by the latter. He was just
walking when he was suddenly attacked by the victim with a bolo and that he
swung his own bolo only to save himself from the impending danger to his
person.25
The accused-appellant further asseverates that there was a reasonable
necessity for him to use his bolo to repel the unlawful aggression of the victim
as it is the only weapon available to him at the time of the attack. He adds that
the unlawful aggression was exerted by the victim without any provocation on
his part.26
Even granting that the theory of self-defense is unavailing to him, the accusedappellant contends that he should only be convicted of the lesser crime of
homicide for failure of the prosecution to establish the presence of treachery. He
claims that the evidence on record failed to show that there was a conscious
effort on his part to adopt a particular means, method or form of attack to ensure
the commission of the crime, without affording the victim any opportunity to
defend himself. And, considering that treachery cannot be presumed, he opines
that any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in his favor.27
For their part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the
accused-appellants guilt for the crime of murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were positive, clear and
consistent in that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked from behind by
the accused-appellant.28
The OSG likewise refutes the accused-appellants claim of self-defense. It
argues that the evidence presented by the accused-appellant do not clearly and
convincingly establish the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. The mere fact that the victim was engaged in a heated argument with
another person so much so that the accused-appellant pacified them does not
constitute unlawful aggression within the contemplation of the law.29
Finally, the OSG maintains that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
clearly established by the eyewitnesses consistent accounts that the accusedappellant, without provocation, suddenly attacked the victim with his bolo from
behind, the latter being defenseless and totally unaware of the impending
danger to his person.30
The Courts Ruling
The accused-appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent any showing that the lower court overlooked circumstances which would
overturn the final outcome of the case, due respect must be made to its
assessment and factual findings. Such findings of the RTC, when affirmed by
the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.31
In the instant case, the records are replete with evidence establishing the
accused-appellants guilt for the crime charged. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, Romero, Borlagdatan and Baylon, were positive, clear
and consistent in all material points. They uniformly declared that they were at
the scene of the crime at the time it was committed and identified the accusedappellant as the assailant who hacked the victim to his death. Specifically,
Baylon relayed in his testimony how the accused-appellant hacked the
unsuspecting victim from behind with a bolo. He recounted that the accusedappellant continued hacking the victim even as the latter was already kneeling
on the ground.32 Baylons testimony was corroborated by several eyewitnesses:
Romero, Ebuenga and Borlagdatan, all of whom confirmed the veracity of his
account.
Further corroborating the eyewitnesses testimonies is the Necropsy Report
issued by Dr. Baal. In the said report, it was confirmed that all of the wounds
suffered by the victim were located at his back, mostly in the head, inflicted by a
sharp-edged object which is presumably a bolo.33
Remarkably, the accused-appellant did not impute any ill-motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses which could have impelled them to falsely implicate
him in a serious crime like murder. Where there is no evidence that the witnesses
of the prosecution were actuated by ill-motive, it is presumed that they were not
so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.34
With the overwhelming evidence presented against the accused-appellant, this
Court entertains no doubt on his guilt.
The accused-appellant failed toestablish the elements of self-defense.

In his vain attempt to extricate himself from criminal liability, the accusedappellant interposed a plea of self-defense. In his version of the incident, he
claims that the victim was the unlawful aggressor and that he simply acted in
self-defense in order to avert an impending harm. He avers that he earned the
ire of the victim when he intervened in his altercation with Villaflor while at a
wedding reception. A few minutes after that, he claims that the victim came back
and loudly tapped the table where he and his friends were having some drinks.
The victim hurled invectives against him and threatened to kill him but he simply
stood up and turned to leave the place. As he was leaving, however, he heard
someone shouting that he is about to be hacked. Turning his head, he saw the
victim running towards him, aiming to hit him with a bolo. He was able to avoid
the attack but he was still hit in the palm as the victim continued to thrust his
bolo. It was then that he removed the bolo from his scabbard and hit the victim.35
It bears emphasizing that self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense
for it is easy to fabricate. Thus, it must be proven by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part
of the person invoking it.36 In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the
accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.37
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non must be present.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim
commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.38 There
is unlawful aggression when the peril to ones life, limb or right is either actual or
imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.39
In People v. Nugas,40 this Court expounded on the nature of unlawful aggression
as the key element of self-defense:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can
be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim
put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the
peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused
must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack
or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault
must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression;

and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression
means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent
unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion
as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening
attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver
was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a
pot.41 (Citations omitted)
Further, as correctly observed by the CA, the severity, location and the number
of wounds suffered by the victim are indicative of a serious intent to inflict harm
on the part of the accused-appellant and not merely that he wanted to defend
himself from an imminent peril to life. The CA noted:
As clearly shown by the evidence at hand, his cut was superficial which only
measures one (1) inch. In stark contrast, Vicente Indaya suffered seven (7) hack
wounds on his head, neck and shoulder, all located at the back and Dr. Teodora
Pornillos described all of them as fatal. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that
accused-appellant hacked Vicente Indaya merely to defend himself or to disarm
the latter. The severity, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
are eloquent evidence that accused-appellant was resolute on his intent to kill
Vicente Indaya.43
In Del Castillo, the Court discussed the implication of a plea of self-defense, viz:
The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accuseds
defense is self-defense he thereby admits being the author of the death of the
victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance
to the satisfaction of the court. The rationale for the shifting of the burden of
evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable
unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of
the State, which carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only
the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-defense is an affirmative
allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory
proof. He must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution, considering that the
Prosecutions evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view of his
admission of the killing.42 (Citations omitted)
Unfortunately for the accused-appellant, his claim of self-defense shrinks into
incredulity when scrutinized alongside the positive and consistent testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses as to what transpired during the incident. It is worth
noting that the incident transpired in broad daylight, in the midst of a wedding
reception at that, within the clear view of a number of guests. Thus, it is of no
wonder that the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent in all
material points, particularly how the attack was made upon the defenseless
victim. They all confirmed that before the crime was consummated, the victim
was only walking in the yard, unarmed. There was not the least provocation done
by the victim that could have triggered the accused-appellant to entertain the
thought that there was a need to defend himself. The victim did not exhibit any
act or gesture that could show that he was out to inflict harm or injury. On the
contrary, the witnesses all point to the accused-appellant as the unlawful
aggressor who mercilessly hacked the unwary victim until he collapsed lifeless
on the ground.
Moreover, in the incident report executed by the police officers, only one (1) bolo,
specifically that which was used in the hacking, was reported to have been
recovered from the crime scene.44
This belies the accused-appellants claim that the victim was also armed at the
time of the incident.
Crime was qualified by treachery.
The accused-appellant contends that even supposing he should be found guilty
of killing the victim, he should be convicted only of homicide, not murder, for
failure of the prosecution to establish treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.45 It takes place when the
following elements concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means of attack employed.46
The CA correctly appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, viz:
WE also concur with the lower courts appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by the aggressors on unsuspecting victims, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressors, and without the slightest provocation on the part
of the victims. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner
that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.
The record shows that Vicente Indaya, while walking in the yard, was suddenly
and repeatedly attacked with a bolo from behind. The manner and mode of
attack adopted by accused-appellant, to OUR minds, bespeak of treachery. To
be sure, the victim, who was then unarmed and unsuspecting, was deprived of
any real chance to mount a defense, thereby ensuring the commission of the
crime without risk to accused-appellant. This is also buttressed by the fact that
the wounds sustained by the victim were all located at the back. On this score,
WE agree with the trial courts finding of treachery.47 (Citations omitted)
At the time that the crime was about to be committed, the victim does not have
the slightest idea of the impending danger to his person. He was not facing the
accused-appellant and unarmed, hence, lacked the opportunity to avoid the
attack, or at least put up a defense to mitigate the impact. On the one hand, the
accused-appellant was armed and commenced his attack while behind the
victim. The presence of treachery cannot be any clearer.
Penalty and Award of Damages
The RTC and the CA did not err in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. However,
modifications have to be made with respect to the penalty imposed and the
amount of civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim.
In its Judgment dated June 10, 2009, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant
with the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
"imprisonment from twenty years and one day to forty years of reclusion
perpetua."48 On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification only as to the damages.49
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of murder
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63, paragraph
2 of the same Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two
indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the crime.50 In the
present case, no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime. Thus, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty which
should be imposed upon the accused-appellant.
The RTC, however, sentenced the accused-appellant to an imprisonment of
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, giving
the impression that the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be divided into periods
when in fact it is a single and indivisible penalty. In People v. Diquit,51 perpetua
is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium, and maximum periods. It
is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.52
Consequently, in this case, the CA should have rectified the error committed by
the RTC as to the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant. The CA should
have been more circumspect in scrutinizing the appealed decision, specifically
the propriety of the penalty imposed, since the very purpose of appeal is to
amend or correct errors overlooked by the lower court. In this case, therefore,
the accused-appellant should simply and appropriately be sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without any specification of duration.53
Further, modification has to be made with respect to the amount of civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim.1wphi1
In People v. Asis,54 this Court held:
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Donald Pais are entitled to
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, which is mandatory and is granted
to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime. Likewise, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall be awarded
in favor of the heirs of the victim. Moral damages are awarded despite the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs. As borne
out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.55
(Citations omitted)
The award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. It requires only
the establishment of the fact of death as a result of the crime and that the
accused-appellant is responsible thereto.56 However, in order to conform with
the prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of victim
must be raised to P75,000.00.57
The awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00, of the CA are all in accordance with existing jurisprudence58 and
are thus sustained.
Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 can be awarded despite the absence
of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs. As borne out by
human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings
about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.59 The award
of temperate damages, on the other hand, is warranted when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty.60 Considering that the death of the victim definitely caused his heirs
some expenses for his wake and burial, though they were not able to present
proof, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 was properly awarded
to them.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may also be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.61 The presence of
treachery was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, recounting how the victim was surprised by the accused-appellants
attack from behind. It has been repeatedly reiterated in the records that the
victim was unarmed and defenseless at the time of the attack. The results of the
post-mortem examination of the cadaver of the victim further confirmed the
veracity of the accounts of the witnesses particularly that the attack was done
when the victim had his back against the accused-appellant. Given the clear
presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery, the award of
exemplary damages of P30,000.0062 is in place.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03972, finding Wilson Roman GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
Wilson Roman is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua and that the award of civil indemnity is hereby raised to P75,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 200800
February 9, 2015

vs.
OSCAR SEVILLANO y RETANAL Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For this Court's resolution is the appeal filed by Oscar Sevillano y Retanal
(appellant) assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) 4
December 2009 Judgment2 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged before the RTC, Branch 1 7, Manila with murder in an
information that reads:
That on or about March 11, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of PABLO MADDAUIN y TAMANG by then and there
suddenly and unexpectedly stabbing him several times with a deadly bladed
weapon hitting upon the said Pablo T. Maddauin fatal stab wounds which are
the direct cause of his death immediately thereafter.3
During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued.
Statement of Facts
The version of the prosecution was summarized by the CA thus wise:
Prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, 67 and 46 years
old, respectively, testified that at around 3:00 p.m. of 11 March 2007, they,
together with Victim Pablo Maddauin, were seated on a long bench having their
usual chit-chat at the vacant lot situated at 4th Street Guadal Canal, St., Sta.
Mesa, Manila. Witness Jose was the watchman of this property. While
conversing, they saw appellant coming towards their direction. Appellant could
not walk straight and appeared to be drunk. Without warning, appellant pulled
out a knife from his waist and stabbed the victim on the chest. Jose and
Carmelita tried to restrain the appellant from attacking the victim, but Jose
experienced leg cramps and lost his hold on appellant. Appellant turned again
on the victim and continued to stab him several times more. The victim was
heard asking appellant, "Bakit?". Carmelita shouted for help. The victims wife
came to the scene and embraced appellant as she wrestled for the knife.
Thereafter, [the] victim was brought to the University of the East Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Medical center; but unfortunately, he died that same day.4
Appellant, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed selfdefense to absolve himself from criminal liability. He averred that on that fateful
afternoon, he went to the vacant lot where the victim and his friends usually
hang-out to feed his chicken. While thereat, the victim, whom he described to
have bloodshot eyes, walk towards him and stepped on his injured foot. While
he was on his knees because of the pain, he saw the victim draw a knife. The
latter thereafter stabbed at him while uttering: "Ikaw pa, putang ina mo," but
missed his target. As he and the victim grappled for the knife, the latter was
accidentally stabbed. When he saw blood oozing out of the victim, he became
apprehensive of the victims relative to such extent that he fled the scene and
hid to as far as Bulacan where he was eventually apprehended.
Ruling of the RTC
In a Judgment5 dated 4 December 2009, the trial court found appellant guilty of
murder for the death of Pablo Maddauin (Pablo) and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole and to pay the heirs of
the deceased P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that
appellant, who appeared to be intoxicated, unexpectedly arrived and stabbed
Pablo seven times with a knife. The trial court disregarded appellants denial as
his testimony was outweighed by the positive statements of the prosecution
witnesses. It likewise ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime,
as demonstrated by the fact that the victim was seated and engaged in a
conversation when suddenly attacked by the appellant. The trial court ruled that
such situation foreclosed any opportunity on the part of the victim to ward off the
impending harm.
In his appeal before the CA, appellant contended that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED INNOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE.6
The CA found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling
but with modification on the amount of damages awarded. The CA ordered
appellant to indemnify the heirs of Pablo in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The appellate court held that the eyewitness accounts of prosecution
witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, and their positive
identification of appellant as the perpetrator, aptly complemented by the findings
of the postmortem examination, are more plausible than the appellants claim of
self-defense.7 The CA likewise sustained the trial courts findings that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the case. It held that
although the attack on the victim was frontal, it was deliberate, sudden and
unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
opportunity to resist or to defend himself.8
Issues
Undaunted, appellant is now before this Court continuing to insist that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that the lower courts erred in
rejecting his claim of self-defense and convicting him of murder instead of
homicide.
Our Ruling
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best
position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity
to observe the witness first hand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude
under gruelling examination.9 Absent any showing that the trial courts
calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its
assessment. In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements must be established
by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that
person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is
not infanticide or parricide.10
After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly
met. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person
who stabbed Pablo several times on the chest which eventually caused the
latters death. They testified that they even tried to stop appellants attack but
unfortunately, were unsuccessful. We find no reason to disbelieve the
testimonies of these witnesses considering that their narration of facts were
straightforward and replete with details that coincide with the medical
examination conducted on the body of the victim. We are not persuaded by the
appellants defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses
positive identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law.11
Anent the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance,
the prosecution was able to establish that the attack on the unsuspecting victim,
who was merely seated on a bench and talking with his friends, was very
sudden. In fact, the victim was able to utter only "Bakit?". We note that the
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting
victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the former of any chance to
defend himself or to repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission without
risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.
By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab
wounds which killed the victim.1wphi1 The burden was, therefore, shifted on
him to prove that the killing was done in self-defense. In Razon v. People,12 this
Court held that where an accused admits the killing, he assumes the burden to
establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise,
conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense
cannot be justifiably appreciated when corroborated by independent and
competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be
present in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in
absolving a person from criminal liability:
First. Unlawful Aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Appellants version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and
threatened to stab him was found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree
with the lower courts conclusion. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the imminence of that danger had
already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the knife from him.
Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify
the need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled
that if an accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer
invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.13 The fact that the victim
suffered many stab wounds in the body that caused his demise, and the nature
and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It
demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.14
As to the penalties and damages
We affirm the penalty imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the RPC, as
amended, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized with reclusion
perpetua to death. The lower courts were correct in sentencing appellant to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, upon consideration of the absence of
any aggravating and mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of
the offense.
We likewise affirm the CAs award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00
as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victims heirs,
as these amounts are consistent with current jurisprudence.15 In addition, we
impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of the resolution until fully paid.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 August 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 finding Oscar Sevillano y Retanal
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordering him to indemnify
the heirs of Pablo Maddauin in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that he shall pay interest at the rate of
six percent ( 6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages awarded from finality of this resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 206381
March 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL MATIBAG Y

DE VILLA @ DANI OR DANILO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Daniel
Matibag y De Villa @ Dani or Danilo (Matibag) assailing the Decision2 dated
September 13, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759
which affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
13941, finding Matibag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The Facts
In an Amended Information4 dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was charged with the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended,5 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 oclock [sic] in the evening at
Iron Street, Twin Villa Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a Beretta Caliber .9MM Pistol with Serial No.
3191M9, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with said pistol one Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan, while the
latter was completely defenseless, thereby hitting him and causing gunshot
wounds at his head and chest, which directly resulted to the victims death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm is
attendant in the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination
of the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.7
The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005,
Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan (Duhan), who just came from a meeting with the
other officers of the homeowners association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was
walking along Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when
Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, ano bang pinagsasasabi mo? Duhan
replied wala, and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan
on the left cheek and causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out
his gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan
remained in that position, Matibag shot him several more times. PO2 Tom
Falejo, a member of the Philippine National Police, positively identified Matibag
and stated on record that he arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005.
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido who conducted an autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the
latter suffered gunshot wounds in the head and chest which led to his death.
8cralawred
In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party
of his neighbor when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the
homeowners association. Wanting to settle a previous misunderstanding,
Matibag approached Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture of
reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and said, putang ina mo, ang
yabang mo, thereby provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw
Duhan pull something from his waist and fearing that it was a gun and Duhan
was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew his own gun, shot Duhan, and
hurriedly left the place. Matibag went to see his police friend, Sgt. Narciso
Amante, to turn himself in, but the latter was unavailable at the time. As Matibag
headed back home, he was stopped by police officers who asked if he was
involved in the shooting incident. He then readily admitted his involvement.9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Matibag as charged,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay the heirs of Duhan the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, ?59,000.00 as actual damages, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.11
The RTC refused to give credence to Matibags claim of self-defense as he failed
to prove the presence of unlawful aggression on Duhans part, finding that: (a)
Duhans words and actions prior to Matibags attack could not be considered as
a real threat against him; (b) no firearm was recovered from the victim; (c)
Matibags account that Duhan was about to pull something from his waist, which
thus led him to believe that he was about to be shot, remained uncorroborated;
and (d) the number of gunshot wounds Duhan sustained contradicts the plea of
self-defense.12
Separately, the RTC appreciated the existence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery since the attack was sudden, unprovoked, and without any warning
on the victim who was unarmed and in a defenseless position.13 Likewise, the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was appreciated
since a firearm was used in the commission of a crime and, hence, considered
unlicensed.14
Dissatisfied, Matibag appealed15 to the CA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibags conviction
in toto.17
The CA agreed with the RTCs findings that: (a) treachery attended the killing of
Duhan as the attack on him was sudden;18 and (b) an unlicensed firearm was
used in committing the crime, which is considered as a special aggravating
circumstance.19cralawred
Hence, the instant appeal.
The sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld
the conviction of Matibag for Murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing principle that
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve
great weight and respect. These factual findings should not be disturbed on
appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or
misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case. The
Court has carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate from
the RTC and CAs factual findings. There is no indication that the trial court,
whose findings the CA affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the
trial court on this score, considering too that it was in the best position to assess
and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.20
On this score, the Court now proceeds to resolve this case on points of law.
Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person
was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the
killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.21
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. In People v. Tan,22 the Court explained that the essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part
of the person attacked.23 In People v. Perez,24 it was explained that a frontal
attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may
still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the
deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.25
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed
with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot
him on the chest.26 Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected
manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend
himself, adding too that he was unarmed.27 Matibag also failed to prove that a
heated exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan
against any impending attack from his assailant.28 The deliberateness of
Matibags act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the moment of
execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to
effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he
confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded
handgun.29 Based on these findings, the Court concludes that treachery was
correctly appreciated.
This finding of treachery further correlates to Matibags plea of self-defense.
Note that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the
commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances
that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of
proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of Duhan was attended by the
following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.30
Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful aggression. It is
well-settled that there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense.31 Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of
aggression justifies a claim of self-defense.32 For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,33 as
against the one claiming self-defense.
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates

unlawful aggression in the sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the
prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so sudden and unexpected,
and the victim was completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibags
version that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist (which thereby impelled
his reaction), remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from
the victim.34 Hence, by these accounts, Matibags allegation of unlawful
aggression and, consequently, his plea of self-defense cannot be sustained. The
foregoing considered, the Court upholds Matibags conviction for the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery, as charged.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use
of unlicensed firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be
appreciated in the imposition of penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866,35
as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294,36 treats the unauthorized use of a
licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a
special aggravating circumstance:
Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x.
x
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,

such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was
unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the imposition of the maximum
penalty of death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346,38
stands proper. To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.39
Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the
heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime;40 (b) actual or compensatory damages to the extent
proved,41 or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot be provided with certainty;42 (c) moral damages;43 and (d)
exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.44
In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00
and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are awarded to Duhans heirs
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime and Duhans
death. Considering further that the crime was committed with treachery,
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is also granted.45
The award of P59,000.00 as actual damages should, however, be deleted as
the records do not show that the prosecution was able to prove the amount
actually expended. In lieu thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate damages is
awarded to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.46 In addition, interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid is imposed on all monetary awards.47
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. The term unlicensed

firearm shall include:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 13, 2012
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 finding accused-appellant
Daniel Matibag y De Villa @ Dani or Danilo GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, and ordering him to pay the Heirs of Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan the
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
in lieu of actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.
1. firearms with expired license; or
SO ORDERED.
2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.

(Emphasis supplied)
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.,

concur.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term unlicensed firearm
has already been expanded as follows:37
G.R. No. 170462
February 5, 2014
RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October
24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA
affirmed, with modification on the amount of damages, the joint decision3 dated
April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan City,
Isabela, finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.
a sharp pointed bolo one David Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered
multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly
caused his death.5
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8,
2000, the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by
the CA through the records.6 The parties failed to raise any objection to the
discrepancy.7
On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases
were jointly tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the
pre-trial, the petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to
conduct a reverse trial of the case.9
During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that
transpired on November 8, 2000.
Factual Antecedents
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide
and homicide under two Informations which read:
To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the

testimonies of Rodolfo, Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with
a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered
multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries
would ordinarily cause the death of the said Erwin Ordonez, thus, performing all
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to the said Erwin Ordonez, which prevented his death.4
Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00
p.m., on November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez,
together with their companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound
and threw stones at his house and tricycle. Through the back door of his house,
Rodolfo went down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to
stop. David saw him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas,"
hitting him on the palm of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by reaching for the
bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house, and hacked and stabbed Erwin and
David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and David
lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the
hospital. He stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.
Testimony of Joey
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:

That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with
Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00
p.m., on November 8, 2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being
thrown at their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela. Through the window, he
saw Erwin, David and Philip breaking into their gate, which was made of wood
and interlink wire and located five ( 5) to six ( 6) meters away from their house.
He then heard his father Rodolfo say to the three men, "kung ano man ang
problema bukas na natin pag-usapan,"10 and David retorted in their dialect,

"Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin taka."11
Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at
around 10:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside
saying "Sige banatan ninyo na."12 He opened his door and saw David, Erwin
and Philip throwing stones at the house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones.
Briones got mad and scolded the three men, "Why are you hitting my house?
Why don't you hit the house of your enemy, mga tarantado kayo!"13 David,
Erwin and Philip then aimed their stones at the petitioners' house. Balbino heard
David calling out to Joey, "Joey, kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa
kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan,"14 but no one came out of Rodolfo's house.
The stoning lasted for about thirty (30) minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull
the gate towards the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan
ninyo ako at papasok kami."15 David, Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners'
compound and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and their ''panabas."
Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about
their problems with him the following day. But David approached Rodolfo and
hacked him with a ''panabas." Rodolfo parried the blow with the back of his hand,
and David and Rodolfo struggled for the possession of the ''panabas."
Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on
his right foot, causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house
from where Rodolfo got "something shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin.
He saw the two brothers fall to the ground.
As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin
who survived the hacking.
Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he,
his brother David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the
petitioners' compound. He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his
companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being
stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which
was three (3) meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by
Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and
Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners' compound and kept on hacking him.
He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately
fell to the ground.
Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and
damaged Rodolfo's tricycle.1wphi1 They did not likewise destroy the
petitioners' gate, which was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it
while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they
were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained
on them and people outside the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the
brothers. Allow them to come out."16
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the
hospital. David died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.
The RTC's Ruling
In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's
version of the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's
version of the events due to material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
defense witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of
clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of
innocence and assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing
evidence, the justification for his act";17 that self-defense is an affirmative
allegation which must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part
of the person invoking it.18 The RTC held that the petitioners miserably failed to
prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, Erwin and
David.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance/s that attended the commission of
the crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer -In
Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Three (3) years and one day of prision correccional as
minimum to Nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify the
victim Erwin Ordonez moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen
(15) years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased David Ordonez Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs against the accused.
The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.
The CA's Ruling
B.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of
the crimes charged. As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David
committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke the actions of the
petitioners; that "aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such
that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense
or to others whom that person is seeking to defend."20 Even assuming the truth
of the petitioners' claims that David challenged Joey to a fight and threatened to
kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the CA held that these acts do
not constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no real or
actual danger existed as the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own
home.

GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS
OF THE PROSECUTION.
The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the
nature and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13)
stab wounds on his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab
wounds on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds logically
indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined
homicidal aggression on the part of the petitioners.21
The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral
damages awarded by the RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1561, appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY
GUEVARRA are each ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez
the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.22
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:
C.
NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO
PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.23
Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of
October 24, 2005.
At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a
petition for review under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining
to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not
reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain
exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial
court's judgment or the appellate court's misapprehension of the adduced
facts.24
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in
this case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to
great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive
when supported by the evidence on record.25 We find that both the RTC and
the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense, and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons
in concluding that the petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide
and homicide.
In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked
certain facts and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of
the present case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the
elements of these crimes fully established during the trial.
The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended
to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2)
the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present."26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is
killed; (2) the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3)
the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was
not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of
The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number
of wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes
against persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the
malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately
after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim.28 The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab
wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen
(13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution's theory that
the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29
In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the
victim Erwin Ordonez would have caused his death were it not for immediate
medical attendance."30
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission
of the acts for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if
proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof
shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David
and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.31
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element
of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.32 The element of
unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense.33
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin
and David were just passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of
November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was
attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the
petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was
destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided
with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the
gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances,
coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly
show that the petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding
Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.
As to the penalties and damages
awarded
We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the
ranges provided by law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.
In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages
awarded by the CA, we award P25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate
damages, in lieu of the actual damages they sustained by reason of the crimes.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or moderate damages may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal
rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully
paid.34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
petitioners are also ordered to pay Erwin Ordonez and the heirs of David
Ordonez the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on
the civil indemnity, moral and temperate damages from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 177763
July 3, 2013

vs.
GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO,
Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 023873 affirming with modification the
December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116,
Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the Philippines v. Gary
Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias "Joseph, "
finding accused-appellants Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio
(Inocencio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as principal and
accomplice, respectively.
On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by
treachery was filed against accused-appellants.
On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.5 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001,
accused-appellants were causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay
City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At around 2:00 a.m., the victim,
Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street. Vergara
approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante
retorted: "Anong pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around
Alfantes shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed
Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter, Vergara and Inocencio
ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile,
was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.6
The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante
sustained eight stab wounds: five located on the chest area and three on the left
forearm. The victim sustained two fatal wounds: one which severed the left
ventricle of the heart and another wound puncturing the lower lobe of the left
lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr. Dominic Agbuda, medicolegal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy,
stated that:
CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.

The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred the
following expenses in connection with the death and burial of Alfante:
a) P17,000.00 for the coffin
b) P3,000.00 for the nicho
c) P250.00 for the mass
d) P15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and
e) P16,000.00 for the burial lot.
Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death
earning P500.00 a day.9
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that
on February 10, 2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a
convenience store to buy salted eggs for "baon" the following day. When they
passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go to the 7-11
convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary
to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached
Vergara, knife in hand and proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the
attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of the knife and, in the course
of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his side for
the duration of the incident.10 Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the
nearest police station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila
for treatment for the injury on his right palm sustained during the tussle.11
Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his
medical examination and treatment of Vergaras injury caused by a bladed
weapon which he sustained on February 11, 2001.12
After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December
29, 2001, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The decretal portion of the Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this
Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused GARY VERGARA Y ORIEL
alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY
as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of Murder, as this felony
is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659, and appreciating in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel
alias Gary the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences said
accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the other accused Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight
(8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and for them
to pay, jointly and severally the Heirs of the deceased Miguelito Alfante the sums
of Php51,250.00, as actual damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for loss of
earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages, plus costs
(sic).13
Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the
Supreme Court.14 The appeal was accepted by this Court in its Resolution15
dated September 4, 2002 but was subsequently transferred to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.16
As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quos
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of the
crime of murder were not proven.17 On March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the Decision of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to

withdraw his appeal stating that he is no longer interested to pursue an appeal.22
This Court, in a Resolution dated June 25, 2008, granted the motion of appellant
Inocencio and declared the case terminated as far as he is concerned.23
Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergaras counsel to file a supplemental
brief, the Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 2008, resolved to dispense
with its filing.24
We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification
respecting the award of damages.
The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis added.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 116,
Pasay City is AFFIRMED with
Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position

to adjudge the credibility of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.25 People v. Clores26 reminds us that:
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held

liable to pay the heirs of the victim, to the exclusion of his common-law-wife, the
following amount, to wit:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding
rules some of which are that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower Court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is
absent herein; (2) the findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if
such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnification;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
c. P51,250.00 as actual damages.18
Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants confinement was confirmed by the
Bureau of Corrections on April 11, 2007.20
The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.
The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves
and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under
grueling examination, the trial courts are in a better position to decide the
question of credibility.27 On the other hand, this Court is far detached from the
details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the case in its
review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this

Court admits to its limitations and acknowledges the advantage of the trial court
whose findings we give due deference.
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the
records reveals that accused-appellant Vergara failed to negate the findings of
the trial court with concrete evidence that it had overlooked, misconstrued or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it stated
that:
The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds
inflicted by [appellant Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the shoulder of
the victim and stabbed him repeatedly in his chest and left forearm with a knife
handed to him by [appellant Inocencio]. This is an overwhelming evidence, and
in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and self-defense.
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the
denial must necessarily fail.28 (Citation omitted.)
Anent accused-appellant Vergaras claim of self-defense, the following essential
elements had to be proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense has the burden
of proof. He must prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the most
important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.30
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict
real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and
strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It "presupposes
actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and
intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to ones life."31
In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the
testimonies of all the witnesses, the victims actuations did not constitute
unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force employed by accused-appellant
Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home albeit drunk
when he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of any
untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that he had by accusedappellant Vergaras hands. As succinctly stated by the RTC:
The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor
provoking the appellants into a fight. Appellant Vergara was the unlawful
aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the victim in actual peril. This can
be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim."32
It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
the act of accused-appellant Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim
was not made in lawful self-defense.
We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accusedappellant Vergara constituted treachery qualifying the crime committed to
murder. As we have previously ruled upon, treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.33
Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw
his arm around the victims shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim was
totally unaware of the evil that would befall him. The number and severity of the
wounds received by the victim indicated that he was rendered immobile and
without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly raising his arm
to ward off the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals
in finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the
commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder.
Though there was an appreciation of voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.34
However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount
of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded by the courts a quo.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following
may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.35
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove
before the trial court, actual damages in the amount of P51,250.00 based on the
receipts36 they submitted to the trial court.1wphi1
We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTCs award
respecting the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity. As we have already
previously ruled that:
Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which
as a rule must be duly proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the selfserving testimony of the widow.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is selfemployed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.37
(Citations and emphasis omitted.)
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals
since no documentary evidence was presented to buttress the claim for the loss
of earning capacity of the victim as claimed by his common-law wife. Neither
was it shown that the victim was covered by the exceptions mentioned in the
above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:
Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost
caused by the crime, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty and
on the best evidence to prove obtainable by the injured party. The prosecution
failed to meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support the contention
of the common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-employed mason
earning P500.00 a day. Hence, this Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated
testimony of the common-law-wife of the victim which lacks specific details or
particulars on the claimed loss earnings.38 (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made.
We have ruled as follows:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230
of the Civil Code.39 (Emphasis omitted.)
We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 to conform

to existing jurisprudence.40
We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.00 to conform
to recent jurisprudence.41
Lastly, we sustain the RTCs award for moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of
the victims heirs.42 As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent
death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victims family.43 While no amount of damages may totally
compensate the sudden and tragic loss of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded
to the heirs of the deceased to at least assuage them.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.44
WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02387 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gary
Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant
is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts of P51
,250.00 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for
damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6o/o per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 189405
November 19, 2014
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in
behalf of his deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its August 19, 2009
Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated
March 2, 2005, which alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
with intent to kill and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one JEFFREY
WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious and moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the
afternoon, petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th
Floor of Robinsons Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner
was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased
victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the
eye witness Antonette Managbanags sketch, was seated fronting his computer
terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from
the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffreys
head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner
holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued
thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said
gun. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffreys face, pulled the trigger four (4)
times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead,
eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.
The defense recounted a different version of the facts.

Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more
or less, petitioner, together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace
of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of Robinsons
Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter so that their family could spend
time and celebrate together the New Years Day. Before entering the Robinsons
Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular security checkup/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main
entrance of said building and no firearm was found in his possession. He
registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.
Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning
the entrance once again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his
possession; hence, he was allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The
security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his wifes table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain
man and asked the latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person
whom petitioner had talked towas the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually
introducing himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo
hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The
response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng
asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from
Jeffrey who he was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey
suddenly picked up something in his chair which happened to be a gun and
pointed the same at petitioners face followed by a clicking sound. The gun,
however, did not fire.
Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the
possession of the gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3)
more times. Again, the gun did not fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to
avoid any further confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately
blocked petitioners path and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then,
Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about to smash the
same on petitioners head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While
in the act of parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and
contact that his parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher and the single
bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on
the floor and die.
as the sentence rendered against petitioner is concerned and the civil damages
awarded.
Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded
towards the elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout,
"Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he was not able to answer.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision with modification on the civil liability of petitioner. The
decretal portion of the Decision7 reads: WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147 dated 26 February
2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following MODIFICATIONS:
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two
(2) young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit
relationship when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January 30,
2005, sent by his friend.
During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was
conducted on even date and trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of
Marie Antonette Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez)
and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gonzales), respectively. The prosecution
likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary evidence to support its
claim.
For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother,
Simeon Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena)
and Managbanag, who was recalled to the witness stand as witness for the
defense.
On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch
147, rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz
y Gloria Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined
and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey
Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus moral damages in
the amount of P1 Million, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent,
through the private prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar
(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity;
(2) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) the amount of P3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning
capacity.
(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Raised are the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE
BULLET WAS DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY
ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF DEFENDING
HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF
THE DECEASED VICTIM.
3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE.
4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

SELF-DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE
ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim,
Jeffrey. What is leftfor determination by this Court is whether the elements of
self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lackof sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10 In other words,
there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the
life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.11
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal
liability, it is well settled thatwhen he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent
upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in
defense of himself.12 The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that
he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution
for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the
accused himself has admitted the killing.14
Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting.
Hence, his petition must be denied.
First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that
unlawful aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely
threatening and intimidating action.15 There is aggression, only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17 In the case at
bar, other than petitioners testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to
show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioners questions or
initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun
from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an assault which may
have caused petitioner to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation
transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of
that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by
wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there
was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated
the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every
opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.1avvphi1
Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in
time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there
was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the
opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use
of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the
gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when
unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound
the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed
(Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more
right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs.
Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).
Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his
(accuseds) headbut he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful
as nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it.In contrast, the two
(2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached, both gave the
impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from the
accused who was then already in possession of the gun.18
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one
who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his
purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril,
there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on
the part of the offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of selfpreservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries
on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.
More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show
that if there was unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather
emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Atty. Mariano:
Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?
A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the
moment and I was standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached
Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of the head of Jeff.
A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.
Q: And then what happened?
He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?
A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession
of the gun.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.
Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey
warded off the gun, they started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?
A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried
to get hold of the fire extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey
fell down.
Q: And who was holding the gun?
A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSSEXAMINATION: Atty. Agoot:
Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from
the other side? Atty. Mariano:
Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.
Atty. Agoot
(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21

Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled
a gun from his chair and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate
competent evidence. Pitted against the testimony of prosecution witnesses,
Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses probative value. We
have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be
justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in itself.22
In addition, other than petitioners testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing
that the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he
blocked the path of petitioner while the latter tried to run away to avoid further
confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of the RTC that there
was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire
extinguisher on petitioners head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses
maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from
petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly weapon. An excerpt
of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:
Atty. Agoot
Atty. Agoot:
Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced
the person who was holding the gun already?
I am on cross examination, your Honor.
Witness:
COURT
A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.
You didnt not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point
the gun at the back of Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means
COURT
COURT
No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?
For the record.

Atty. Mariano:
Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire
extinguisher upright with his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left
hand below the fire extinguisher.
A: Three (3) times, sir.
Witness:
Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?
The left hand would support the weight basically.
Witness
Atty. Agoot
A: They were still pushing each other at that time.
Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping
of that person who was in possession of the gun?
Atty. Agoot
Witness
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Agoot
Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person
Witness
Atty. Agoot
A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was
pointing the gun at him.
Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?
Atty. Agoot
Witness
Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire
extinguisher?
A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire
extinguisher at thattime. And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.
Atty. Agoot
Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi
pumutok" Do you affirmand confirm this statement?
Witness
A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly
saw what was going on at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN
dated 04 September 2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23
Witness
A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point
the gun at Jeffrey and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire
extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time.
Atty. Agoot
Petitioners contention that Jeffreys unlawful aggression was continuous and

imminent is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant
case, the severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted
and, therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent
laws and jurisprudence.
Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?
Witness
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the
deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably
commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought
to avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed
to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person
invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means
of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched
him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant)
stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer
and inflicting a wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body was unreasonable and
unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the
victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite
was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the
gun. The gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate
to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that
the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a
rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs.
Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun,
as against the victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which
is not a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accuseds alleged fear was
unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an imagined impending
attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful
aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628).
It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be
confronted by a real threat on his lifeand limb; and the peril sought to be avoided
is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA
695).26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should
have just run, despite any obstruction, considering that he was already in
possession of the gun. He could have also immediately sought help from the
people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the
shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the
authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident
or a cry of self-preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and
hassling with Jeffrey, and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only
once, but four times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt
Jeffrey. Thus:
Moreover, the Prosecutions eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that
while there was prior struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless
accused who was holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof (TSN,
p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness Managbanag
even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire
extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other, accused pointed the
gun at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN,
p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot be safely said that
the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun
which led to the victims death was no longer made in the course of the grapple
and/or struggle for the possession of the gun.27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot
accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a
misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the
onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt (or
even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the pastthat
the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered
important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense.28 Thus, petitioners
contention that an accident simultaneously occurred while hewas in the act of
self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could nothave
been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his
head, a vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved
to end the life of the victim.
Besides, petitioners failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on
the part of Jeffrey and to surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates
against his claim of self-defense.29
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of
self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua
nonfor upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.30 If there is nothing
to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.31
Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioners argument that a privileged
mitigating circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case, because unless
the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no
self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter.32
Anent petitioners argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as
suppression of evidence the prosecutions alleged deliberate omission to
present the testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at the time of the shooting
incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of the CA on
this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in
self-defense, shifted to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission of responsibility for the killing.
The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the
disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer
proof that the prosecution prevented the security guards from testifying. There
is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of
suppression of evidence.
The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion
that their [the security guards] testimonies were vital and material to the case of
the defense. It could have compelled the security guards on duty to appear
before the court. xxx.33
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense
is essentially a question of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to
determine the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of
its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses
while testifying.35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA
and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and
substance that would have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that petitioner did not act in
self-defense.36
In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioners contention that since the
incident transpired in Jeffreys office, and the witnesses presented by the
prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are expected to
testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed out by
respondent, there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses
to falsely testify against petitioner.37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey
does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or
fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating petitioner
with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.
All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of
the RTC and the CA that the elements of homicide are present in the instant
case as amply shown by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, and
they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or doubt.
Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance

of use of an unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal
of the Information will show that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly
alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was further proved during trial by
the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Division, dated November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per verification from
the records of the said Division. Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance, to wit:
xxxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
x x x x.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being an aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the
penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period.38 Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.
As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of
earning capacity in favor ofprivate respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA
in so far as they are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we
find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in order, since the
presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has
been established.39 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary
damages for homicide is P30,000.00.40
Finally, pursuant to this Courts ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil
indemnity and damages for loss of earning capacity shall be imposed, computed
from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August
19, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding
petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10)

years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum, as the maximum penalty;
(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:
a. the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d. the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. the amount of P3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning
capacity;
f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity,
an interest of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of
finality of this Decision until full payment thereof; and
g. the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

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Public Crime vs.

August 16, 1994

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

to the damage and prejudice of Mrs. Fe Palmon in the

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.

was then in military uniform. 15 Subsequently, said photograph was shown to Fe

established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the

G.R. No. 149357

March 04, 2005

MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioners,

March 04, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

8) 1 piece, Model Table No. 2,

with an aggregate value of P3,219,875.00, Philippine currency, without the

9) 1 piece, Model Table No. 4,

Italian marble table, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 105,000.00

On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary

10) 2 pieces, Model Pedestal

Italian marble table, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 105,000.00

Italian marble table, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 112,500.00

Italian marble table, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 187,500.00

principal place of business is at the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu

WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

2. THE COURT OF APEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN

The Courts Ruling

The Court also held in Chua v. Court of Appeals:30

exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter

(b) controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between

... Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an

In synthesis, Sec. 5 of PD 902-A mandates that cases involving fraudulent

A dispute involving the corporation and its stockholders is not necessarily an

complaint filed by private complainant company sufficiently established prima

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The

No Crime when no law punishes it/No common law crimes

December 13, 1996

RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO

obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 45, in relation to the second sentence of

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

The Solicitor General submitted a "Manifestation in Lieu of Comment" praying

violation of this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of

constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima

We now review the evidence to determine whether petitioners have successfully

Q: I get your point therefore, that the illegal

Gross weight of specimen = 3.849 kg.

Q: In other words, there was negative activity

Q: And despite the fact you had negative

ITEMS QUANTITY REMARKS

F/B Robinson (1) unit operating

Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the

It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a

were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or counsel, a

This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules

Penal Law not Subject to Facial Challenge

December 11, 2008