G.R. No.

192896

July 24, 2013

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.,

represented by its Incumbent President, GREG SERIEGO,
Petitioner,
vs.
BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before us on Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision2 dated September 10, 2009 and Resolution3 dated July 13,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85228 nullifying
and setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the Resolution 4 dated April 28,
2004 of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) in COS LAP Case No. 99-500. The fallo of the assailed
COS LAP Resolution reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466 square
meters, now being occupied by the members of the Dream Village
Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be outside of Swo-00-0001302
BCDA property.

SO ORDERED.5
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream
Village) claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have been
occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City
since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously."6 The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban
(Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under a
Torrens title,7 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued on
October 17, 1906 by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. 8 Maricaban
covered several parcels of land with a total area of over 2,544 hectares
spread out over Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and Paraaque.9
Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United
States of America (USA) early in the American colonial period, to be
converted into the military reservation known as Fort William Mckinley,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of
the USA to cancel OCT No. 291.10 The US government later transferred
30 has. of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad Company, for which TCT
No. 192 was cancelled by TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219, the first in the
name of the Manila Railroad Company for 30 has., and the second in the
name of the USA for the rest of the Maricaban property.11

3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to process

the sales patent application of complainants pursuant to existing
laws and regulation.

On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and replaced by
TCT No. 1688, and later that year, on September 15, 1914, TCT No.
1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 2288, both times in the
name of the USA.12 On December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort
William Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and on
September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and replaced by TCT
No. 61524, this time in the name of the Republic. 13 On July 12, 1957,
President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing
from sale or settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley,
now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for military
purposes.14

4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected by the

respondents.

On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and

2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of said

association are advised to apply for sales patent on their respective
occupied lots with the Land Management Bureau, DENR-NCR,
pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730.

disposable15 in the manner provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274
and 730, in relation to the Public Land Act,16 thus allowing the sale to
the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal
Village, and Western Bicutan.17
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 172 amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of
the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open for
disposition.18
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed 19 creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and
accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and
their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station,
ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications
Station and Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. Section 8 20
of the said law provides that the capital of the BCDA will be provided
from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine (9) military camps in
Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus,
expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the above
lands, in whole or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties,"21 specifically to raise capital
for the BCDA. Titles to the camps were transferred to the BCDA for this
purpose,22 and TCT No. 61524 was cancelled on January 3, 1995 by
TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, now
in the name of the BCDA.23
Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a) approximately 148.80
has. reserved for the National Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade,
Philippine Army officers housing area, and Philippine National Police
jails and support services (presently known as Camp Bagong Diwa); b)
approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the Presidential
Airlift Wing, one squadron of helicopters for the NCR and respective
security units; c) twenty one (21) areas segregated by various
presidential proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15 has. as relocation
site for families to be affected by the construction of Circumferential
Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided that the boundaries and technical
description of these exempt areas shall be determined by an actual

ground survey.24
Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village
and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary demolition,
resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents,25 on November 22,
1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its
assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property,
which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and thus is
covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been
occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners
continuously, exclusively and notoriously for several years," and have
built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved
roads, drainage and recreational and religious facilities. Dream Village,
thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA
under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants
should be processed by the Land Management Bureau (LMB).
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing
an Amended Petition26 in the COSLAP. Among the reliefs it sought
were:
d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and disposable
by virtue of applicable laws;
e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13000298, situated in the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, which is presently being occupied by herein petitioner as
within the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside
the claim of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPLEX and/or
BASES CONVESION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.
f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the
application of the ASSOCIATION members for the purchase of
their respective lots under the provisions of Acts Nos. 274 and 730.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent BCDA in its Answer28 dated November 23, 2000 questioned
the jurisdiction of the COSLAP to hear Dream Villages complaint,
while asserting its title to the subject property pursuant to R.A. No.

7227. It argued that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561 which
created the COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the various
government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land
problems or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall in the
enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being neither a
pastureland-lease holder, a timber concessionaire, or a government
reservation grantee, but the holder of patrimonial government property
which cannot be the subject of a petition for classification, release or
subdivision by the occupants of Dream Village.
In its Resolution29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP narrated that it
called a mediation conference on March 22, 2001, during which the
parties agreed to have a relocation/verification survey conducted of the
subject lot. On April 4, 2001, the COSLAP wrote to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office-NCR requesting the survey, which would
also include Swo-00-0001302, covering the adjacent AFP-RSBS
Industrial Park established by Proclamation No. 1218 on May 8, 1998
as well as the abandoned Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road).30
On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the
verification survey and a blueprint copy of the survey plan from Atty.
Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for Lands of DENR.
Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states:
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village
Neighborhood Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and
inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual
area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area actually is outside
Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.31 (Emphasis ours and underscoring
supplied)
COSLAP Ruling
On the basis of the DENRs verification survey report, the COSLAP
resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and particularly,
outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to
process the applications of Dream Villages members for sales patent,
noting that in view of the length of time that they "have been openly,

continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property in the

concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on
their respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in
relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act."32
On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the COSLAP
cited the likelihood that the summary eviction by the BCDA of more
than 2,000 families in Dream Village could stir up serious social unrest,
and maintained that Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 authorizes it to
"assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are
critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large
number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension
or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action,"
even as Section 3(2)(d) of E.O. No. 561 also allows it to take
cognizance of "petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought by Dream
Village. Rationalizing that it was created precisely to provide a more
effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems "in
general," the COSLAP invoked as its authority the 1990 case of Baaga
v. COSLAP,33 where this Court said:
It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may
take cognizance of cases which are "critical and explosive in nature
considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action." However, the use of the
word "may" does not mean that the COSLAPs jurisdiction is merely
confined to the above mentioned cases. The provisions of the said
Executive Order are clear that the COSLAP was created as a means of
providing a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts
among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides, the
COSLAP merely took over from the abolished PACLAP whose
functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on,
decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed
by it. The said Executive Order No. 561 containing said provision,
being enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot affect the exercise of
jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial Committee of Koronadal on
September 20, 1978. Neither can it affect the decision of the COSLAP

which merely affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction.34

In its Motion for Reconsideration35 filed on May 20, 2004, the BCDA
questioned the validity of the survey results since it was conducted
without its representatives present, at the same time denying that it
received a notification of the DENR verification survey.36 It maintained
that there is no basis for the COSLAPs finding that the members of
Dream Village were in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the
concept of owner, because not only is the property not among those
declared alienable and disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial property
of the State.37
In the Order38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied BCDAs
Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that it had due notice of the
verification survey, while also noting that although the BCDA wanted to
postpone the verification survey due to its tight schedule, it actually
stalled the survey when it failed to suggest an alternative survey date to
ensure its presence.
CA Ruling
On Petition for Review39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that the dispute is
outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the lands history of
private ownership and because it is registered under an indefeasible
Torrens title40; that Proclamation No. 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of
Swo-13-000298 in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village occupies
Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302, which also belongs to
the BCDA 41; that the COSLAP resolution is based on an erroneous
DENR report stating that Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because
Lots 10, 11, and portion of Lot 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are within the
DA42; that the COSLAP was not justified in ignoring BCDAs request to
postpone the survey to the succeeding year because the presence of its
representatives in such an important verification survey was
indispensable for the impartiality of the survey aimed at resolving a
highly volatile situation43; that the COSLAP is a mere coordinating
administrative agency with limited jurisdiction44; and, that the present
case is not among those enumerated in Section 3 of E.O. No. 56145.
The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3(2)(e) of

E.O. No. 561 provides that it may assume jurisdiction and resolve land
problems or disputes in "other similar land problems of grave urgency
and magnitude,"46 and the present case is one such problem.
The CA in its Decision47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the complaint because the question of
whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as available for
disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to
determine, even as the land in dispute has been under a private title
since 1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the
BCDA, in contrast to the case of Baaga relied upon by Dream Village,
where the disputed land was part of the public domain and the
disputants were applicants for sales patent thereto.
Dream Villages motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate
courts Order48 of July 13, 2010.
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream Village
interposes the following issues:
A
IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN COSLAP
CASE NO. 99-500, THE HONORABLE CA DECIDED THE CASE IN
A MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT;
B
THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT COSLAP HAD
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE
PARTIES HEREIN.49
The Courts Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.

The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.

excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423:

That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with
finality. In Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA, 50 it
was categorically ruled as follows:

Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved

First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the

BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting
Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is
final and conclusive on the ownership of the then Hacienda de
Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue
on the ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest.
Other than their view that the USA is still the owner of the subject lots,
petitioner has not put forward any claim of ownership or interest in
them.51
The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not
much different from the controversy below. There, 20,000 families were
long-time residents occupying 98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City,
who vainly sought to avert their eviction and the demolition of their
houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA
under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court found that TCT No. 2288 had
in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the name of the Republic,
which title was in turn cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos.
23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name
of the BCDA. The Court ruled that the BCDAs aforesaid titles over Fort
Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question, since TCT No.
61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to an explicit authority
under R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for BCDAs takeover and
management of the subject lots.52

1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986

2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 198753
However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows
that Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 thereof are inside the area segregated for the
Libingan ng mga Bayani under Proclamation No. 208, which then
leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 as available for disposition.
For this reason, it was necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476.
Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 are
declared alienable and disposable.54

Dream Village sits on the

abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as
alienable and disposable.

The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not
situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 but actually occupies Lots 10, 11
and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: "x x x Dream Village is outside
Lot1, SWO-13-000298 and inside Lot 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13,
SWO-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78466 square meters. The area
is actually is [sic] outside SWO-00-0001302 of BCDA."55 Inexplicably
and gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is outside of BCDA,
completely oblivious that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort
Bonifacio, even as the BCDA asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO00-0001302 are part of the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road. This
area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and of Lots
3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan
ng mga Bayani, and the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road
is really the proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which was abandoned
when, as constructed, it was made to traverse northward into the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has not disputed this assertion.

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were

conducted by the Bureau of Lands to delimit the boundaries of the areas

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-000001302 was abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the

southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment

by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then
become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the
BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No.
7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families
affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that
Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said relocation
site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, 56making them
commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that
the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.
While property of the State or any
of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth" are considered property of
public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription." Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of
public dominion and what is patrimonial property:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream

Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic,57 it was pointed out that from the moment R.A.
No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila
became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the
said lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law
makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise
funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and
Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either
"public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the
public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The
Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or
entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become private property
and cease to be property of the public dominion:58
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."59
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become
patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before
acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be
registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable, it
must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public
dominion.60
Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the

former Maricaban have been legally disposed to settlers, besides those

segregated for public or government use. Proclamation No. 1217 (1973)
established the Maharlika Village in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs
of resident Muslims of Metro Manila; Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as
amended by Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared more than 400 has.
of Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western
Bicutan as alienable and disposable; Proclamation No. 518 (1990)
formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of
Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo
and Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared them open for
disposition.
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains
property of public dominion of the State, because although declared
alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of
military reservations in the country to productive civilian uses. 61
Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village
has not even begun to run.
Ownership of a land registered
under a Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse
possession.
Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDAs claim that Lots 10,
11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are the abandoned right-of-way of
C-5 Road, which is within the vast titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We
have already established that these lots have not been declared alienable
and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 62 Section 47 of P.D. No.
1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title
to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. And, although the
registered landowner may still lose his right to recover the possession of
his registered property by reason of laches,63 nowhere has Dream
Village alleged or proved laches, which has been defined as such

neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of

time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as
will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the assertion
of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity
founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or
parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society,
ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise
could be a valid claim.64
The subject property having been
expressly reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village
settlers.
BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to
hear Dream Villages complaint. Concurring, the CA has ruled that
questions as to the physical identity of Dream Village and whether it lies
in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302, or whether Proclamation No.
172 has released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are
"manifestly beyond the scope of the COSLAPs jurisdiction vis--vis
Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561," 65 rendering its Resolution a
patent nullity and its pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAPs duty would have been to
refer the conflict to another tribunal or agency of government in view of
the serious ramifications of the disputed claims:
In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the case. It would have been more prudent if the
COSLAP has [sic] just referred the controversy to the proper forum in
order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is,
the impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which
rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements contained
therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want
of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect."66 (Citation omitted)

We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific
public purpose under R.A. No. 7227, which unfortunately for Dream
Village does not encompass the present demands of its members.
Indeed, this purpose was the very reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has
been transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes
the dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the COSLAP. A review of the
history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited
to disputes over public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or
purpose.

to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having

jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the Executive Committee
decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon
shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative
resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties
therein involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction
thereof;

On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the
Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to
expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of all kinds of
land disputes between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative
procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or
recommend other solutions.67 E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19, 1971,
reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases involving public lands and other lands of the public domain, 68 as
well as adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate,
coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline
administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive
measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the
public domain."69

4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy

investigation and resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial
level, if possible. (Underscoring supplied)

On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and
enlarged its functions and duties. Section 2 thereof even granted it quasi
judicial functions, to wit:
Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. The PACLAP shall have
the following functions and duties:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation
work, of the various government agencies and agencies involved in
land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures
to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural
minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to
the solution of such problems or disputes;
2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought

xxxx

On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and
created the COSLAP to be a more effective administrative body to
provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems
among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural
minorities to avoid social unrest.70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No.
561 now specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can
exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of
the various government offices and agencies involved in the
settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline
administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders
and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time
consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or
disputes;
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes
which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance,
the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence

of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations

requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement
holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation
grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude.
xxxx
Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the
BCDA and the seriousness and urgency of the reliefs sought in its
Amended Petition, Dream Village insists that the COSLAP was justified
in assuming jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But in Longino
v. Atty. General,71 it was held that as an administrative agency,
COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically mentioned in its
enabling statute, E.O. No. 561. The Supreme Court said:
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically
granted to them by the enabling statutes. x x x.
xxxx
Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on
a land dispute or problem lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the matter
to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution;
or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in

paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in
nature, taking into account the large number of the parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to
assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular
agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of
the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action
thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to
property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any
land dispute or problem.72(Citation omitted)
The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP
cases, among them Davao New Town Development Corp. v. COSLAP,73
Barranco v. COSLAP,74 NHA v. COSLAP,75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino,76
Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan,77 Machado v. Gatdula,78 and Vda. de Herrera v.
Bernardo.79
Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section
3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 to assume jurisdiction over "other similar land
problems of grave urgency," since the statutory construction principle of
ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind as those specifically mentioned.80 Following this rule,
COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving lands in which
the government has a proprietary or regulatory interest, 81 or public lands
covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture
lease agreements, a timber concessions, or a reservation grants, 82 and
where moreover, the dispute is between occupants/squatters and pasture
lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; between
occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; and between
occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants.
In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine
National Railways. The high court rejected COSLAPs jurisdiction,
noting that the disputed lot is not public land, and neither party was a
squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee,

public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority,

nor was the dispute critical and explosive in nature so as to generate
social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate
action.83
In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP
has no concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) in respect of disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian
reform laws, since "the grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over
agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no other court,
tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable
by the DAR."84 Thus, instead of hearing and resolving the case,
COSLAP should have simply referred private respondents complaint to
the DAR or DARAB. According to the Court:
The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which
vests COSLAP the power to resolve land disputes, does not confer upon
COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it. Its
jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the
government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land
dispute in Baaga involved parties with conflicting free patent
applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve,
unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the
DAR.85
In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching
into private property.1wphi1 The Supreme court ruled that COSLAP
may resolve only land disputes "involving public lands or lands of the
public domain or those covered with a specific license from the
government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a
reservation grant."86
In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary
dispute between two local government units, that its decision is an utter
nullity correctible by certiorari, that it can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it is void, and all acts performed pursuant to
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.87
In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not

extend to disputes involving the ownership of private lands, or those

already covered by a certificate of title, as these fall exactly within the
jurisdiction of the courts and other administrative agencies."88
In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over
controversies relating to ownership and possession of private lands, and
thus, the failure of respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP
decision before the appropriate court was held not fatal to the petition
for certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy
remained available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from the
void COSLAP decision.89
In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in
disputes over private lands between private parties, reiterating the
essential rules contained in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 governing the
exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit:
Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a
land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume
jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph
2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular
agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or
classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the
nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and
urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the
COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute
or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may
resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or
those covered by a specific license from the government, such as
pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants. 90
(Citations omitted)
In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint
for "interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and
trespassing" over a private parcel of land. The CA ruled that the parties
were estopped to question COSLAPs jurisdiction since they

participated actively in the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting

from the complaint that the case actually involved a claim of title and
possession of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has
jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall under Section 3, paragraph 2
(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not critical and explosive in nature, did
not involve a large number of parties, nor was there social tension or
unrest present or emergent.91
In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Baaga to assert its
jurisdiction. There, Guillermo Baaga had filed a free patent application
with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with an area of 30 has.
Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent application for the same
property. The opposing claims and protests of the claimants remained
unresolved by the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it conduct an
investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then opted to
exercise jurisdiction over the controversy. The high court sustained
COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction is not confined to the cases
mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, but includes land
problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among
settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.
But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases
aforecited, the land dispute in Baaga was between private individuals
who were free patent applicants over unregistered public lands. In
contrast, the present petition involves land titled to and managed by a
government agency which has been expressly reserved by law for a
specific public purpose other than for settlement. Thus, as we have
advised in Longino, the law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP
over any land dispute or problem, but it has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of
the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action
thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to
property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.