Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1997 > October 1997 Decisions > G.R.

No. 130644 October 27, 1997 - FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA v. COURT OF

APPEALS, ET AL.:

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130644. October 27, 1997.]
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his
mother MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
R ES OLUTIO N
PUNO, J.:
On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and serious illegal
detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranaga alias Paco, filed in the RTC
1 of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued. as a consequence thereof.
Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order 2 of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranagas motion for a regular preliminary
investigation and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the Office of the
State Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve
her son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.
It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center
for Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to
arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit
remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The police did not carry out the arrest on
the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on
September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation.
On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved
that his client be given a regular preliminary investigation. He also requested for
copies of all affidavits and documents in support of the complaint against his client
and that he be granted a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt
to file the defense affidavit. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the
ground that Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to
an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He
was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his clients right to a
preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armovits verbal motion for reconsideration was
denied by the city prosecutor.
On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals
assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. 3 However, Larranagas effort to stop the filing of a

criminal information
against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had
filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On September 22,
1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the
RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioners arrest. The move again proved fruitless as
Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of
arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila
Agana. A second Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranagas counsel in the Court
of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the
Court of Appeals dismissed Larranagas petitions, hence, the case at bar.
On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated comment
on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997,
we temporarily restrained the presiding judge of Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from
proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from becoming moot.
On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that." . . it
is within petitioners constitutional and legal rights to demand that a regular
preliminary investigation rather than a mere inquest be conducted before resolving the
issue of whether or not to file informations against him." He asked that." . . the
petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary
investigation." He further recommended that." . . during the pendency thereof,
petitioner be released from detention."
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We agree.
Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary
investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioners inquest
investigation. Said section clearly provides that "when a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint
or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting officer or person."
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The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested." For one, the petitioner
was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting
officers that he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be
conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting officers had
no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed
some two (2) months before. So we held in Go v. Court of Appeals, viz.: 4
"Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides:
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Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
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(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at
the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six
(6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when (the shooting
had) in fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none
of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down
the alleged gunmans cars plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioners wifes name. That information did not, however, constitute personal
knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112
is not applicable. . . . When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with
the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in
court for the killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor
proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable
and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive
error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should
have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not
been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith
subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation."
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It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation

pursuant to section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is
charged with a capital offense kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its filing in
court means his arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed
bail. His conviction will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus,
petitioners counsel was far from being unreasonable when he demanded from the city
prosecutors that he be furnished copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and
that he be given a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days to submit defense
affidavit. As well pointed out by petitioners counsel, the precipitate denial of his
motion." . . prevented petitioner from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some
forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors and security guards who had previously made
known their willingness to testify that:
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" during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his
classmates were all in their school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July 16
and 17, 1997, petitioner and his classmates took their mid-term exams;
following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at petitioners
Quezon City apartment until about 9 oclock in the evening, and then repaired to a
Quezon City restaurant at Katipunan Avenue where they stayed on until 3 oclock in
the morning of July 17; they even had pictures taken of their party;
indeed petitioners July 16 examination papers and that of a classmate are ready for
submission as evidence, along with petitioners grades for the terms end in September
1997;
two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember seeing
petitioner at their Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;

 petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until terms
end in September 1997;

petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment since
June 1997, particularly including July 16 and 17;
petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No.
PR833, as shown by his plane ticket and boarding pass."
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Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital
offense case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb v. de
Leon, 5 we emphasized that "attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure
inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasijudicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be
fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals, the
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial
for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. "A
preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material
damage."
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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of
petitioner and to order the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular
preliminary investigation of the petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to
annul the Order for Detention During The Pendency of the Case issued by Executive
Judge Priscila Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304;
(3) to order the immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation
and (4) to order the Presiding Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist
from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU45303 and 45304, pending the result of petitioners preliminary investigation.
Regalado, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

1. Branch VII.
2. Dated September 17, 1997.
3. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45340.
4. 206 SCRA 138.
5. 247 SCRA 652, 687.