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Castro Vs JBC Case Digest
Castro Vs JBC Case Digest
DE CASTRO,
G. R. No. 191002
Petitioner,
- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO,
Respondents.
x----------------------x
JAIME N. SORIANO,
Petitioner,
- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC),
Respondent.
x----------------------x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
Petitioner,
- versus -
x----------------------x
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF
SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF
THE CONSTITUTION TO
APPOINTMENTS TO THE
JUDICIARY,
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
x----------------------x
JOHN G. PERALTA,
Petitioner,
- versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC).
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
PETER IRVING CORVERA;
ADVANCE-MENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE) CHAIRMAN
FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN
NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
(KADAMAY) SECRETARY
GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO;
ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN
PARA SA KAUNLARAN
(ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN
LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG
PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN
PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN
JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN
RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN
RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS
GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE
ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT
CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN
PUNO, C.J.,
(JBC),
CARPIO,
Respondent.
CORONA,
x-----------------------
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
INC.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioner,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
- versus Promulgated:
March 17, 2010
the
incumbent
President
is
prohibited
from
making
In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on January 18, 2010
to open the search, nomination, and selection process for the position
of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the
appointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is the Supreme
Court
itself,
the
Presidents
authority
being
limited
to
the
Supreme
Court
and
judges
of
the
lower
courts
may
be
states
in
his
petition
in
G.R.
No.
191149
(sgd.)
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court &
Ex-Officio Secretary
Judicial and Bar Council
be
submitted
not
later
than
February
his
name
February
8,
from
consideration
2010.
Candidates
through
who
his
letter
accepted
their
(due
to
cases
pending
in
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman).[21]
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to
the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to
invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or
opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate
Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio
Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice
Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues
of February 13, 2010.[22]
Issues
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the
position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC
is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy now before us being
yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching in quick step
towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the retirement
of Chief Justice Puno.
The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only
among legal luminaries, but also among non-legal quarters, and
brought out highly disparate opinions on whether the incumbent
President can appoint the next Chief Justice or not. Petitioner
Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the appointments
of two judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed this
issue now before us as an administrative matter to avoid any possible
polemics concerning the matter, but he opines that the polemics
leading to Valenzuela would be miniscule [sic] compared to the
polemics that have now erupted in regard to the current controversy,
and that unless put to a halt, and this may only be achieved by a
ruling from the Court, the integrity of the process and the credibility
of whoever is appointed to the position of Chief Justice, may
irreparably be impaired.[23]
only
to
positions
in
the
Executive
Department?
b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution also applies to members of the
Judiciary, may such appointments be excepted because
they are impressed with public interest or are
demanded by the exigencies of public service, thereby
justifying these appointments during the period of
prohibition?
c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or
not to include and submit the names of nominees who
manifested interest to be nominated for the position of
Chief Justice on the understanding that his/her
nomination will be submitted to the next President in
view
of
the
prohibition
against
presidential
May
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
make
to
the
incumbent
President
without
b.
On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the JBC and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the consolidated
petitions, except that filed in G.R. No. 191342.
On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment,
reporting therein that the next stage of the process for the selection
of the nominees for the position of Chief Justice would be the public
interview of the candidates and the preparation of the short list of
candidates, including the interview of the constitutional experts, as
may be needed.[24] It stated:[25]
the
Constitution
concerning
the
ban
on
Presidential
appointments
two
(2)
months
[31]
that in their
(KADAMAY)
Secretary
General
Gloria
Para
sa
Kaunlaran
(ANAKBAYAN)
appointment
of
the
successor
of
Chief
Justice
Puno.
Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC to submit the list
of nominees to the outgoing President if the constitutional prohibition
is already in effect. Tan adds that the prohibition against midnight
appointments was applied by the Court to the appointments to the
Judiciary made by then President Ramos, with the Court holding that
the duty of the President to fill the vacancies within 90 days from
occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or from the
submission of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to
violate the constitutional prohibition.
Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al.,
and Bello et al. oppose the insistence that Valenzuela recognizes the
possibility that the President may appoint the next Chief Justice if
exigent circumstances warrant the appointment, because that
recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the absence of a Chief
Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or
Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not apply only to the appointments in the
Executive Department, but also to judicial appointments, contrary to
the submission of PHILCONSA; that Section 15 does not distinguish;
and that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition as applicable
to judicial appointments.
Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Sorianos
contention that the power to appoint the Chief Justice is vested, not
in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly baseless,
because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Court as
contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any rate, the
term members was interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the
Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the
JBCs act of nominating appointees to the Supreme Court is purely
ministerial and does not involve the exercise of judgment; that there
can be no default on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of
nominees to the President, considering that the call for applications
only begins from the occurrence of the vacancy in the Supreme
Court; and that the commencement of the process of screening of
applicants to fill the vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only
begins from the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to this date,
there is no definite legal basis for any party to claim that the
submission or non-submission of the list of nominees to the
President by the JBC is a matter of right under law.
The main question presented in all the filings herein because it
involves
two
seemingly
conflicting
provisions
of
the
which
the
illumination
of
court
so
largely
difficult
depends
for
constitutional
la
Fuente,[47]
Anti-Chinese
League
of
the
Philippines
v.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus
standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949,
in Araneta v. Dinglasan,[50] the Court liberalized the approach when
the
cases
had
transcendental
importance.
Some
notable
on
Elections
has
been
adopted
in
Bar
of
the
Philippines
(IBP)
for
Southern
Luzon and Eastern Visayas. They allege that they have the legal
standing to enjoin the submission of the list of nominees by the JBC
to the President, for [a]n adjudication of the proper interpretation and
application of the constitutional ban on midnight appointments with
regard to respondent JBCs function in submitting the list of
nominees is well within the concern of petitioners, who are duty
bound to ensure that obedience and respect for the Constitution is
upheld, most especially by government offices, such as respondent
JBC, who are specifically tasked to perform crucial functions in the
whole scheme of our democratic institution. They further allege that,
reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal interest in
the process of selecting the members of the Supreme Court, and in
the selection of the Chief Justice, considering that the person
appointed becomes a member of the body that has constitutional
supervision and authority over them and other members of the legal
profession.[61]
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated
adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them
with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of
transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to the
petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including
the petitioners), regardless of ones personal interest in life, because
they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent
President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent
Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which
already suffers from a far too great number of vacancies in the ranks
of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the
requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the
matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise
requires a liberalization of the requirement.[62]
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any
petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle
or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely
presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging our solemn
duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than otherwise.
In Agan, Jr. v.Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[63] we
pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.[64]
Justiciability
or
Acting
President
appointments,
except
temporary
shall
not
make
appointments
to
styling,
and
arranging
the
Constitution.
Such
to
have
an
eleven-member
Supreme
Court.
that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any
substantial period as a result of vacancies, Lerum
proposed the insertion in the provision (anent the Courts
membership) of the same mandate that IN CASE OF ANY
VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF. He later
agreed to suggestions to make the period three, instead of
two, months. As thus amended, the proposal was
approved. As it turned out, however, the Commission
ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was
that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme
Court came to include a command to fill up any
vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that
instruction that any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII)
contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
which is couched in stronger negative language - that a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments
The
commission
later
approved
proposal
of
paragraph:
THE
WITH
PRESIDENT
RESPECT
SHALL
TO
LOWER
ISSUE
THE
APPOINTMENT
WITHIN
NINETY
DAYS
FROM
THE
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the
President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly
a special provision to establish adefinite mandate for the President as
the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial
interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII
prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Such
interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the
records of the Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section
4 (1), Article VIII.
How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is
hardly
warranted.
According
to
an
authority
on
statutory
construction:[72]
xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the
provisions of the statute by endeavoring to harmonize and
reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It is not
easy to draft a statute, or any other writing for that matter,
which may not in some manner contain conflicting
provisions. But what appears to the reader to be a conflict
may not have seemed so to the drafter. Undoubtedly, each
provision was inserted for a definite reason. Often by
considering the enactment in its entirety, what appears to
be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the
provisions reconciled.
in
the
Judiciary
cannot
be
sustained.
is
entirely
incompatible
with
of
eliminate
Section
midnight
15
as
part
appointments
of
Article
from
VII
being
was
made
to
by
votes
and
(2)
those
made
for
partisan
Article
VII
consists
of
the
so-
permitted.
But
the
issuance
of
350
the
opportunity
new
to
administration
make
the
of
an
corresponding
appointments.
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well
be appointments to important positions which have to be
made
even
after
the
proclamation
of
the
new
making
executive
of
positions
temporary
when
appointments
continued
vacancies
temporarily
by
designation.
But
prohibited
to
the
confirmation
of
Justice
to
appointments
in
the
Judiciary,
Constitutional
Commission
restored
the
requirement
of
Department
from
the
Executive
and
Legislative
Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme
Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the
Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of
having the new President, instead of the current incumbent
President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot
ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also
become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the
appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk
xxx
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President
to appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the
Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the
next President appoint the successor.
prepared
by
the
JBC
for
every
vacancy,
which
abhors
the
idea
that
the
framers
contemplated
permanent,
not
one
to
be
occupied
in
an
acting
The
Chief
Justice
performs
functions
absolutely
significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court
being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the
Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being
mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the 90-day
period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the
successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.
Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no
wide gap between the retirement and the resignation of an incumbent
Chief Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to and assumption
of office of his successor, on the other hand. As summarized in the
comment of the OSG, the chronology of succession is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the
vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by
the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the
JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it
will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample
time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications
of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the
appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start
of the Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial,
but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to
be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC.
The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to
the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every
vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful
neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that
duty.[88] For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should
be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to
the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary
one has been delineated in the following manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act
is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
and
not
ministerial.
The
duty
is
IV
Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC
No. 191002
and
G.R.
No. 191149,
and
the
petition
2.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice