RAY SHU VS.

JAIME DEE
FACTS:
In his complaint for falsification of public document before the NBI
against Jaime (Dee) and Edwin (So), employees of Metrobank, Ramon
(Miranda) and Enriqueto (Magpantay), Ray (Shu) alleged that Jaime
and Edwin falsified his signatures in two deeds of real estate
mortgage, one in his now name, and another in the name of 3A
Corporation. Jaime and Edwin signed the deeds, Enriqueto and Ramon
notarised it, and Larry (Macillan) acted as witness. Bases on these
deeds, the Metrobank foreclosed the properties. After investigation,
the NBI filed a complaint for falsification of public documents against
the respondents, attaching to it Questioned Documents Report no.
746-1098 showing that the signatures of Ray appearing on the deeds
are not the same as the standard sample he submitted to the NBI.
Averring lack of due process because the NBI never required them and
Metrobank to submit the standard samples of Ray for comparison, the
respondents denied committing falsification, arguing that they have in
their possession standard samples of Ray revealing that his signatures
were genuine. They also aver that the NBI conducted the examination
without the original copies of the questioned documents.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor dismissed
the complaint, holding that the report is not conclusive evidence that
the respondents committed falsification, and only proves that the
sample signatures presented by Ray are not the same appearing in the
deeds. Other documents submitted to the prosecutor which were not
examined by the NBI and which Ray does not dispute disprove the
alleged falsification.
Further, Ray availed of the credit line and
benefited from the proceeds of the loan. The fact that Ray presented
a cancelled passport to the notary without disclosing it to them also
presumed the official performance of duty by a notary.
Ray filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, which
reversed the recommendation of the prosecutor, but the respondents
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which sided in
their favour. According to the CA, the respondents were denied their
right to due process in the proceedings before the NBI and the
Secretary of Justice. They were not given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence or were furnished a copy of the complaint at

the NBI. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, did not even
require them to comment or reply when the petition for review was
filed by Ray. The persons who personally investigated the case, the
NBI investigating agent, and the city prosecutor, and who had the
opportunity to examine the documents were not convinced of the
evidence and did not recommend the filing of the complaint; only the
NBI chief and director and the Secretary of Justice did.
Ray thus filed a petition for review on certiorari with the CA. He
assails the CAs reliance on the respondents assertion that they were
denied due process at the NBI and at the DOJ, its giving credence to
the findings of the NBI investigating agent and the prosecutor, and
argues that the NBI examination of the documents at the request of a
private litigant does not nullify the examination, and its purpose was
merely to assist the court in the performance of its duties. On the
other hand, the respondents adopt the findings of the CA and argue
otherwise.
Issue/s:
Whether or not probable cause exists to charge the respondents with
falsification of public documents, contrary to the findings of the CA.
HELD:
We find the petition meritorious.
The respondents were not denied their right to due process
We find no merit in the respondents claim that they were denied due
process when they were not informed by the Secretary of Justice of
the pendency of the petitioners appeal.
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its
absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party
is given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.
In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents
filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her
resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was
cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.

On the respondents allegation that they were denied due process

during the NBI investigation, we stress that the functions of this
agency are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no
judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief
to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an
investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It
undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public
welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders
assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes
in order to prosecute the persons responsible.
Since the NBIs findings were merely recommendatory, we find that
no denial of the respondents due process right could have taken
place; the NBIs findings were still subject to the prosecutors and the
Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of finding the existence of
probable cause. We find it significant that the specimen signatures in
the possession of Metrobank were submitted by the respondents for
the consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary
of Justice during the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus,
these officers had the opportunity to examine these signatures.
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process
when the NBI issued the questioned documents report. We note that
this report merely stated that the signatures appearing on the two
deeds and in the petitioners submitted sample signatures were not
written by one and the same person. Notably, there was no categorical
finding in the questioned documents report that the respondents
falsified the documents. This report, too, was procured during the
conduct of the NBIs investigation at the petitioners request for
assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The
report is inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from
securing a separate documents examination by handwriting experts
based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBIs questioned
documents report does not directly point to the respondents
involvement in the crime charged. Its significance is that, taken
together with the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties
during the preliminary investigation, these evidence
could be
sufficient for purposes of finding probable cause the action that the
Secretary of Justice undertook in the present case.
The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion

Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to

support a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause,
the elements of the crime charged should be present. In determining
these elements for purposes of preliminary investigation, only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty. Thus, probable cause implies mere
probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion
but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.
The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows: (1)
the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who
did not take advantage of his official position; (2) he committed any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3)
the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.
In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of the
Secretary of Justice are more in accord with the duty to determine the
existence of probable cause than the findings of the city prosecutor.
Contrary to the respondents assertions, the Secretary of Justice did
not just merely give credence to the questioned documents report and
the petitioners self-serving allegations. The Secretary of Justice made
a holistic review of the parties submitted pieces of evidence in ruling
that the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that he did
not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the
proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove that he did not execute the
subject deeds. Also, the finding in the assailed resolution that the
credit line of the petitioner with Metrobank is sufficient consideration
for him to have executed the deeds is gratuitous and conjectural.
From the evidence submitted by the parties, the petitioner offered
sufficient evidence
showing that falsification might have been
committed and that the respondents might have been responsible
therefor. The NBIs questioned documents report states that the
questioned deeds of mortgage and the sample signatures submitted by
the petitioner were not written by one and the same person. It was
also shown that the respondents Dee, So, Magpantay and Miranda
signed and participated in the execution of the two deeds of real estate

mortgage and the respondent Macillan signed and submitted these

documents to the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro
Manila. The petitioner also submitted evidence that the passport used
in notarizing the documents was a cancelled passport. Furthermore, as
the Secretary of Justice found, the respondents did not show that the
petitioner received the proceeds of the loan.
The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary
investigation but should be threshed out in a full-blown trial
In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned documents
report issued by the NBI. He concluded that the documents submitted
by the respondents showed that even a layman could see the striking
similarities of the alleged signatures of the petitioner in the questioned
deeds and in the documents submitted by the respondents. He also
concluded that the petitioner misrepresented to the respondentsnotaries public Miranda and Magpantay that the passport used in
notarizing the questioned deeds was not yet cancelled.
In arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved into
the merits of the respondents defense. This is contrary to the wellsettled rule that the validity and merits of a partys defense and
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level. The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be
put to test in a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed,
weighed, given credence or disproved. The preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. Simply put, in determining probable cause, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the rules of
evidence that, as a rule, is outside his technical knowledge.
That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a fullblown trial is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a
questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine
signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests
on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the
signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity. Thus, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court

explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the

disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine.
Read in this light, the respondents defense that there are striking
similarities in the specimen signatures they submitted and those of the
questioned deeds is a matter of evidence whose consideration is
proper only in a full-blown trial. In that proper forum, the respondents
can present evidence to prove their defense and controvert the
questioned documents report; they can raise as issue the alleged
irregularities in the conduct of the examination.
The Secretary of Justice has the power to review the findings of the
city prosecutor
We also find that the CA erred in ruling that the city prosecutors
findings should be given more weight than the findings of the
Secretary of Justice.
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive
function, lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation. The prosecutors ruling is reviewable by the
Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has
the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutors determination.
It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to interference by the courts, save only when he acts with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
when he grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a manner so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts
outside the contemplation of law.
Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of Justice
did not gravely abuse the exercise of her discretion in reversing the
findings of the city prosecutor.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2007 and its resolution
dated April 4, 2008.