S. HRG.

109920

THE REPORT OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 7, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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33184 PDF

2007

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri
BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CHARLES S. ABELL, Staff Director
RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Democratic Staff Director

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CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
THE REPORT

OF THE

IRAQ STUDY GROUP

DECEMBER 7, 2006
Page

Baker, Hon. James A., III, Co-Chair, Iraq Study Group ......................................
Hamilton, Hon. Lee, Co-Chair, Iraq Study Group ................................................

3
3

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THE REPORT OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2006

U.S. SENATE,
ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:41 a.m. in room SH
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman)
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, Levin, Byrd,
Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh,
and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Sandra E. Luff, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker,
professional staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional
staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Diana G.
Tabler, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic
staff director; Jonathan D. Clark, minority counsel; Richard W.
Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority
counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and William G.P.
Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Micah H. Harris, Jessica L. Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Libby Burgess, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway
II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant
to Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; Bob Taylor, assistant to Senator Thune; Terrence E.
Sauvain, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Matthew Benham, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson;
and Luke Ballman, assistant to Senator Dayton.
COMMITTEE

ON

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,

CHAIRMAN

Chairman WARNER. Good morning, everyone. The committee is

very privileged to have before us this morning Secretary Baker and
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2
Congressman Hamilton, two colleagues well known and admired I
think by every person on this committee. We commend you for the
work that you have done. This committee in the course of its deliberations on these issues, I assure you, will take into consideration
very carefully the work and ability that you applied to reach consensus between five Democrats, five Republicans, and the fact that
you had made available the opportunity for all types of peopleprivate sector, public sector, people from abroadto come and provide
your study group with testimony.
I believe that I have watched you carefully, as others have, in appearances, and in your appearance yesterday before our Senate
leadership joint session you indicated that every issue about this
complex situation that is known to mankind was considered by
your group.
Now, could you advise us with regard to your time constraints?
There was some communication to Senator Levin and myself.
Could you give us that estimate?
Mr. BAKER. Were scheduled, Senator Warner, to leave the Capitol at 11 oclock if we can.
Chairman WARNER. Well try our best to accommodate that
schedule, well start out with say a 3-minute question round, so
that hopefully all members can fit within that time constraint. We
have a vote that will be superimposed on that, but the hearing will
continue during the vote, and as members come and go just in an
orderly way well ask our questions.
So, I once again thank you gentlemen and all members of your
committee. I wish to also acknowledge my long-time friend and colleague, Frank Wolf, who came to me with this concept 2 years ago.
We worked together on it, in concert with the United States Institute for Peace. I would hope that in your opening remarks you
would comment on the value of that organization as its helped you
in this work. I want to thank Frank and others, because youre
more or less a creation of the Congress of the United States. The
idea came to fruition. You then, Mr. Baker, met with the President
and he indicated his concurrence in going forward, and here we
are, and you have your report.
So with that, I turn to Senator Levin for such remarks as you
have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I join you first in thanking the cochairs of the Iraq Study Group. We thank the other members of
that study group. We thank their staff for a really very comprehensive, important report.
Yesterday was surely an extraordinary day in the history of the
Iraq war. A day which signaled the end of the administrations
stay the course policy and the beginning of the development of a
new, realistic, bipartisan, and hopefully successful approach. First,
Robert Gates was confirmed. Dr. Gates brought to this committee
and the country a realistic view of the situation in Iraq, that after
312 years were not winning and that the only way to end the violence is for the Iraqis to reach a political settlement.
Yesterday, the Baker-Hamilton Study Group issued a powerful
comprehensive plan for change in course, including calling for an

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end to the open-ended commitment of American troops as a way of
pressing the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own future. Like
Dr. Gates, the Baker-Hamilton report concludes that the violence
cannot be stopped or even contained, if there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country.
The report calls for U.S. combat brigades to move out of Iraq and
says further that, By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all
combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of
Iraq.
A principal reason for the Iraq Study Group, that they called for
these reductions, is as follows: An open-ended commitment of
American forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best
chance of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the report says, the Iraqi government might continue to
delay taking those difficult actions.
As I told President Bush yesterday at the White House, his
statement a few weeks ago that, We are going to stay in Iraq as
long as the Iraqis ask us to be there, creates the exact opposite
impression. It maintains an open-ended commitment and removes
the pressure from the Iraqis to take responsibility for their future.
I hope the administration will accept the recommendations in
this report and will determine to change course as the best hope
of turning around this grave and deteriorating situation in the
words of the report.
Once again, I commend Secretary Baker, Congressman Hamilton, their colleagues, and their staff for an extraordinary bipartisan effort.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Gentlemen, well now receive your opening statements.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. BAKER III, CO-CHAIR, IRAQ
STUDY GROUP

Mr. BAKER. Senator Warner, if its okay with the committee, I

have an opening statement. I think my co-chairman, Congressman
Hamilton does. We would submit those for the record and go to
your questions if that would be acceptable.
Chairman WARNER. Thats fine.
Mr. BAKER. I think we should say, and Lee will probably have
something to add to this, that we note your appreciative statements about Congressman Frank Wolf. Lee made the same remarks yesterday at our press conference, and many other people,
Senator Warner, helped us in the preparation of this report and in
the preparation for writing this report, including the administration, who was very supportive in providing documents and personnel, and travel and access to people, and things that we needed
in order to do our job.
STATEMENT OF HON. LEE HAMILTON, CO-CHAIR, IRAQ STUDY
GROUP

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Warner, we are mindful of the fact that

at the creation of the Iraq Study Group you were there, you were
helpful to us. We deeply appreciate that, as indeed were other

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members of the Senate and the House. Youre quite right to acknowledge the initiative taken by Congressman Frank Wolf, without whose initiative there would be no Iraq Study Group. Youre
right, of course, to recognize the important role that the United
States Institute of Peace played. They gave us marvelous logistical
support, expert support, all along the way, along with the Baker
Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
the Center for the Study of the Presidency. They were all very
helpful to us. As Jim has indicated, we had very strong support
from the administration. We saw the people we wanted to see.
They facilitated our travel and they made the documents available
we needed.
The only thing I would say about the statement that I have submitted that we did not comment really very much in our public
presentation yesterday is that we really spend a good bit of time
on the whole question of resetting the American military. We consider that enormously important and I know this committee will
likewise. We make some recommendations here about how to restore the U.S. military. I know this committee is very well-informed on that matter. We want to try to reinforce what you will
do with your leadership.
[The joint prepared statement of Messrs. Baker and Hamilton
follows:]
JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT

BY

JAMES A. BAKER III

AND

LEE H. HAMILTON

Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the Committee on

Armed Services. It is a distinct honor to appear before you this morning, and to
have the opportunity to discuss the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report.
We want to begin by thanking Chairman Warner for his strong support from the
outset of the work of the Iraq Study Group. We also thank Chairman Warner and
Senator Levin for taking the time to meet with the Study Group. Our work is better
informed because of the wise counsel you gave.
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

The situation in Iraq today is grave and deteriorating. Violence is increasing in

scope and lethality. Attacks on U.S. forcesand U.S. casualtiescontinue at an
alarming rate.
The Iraqi people are suffering great hardship. The democratically elected government that replaced Saddam Hussein is not adequately advancing the key issues: national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services. Economic development is hampered. The current approach is not working, and the ability of the United States to influence events is diminishing.
The United States has committed staggering resources. Our country has lost 2,900
Americans. 21,000 more have been wounded. The United States has spent $400 billion in Iraq. Costs could rise well over $1 trillion.
Many Americans are understandably dissatisfied. Our ship of state has hit rough
waters. It must now chart a new way forward.
A NEW WAY FORWARD

No course of action in Iraq is guaranteed to stop a slide toward chaos. Yet not
all options have been exhausted.
We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by President Bush: an
Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.
We recommend a new approach to pursue that goal. We recommend a responsible
transition. Our three most important recommendations are equally important and
reenforce one another:
a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq, that will enable
the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly;

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prompt action by the Iraqi government to achieve milestonesparticularly on national reconciliation; and
new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region.
U.S. FORCES

The United States must encourage Iraqis to take responsibility for their own destiny. This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in the U.S. presence in
Iraq over time.
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the
Iraqi Army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. As
this transition proceeds, the United States should increase the number of troops
imbedded in and supporting the Iraqi Army, and U.S. combat forces could begin to
move out of Iraq.
By the first quarter of 2008subjected to unexpected developments on the
groundall U.S. combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of
Iraq. U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi
forces, in rapid reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping,
advising, and force protection. A key mission for rapid-reaction and special operations forces that remain would be to target al Qaeda.
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the United States
for some time to come. Yet the United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that we could carry out our plansincluding planned redeploymentseven if
the Iraqi government did not implement their planned changes.
The United States must not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of troops deployed in Iraq.
RESTORING THE U.S. MILITARY

We also make several recommendations to restore the U.S. military:

The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy
civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior
military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security
Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize
training and education programs for the force that have returned to the
continental United States in order to reset the force and restore the U.S.
military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.
As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate
sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next
5 years.
The administration, in full consultation with the relevant committees of
Congress, should assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq
and its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the ability to
recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research and development, and the budgets of other U.S. Government agencies involved in the stability and reconstruction effort.
MILESTONES

A military solution alone will not end the violence in Iraqwe must help the
Iraqis help themselves.
President Bush and his national security team should convey a clear message to
Iraqi leaders: the United States will support them if they take action to make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
security, and improving the daily lives of Iraqis.
If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.
DIPLOMACY

There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. But to give the Iraqi government a chance to succeed, U.S. policy must be focused more broadly than on
military strategy alone or Iraq alone. It must seek the active and constructive engagement of all governments that have an interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, including all of Iraqs neighbors.
To gain this constructive engagement, the United States should promptly initiate
a New Diplomatic Offensive and, working with the government of Iraq, create an

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International Iraq Support Group to address comprehensively the political, economic, and military matters necessary to provide stability in Iraq. That support
group should include Iraq, of course, and all of Iraqs neighbors, including Iran and
Syria, as well as Egypt, the U.N. Security Council Perm 5 member countries, a representative of the U.N. Secretary General, and the European Union.
Given the central importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict to many countries both
in and out of the region, the United States must again initiate active negotiations
to achieve a stable Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts in the manner we outline in the
Report.
Altogether in this Report, we make 79 recommendations. In addition to Military,
Political, and Diplomatic recommendations, which are equally important and reinforce each other, they cover a range of other areas: criminal justice, oil, reconstruction, the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. Government personnel, and U.S.
intelligence. These recommendations are important, and will greatly increase our
ability to achieve a responsible transition in Iraq.
We agreed upon our recommendations after considering a full range of other approaches.
We have not recommended a stay the course solution. In our opinion, that approach is no longer viable. While we do recommend a five-fold increase in U.S. forces
training Iraqi troops, we do not recommend increasing U.S. forces by in excess of
100,000 as some have suggested. Additional fully combat-ready U.S. forces of that
magnitude are simply not available. We have not recommended a division of Iraq
into three autonomous regions based on ethnic or sectarian identities, but with a
weak central government. As a practical matter, such a devolution could not be
managed on an orderly basis; and because Iraqs major cities are peopled by a mixture of warring groups, a disorderly devolution would likely result in a humanitarian disaster or civil war. We also did not recommend a precipitate withdrawal
of troopsbecause that might not only cause a bloodbath. It would also invite a
wider regional war.
The approach we recommend has shortcomings. We recognize that implementing
it will require a tremendous amount of political will and unity of effort by government agencies. It will require cooperation by the executive and legislative branches
of government.
Events in Iraq may overtake what we recommend. For that reason, we believe
that decisions must be made by our national leaders with urgency.
As it is now, people are being killed day after dayIraqis and the brave American
troops who are trying to help them. Struggling in a world of fear, Iraqis dare not
dream. They have been liberated from the nightmare of a tyrannical order, only to
face the nightmare of brutal violence.
As a matter of humanitarian concern, as a matter of national interest, and as a
matter of practical necessity, it is time to find a new way forwarda new approach.
We believe that a constructive solution requires that a new political consensus be
builta new consensus here at home, and a new consensus abroad. In that spirit,
we have approached our Study Groups task on a bipartisan basis. So we are especially pleased to note that our group offers and supports each and every one of our
recommendations unanimously.
We, of course, recognize that some people will differ with some of our recommendations. We nevertheless hope very much that, in moving forward, others
will wish to continue to broaden and deepen the bipartisan spirit that has helped
us come together.
We would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Thank you.

I will proceed now with 2 or 3 minutes. First, Congressman
Hamilton, Ive watched a number of the appearances and listened
to you yesterday. You made two strong points yesterday to the joint
leadership, and the chairmen and ranking members of several of
our committees: one, the need for a bipartisan approach to unify as
best we can Congress and the executive branch behind such future
policies as the President may determine. Would you comment on
that and once again establish how you feel that that is a very essential element to any success?
Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the Senator for his question. We are indeed impressed with the necessity of having a unity of effort in
dealing with an extremely difficult foreign policy challenge. To the

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extent that the country is split, to the extent that the country is
divided on how to deal with Iraq, we greatly weaken our ability to
deal with the problem.
Im impressed, as Im sure you have been, with how much of the
political debate seems to be people kind of talking passing in the
night, as it were, and not really connecting with a genuine substantive policy debate. Bipartisanship is absolutely essential. What
we tried very hard to do in this report, and I dont know that weve
succeeded entirely, is to put together realizable recommendations.
Given the political environment in Washington, given the political
environment in Iraq, what can be done in both of these governments to put together an effective policy? Thats a very tough policy
problem and we tried to say that in order for this to happen it cant
be pie in the sky, it cant be idealistic; it has to be very pragmatic
as to the recommendations, and so we hope they are achievable
recommendations.
The fact of the matter is you have President Bush in office for
2 more years. The fact of the matter is that the report that we put
before you must largely be implemented by the executive branch.
You cannot dodge that fact. It is a fact of political life, and Congress will play an important role, should play an important role,
but Congress cannot implement the decisions in this report for the
most part. There are some legislative matters to be addressed.
So we feel the approach of bipartisanship and unity of effort is
absolutely critical to the success of our policy.
Chairman WARNER. I thank you for that. To take off on your
question on Congress, Congress having really been the impetus
that established this group, the President will now look at the options that his internal National Security Council provides for him,
certain other perspectives that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
will give, and then he has to synthesize this and make these decisions.
Ive recommended that somehow Congress reinvolve itself, obviously not the whole Congress, but the leadership of Congress. I
would hope that the President would consult with them before he
finally promulgates to the public and to the world his views.
Do you think that would be a wise idea?
Mr. HAMILTON. I certainly do, and I think Congress is quite capable of doing that. I do have some questions about your word synthesize. I think its terribly important that we understand that
you cannot solve the Iraqi problem in pieces, and so you have to
approach it comprehensively. If you think you can solve the problem of Iraq by manipulating the troop levels, I think you have it
dead wrong. If you think you can solve the problem by economic
reconstruction or political action, I think thats wrong, too.
What has to be done is that all of the tools of American power
have to be integrated carefully herepolitical, economic, military
for sureand to use those effectively. What you have to have is a
comprehensive approach.
Chairman WARNER. Excuse me. My time is running out. I think
I concur generally with that. I used the word deliberately because
the President must take into consideration the perspectives from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Thats what I meant.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thats correct.

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Chairman WARNER. But you concur generally that Congress
would be helpful to look at it once before, likely through the leadership, whatever private meetings can be arranged, before it goes
out, Secretary Baker?
Mr. BAKER. Yes, I do, Senator. But let me reinforce what Mr.
Hamilton has just said on two points. Bipartisanship is critical.
This is an extraordinarily difficult problem and unless Congress
comes together behind a unified approach, were going to have a
tough time dealing with it.
Second, I hope we dont treat this like a fruit salad and say, I
like this but I dont like that, I like this but I dont like that. This
is a comprehensive strategy designed to deal with this problem
were facing in Iraq, but also designed to deal with other problems
that we face in the region, and to restore Americas standing and
credibility in that part of the world.
So thats why we say in here that its important. These are interdependent recommendations we make, and we hope that when people look at them and start thinking about implementing them
theyll think about implementing all of them and certainly at least
as many as they can.
Chairman WARNER. I thank the witnesses. I just simply close
with this observation: But the President under the Constitution
has the responsibility and he has a great deal of valuable input
coming before him.
Mr. BAKER. That is correct.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you.
I agree with both of your comments about the need for a comprehensive approach. Secretary Baker, I heard you yesterday say
on some radio program that the stay the course solution is no
longer viable. Would you tell us why you believe that?
Mr. BAKER. We took a look at this over a period of 9 months,
Senator, and the principal recommendations in here are that we
change the primary mission of U.S. forces, that we have a new diplomatic offensive that is very extensive and comprehensive, and
that we work with the Iraqi government to create performance
milestones which we expect them to live up to.
We condition most of our security assistance and economic assistance when we give it to other countries. Theres nothing unreasonable, we dont think, about having some reasonable conditionality
here, particularly when youre talking about milestones worked out
by the United States in consultation with the government of Iraq.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Your report says that American military forces cannot stop the violence or even contain it if there is
no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of
their country. Then you go on to say that an open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government
the incentive that it needs to take the political actions that give
Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence
of such an incentive, the Iraqi government might continue to delay
taking those difficult actions.
Im wondering if perhaps you or Congressman Hamilton could
give us your thinking behind that conclusion, which is a very, very

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significant one and one which many of us have been preaching here
for a long time?
Mr. HAMILTON. One of the things we kept asking ourselves repeatedly through our discussions was what kind of leverage you
could assert on the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government has
not performed well. Its a weak government. If you look at the ministries of the Iraqi government, not a single one of those ministries
are what you would call really effective, some better than others.
Now, our approach to this point has been one of giving assistance
without conditionality, providing the troops without any reservation of any kind. If you look at this from the standpoint of the Iraqi
government, thats a pretty good deal. Were supplying them a lot
of money and a lot of troops. Were doing a lot of fighting. Were
taking a lot of bloodshed. Were pouring huge resources into there,
and why wouldnt they be satisfied with that? Why wouldnt they
criticize our report, as they did yesterday?
But the fact of the matter is this government has not taken the
tough steps it needs to take, the Iraqi government, on the three
key issues of national security, on the security question, national
reconciliation, and providing just the basic services of any governing powerelectricity and water and all the rest of it.
Now, how do you get them to do it? What kind of leverage do you
have? We believe that the troop level question is one point of leverage, and we have to say to those folks that were just not going to
be there indefinitely. There are limits to American patience, there
are limits to American resources, and you have to get moving and
get your act together. Among the things you have to doand you
mentioned thisis to deal with the political problem.
Again and again the comment from the experts is that you cannot solve this problem by military power alone. Military power is
important, but fundamentally you have to deal with the underlying
political problems of that country. Now, theres no mystery as to
what has to be done. What has to be done is that the various elements of that country have to be given a fair deal, a fair shake,
in the political structure of the country.
If youre going to ignore 20 percent of the people in the country,
the Sunnis who have traditionally ruled the country, theyre going
to be pretty upset about it and theyre going to fight and theyre
going to bring violence to the table, and they feel theyre being shut
out of the game, and thats one of the principal driving forces behind the sectarian violence that is now taking place.
So the idea here is leverage through aid, leverage through troop
levels, letting the Iraqis know firmly that they have to move and
make substantial progress in a whole variety of areaswe spell it
all out in the reportand that that has to be done promptly. That
brings up the question of time frame. I see people talking about
very elongated time frames. I dont think you have that kind of
time frame here. Youre dealing with time frames of weeks and
maybe days.
Throughout our consideration of this report, we were constantly
aware that events could overtake us. Maybe they have, I dont
know, and tomorrow morning maybe they will. But you are where
you are. You have to deal with the circumstances that you have.

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Weve put forward a plan that we think has a reasonable chance
of success in that region if it is well carried out.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you.
Mr. BAKER. At the same time, Senator Levin, I think its fair to
say, and I know Lee would agree with this, that our panel, our
Study Group, understands the difference between political will to
take the actions that we want the Iraqi government to take, and
ability to take those actions. So if you will look at the report carefully, you will see that what we say is that if they do not make substantial progress toward the completion of these milestones, or toward meeting these milestones, the United States should reduce its
political, economic, or military support. Its phrased dysjunctively
because there could be, and probably will be, occasions where they
might try in good faith to meet a milestone theyve agreed to with
us but not be able to, simply as a matter of capacity.
So I want to call the committees attention to that particular provision. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you.
I wish to advise the committee that the vote will be at 10:45.
Consequently, Im certain that we can conclude our committee
meeting and give every member present the opportunity to question our witnesses.
Senator McCain.
Senator MCCAIN. I want to thank the panel and especially our
two leaders for the outstanding work and effort theyve made to try
to help us through this difficult dilemma which we face, and I very
much appreciate not only their present, but past service to the
country.
I do believe that General Jack Kean, who was I believe on your
panel of military advisers, said, Based on where we are now, we
cant get there, adding that the reports conclusions say more
about, the absence of political will in Washington than the harsh
realities in Iraq.
I agree with him, particularly in light of your conclusions on
page 73, which say: Because of the importance of Iraq to our national security goals and our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we
considered proposals to make substantial increases in the number
of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not
believe that the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment.
My studies and figures show that they are available for sustained deployment, at least in order to get the situation under control, number one.
I want to tell you something that I know that you know. Theres
only one thing worse than an overstressed Army and Marine
Corps, and thats a defeated Army and Marine Corps. We saw that
in 1973. I believe that this is a recipe that will lead to sooner or
later our defeat in Iraq. I dont believe that a peace conference with
people who are dedicated to your extinction has much short-term
gain. I do not believe that a regional conference with Iran and
Syria, who obviously have at least very difficult short-term goals
than the United States of America, including a 1,000-year-old ambition on the part of the Persians to exert hegemony in the area,

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are probably, at least in the short term, going to lead to a viable
solution or one that we would agree on.
But most of all, this issue of saying that we dont support increased number of troops because weve always known now that
there was not enough troops there. That is the overall consensus
of opinion. To say that we dont have enough troops, but well
threaten to have less unless you somehow react in a way that we
want you to, is a degree of impracticality. To withdraw the troops
and then still have thousands of American soldiers embedded in
Iraqi units that are of questionable value or loyalty, I think, puts
at risk a large number of American military advisers.
Id like to hear your response to that, but I do also want to thank
you again, with the greatest respect, for the hard work that you
and the other members of the commission did.
Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Senator. Let me say one or two things,
and I know Lee will have some comments as well.
First of all with respect to the augmentation of forces, we call for
a fivefold increase in the U.S. combat forces dedicated to the training and equipping mission. We do point out that those forces could
beits up to the commander in chief, of courseavailable perhaps
in region without bringing them in from the United States. Or they
might be brought in from the United States.
We did receive commentary from people to the effect, generally,
that we do not have readily available combat forces up to the level
of 100,000, that if that were the policy approach that was suggested, that would be available to go in there for at least quite
some time.
Were not suggesting a regional conference, Senator McCain, as
a solution or a panacea to this. It is really only part of a comprehensive strategy. General Keans comments we noted today as
well, and what I think he really was saying, at least the way I read
them, was that the training and equipping mission would not succeed, and thats his opinion. We received opinions to the contrary,
but whether hes right or whether the others are right, we think
its worth a try, particularly if were going to enhance the number
and the capability of our trainers, as is also called for in this document.
Mr. HAMILTON. Senator McCain, that relates to the risk with embedded American forces with Iraqi forces. Youre absolutely right
about that, there are risks there. If you put American forces right
in the middle of this sectarian violence working with Iraqi forces,
those young men and perhaps young women too are in a place of
danger.
Now, we tried to deal with that by saying that were going to do
everything we can by way of force protection. We will have combat
forces there to protect the embedded forces. Were going to have all
kinds of logistics and supply efforts to help them. But there is no
blinking the fact that thats a risky mission and a different mission
and we should not slide over it, as you have not in your comments.
The comment the general made about we cant get there is a
deeply pessimistic comment, not without some basis. We appreciate
the fact that the training of Iraqi forces did not go very well for
the first 2 years. We do believe that weve learned and, through
trial and error, that our efforts over the past year have been much

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better, and we believe that an intensive effort over the next 18
months can make a difference in this military training. We dont
underestimate that task at all.
It is certainly the case that the Iraqi units perform better when
the U.S. trainers are present, and if we accelerate that effort we
believe we can make a difference in getting where we want to go.
So this is a very, very important part of the security arrangements
in that country. Incidentally, this embedding idea is strongly supported by the Iraqi government itself. It obviously doesnt agree
with all of our report, but it does agree with this part of it.
Are we convinced that this is going to work? We just believe its
the best plan possible under the circumstances, and obviously everything we do to protect the forces that are engaged in whatever
capacity just has to be done.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. BAKER. Senator McCain, may I just add to what Lee has
said? Were not only increasing fivefold the combat forces dedicated
to training and calling for the best U.S. combat personnel to be engaged in this; were also suggesting that they be inserted all the
way down to the company level. We had a lot of very difficult discussions about this issue you raise about forces to be left there to
protect our trainers and our embedded U.S. forces with the Iraqi
forces. It was the subject of some dispute and debate. I think we
have come up with language on page 72 of the document, Senator,
that will enable us to maintain sufficient combat forces there in a
robust deployment that we will be able to protect our trainers. I
discussed this indirectly with General Pace, and I think he agrees
with that.
Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would like
to say it should alarm usand its out of the scope of your study
that with 300 million people in America and the responsibilities we
have throughout the world that we dont have enough troops to
surge in Iraq, which was your conclusion. I do not believe it would
require 100,000, but I wont waste the time of the committee. But
I think theres a disconnect between what youre recommending
and the situation on the ground. I very much appreciate all your
work.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator McCain.
I hope in the course of your dialogue here today you can touch
once again on the involvement or noninvolvement of our troops in
combat relating to sectarian violence. Speaking for myself, I think
they should not be put in positions where if Iraqi troops decide to
get involved directly in trying to fight against the Sunni, or fight
against the Shia, because of this senseless, wanton killing for religious reasons, I do not think theyre there for that purpose.
Mr. BAKER. Senator Warner, just one more thing with reference
to Senator McCains very, very valid point. We also call, Senator,
for support of a short-term surge of forces for the mission in Baghdad if U.S. commanders should suggest it.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
Senator BYRD. Time does not permit me to adequately express
my respect for both of you gentlemen, and my thanks for the work
you have done for our country and that you are doing.

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The theme of your report seems to be that the United States
should be moving quickly to find an end to our involvement in Iraq
and allow Iraqis to take control of their future. You emphasize that
the U.S. involvement in Iraq cannot be permanent, and I agree.
Meanwhile, the 2002 Iraqi war resolution is outdated and does not
take into account the current situation.
In June, I introduced an amendment in the Senate with Senator
Snowe that would provide an exit strategy for Iraq that is not
based upon dates. The amendment would have sunset the war resolution based on conditions such as Iraq taking control of security,
other countries relieving U.S. troops of their mission to support the
Iraqi Security Forces, the President declaring the mission in Iraq
to be complete, and so on and so on. In short, this amendment
would have put an exit strategy in law, signaled the finite commitment of the United States to Iraq, and set forth a path for U.S.
troops to come home, while avoiding the mistake of Congresss trying to micromanage military decisions.
Secretary Baker and Congressman Hamilton, is it not time for
Congress to take a fresh look at the outdated use of force resolution
that was passed in 2002 without my vote? Isnt it time?
Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, we really did not express a view on that.
One of the rules we followed pretty closely throughout the consideration of our work was not to look backwards, and we did not look
at the resolution that you refer to. I really dont have a judgment
with regard to its adequacy for the present situation.
I saw the piece in the post by my friend Michael Lennon today,
but we did not make a judgment about that. We operated with a
very strict rule that we would not try to evaluate the past. Our
mandate was to look forward. We are where we are. What do we
do from this point on was the question we addressed, and we really
do not have a judgment about this resolution.
Senator BYRD. Secretary Baker?
Mr. BAKER. I would agree with that, Senator Byrd. I havent
studied it and we did not study it as a part of our report because
it was a past tense action.
Senator BYRD. I think youre exactly right and were exactly right,
but I ask the question again: Isnt it timemaybe you can help us
a little on thisfor Congress itself, us, to take a fresh look at the
outdated use of force resolution that was passed in 2002? Would
you venture a response? Do you think its time?
Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I think if such a resolution were in the
form and supported strongly, which would reinforce the role of Congress in the very grave question of sending young men and women
into harms way, and would contribute to a unified effort and more
bipartisan support, such a resolution could play a very, very important role in terms of strengthening American foreign policy in the
region.
Senator BYRD. Thats a very helpful response.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Byrd.
Senator BYRD. Might I just elicit a response from Secretary
Baker?
Chairman WARNER. Yes.
Mr. BAKER. I wouldnt disagree with my co-chairman. Hes the
legislative expert, Senator. Im an executive branch expert, or

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maybe not an expert, but all of my experience has been in the executive branch. So if the distinguished gentleman on my left says
that as a legislative matter it would be appropriate, Ill go along
with that.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator BYRD. Good answer. Thank you both.
Mr. BAKER. Reluctantly. Reluctantly, Senator, reluctantly.
[Laughter.]
Chairman WARNER. I raised a similar question to that about 6
months ago in the context of one of these hearings.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I cant think of any two people better equipped to
handle this thing than the two who are doing it. I still work with
Secretary Baker on a regular basis, and of course Ive worked
under Mr. Hamilton on the House Armed Services Committee. So
I just appreciate the fact that the right people are doing this.
I have two questions. The first one is, if I could get an answer
for the record because it would take too long, but I have not agreed
quite often with some of the things of Senator Levin, some of the
positions hes taken, but one that I have agreed with is we need
to budget this stuff and not have it depend on these emergency
supplementals. I notice the 79 specific recommendations. We have
not gotten into that, and Id like to do that. Some of the things that
youre doing, I think, Im glad youre talking about, and that is this
5-year limitation on reset. I had occasion to be to the Army logistics centers and see the lines, and I recognize thats going to be a
very expensive thing and we need to address that.
Also on the train and equip. Ive been more impressed than some
of the rest of the people on this committee over the quality of training that were giving these people. I was in Afghanistan. Ive had
12 trips over there to the area of responsibility (AOR), and I saw
the way that they are taking up their training, their abilities, and
I think maybe a lesson could be learned in Iraq.
But Ive also seen the equipment that theyre using, up in
Fallujah during one of the elections. I saw them carrying around
this old Russian stuff. Most of it didnt work. So we have to get
them the right equipment. You acknowledge this in the report, but
again this is a very expensive thing, and Id like to get something
for the record on where we might go in addressing that and preparing ourselves fiscally for the future.
Mr. BAKER. On budgeting, Senatorand Lees the one to answer
this question, but on budgeting we have a specific recommendation
about the question of supplementals in here.
Senator INHOFE. I know you do.
Mr. BAKER. We say the costs for the war should be included in
the Presidents annual budget request starting in fiscal year 2008.
Senator INHOFE. Yes, sir, I understand that. Im talking about
amounts, so we can get an idea of what thats going to be. I applaud the fact that youve included that.
But one thing that was not in the report, when you talk about
the advisory teams and the drawdowns that will be taking place or
the redeployment, you talk about the ground forces, and I was a
ground guy, so I have a prejudice in that direction. But nothing is

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really said about the air support. Right now, the only places outside of Iraq that we have that capability would be in Qatar, Bahrain, and maybe Kuwait.
But as were drawing down, we also are going to lose some of our
capability to take care of our F16s, our A10s, and other equipment thats going to provide ground support. Now, I would like to
see that added as a component of the ground deployment, and I
wondered if you had any comments about whether or not you took
that into consideration, and if not where we should go with that?
Mr. HAMILTON. Thats totally consistent, Senator, with everything we heard. I think we used the word support. Perhaps we
werent specific enough in some respects. But air support is clearly
needed in large quantities, maybe needed in even larger quantities
if we go to this embedded idea. So that equipment has to be available and the people have to be trained for that.
I want to say that, with regard to your comment on the quality
of training, I think was quite appropriate, and I just emphasize
that I really do think weve made improvements here in training.
It took us a while. I think we were a little slow to learn on it, but
were getting it right, I believe. Its terribly important that we do.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much for your service.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Lieberman.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
Thanks to both of you for the contribution that youve made to
the decisions that the President and Members of Congress now
have to make about what to do in Iraq. I want to make two quick
points and ask a question. I think perhaps the most significant
thing youve done is to set an example for us, that five Democrats
and five Republicans sat and reasoned together about what we
should do in Iraq to succeed, because you have stated your understanding quite clearly of the importance of how our involvement
ends in Iraq, how important it is to end it successfully.
Too much of our debate here about Iraq has been carried out in
partisan press conferences, and that has to end and I think youve
created an example for us as to how to do that.
The second point is that I must say, notwithstanding what the
media has said, I find that large parts of the report are not that
different than the courseits not stay the course, but than the
policies that we have been following. In the cases where you have
made a choice, I want to compliment you and say I think youve
made some right choices.
For instance, you have rejected the idea of a deadline by which
we must remove all of our troops from Iraq because of whats at
stake there. You have rejected the idea of a time line to begin withdrawal of troops. You have said, All combat brigades not necessary
for force protection couldI emphasize, couldbe out of Iraq by
the first quarter of 2008.
In fact, as you said, Secretary Baker, the report does recommend
a surge in our forces there now to try to grab hold of the situation,
particularly in Baghdad. So I appreciate that you have expressed
that consensus, because these are ongoing debates here.
The question is this, and let me just say that I totally support
the idea of a regional approach, an international conference. I believe that the United States is strong enough never to fear to sit

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down and talk to anyone. But if I may say respectfully, others have
described this commission as composed of realists. You havent described yourself that way. Im skeptical that its realistic to think
that Iran wants to help the United States succeed in Iraq. They
are, after all, supporting Hezbollah, which gathers people in a
square in Beirut to shout Death to America. They are giving sophisticated IEDs to the militias which are killing Americans every
day in Iraq.
So to say that, as you do, that Iran should stem the flow of arms
and training to Iraq, respect Iraqs security and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliationwhy is there any reasonable belief that the
Iranians should do any of the things that you think they should do?
If they do, wont they ask us an unacceptable price, which is to
allow them to go ahead
Mr. BAKER. Develop nukes?
Senator LIEBERMAN. Exactly.
Mr. BAKER. Yes. Senator, thank you. Thats a very good question
and let me answer it this way. First of all, we specifically exclude
any linkage to the nuclear proliferation issue. We say that should
not be taken up in any discussion we might have with Iran.
Youre saying why should we approach them? There are two reasons in my opinion. One, we did so in Afghanistan and, guess what,
they helped us. Now, youre quite right, they probably would much
prefer to see us stay bogged down in Iraq. But approaching them
in the context, Senator, of pulling together all of Iraqs neighbors
to put the finger on each one of them and say, you can do this, you
can do that, you can do this, and they can all do a better job of
not stirring, fomenting trouble, or they can do a better job of trying
to assist. Some of them are actually trying to assist.
But if we ask Iran to come and they say no, we and the Iraqi
government, and they say no, then we will hold them up to public
scrutiny as the rejectionist state that they have proven to be. Now,
were not naive enough to think that in this case they may want
to help. They probably dont. The President authorized me to approach the Iranian government. I did so, and they in effect said:
We would not be inclined to help you this time around.
Fine. What do we lose by saying were getting all of Iraqs neighbors together, we want you to come, and if they say no we show
the world what theyre all about.
Syria is a totally different issue, a totally different proposition,
and I didnt understand you to say what makes you think we could
get something out of Syria. What makes me think that is we have
it, I have it, back in 1991 after 15 trips there, at a time when they
were a state that sponsored terrorism. But we talked to them and
we made them change 25 years of policy.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, I agree with that. So I appreciate your
answer. Theres obviously a lot to gain from getting most of the
neighbors who have common interests to ours in not seeing Iraq
collapse and go into chaos. Im just not convinced that the Iranians
do, and I single out the Iranians. I appreciate the fact that you just
said thatI dont want to put words in your mouththat the Iranians probably wont want to assist us.

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Mr. BAKER. We say it in the report, Senator. Its in the report.
We say weve approached them; based on our limited contact we
suspect they will not come. But what do we lose by approaching
them, in the same way that this same administration has approached them with respect to Afghanistan?
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Collins.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me echo the thanks of my colleagues on this committee
for your study, for your dedicated work. We really need a bipartisan approach to developing a new strategy for Iraq since the current strategy clearly has not been successful.
I appreciate your blunt assessment of where we are, your description of Iraq as a situation that is grave and deteriorating. Its
very realistic. I do share some of the concerns that have been expressed here this morning about some of the specific recommendations. Like my colleague from Connecticut, I must say that, while
Im always open to our country talking with anyone, Im very skeptical that Syria, which has been the source, or the path for foreign
fighters to get into Iraq, and Iran, which has provided munitions
and IEDs that have killed or maimed so many of our troops, are
really going to be partners in the solution.
For my question, however, I want to go back to the issue that
Senator McCain has raised. Under your proposal we would have
American advisers, both civilian and military, embedded in Iraqi
units all over Iraq, down to the company level, as youve said. That
means that thousands of Americans are going to be in units all
over Iraq. If we withdraw all of the combat brigades, as you have
recommended, except those necessary for force protection, how can
we really ensure that were going to have a sufficient number of
troops for force protection? It seems to me thats going to require
a massive effort if were dispersing our advisers.
I like the embedding concept. I think we should do more of it.
But Im just wondering as a practical matter whether that isnt an
invitation to attack American troops that are one by one in small
units.
Mr. HAMILTON. Were not at all satisfied with the present exposure of American forces and we want to make some changes. As we
say in the report, the options in front of you arent very good. You
want to get out in a way that is responsible. America has a lot of
interests there and thats why we reject the idea of a precipitous
withdrawal. But we think the best course forward is the embedded
approach; absolutely not risk-free.
We spent a lot of time in wording those sentences involving that
in the report, and I think youll see that we made quite an allowance for the necessity of having the forces in place to protect Americans who are embedded. Thats what we mean by force protection,
and it involves a lot of aspects and it includes having some American combat forces there, such as Special Operations Forces and
rapid reaction teams so that you can move in quickly when a problem breaks out.
That will have some risks to it, and there will be some American
casualties there, but not like I think were now suffering.

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Mr. BAKER. Combat brigades, Senator, dedicated to force protection.
Senator COLLINS. It just seems to me that youre going to have
to have a substantial combat presence in order to protect those advisers.
Mr. HAMILTON. I think you will have to have substantial capabilities to protect those advisers, and obviously any American,
every American Member of Congress, Im sure wants to do whatever is necessary to protect those people. But you have to be candid
here and the candor part of it is, when you put these men into
Iraqi units theyre very exposed, and you have to do everything you
can to protect them, but its not risk-free.
Mr. BAKER. The Pentagon, of course, is coming up with its own
study here in connection with where we go from here with Iraq. I
dont know this for certain, Senator, but I think they have done
some looking at this business of how many combat brigades they
might need for force protection if we beef up the training, equipping, and advising mission.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Its an excellent question.
Senator Reed.
Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your extraordinary work and the work of your colleagues.
This issue of troop levels, of surging troops, I think is an important one, and I think it rests on some basic questions: How many
troops would be necessary, how long must they stay there, and for
what purpose would they be sent into Baghdad in particular?
Baghdad as I understand it is a city of about 6 million people. In
your deliberations did you have a notion of how many additional
troops would be necessary to make an impact?
Mr. HAMILTON. In Baghdad?
Senator REED. In Baghdad, if that was the only area we decided
to be proactive.
Mr. HAMILTON. I think were impressed that the operation in
Baghdad has not gone well and has not met our expectations, and
that the Iraqi forces that were assisting us there have not performed all that well. I dont know that we have, Senator Reed, an
exact estimate. The figure that Jim and I just mentioned to one another is 20,000. I think that was the figure that might be available
in country pretty quickly to help in Baghdad.
Mr. BAKER. General Corellis Reserves are about 20,000 in Kuwait and Germany, as I understand it.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now, I know youve talked to the commanders a
lot, but its not crystal clear to me that the commanders believe
that additional forces will help all that much.
Senator REED. My impression is that if youre going to take this
road, the force has to be substantial in size and you have to be prepared to be there for not 2 or 3 months as a demonstration, but
probably longer than that, which again raises the issue of how such
a force can be supported in size over the time.
It also raises the other issue, too, which is for what purpose. The
strategy thats being pursued there now, the clear, hold, and build
strategyand I think your report alludes to thishas become the

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clear, hold, and wait strategy, where military forces are on the
ground, but not the complementary reconstruction, political governance aspects. I think your report goes to the point, unless were
able to do all of this together simultaneously, in a coordinated fashion, none of it will work.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thats right.
Senator REED. So that begs the other question of, lets assume
were going to plus-up our forces in Baghdad, for just one example,
by 50,000 troops. I think we have to ask the other question: How
many more civilian personnel, how much more reconstruction
money, how is it delivered? That has to be part of the equation because to simply talk in terms of troops misses the whole essence
of this operation, which is its a political dynamic and an economic
dynamic, as well as a military one.
Mr. HAMILTON. I think you make a very good point. I dont want
to understate this, but the clearing aspect is not the tough part.
Now, you may sustain casualties there and obviously thats the
most serious consideration, but we have the ability to clear, no
doubt about that. The real question is can we hold? What has happened is that we have not been able to hold, and the very forces
that youve pushed out filter back in again. Holding is very manpower-intensive. You would normally look to the police to help, but
the police have been the most disappointing in terms of performance in Iraq, the various Iraqi police forces.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Chambliss.
Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you once again for your strong leadership and
your commitment to freedom and to the American people. We indeed owe you a debt of gratitude and we do thank you very much.
Going back to what Senator Lieberman was talking about with
reference to the Syrians and the Iranians, I happen to like your approach to some sort of coalition approach to these two countries,
and Im not sure that we can ever achieve any sort of total peaceful
resolution in that part of the world without the involvement of a
number of those countries, and particularly in Iraq with regard to
the Syrians and the Iranians.
However, you correctly point out in your report that the Iranians
and the Syrians are providing financial assistance, theyre providing training, theyre also weaponizing to a certain degree the insurgents. Before we ever get to the point of a coalition group sitting
down at a table or entering into any sort of diplomatic negotiations,
should we not receive some sort of overt act from the Syrians and
the Iranians relative to a public commitment to stopping the violence, and to ceasing their support of the insurgent activity in advance of any kind of diplomatic overture?
Mr. BAKER. Senator, the two countries, in our report, we approach them differently. With respect to Iran, were not suggesting
direct bilateral negotiations with Iran on a wide variety of issues,
and particularly not the nuclear issue. We are suggesting that,
with respect to Syria, in terms of progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict, going back to the Madrid conference of 1991 and the two

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tracks, one on Palestinians, one Lebanese-Syrian, we think we
ought to try and reenergize that. Thats a different proposition.
On September 18, Secretary Rice attended a meeting of the
International Compact for Iraq, which is an economic grouping of
regional countries, and sat there in the meeting with the Iranian
foreign minister. So I dont know that preconditioning it in terms
of inviting them to some sort of a regional meeting to improve the
situation in Iraq is necessary. I dont know that we lose anything
by saying to them, you want to be part of the solution instead of
part of the problem? If they say no, fine; everybody in the world
knows the attitude that they take and we havent lost a thing, particularly given the fact weve already sat with them as recently as
the 18th of September.
With respect to Syria, I think its different, Senator. I think there
are some opportunities there, that it is in the national interest of
the United States to explore the peace process.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Nelson, I inform my colleagues the
vote has started.
Mr. HAMILTON. Excuse me.
Chairman WARNER. Please go ahead.
Mr. HAMILTON. Weve had more than a little pushback on the
Syrian and Iranian question because its a tough one.
We understand that the road to peace lies through Baghdad in
Iraq and you dont get peace unless a lot of things happen there.
But we also believe that what you do in the region can be reinforcing of what steps are necessary to take in Iraq, and that Iraqs
neighbors have to play a role in all of this. Syria and Iran have
very great influence over events within Iraq, particularly Iran, but
also Syria. I just dont think you can avoid that.
Now, it is quite true that the Iranians have not been all that
helpful, as a matter of fact just the opposite, in Iraq today. But we
do not think its in the Iranian interest for American policy to fail
completely and to lead to chaos in that country. It is important to
take a look at Iran itself. Iran is not a homogeneous population.
Only slightly more than 50 percent of its population is Persian, and
what they are really worried about is a flow of refugees into that
country, which would be highly destabilizing.
So Iran has some interests here that we must not forget. Of
course, they live in a very dangerous part of the world and they
have huge security interests. It is quite possiblewe dont know
that this is probable, but it is possiblethat you can put together
some incentives and disincentives that can attract them. As Jim
has repeatedly pointed out, you dont have much to lose here.
Things are not going in a very good direction right now, and why
not take some chance here in involving these countries?
Chairman WARNER. Secretary Baker, do you want to add?
Mr. BAKER. I want to just direct your attention if I could, Senator
Chambliss, to the bottom of page 56, the top of page 57, with respect to the issues we would raise with Syria, if we could reenergize the peace process to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Youll
find in there we would ask everything of them. Were going to want
their full cooperation in these assassinations in Lebanon, stop
screwing around in Lebanon, implement U.N. Security Council
1701.

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But theres one thing that, if we were able to bring Syria
aroundand you know, theyre a Sunni Arab state. I think they
want to resume good relations with their Sunni Arab neighbors,
and I think they would much rather be on a normal relationship
basis with the United States than they would their marriage of
convenience with Iran. What could they do for us and what could
they do for our ally Israel? They couldif we could bring Syria
back, we could stop the flow of arms to Hezbollah, because they are
the transit point, and that would cure Israels Hezbollah problem.
Second, they have the ability in my opinion to get Hamas to recognize Israels right to exist, which would give Israel a negotiating
partner on the Palestinian track, something that Israel badly
wants.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I note the vote is on, but we will be able to meet your deadline
and all Senators if we keep it short. I will now turn to Senator Nelson.
Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, and thank you to both of you.
Your success in government has been extraordinary. Thank you
again for your contribution. Secretary Baker, about the only thing
that I disagree with your success in the past is the 34 days that
you spent in Tallahassee, Florida.
Mr. BAKER. 37, Senator.
Senator BILL NELSON. 37 days in Tallahassee, Florida in November and December 2000. [Laughter.]
I want to point out that Associated Press has moved a story
today that the prime minister of Israel said he disagreed with your
recommendation of linkage of efforts to stabilize Iraq with the new
moves to end Israels conflict with its neighbors. Your report recommends negotiations toward the Syrian-Israeli peace agreement
that would include Israels return of the Golan Heights, Syria, ending its support for the terrorist groups, agreeing to full normalization with Israel, and ending its attempts to dominate Lebanon.
Are you suggesting that the war in Iraq cannot be resolved unless Israel and the United States reach an accord with the Golan
Heights? I know youre talking about a comprehensiveif its true,
does it mean that the conflict in Iraq could be extended indefinitely
by rejectionist hard-liners in conflicts that have long predated this
Iraq conflict?
Mr. BAKER. Im not sure you can say that, Senator. But let me
mention one other thing thats in there that we recommended in
connection with the Golan Heights. We dont suggest that if Syria
does all these things youve outlined and that we have outlined
here that there should be a peace agreement between Israel and
Syria on the Golan Heights without a United States security guarantee. Thats a very important point and should not be left out.
The reason we have the suggestion for a new diplomatic offensive
in this document is because we think we need to have, as Congressman Hamilton has said, a comprehensive strategy to deal
with the problems of Iraq and the problems of the region. I dont
think theres anybody we talked to that did not raise this issue of
our engagement on the Arab-Israel peace process, and every one of
them said without exception you need to become re-engaged in a
very vigorous way on this issue.

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Senator BILL NELSON. So too with the proposed two-state solution. The prime minister of Israel has said he wants to negotiate
with Mahmoud Abbas. What do you recommend if Hamas says no
dice?
Mr. BAKER. I recommend that we bring Syria across and get
them to get Hamas to acknowledge Israels right to exist, so Israel
would have a negotiating partner on the Palestinian track. Thats
exactly one of the main reasons for engaging Syria. If we cant do
it we cant do it, but we dont lose a darn thing by trying.
Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, there are a lot of moderate Arabs that
you have to appeal to in order to solve the Iraqi problem. All of
them are friends of oursthe Saudis, the Jordanians, the Egyptians, the Kuwaitis, the Gulf States. It goes on and on and on.
Now, in order to appeal to the moderate Arabsand this is hugely
important in our relationship with Islam and the Islamic countries,
1.3 billion Muslims in the worldin order to appeal to that group,
you have to be able to show that we are serious about dealing with
the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is absolutely essential.
Now, you used the words, I think, are we requiring that we reach
an accord? No, were not requiring that and I dont think its required. What is required is that the United States re-energize this
process. Were not going to solve it. Its been here for a number of
decades. Were not going to solve it quickly. So its not so much a
question of solving the problem. It is a question of the United
States as the principal power being sensitive to this and trying to
do what we can to move towards a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Without it, we have no credibility, we have no legitimacy, with the moderate Arabs, who are key for us.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you both on behalf of our country. I think the biggest contribution youve made is to explain to us the state of affairs
in Iraq as they are, and we may not agree on solutions for it, but
thats a beginning point, and weve never really had a consensus
until you came along. Things are not good.
Based on your review of our situation, not only just in Iraq but
of our own military, do you think Congress would be well-advised
to consider growing the Army and Marine Corps?
Mr. BAKER. I personally do, but then Im a former marine.
Mr. HAMILTON. I do as well.
Senator GRAHAM. We may have to draft you back into the Service
here.
Mr. BAKER. Theres no such thing as a former marine. Let me
correct the record. I am a marine.
Senator GRAHAM. Youre always a marine. Once a marine, always a marine.
Mr. BAKER. Thats right.
Senator GRAHAM. Im glad youre on our side, then and now.
Mr. BAKER. Thats right.
Senator GRAHAM. Now, to me the heart of the matter is, we can
differ about how to go forward and thats okay, nothing wrong with
having different opinions. I get asked all the time, gentlemen, on
the streets of South Carolina and every other place in the country

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I go to: Are we in the middle of a bunch of people who could never
solve their problems no matter how much we help them? So the
question is, based on your assessment of the situation, are the
Iraqi people capable of forming a democracy with the right assistance?
Mr. BAKER. I think so.
Mr. HAMILTON. Our whole premise of the policy is that they are.
Senator GRAHAM. Okay. The second question is
Mr. BAKER. Excuse me. The whole premise of our policy suggestions in our report is that they are.
Senator GRAHAM. Thats important for the country to hear, because a lot of Americans dont believe that. Do you agree with that?
Mr. HAMILTON. I think I do agree with it. Your judgment on that
would be better than mine. Now, I dont want to pretend to you
that I dont have doubts.
Senator GRAHAM. I dont mean towell, I think we all have
doubts. We probably have doubts about our own democracy. The
Civil War was started in my State. We had a lot of doubts there,
and Im glad we resolved them in favor of the Union.
Mr. HAMILTON. There are a lot of pundits writing now about how
the Iraqi government will never be able to get their act together
and the whole situation is hopeless. Thats not exactly a policy. We
are where we are. We have to deal with this. You have a democratically-elected government.
Senator GRAHAM. But you both believe, after having analyzed the
situation, that theres reason to believe with the right assistance
they can pull this off?
Mr. BAKER. Yes.
Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, we believe that. The if clause you used is
hugely important.
Senator GRAHAM. Thats where the debate is, and I dont want
to monopolize more than my time.
Last question. If you asked the 10 members of the commission
the question, is Iraq the central battle front in the war on terror,
what answer would you have received?
Mr. BAKER. Ill answer for myself, Senator. In my view it may
not have been when we first went in, but it certainly is now.
Senator GRAHAM. The outcome affects the overall war on terror?
Mr. BAKER. It certainly does.
Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Hamilton?
Mr. HAMILTON. I would strike the word the and use a. It is
a central front. Look, al Qaeda today is an important part of the
violence, but not as important as sectarian violence. It is a central
front in the war on terror, but to make it the central front overstates it.
Senator GRAHAM. Well said.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Clinton.
Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much again, gentlemen, for
your service to our country once again. I think you can tell from
the tenor and content of the questions that were searching for the
best way to implement a series of policies and actions that might
possibly move us forward.

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As I listen to you and as I reviewed the report, Im basically
hearing two overriding suggestions: one, that we have to engender
the will and assist the capacity of the Iraqi government to take the
political and economic actions necessary to stabilize itself, and our
biggest stick in order to do that is to make it clear we are not there
unconditionally, we are not going to be babysitting a civil war, we
are not going to take sides in sectarian violence. Is that a correct
statement, number one?
Mr. HAMILTON. I think its a correct statement, but its not the
only leverage we have, the troop level. I think the conditionality of
aid is another leverage. I also think if you play it right the regional
diplomacy which Jim has been talking about can be used very effectively as leverage on the Iraqi government.
But youre right, we think you have to encourage the Iraqi government to act, and the military troop level is a very important
part of that.
Senator CLINTON. But let me follow up and ask about our own
Government, because you have a series of recommendations that
are both comprehensive and challenging. The idea of a GoldwaterNichols process that would get us where we need to be, that took
decades. We know it was contentious. It made significant changes.
We dont have time for that.
You have other recommendations that talk about engaging the
entire United States Government, using all the tools at our disposal. Weve now heard from the Iraq Study Group, but we need
the White House to become the Iraq Results Group. That is very
frustrating for some of us. We dont understand the misjudgments
and missteps that have been taken in the last years.
What advice can you give us as to the role that Congress can
play to try to help create the conditions that our own Government
will muster both the will and capacity to act along the lines that
youve recommended, and that I think we in general agree need to
be pursued?
Mr. BAKER. Senator Clinton, I think if Congress were to, in addition to praising this report, which many Members of Congress have
and for which we are grateful, say this is a good basis for going
forward and unifying the country behind a single approach to this
difficult problem of Iraq, that would help, I think, the executive
branch in its deliberations.
They just received the report yesterday, just like you just got it
yesterday, and weve heard differing views here with respect to
many of the recommendations. If Congress could come together behind supporting, lets say utopianly, all of the recommendations of
this report, that would do a lot toward moving things downtown in
my opinion.
Mr. HAMILTON. Congress is a co-equal branch of Government. I
frankly am not that impressed with what Congress has been able
to do. I think Congress has been extraordinarily timid in the exercise of its constitutional responsibilities on the question of
warmaking and conducting war.
Now, the answers here are not easy, but in a word I think very
robust oversight is necessary. I think its been lacking. I think it
has not been a strong performance by Congress. What can you do
to most assure success of the policy? I would say very vigorous, ro-

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bust oversight. Many of the problems that you mention that have
occurred we did not examine because we thought they are out of
our mandate. I think they could have been corrected with vigorous
oversight.
Senator CLINTON. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you.
I feel I must make an observation here. Yes, Congress is very impressed with your report. But we, the Congress, I do not know the
extent to which we will be able to share the Presidents internal
review of his own security who will come up with a framework of
points. So we have to be cautious as we, Im sure, endorse what
you have done, but at the same time I dont know to the extent we
will have before us the full realm of the options that have been
shown to the President, namely from his own internal staff, as well
as from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
So before Congress rushes in, Im just hopeful we can have all
points.
Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Senator, but could you say this is good
until something better comes along?
Chairman WARNER. Ill let your question stand unanswered.
Thank you, dear friend. I know you too well.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator CORNYN. Gentlemen, let me add my word of thanks. I
think youve rendered a great service to the country. Clearly now,
or at least by the time the process of the Pentagon and the State
Department and within the executive branch itself in addition to
your good work, itll be clear that this situation has been analyzed
without regard to ideology, without regard to partisan affiliation,
without regard to the consequences of the next election, but in the
interests of the country.
I think the second service that youve rendered is to point out
that this is not just about Iraq, that the debate seems to be, how
do we fix Iraq. Youve made clear that Iraq cannot be viewed in isolation and I think rendered a service in making that point.
There have been some, of course, during the course of the debates in Congress and during the recent election who have said
that we need to have a phased withdrawal from Iraq. The irony of
that to me is that we all agree we need to bring our troops home
as soon as we can. The question is whether its based upon domestic political considerations or based upon our national security interests.
Ive always scratched my head and wondered why its appropriate to threaten the Iraqis that unless they shape up well ship
out, when in fact if we ship out before Iraq becomes more stable
it remains an ongoing threat of a failed state which will provide opportunities for terrorists to regroup and to continue their assaults
against the United States, not to mention the chance, the likelihood, of Iranian expansionism in the area.
I have really two questions, if I can ask them quickly. One is,
Secretary Baker, youve been good to point out and your report
points out on page 52 that the President has authorized you to approach the Iranians about their likely participation in diplomatic
efforts to support stability in Iraq, and theyve indicated to you
they would be unlikely to participate. Did I get that correct, sir?

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Mr. BAKER. Thats correct.
Senator CORNYN. There are some whove criticized the President
for not agreeing to talk to Iran. But from what youve told us here
today, the President has authorized you to do so and theyve indicated their disinclination.
Mr. BAKER. Further to that, Senator, the President authorized
his Secretary of State to attend a meeting with the Iranian Foreign
Minister in the International Compact for Iraq on September 18.
Furthermore, with respect to Afghanistan he authorized his administration to approach the Iranians to help us in Afghanistan and
they did.
Senator CORNYN. Youve been around this city a lot longer than
I have, but sometimes these positions appear to be caricatured in
a way that isnt justified by the facts. I appreciate your pointing
that out.
Mr. BAKER. Before you ask the second question, may I just say
something about the shape up or ship out? We had to walk a fine
line here between being overbearing in that regard and giving the
Iraqis the message that we cant just stay there forever if theyre
not willing to take some political actions that they need to take.
So the sentence was very carefully crafted. You can look at it at
your convenience, but it says if they do not make substantial
progress on these milestones, the United States could reduce its
military, political, or economic support. So its not a case of shipping out necessarily. The President will have the latitude to determine what he wants to do by way of reduction in support.
Senator CORNYN. My last question is, you recommend that the
United States talk to al-Sadr. At one point there was an arrest
warrant out for al-Sadr. Why do you recommend that we talk to
him rather than arrest him and bring him to justice?
Mr. HAMILTON. Because hes a very important leader in the country. We had described to us again and again that the most important politician in the country was Sistani, whos a clergyman. If
you really want to influence events in Iraq, you go to the Grand
Ayatollah and his principal people. Thats the nature of the society.
Now, we have tried to speak to Sadr and he wont talk to us. We
tried to speak to Sistani. He wont talk to us either. So its not that
we havent tried. But the point here is, I think, that the religious
leaders in this country are hugely important, not just as religious
leaders, but as political leaders too.
The only person I know that talks to either of these gentlemen
is the U.N. representative in Baghdad, and even his contact has
been limited. So we recognize, number one, their importance; number two, the difficulty of talking to them; and number three, we
think it would be good if we could talk to Sadr.
Mr. BAKER. Senator, that arrest warrant, youre right, but it was
quite some time ago, and it was rescinded after Bremer left.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Dayton, would you indulge me? I
wish to go vote.
Senator DAYTON. Yes.
Chairman WARNER. Then Senator Levin and Senator Thune will
resume.

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I want to reiterate, Mr. Secretary, my profound gratitude for
your report. Its important. But if Congress is going to be a partner
to work through this, you can understand that before we come forward with such recommendations as we wish to make wed like to
hear from our President about his own internal review.
Mr. BAKER. Absolutely. I understand that, Senator. Absolutely.
Chairman WARNER. Then have some input. Now, practically
were going to be out of here in about 48 hours, not to return until
the first week in January. So this poses a challenge.
Mr. BAKER. Absolutely.
Chairman WARNER. But Im sure a number of us could come back
and work with the administration. I know my colleague has indicated his willingness to join me.
Senator LEVIN. With the President, indeed we made that point.
The chairman made it to the President. He indicated hes more
than willing to involve that part in the process and to receive our
reaction before something is just announced. Not just the two of us.
Im saying the reaction of leaders of Congress.
Chairman WARNER. I just ask one observation that perplexes me
greatly. Ive been back and forth, maybe not as many times, certainly not as many times as you have, Mr. Secretary Baker and
Congressman Hamilton, to that part of the world in my 28 years
in the Senate and then 5 years before that when I was in the Navy
secretariat. Throughout history, the Sunni and the Shia have found
the ability to live together in peace. To a certain extent, thats
being done in the peripheral states. Now we see a mass exodus to
Jordan, primarily Sunni but undoubtedly some Shia, living in
peace. We do not hear of any instance of this sectarian violence to
speak of in the bordering states.
What is the root cause for this thing suddenly to erupt in Iraq
like a volcano, where they lived in Iraq prior to our intervention,
which I support that intervention, intermarried, lived side by side?
What is the root cause that has caused this volcanic sectarian violence, wanton, senseless killing of each other?
Mr. BAKER. Senator, this is the first time to my knowledge that
youve ever had a state that has been dominated by one of those
ethnic groups, in this case the Sunnis, who represented only 20
percent of the population, but who have ruled over, in a fairly ruthless way, the remaining 60 percent of the population that is Shia.
I think thats part of the problem.
Another part of the problem, quite frankly, are the efforts of al
Qaeda in Iraq and people like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who set
about specifically to foment sectarian violence as the best way to
advance al Qaeda in Iraq and to bring down the government that
the United States had established in Iraq.
Chairman WARNER. I thank you both very much, and I must depart for the vote at this point in time. But youve made a remarkable contribution and it just shows how within our private sector
there are those who are willing to receive the call to come back and
perform admirable public service and valuable public service.
Mr. BAKER. Senator Warner, thank you. I want to add my appreciation to that of Congressman Hamilton. I remember the day we
rolled out the announcement of the Iraq Study Group on March 15
of this year. You were kind enough to be our host on that occasion.

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Without you or Congressman Wolf, and perhaps a few others, there
would not have been an Iraq Study Group. So thank you, sir.
Chairman WARNER. I thank you with a great sense of humility
for that recognition.
Senator Dayton.
Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service. Some cynic was
quoted as saying that in Washington when the situation is hopeless
people turn to a commission. If you could help me translate your
description of the situation in Iraq as grave and deteriorating into
that vernacular, if you put hopeless on a scale of one and complete
success a ten, where are we in Iraq today, just a number?
Mr. HAMILTON. I think we reject the idea that the situation is
hopeless.
Senator DAYTON. So its not a one. Where are we on that spectrum from hopeless to successful?
Mr. HAMILTON. Oh, my mind doesnt think in those quantitative
terms, I guess, Senator. I think where we are is that the situation
is just very difficult, that political leaders have the responsibility
in this country to let people know how difficult that situation is.
We tried to spell that out in the assessment to some degree.
But we also said that if we take the right steps we can improve
it, and thats where we are in terms of public policy, to try to take
the right steps now. Nobody can assure success even if we take the
right steps, but you can certainly secure failure if we dont take
those steps.
Senator DAYTON. I understand. This leads into my next question,
which is: To get to the point where your recommendations can take
hold and be successful, it seems that were going on the spectrum
there from, I dont know, a three to an eight or so. I guess others
have posited this question, but realistically in the timeframe youve
described is that feasible? Conversely, is there a tipping point in
a rough timetable where if the situation remains grave and deteriorating it does become hopeless?
Mr. HAMILTON. There certainly is that point and were perilously
close to that point, and thats why we emphasize here very, very,
great urgency in action by ourselves as well as by the Iraqi government.
Senator DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, Ill let our distinguished visitors
move on.
Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you.
Has Senator Nelson had an opportunity?
Senator BILL NELSON. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Were past the 11 oclock hour. We thank you for
not just your contribution to this Nation and hopefully to the success in Iraq, but your patience. Thank you. We are adjourned.
[The Iraq Study Group Report follows:]

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112

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY

SENATOR CARL LEVIN

PHASED REDEPLOYMENT

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1. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, for some time I, along with Senator Jack Reed, have urged President Bush to tell Iraqi political leaders that the

113
United States will begin a phased redeployment of American forces within the next
4 to 6 months so as to induce those leaders to make the political compromises that
are required for the political settlement, which in turn is essential for ending the
insurgency and the sectarian violence now plaguing Iraq. Our proposal recognized
that a residual force would be needed for some period of time dedicated to training
Iraqi security forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism missions, and providing
logistical support and force protection.
The Iraq Study Group recommends that by the first quarter of 2008, subject to
unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.
Do you believe that our proposal is consistent with the recommendations of the
Iraq Study Group?
Mr. BAKER. The Iraq Study Group does not address the question of a phased redeployment. It opposes a precipitate withdrawal of troops. The Iraq Study Group argues that the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over the primary responsibility for combat
operations. While these efforts are building up and as additional Iraqi brigades are
being deployed, U.S. combat troops could begin to move out of Iraq, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground. It argues that the
United States will maintain a significant force in Iraq in order to provide political
reassurance to the Iraqi government; fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq; train, equip, and support Iraqi security forces; and deter destructive
interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran.
Mr. HAMILTON. The Iraq Study Group report does not address the question of a
phased redeployment of U.S. forces. It recommended no timetable or deadline for
troop withdrawals, which are left to the commander in chief.
At the same time, there are common elements in the proposal put forward by Senators Levin and Reed and the proposal by the Iraq Study Group. They are not inconsistent. They offer a basis for a responsible transition.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY

JAMES M. INHOFE

DRAWDOWN ASYMMETRY BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES

2. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, there is much discussion in your
report about how and when to redeploy our ground forces, which is obviously of extreme importance, but nowhere have I seen detailed discussion on the disengagement of our air forces.
I recognize that Iraqi air forces will not be able to assume responsibilities for air
missions in the near future, but I am troubled by the lack of analysis on the implications of a long-term air presence in Iraq.
When we redeployed ground forces in 1991 after Operation Desert Storm, our Air
Force remained deployed in the region and has maintained a constant air presence
there for the last 15 years.
Many assume our air presence after the eventual redeployment of ground forces
will be similar to the years after Operation Desert Storm. While there are similarities, we need to ensure we understand the differences.
The no-fly zones were part of an international standoff between the U.N. and Saddam Hussein. They were flown in support of a U.N. resolution and had international
legitimacy. The objectives were achievable through air power alone.
Today we are dealing with an Iraqi government that wants to be seen as independent of U.S. influence, and we will need its permission to employ air power in
pursuit of counterinsurgency objectives or we will undermine the government of
Iraqs legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis and hence our long-term goals.
The situation in Iraq today is an insurgency. The ability to achieve
counterinsurgency objectives by air power alone is limited and would require close
coordination with ground forces. Once coalition ground forces redeploy, we are also
left with serious dilemmas regarding the rules of engagement for employing air
power.
Specifically, are we going to allow Iraqi forces access to joint fires (air power employing ordinance) only if they have a U.S./coalition joint tactical air controller as
part of their advisory team?
Mr. BAKER. This was not an issue that the Iraq Study Group addressed in great
detail. However, on page 72, the report states: Even after the United States has
moved all combat brigades out if Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military
presence in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as increased presence in Afghanistan.

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Mr. HAMILTON. The Iraq Study Group did not address your question in any detail.
Given that air power is a critical part of the support mission for U.S. forces in
Iraq, the Iraq Study Group would support a continuing, robust presence for U.S. air
power in Iraq and the region.
3. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, if yes, then unless we leave hundreds of these advisory teams for the duration of our air presence, we will leave significant sanctuaries for insurgents to hide.
If we employ air power under the control of an Iraqi controller, or independently
of any controller at all, the effects would be too indiscriminate, especially in urban
areas where the air power would be most needed.
We also need to consider basing. No-fly zone operations were flown from bases
outside of Iraq. If we keep bases inside Iraq, there will be significant force protection issues.
If we attempt to utilize bases outside Iraq, then we must contend with ramp
space, fuel shortages, and facilities that are already overloaded. Furthermore, we
must consider the national caveats placed on our air forces regarding the types of
missions we could fly from the remaining bases.
If we move these assets outside of Iraq, then we will pay a higher bill in flight
hours, tankers, and maintenance to get the assets to the fight.
What consideration did your panel give to the disengagement of air forces, and
what recommendations do you have for dealing with the drawdown asymmetry between ground and air forces?
Mr. BAKER. This was not an issue that the Iraq Study Group studied in great detail. We would leave such decisions to U.S. military leaders, depending on the situation on the ground.
Mr. HAMILTON. We did not address the question of air power in detail.
We would defer to others on the nature of the air assets that should remain, and
where they should be based, consistent with the principle outlined in the Iraq Study
Group report that training should become the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY

SENATOR JOHN THUNE

POLICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

4. Senator THUNE. Mr. Hamilton, on page 78 of the report under Police and Criminal Justice the Iraq Study Group wrote: The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are profound. The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must
support the mission to protect and serve all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police
do not embrace that mission. In recommendation 50 you state that the entire Iraqi
National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police
commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.
Do you believe that the current organization of the police is responsible for their
failure to effectively combat the insurgency and how will placing them in the Ministry of Defense affect the long-term mission of the police which is not primarily a
military one but a domestic one?
Mr. HAMILTON. The reason for recommendation 50 is that the Iraqi National Police is comprised of heavily armed units engaged in commando-style operations.
That mission fits better under the Ministry of Defense.
Moreover, U.S. advisers have greater access in the Ministry of Defense than they
do in the Ministry of the Interior. Units under the command of the Ministry of Defense perform better than those under the Ministry of Interior.
It is our belief that a reorganization of this kind can be helpful as part of the
comprehensive reforms necessary to create professional, well-trained, non-sectarian
Iraqi security forces.
The Ministry of the Interior will still have responsibility for traditional policing
activities, which are carried out by the Iraqi Police Service, and the Iraq Study
Group outlined several recommendations for reform of that Ministry.
RECONCILIATION

5. Senator THUNE. Mr. Hamilton, in other areas of the report the group emphasizes the importance for Iraq to follow through with the reconciliation program. The
reconciliation between Sunni and Shia is, I believe, at the heart of stabilizing Iraq.
Further, I believe it is also the driving factor which is keeping the police from being
more effective against sectarian militias and the insurgency as a whole. For some
time I have been concerned with the development of the Iraqi police force. While

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there have been some successes such as increased visibility on the streets and some
signs of increased respect among the people, my concerns lie with the loyalty and
quality of the police. In your consultations with Iraqi officials, what steps did you
find they were taking to break a recruits ties to a militia or tribal loyalties?
Mr. HAMILTON. It is our understanding that the Minister of the Interior is taking
important steps to identify and begin removing members of the police force with
criminal records.
It is unclear what specific actions the Minister of the Interior is taking against
police force members who have ties to militias, unless they also have criminal
records.
AL QAEDA

6. Senator THUNE. Mr. Baker, the role of al Qaeda in Iraq is nefarious and singleminded. Their goal is to destabilize the rebuilding process and create a failed state
which would serve as a breeding ground for recruitment of young men to their extremist ideology. No one in the international community, especially in the Middle
East, benefits from Iraq as a failed state. While conducting your research what did
you discover about how the Iraqi people view al Qaeda in Iraq?
Mr. BAKER. Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq,
but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck
bombs, and attacks on significant religious targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely
Iraq-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Al Qaeda is a fact of life. As one Iraqi told
us, Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonalds.
7. Senator THUNE. Mr. Baker, do they see them as an outside force impeding
progress?
Mr. BAKER. The response of Iraqis to al Qaeda varies. Some, like the tribal leaders in al Anbar province, are actively working against al Qaeda efforts. On the other
hand, some Sunni leaders view branches of al Qaeda as resistance rather than terrorism.
8. Senator THUNE. Mr. Baker, what has been the reaction of other states in the
Middle East to al Qaeda in Iraqs effort to derail the rebuilding process by fomenting conflict between the Sunni and Shia populations?
Mr. BAKER. The countries neighboring Iraq are concerned about the type of sectarian violence that has erupted between Sunni and Shiites spreading to their populations. Many fear Shia insurrectionsperhaps fomented by Iranin Sunni-run
states. Such a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandoras box of problems
including the radicalization of populations, mass movement of populations, and regime changesthat might take decades to play out.
ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN

9. Senator THUNE. Mr. Baker, what role are Saudi Arabia and Jordan playing to
engage the Sunnis in Iraq to convince them to dialogue with the Shias in Iraq?
Mr. BAKER. Saudi Arabia and Jordan should be a participant in regional and
international diplomatic efforts to help bring about peace and stability in Iraq. Both
countries can assist the national reconciliation process in Iraq with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. The Saudis, especially, could use their Islamic credentials to help reconcile differences between Iraqi factions and build broader support in the Islamic world for national reconciliation.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY

SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

STABILITY IN IRAQ

10. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report states, The situation
in Baghdad and several provinces is dire. . . . U.S. military and civilian personnel,
and our coalition partners, are making exceptional and dedicated effortsand sacrificesto help Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices for a better future. However, the ability of the United States to influence
events within Iraq is diminishing. Should President Bush elect not to implement
the recommendations of the report, is it your belief that the stability in Iraq would
continue to deteriorate?
Mr. BAKER. The President has implemented some of the essential elements of the
report, including the decision to make the training of Iraqi troops the essential or

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primary mission of U.S. troops. He has decided not to implement others, for the
time being. As we frequently state, there is no silver bullet for Iraq. It is possible
that even if the President implemented all of the Iraq Study Groups recommendations, the situation would continue to deteriorate. However, the Iraq Study Group
believes that its recommendations, taken together, represent the best chance for
success in Iraq.
Mr. HAMILTON. The President has decided to implement some elements of the
Iraq Study Groups recommendations, and not others.
As we said at the outset of the report, the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved.
11. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, in the report, it states The
ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out.
In your best estimate, when will time run out?
Mr. BAKER. That is a hypothetical question that I cannot answer with specificity.
But at the present, it is critical that the United States concentrate its diplomatic,
economic, and military powers on this important region of the world.
Mr. HAMILTON. We do not know when time will run out, but we do know that
the situation is deteriorating.
Therefore, we believe the need for action in Iraq is urgent.
12. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report recommends that the
United States, working with the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive new diplomatic offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and the region. This
new diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006.
However, this offensive requires not only for the United States to work with the
Iraqi government, but also neighboring countries, including Iran and Syria, that
have a critical stake in the stability of Iraq, to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq.
How important is the inclusion of countries such as Iran and Syria in this new
offensive, given the Bush administrations strained relations with them?
Mr. BAKER. Both Iran and Syria can and do play major roles in developments in
Iraq. The Iraqi borders with those two countries are porous. They allow destabilizing elements into Iraq such as arms and foreign fighters. It is possible that Iran
may reject offers to take part in a new diplomatic offensive. However, the United
States should offer Iran that opportunity. If Iran declines, the world will view its
rejectionist attitude towards Iraq. Syria is more likely to take part in such discussions, though it will take tough diplomacy by the United States. With both Iran and
Syria, the United States should use incentives and disincentives. Neither of those
countries wants a chaotic Iraq, in our view.
Mr. HAMILTON. The inclusion of Iran and Syria is critical to the success of diplomatic efforts to support peace and stability in Iraq. Iran and Syria border Iraq. They
have influence in Iraq. The can contribute in important ways to stability or instability in Iraq. Their exclusion from regional diplomacy will undermine the success
of diplomatic efforts.
AFGHANISTAN

13. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, while the groups main concern
was addressing the situation in Iraq, as stated in its report, there are other areas
of concern that must also not be overlooked, in particular the situation in Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed by the Taliban. If Iraq continues to require
greater U.S. military involvement, do you believe that the situation in Afghanistan
would deteriorate?
Mr. BAKER. We must not lose sight of the importance of the situation inside of
Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed by the Taliban. As the United States develops an approach towards Iraq and the Middle East, it must give priority to the
situation in Afghanistan.
Mr. HAMILTON. It is critical for the United States to provide additional political,
economic and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.
14. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report recommends that If
the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement
of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States
should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

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Am I correct to assume that it is the groups understanding that without incentives
for the Iraqi government to stand up and make substantial progress toward national
reconciliation, security, and governance, that stability of Iraq is in jeopardy?
Mr. BAKER. Incentives are one tool that the United States should employ in order
to encourage the Iraqi government to make the changes required to improve national reconciliation, security, and governance.
Mr. HAMILTON. The violence in Iraq will not end without national reconciliation.
Unfavorable trends in Iraq are likely to continue unless the Iraqi government makes
substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation
and governance. The United States must pressure the Iraqi government to act. Making assistance conditional on Iraqi performance is a way to apply that pressure.
15. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report recommends that the
Iraqi National Police and Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, and the Iraqi Police Service should become a true police force. However, the
group also states that U.S. authorities do not know with precision the composition
and membership of the various police forces, nor the disposition of their funds and
equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in training
in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for use in sectarian violence.
What mechanisms should be in place to ensure that participants do not use their
knowledge and position to further advance sectarian violence?
Mr. BAKER and Mr. HAMILTON. The Ministry of the Interior needs to undertake
substantial reforms to purge bad elements and highlight best practices.
The Ministry of the Interior needs to gain control of policing funds. Doing so will
improve accountability and organizational discipline.
All officers need to be vetted, retrained, and closely supervised.
The presence of U.S. and international expert advisers is crucial to the success
of reform efforts.
Those who are no longer part of the police force need to participate in a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program.
16. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, it is my understanding that
various countries, including Iran, are already discussing current relations with the
Iraqi government. What role should the United States play as the discussions are
ongoing?
Mr. BAKER and Mr. HAMILTON. The United States should be a participant in regional and international diplomatic efforts to help bring about peace and stability
in Iraq.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY

SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

OIL TRUST

17. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, you recommend that Iraqs
oil revenue should accrue to the Federal Government and be shared on the basis
of population instead of on the basis of geographic regions. For several years, I have
advocated an oil trust plan for Iraq, based on the Alaskan Permanent Fund, which
would take the profits from Iraqs oil sector, invest it, and distribute the dividends
to every Iraqi so that all of Iraq has an incentive to keep their oil flowing and at
the same time, help the economy grow and keep regular Iraqis from joining the insurgency by putting more money in their pockets.
Instead, oil distribution remains unsettled. Guaranteeing every Iraqi a share of
the oil revenues at the individual level is one way to try to begin to move beyond
the impasseand to give Iraqis some reason to believe we arent there for oil; we
arent there to support big oil; and to give the Iraqis also some reason to feel positive about their national government. How do you think such a plan would be received?
Mr. BAKER. There is some merit to the plan that you propose. However, it would
be difficult to do because the Iraqi government does not have a banking system to
distribute the revenues.
Mr. HAMILTON. The Iraq Study Group examined such plans with great interest.
The Iraq Study Group agrees that such a plan has the potential to give all Iraqi
citizens a stake in the nations chief natural resource.
However, there is no institution in Iraq at present that could properly implement
such a distribution system for oil revenues. It would take substantial time to establish, and would have to be based on a well-developed state census and income tax
system, which Iraq currently lacks.

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In addition, oil revenues have been incorporated into state budget projections for
the next several years. If oil revenues are removed from the state budget and distributed to the general population, alternative sources of revenues would need to be
identified.
18. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, do you believe that such a
plan would help national reconciliation?
Mr. BAKER. Yes, if the plan were accepted by all factions of the Iraqi government.
Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. Such a plan, if implemented efficiently and effectively, could
help national reconciliation.
Alternative sources of revenues for the Iraqi state budget would also need to be
identified.

[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

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