Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission GR NO.

47065,
June 26, 1940
FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan
Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past
twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of
Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco
filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10
additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was
made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco
then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:
- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called
Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative
function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National
Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper
and suitable manner. The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise
nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to
governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice
and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued,
whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was
never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition,
the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When
private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or
private use only.

Separation of Powers
In re: Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]

IN DEFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, JUDICIAL OFFICERS

ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BE APPOINTED TO POSITIONS PERFORMING NON-JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS. - Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation
of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
"While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced
with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a
position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception
to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of
respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less."
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on
Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the
solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for
which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of their judicial duties.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs

Association

Court of Appeals and Davao Pilots

GR No. 116356, 29 June 1998, J. Panganiban

FACTS:
Private respondent Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint against petitioner
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. for sum of money, alleging that petitioner has unpaid
fees for pilotage services rendered by respondent. Petitioner disputed the claims of
respondent by assailing the constitutionality of Executive Order 1088, from which
respondent based its claims. It maintains that rates of pilotage fees should be based
on circulars issued by the Philippine Ports Authority since it has been given the
power to set the rates by virtue of PD 857.The lower court ruled in favor of
respondent and this decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
EO 1088 is valid. The Court adopts its pronouncement in Philippine Interisland
Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals:
E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing
the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or
fees. The reason is because EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates.
Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the
imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all
Philippine ports.
xxx xxx xxx

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to
comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease
them below those mandated by EO
1088
Because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and
ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." An administrative
agency, like PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is
to enforce it. Thus, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such
as EO 1088, the latter prevails.
Petition is denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed

Philam v Arnaldo G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994

Facts:
One Ramon Paterno complained about the unfair practices committed by the
company against its agents, employees and consumers. The Commissioner called
for a hearing where Paterno was required to specify which acts were illegal. Paterno
then specified that the fees and charges stated in the Contract of Agency between
Philam and its agents be declared void. Philam, on the other hand, averred that
there Paterno must submit a verified formal complaint and that his letter didnt
contain information Philam was seeking from him. Philam then questioned the
Insurance Commissions jurisdiction over the matter and submitted a motion to
quash. The commissioner denied this. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency falls
within the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.
Held:
No. Petition granted.
Ratio:
According to the Insurance code, the Insurance Commissioner was authorized to
suspend, directors, officers, and agents of insurance companies. In general, he was
tasked to regulate the insurance business, which includes:
(2) The term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance business,"
within the meaning of this Code, shall include

(a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract;

(b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a
vocation and not as
merely incidental to any other legitimate business
or activity of the surety; (c) doing any kind of
business,
including
a
reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an
insurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to
do any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner
designed to evade the provisions of
this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2[2])
The contract of agency between Philamlife and its agents wasnt included with the
Commissoners power to regulate the business. Hence, the Insurance commissioner
wasnt vested with jurisidiction under the rule expresio unius est exclusion
alterius.
The respondent contended that the commissioner had the quasi-judicial power to
adjudicate under Section 416 of the Code. It stated:
The Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints
involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be answerable
under any kind of policy or contract of insurance, or for which such insurer may be
liable under a contract of suretyship, or for which a reinsurer may be used under
any contract or reinsurance it may have entered into, or for which a mutual benefit
association may be held liable under the membership certificates it has issued to its
members, where the amount of any such loss, damage or liability, excluding
interest, costs and attorney's fees, being claimed or sued upon any kind of
insurance, bond, reinsurance contract, or membership certificate does not exceed in
any single claim one hundred thousand pesos.
This was, however, regarding complaints filed by the insured against the Insurance
company.
Also, the insurance code only discusses the licensing requirements for agents and
brokers. The Insurance Code does not have provisions governing the relations
between insurance companies and their agents.
Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines v. Social Security Commissionthat an insurance company may have two classes of agents who sell its insurance
policies: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours and work under the control
and supervision of the company; and (2) registered representatives, who work on
commission basis.
The agents under the 2nd sentence are governed by the Civil Code laws on agency.
This means that the regular courts have jurisdiction over this category.

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii,
USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos
family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the
petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes

According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not
define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on
exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess
of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty
making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power
(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.

Pelaez vs. Auditor General Digest

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

Facts:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued
executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.

Issue: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the
President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has
been vested in the legislative department.

Held:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well
as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not
include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to
create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely
fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities referred to.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
Petitioner: Francis Tatad
Respondents: The Secretary of the Department of Energy and the Secretary of the
Department of Finance

Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the
enactment of R.A. No. 7638) to control energy-related government activities. In
March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was
enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and energy thrust under R.A.
7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was allowed to import and

market crude oil and petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate refineries
and other downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No.
8180 since the imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the
entry of others in the oil industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates
Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution requiring every law to have only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo,
Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from
Debt Coalition and Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is
unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy by not providing a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order
No. 392, an order declaring the implementation of the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due
to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in
R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the
formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of
constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and
unfair competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be
settled by the court) and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they did not
sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.
3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power.

Held:
1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition. The deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three
major league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore
considered void. The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A.
No. 8180 to be considered in declaring full deregulation of the oil industry.
Therefore, the executive department, in its declaration of E.O. No. 392, failed to
follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain
any number of provisions as long as they are not inconsistent with the foreign
subject. Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of the
deregulation of the downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does
not violate the one title-one subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation
of legislative power. The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative
power are the completeness test and the sufficiency test. The completeness test
demands that the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions such that
when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test
demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegates
authority. Section 15 provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which
answers the completeness test. It also laid down standard guide for the judgement
of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil
and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.
Decision:
The petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional and E.O.
No. 372 void.

Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)

Facts:

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation

Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions
to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed
by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of
the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with
the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain
the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its
resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing
and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not
satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They
relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza
where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders
of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.

SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the
reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with
the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said
cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other
government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the
SEC. The respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same
category. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who
wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that
PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination.
Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the
President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC
has jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable
purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations,
the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review
class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip
from any school, college or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness
is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to
dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic
freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review
that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass
the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to
be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers
may not be stopped from helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages
in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and
stop it right there.
The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals [G.R. No. L-52306.
October 12, 1981]

Facts:
During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was engaged in the
business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines for which
petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film
rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued
General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully
withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals paid by it to foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that
the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908,
RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30%
to 35% and revising the tax basis from such amount referring to rents, etc. to
gross income. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and
demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company
requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon.

Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V334, may be retroactively applied.

Held:
Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive
application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein, the
prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71
is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last
year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The
assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was
also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The
company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign
corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer
control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated
exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.