Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Summary Judgment Motion
Summary Judgment Motion
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SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON
FOR KING COUNTY
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A.W.,
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Plaintiff,
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V.
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Defendant.
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I. RELIEF REQUESTED
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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First, Plaintiff was not in the custody of St. John's at the time of the alleged abuse. The
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school year had ended, and Plaintiff had been returned to the custody of her parents. While
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Plaintiff alleges that the abuse occurred on school grounds, there is no evidence to suggest that
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Plaintiff was participating in a school sanctioned activity. Second, the individuals who were
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part of the administrative staff at St. John's have since passed away, as has the janitor himself.
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In addition, any records regarding the janitor, whether previously held by St. John's or held by
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
any authority such as Child Protective Services ("CPS") or the Department of Social and
Health Services ("DSHS"), are no longer available. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks information
necessary to sustain her claim. Given this lack of information, Plaintiff can only speculate, and
In addition, Plaintiffs delay has severely prejudiced the Archdiocese's ability to raise a
defense. Given the death of those who would likely have reported, and the destruction of CPS
or DSHS records, Defendant has lost the ability to refute Plaintiffs bald assertions.
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may attempt to explain away the known facts by alleging that she did not realize the full impact
of the abuse, it is clear from her own testimony that she connected the abuse with her alleged
damages as early as her S1'1 grade year. Therefore, the Archdiocese request this Court enter an
order dismissing Plaintiffs claims with prejudice.
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Alleged Abuse
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Over 33 years ago, on June 10, 1983, Charles Siddons, a janitor at St. John School,
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abused A.W., a student, when school was closed after the final day of the school year. Decl. of
Michael A. Patterson, Ex. A, A.W. Dep., 77:24-78:24; id. at Ex. B, Seattle Police Dept. Report,
p. 1. In the days approaching the abuse, Siddons asked A.W. if she would help him change the
locks at the school once school let out. Id. at Ex. A, A.W. Dep. at 78:25-79:6. The day prior to
the alleged abuse, Siddons approached Rose Morris, A.W.'s mother, who worked for St. John's
as the Parish Secretary. Id. at Ex. B, Seattle Police Dept. Report, p. II1. Ms. Morris gave
A.W. permission to work with Siddons after school let out at 10 a.m. and agreed to let Siddons
give A.W. a ride home afterwards. Id. Ms. Morris testified that she was aware this particular
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This is the statement of Rose Morris, as indicated by the signature at the end of the document.
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
528679
project was to occur after the school year had ended, and she thought nothing of it at the time.
On the day of the abuse, Ms. Morris also gave Siddons permission for A.W. to
accompany him to pick up filters for his fish. Id. at Ex. B, Seattle Police Dept. Report, p. 11.
According to Ms. Morris and Christine Geddis, A.W.'s sister, helping Siddons after school did
not happen on a regular basis. Id. at Ex. C, Morris Dep., 101:7-16 and 101:21-102:3; see also
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break, Siddons abused her by fondling her chest, legs, and vagina. Id. at Ex. B, Seattle Police
Dept. Report, p. 9-10. All of the faculty at the school were gone during the time that the abuse
occurred. Id. at Ex. A., A.W. Dep., 81:24-82:1. No one saw her at the office. Id. at 78:13-24;
81:24-82:1. No teachers were on the school grounds at the time because they were meeting up
at around 1:30 p.m. for an event they called "St. Margaret's Day." Id. at Ex. E, Desclos Dep.,
31:23-32:21. On the last day of school, teachers would meet for lunch to end the school year
with awards in a social setting. Id. Students were not expected to be at school at this point, for
school would have let out hours before, at 10:00 a.m. Id.
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With regard to her ability to remember the details of the abuse, A.W. testified, "I
remember up to a certain point, and then the memory goes away." Id. at Ex. A., A.W. Dep. at
82:7-8; see id. at 88:4-5. Plaintiff testified that three or four years after the abuse when she was
learning about sexual intercourse in eighth grade, she realized that Siddons had forced sexual
intercourse on her in addition to the fondling. Id. at 86: 11-21. She testified that when she
made the realization about the sexual intercourse, she experienced a strong emotional reaction,
and at this point understood what had happened to her. Id.', see also id. at 100:18-25. She also
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testified that she believed the intercourse had occurred because when she had her first
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
On the same day of her abuse, A.W. reported to her parents what had happened. Id. at
Ex. B, Seattle Police Dept. Report, p. 11. Ms. Morris contacted the police and Father Boyle,
who then fired Siddons. Id. at Ex. C, Morris Dep. at 88:20-21. R.D. Reith of the Seattle Police
Department took A.W.'s statement on June 14, 1983. See id. at Ex. B, Seattle Police Dept.
Report, pp. 9-10. He is now dead. See id. at Ex. L, Washington State Archives. On June 21,
1983, Siddons was arrested. Id. at Ex. B, Seattle Police Dept. Report, p. 6. Siddons gave a
statement acknowledging that he had fondled A.W.'s chest, and put his hand in her pants and
Plaintiff alleges that prior to A.W.'s abuse, the Archdiocese was aware that another
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student at St. John School was sexually abused by Siddons. Complaint, f 4.3. Plaintiff and the
Archdiocese have access to only limited evidence regarding this complaint. Parties can only
rely on the testimony of Mya Thomas (a friend of A.W. and a plaintiff in a separate lawsuit
against the Archdiocese) and Delores Thomas, Mya Thomas' mother, because Doug Arthur,
Father Boyle, Pauline Haslam, and Siddons, are all dead. See id. at Ex. E, Desclos Dep., 28:1430:1.
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Mya Thomas testified that before A.W.'s incident, she had reported her own abuse by
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Siddons to Mr. Arthur, the principal of St.. John's at the time, and Pauline Haslam, the school
secretary when she was in third grade. Id. at Ex. F, Mya Thomas Dep., 20:14-21:4. Mya
Thomas had transferred to the school and did not like St. Johns. Id. at Ex. G, Delores Thomas
Dep. at 33:24-34:6. Mya Thomas was progressively complaining about the school as time
wore on. Id. at 34:13-35:24. Mya Thomas alleges that when she met with Mr. Arthur with her
mother, Mr. Arthur did not believe that any abuse had occurred. Id. at Ex. F., Mya Thomas
Dep., 21:5-8. After this meeting, her mother would go back to school to report subsequent
abuse by Siddons, where she would be told that "they looked into it." Id. at 22:2-6.
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
Because of the passage of time and the death of key witnesses, the Archdiocese cannot
provide evidence of Mr. Arthur's actions following the report by Mya Thomas. This is not due
to the fact that Mr. Arthur failed to act. Rather, it is due to the passage of time and the death of
key witnesses. Staff and administrators who are still alive when Mya Thomas allegedly
reported are Jodi Desclos and Kate Brune2, both of whom do not have personal knowledge as
to actions that Doug Arthur may or may not have taken with regards to Siddons in light of any
accusations. See id. at Ex. E, Desclos Dep., 29:11-14, 30:19-31:7. Neither Dan Sherman, the
principal who took over after Doug Arthur in 1984, nor Father Picton, who was assigned to St.
John's in 1985, have any personal knowledge because they arrived after Mya Thomas made
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any allegations. See id. at Ex. H, Sherman Dep., 9:14-25; see also id. at Ex. I, Picton Dep.
16:10-12. Furthermore, Father Picton stated that he had no knowledge of personnel issues
between 1981 and 1985, and those who would know about Father Boyle's responsibilities are
dead.
Id. at Ex. I, Picton Dep., 63:23-64:24. Finally, there is no remaining evidence that
determines whether Doug Arthur failed to report Mya Thomas' allegations to Child Protective
Services or law enforcement. Reports relating to claims of child abuse are expunged after 6
years if they were unfounded, and 35 years if they were determined to be credible. Id. at Ex. J.
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Department of Social and Health Services Records Retention Schedule, p. 68. As testified by
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Mya Thomas, she reported her alleged abuse when she was in third grade, which would be in
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Plaintiff appears to have connected the alleged abuse to various issues in her life.
Plaintiff testified that she experienced a strong emotional reaction in eighth grade when she
came to the realization that Siddons had forced sexual intercourse upon her. Id. at Ex. A., A.W.
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Kate Brune's deposition was taken on September 2, 2016. We have not yet received the deposition transcript,
but it will be presented to the court before the court hears the motion.
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5
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Dep., 100:18-25. Plaintiff also connected the alleged abuse to her desire to not want children.
Id. at 16:5-16.
connected her damages with the abuse as far back as 2004. Id. at Ex. K, Denise Jones Dep.,
7:9-21, 20:19-20, 46:23-47:14, 51:5-8. Ms. Jones also testified that in 2004, Plaintiff discussed
how her drive to overcome her abuse "permeates every area of her life." Id. at 51:9-52:6. In
2006, Plaintiff also described the ways that being held back and attending St. John's following
the abuse impacted her life. Id. at 58:11-62:7. Ms. Jones also testified that Angela was also
Plaintiffs best friend of 17 years, Denise Jones, also testified that A.W.
previously aware of her injuries associated with the abuse, but delayed discussing them until a
point when her mother was able to participate. Id. at 105:17-106:5. Between 1999 and 2004,
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A.W. appeared to be discussing how Ms. Jones dealt with her own sexual abuse as a way of
dealing with her own abuse. Id. at 109:12-115:14.
Furthermore, A.W. saw a counselor, whose name is forgotten, a couple years after the
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abuse due to Ms. Morris' concerns with A.W.'s performance in school. Id. at Ex. A, A.W.
Dep., 167:1-3, 12-17; id. at Ex. C, Morris Dep., 142:23-143:5. To determine A.W.'s alleged
behavioral changes, Ms. Morris believes that she may have told the counselor about A.W.'s
abuse by Siddons. Id. at 150:19-24, 169:5-13.
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1. Whether the Archdiocese can be found negligent when Plaintiffs injuries were caused by
an intentional actor after school was closed when all teachers were gone, for an activity
that was not sanctioned by or related to the Archdiocese, and Plaintiffs mother explicitly
provided permission for Plaintiff to spend time with the intentional actor after school.
2. Whether Plaintiff can establish a claim for outrage where she does not have any evidence
to support the alleged acts she alleges satisfy her claim for outrage.
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3. Whether the claims against the Archdiocese should be dismissed based upon the doctrine
of laches where the Plaintiff knew the facts of her claim for at least 28 years, and the
delay in bringing the claim prevents the Archdiocese from bringing a complete defense.
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
4. Whether the statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs claims where Plaintiff admitted
that she understood the meaning of what had happened to her as early as eighth grade and
she experiences a panic attach when engaging in a sexual encounter at the age of 19.
V. AUTHORITY
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the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). "A material fact is one
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that affects the outcome of the litigation." Owen v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 153 Wn.2d
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780, 789, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). "Questions of fact may be determined as a matter of law
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'when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion.'" Id. at 788 (quoting Hartley v. State,
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103 Wn.2d 768, 775, 698 P.2d 77 (1985)). When considering a summary judgment motion,
the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
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nonmoving party. Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000).
A plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment by relying on speculation, hearsay, or
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Lynn v.
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Labor Ready, Inc., 136 Wn. App. 295, 306, 151 P.3d 201 (2006). They must instead set forth
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specific facts that sufficiently rebut the moving party's contentions and disclose that a genuine
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issue as to a material fact exists. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wn.2d 1,
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
where a person has no duty to prevent a third-party from causing injury to another. However, a
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duty to protect another from harm by a third-person may arise when the defendant has a special
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relationship with the tortfeasor and the plaintiff. C.J. C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of
Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 721, 985 P.2d 262 (1999) (citing, inter alia, Niece v. Elmview Group
Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 43, 929 P.2d 420 (1997)).
Under C.J. C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, four factors are used to show
the existence of a legal duty:
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(1) the special relationship between the Church and [the abuser]; (2) the special
relationship between the Church and the plaintiff; (3) the alleged knowledge of the risk
of harm possessed by the Church; and (4) the alleged causal connection between [the
abuser's] position in the Church and the resulting harm."
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C.J.C., 138 Wn.2d 699, 721, 985 P.2d 262 (1999) (citing, inter alia, Niece v. Elmview Group
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employee/agent was modified by the Court in N.K. v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
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Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, et al, 175 Wn. App. 517, 307 P.3d 730 (2013).
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C.J.C., together with N.K., hold that defendant may only owe a duty under one of two
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situations: either; (a) custody and care where the type of harm suffered was foreseeable; or (b)
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were known and the victim was foreseeable. In either case of a duty owed under a theory of
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custody or knowledge of dangerous propensities, it is still required that a plaintiff show that a
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abuse.
In
addition, Plaintiff cannot sustain her burden to show that the Archdiocese actions were
unreasonable.
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
Plaintiff alleges that the Archdiocese was negligent in that it failed its "duty to take
reasonable steps to protect A.W. from foreseeable harm while she was in its custody and care."
See Plaintiff s Complaint. This claim is not supported under the facts and the law. A custodial
relationship typically involves "on the ground control of day to day operations." N.K. v. Corp.
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, et al, 175 Wn.
It is also well settled that a school district has a special relationship with students as a
result of its role as a substitute parent. Christensen v. Royal Sch. Dist No. 160, 156 Wn.2d 62,
Because a child is compelled to attend school, "the protective
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custody of teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parent." McLeod, 42 Wn.2d at
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319; Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 44 ("The rationale for such a duty [is] the placement of the student in
the care of the defendant with the resulting loss of the student's ability to protect himself or
herself."); RESTATEMENT, supra, 320 cmt. b ("[A] child while in school is deprived of the
protection of his parents or guardian. Therefore, the actor who takes custody of ... a child is
properly required to give him the protection which the custody or the manner in which it is
taken has deprived him."). There is a logical break at the point when a child is returned to the
custody of a parent, thereby extinguishing any liability on behalf of the school.
Lack of custody is supported in the holdings and reasoning applied in Scott v. Blanchet
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High School, 50 Wn.App. 37 (1987). In Scott, the plaintiffs sought damages relating to injuries
their daughter suffered from sexual abuse by a teacher. Id. at 38. The principal had heard
rumors that the plaintiffs' daughter and a teacher were in a sexual relationship. Id. at 40. The
principal met with the plaintiffs' daughter who denied the rumors were true. The principal also
met with the alleged abuser, who also denied the rumors, but later confessed to another teacher
that he had lied to the principal. Id. at 40-41. The plaintiffs then brought a negligent hiring and
supervision claim against the school after their daughter ran away with her teacher.
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
The
plaintiffs had alleged that the sexual activities with their daughter occurred within the context
of counseling with the teacher, and the court concluded that these activities occurred outside
The court in Scott held the school had a duty to exercise ordinary care and supervision
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of its teachers. However, the school did not breach that duty. The court in Scott held that if a
breach occurred, during counseling sessions, it was outside the scope of the school's duty. Id.
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at 44. The court found that plaintiffs lacked any evidence to support assumptions that any
after-hours counseling was authorized or encouraged by the school.
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The court
further held that at some point, the event is so distant in time and place that the responsibility
for adequate supervision is with the parents rather than the school. Id. The Scott court found
that the plaintiffs' arguments regarding duty to supervise students and teachers had failed in
that the responsibility at the time of the alleged activities had shifted away from the school. Id.
at 45.
This position is further supported in persuasive and informative cases like Rambo v.
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Id, at 42.
Webster Parish School Bd., 745 So.2d 770 (La. 1999). In Rambo v. Webster Parish School
Bd., plaintiff brought a claim against a school district based upon allegations of sexual abuse at
a high school near an elementary school bus stop. Rambo, 745 So.2d at 771-772. Plaintiff
alleged he was sexually assaulted by a high school janitor in the janitor's washroom.
Id.
Plaintiff was on the campus of the high school while waiting for a bus to take him to his
elementary school. Id. The janitor later entered a guilty plea for his conduct, and the victim
sued alleging negligent supervision.
Id.
supervise the school grounds after school hours or during the summer. Id. at 772. The court
further held that while there was a limited duty to supervise children who are waiting on the
grounds for a school bus, the supervision that was in place was adequate. Id.
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The issues in Scott and Rambo bear a resemblance to the current matter. Here, the
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abuse occurred after school hours, and after the end of the school year, and at a time when
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
A.W. was not engaged in a school sanctioned activity. Rather, one day prior to the alleged
abuse, Siddons asked Rose Morris for permission for A.W. to help him change the locks after
school was out. On the day of the alleged abuse, when Siddons called Ms. Morris asking for
permission to have A.W. accompany him to pick up filters, she gave him permission again.
There is no evidence that this sort of activity was allowed by the administration at St. John's,
While A.W. and her sister would stay after school sometimes because of their mother's job at
the Parish offices, id. at Ex. C., Morris Dep., 100:14-22, A.W. did not help Siddons on a
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school. At the time of the alleged abuse, there were no teachers on the school grounds because
it was "St. Margaret's Day." After packing up, all of the teachers would meet up for lunch
together to end the school year with awards in a social setting. Id. at Ex. E, Desclos Dep.,
31:23-32:21. Students were not expected to be at school at this point, for school would have let
out hours before at 10 am. Id. As such, the Archdiocese did not have a custodial relationship
with the Plaintiff at the time of the abuse by the intentional actor. Moreover, as testified by
Plaintiff, no one saw her in Siddons office.
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In sum, Plaintiff has no evidence that her after-school work with Siddons was
sanctioned by St. John's. Furthermore, Plaintiff had been returned to the custody of her mother
who then allowed her to spend time with Siddons after the school year had ended and the
school had closed. Accordingly, St. John's did not owe any duty to Plaintiff as she was not in
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The Archdiocese Does Not Owe a Duty Based on the Mere Allegation of
Knowledge of Prior Misconduct of a School Janitor
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Plaintiff alleges that the Archdiocese also breached its duty to take reasonable steps to
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prevent Charles Siddons from harming A.W. to the extent it knew or should have known that
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Siddons posed a danger to A.W. See Plaintiffs Complaint at If 5.2. Plaintiff alleges that the
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
Archdiocese breached that duty by "allowing A.W. to be sexually abused despite the fact that it
knew or should have known of that danger." Id. at ^ 5.3. However, evidence regarding the
Archdiocese's knowledge of Siddons acts prior to A.W.'s abuse, and any actions they may
have taken in response to that knowledge' are no longer available. Accordingly, there is no
information available for the jury to determine whether the Archdiocese's failed to act
reasonably, and therefore breached any duty. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to
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support her claim, absent application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, or strict liability.
Both of which are inapplicable to the current matter.
a.
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Regardless of whether a duty is owed to Plaintiff under the duty to control or the duty to
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protect, Plaintiff must still prove that the Archdiocese breached a duty of "reasonable care," or
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to take reasonable precautions to protect others. C.J.C. 138 Wn. 2d at 722; Niece, 131 Wn.2d
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at 45-46. In turn, the defendant may defend a claim by providing evidence of reasonableness in
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principles of proximate cause. As discussed below, Plaintiff is unable to meet her burden of
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proof to support her claim. There exists a void of information in this matter due to the death of
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A school, such as St. John's, is liable only if its breach of a duty was a proximate cause
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of a plaintiff s injuries. Travis v. Bohannon, 128 Wn. App. 231, 240, 115 P. 3d 342 (2005).
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Proximate cause has two elements: (1) Cause in fact, and (2) legal causation. Lowman v.
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Wilbur, 178 Wn.2d 165, 169, 309 P.3d 387 (2013). Cause in fact or "but for" causation refers
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to the "physical connection between an act and an injury." Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768,
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778, 698 P. 2d 77 (1985). Legal causation is a question of law, and is grounded in policy
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considerations as to how far the consequences of a defendant's action should extend. Lynn v.
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Labor Ready, Inc. 136 WN. App. 295, 311, 151 P.3d 201 (2007); Lowman, 178 Wn.2d at 169.
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
For example, a school does not owe a duty as a matter of law to a student when the
nexus between the harm and the school district's alleged negligent action is too remote. Coates
v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 55 Wn.2d 392, 396-97, 347 P.2d 1093 (1960); Scott v. Blanchet High
breach of duty is too remote to hold the defendant liable as a matter of law, courts are directed
to "evaluate 'mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.'"
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Lowman, 178 Wn.2d at 169 (quoting Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 779). In Coates, the Washington
Supreme Court held that a defendant school district did not owe a duty of reasonable care when
a student was involved in an accident on her way to a club initiation that was connected to the
school only through an advisor. Coates, 55 Wn.2d at 394-95, 347 P.2d 1093.
engaged in a romantic relationship with a teacher because the alleged sexual activities between
the teacher and student did not occur at school, during after-hours counseling, or with the
school's knowledge or consent.
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For both
cases, the nexus between harm and alleged negligence was ruled too remote.
Essentially, Plaintiff must prove that the Archdiocese's breached its duty to the Plaintiff
in how it monitored and supervised Siddons.
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Similarly,
in Scott, Division One held that a defendant school district did not owe a duty to a student who
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Archdiocese's own negligence, not the mere fact that the abuse occurred. For example, in Scott
v. Blanchett, the court looked to what steps were taken to check the background when hiring a
teacher who was later accused of becoming sexually involved with a student. Scott, 50 Wn.
App. at 43. In contrast, in N.L v. Bethel School Dist., 187 Wn. App. 460, 348 P.3d 1237
(2015), the court found that the defendant took no action to monitor a student despite the
student's status as a registered sex offender.
put forth expert testimony regarding the standard of care at the time of the abuse and the need
to prepare a safety plan with respect to the sex offender student. Id, at 467. The N.L court was
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
provided testimony by the principal of the subject school regarding the safety plan, and
determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Id. 466-467, 473.
supervision that Plaintiff can present. The individuals who would have monitored Siddons are
deceased, Siddons himself is deceased, and any reports that were provided to DSHS, and any
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reporting to claim that no such monitoring or reporting took place. However, it is readily
apparent that the reason this evidence is not available is due to Plaintiffs own delay in bringing
her claim. In order for Plaintiff to succeed at trial, the Court would need to allow Plaintiff to
make significant logical leaps and rely upon a series of assumptions and speculation on what
sort of efforts, or lack thereof, were undertaken by the administrative staff at St. John's with
respect to monitoring Siddons.
For example, Plaintiff will need to rely on speculation as to what actions Principal Doug
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Arthur took or did not take in response to allegations of inappropriate behavior with respect to
students at St. John's. Plaintiff will also need to rely on speculation as to what supervision, or
lack thereof, was put in place regarding Siddons. In addition, Plaintiff will also need to rely on
17
speculation as to whether allegations regarding Siddons' were reported to DSHS.
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19
20
21
22
Such
speculation is not sufficient for Plaintiff to sustain her burden. Plaintiff must provide specific
admissible evidence supporting the validity of the mere allegations of her complaint. Las v.
Yellow Front Stores, Inc., 66 Wn.App. 196, 198, 831 P.2d 744 (1992). Speculative statements,
argumentative assertions, and references to conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id
23
24
25
3 In addition, testimony about what was said to Doug Arthur, or others at the time, particularly with respect to
Mya Thomas' and Delores Thomas' testimony is inadmissible. The deadman's statute, RCW 5.60.030 bars Mya
Thomas and Delores Thomas' testimony regarding what they discussed with Dong Arthur and Paulene Haslam.
Mya Thomas and Delores Thomas are parties in interest as defined under RCW 6.60.030 as they "stand to gain or
lose in the action in question." Mya Thomas has recently filed her own claim against the Archdiocese regarding
Siddons.
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14
528679
The alleged abuse did not occur Under any form of supervision of the Archdiocese.
Plaintiff was helping Siddons change locks, which was not an activity sanctioned or
encouraged by the school. Moreover, Rose Morris gave Siddons permission for A.W. to spend
time with him after school had let out. Rose Morris provided permission, knowing that A.W.
was not under the supervision of the school once school was let out. Under these facts, Ms.
Morris' actions constitute a superseding and intervening cause, thereby breaking the chain of
causation, if any existed, with respect to the Archdiocese. "Whether an act may be considered
8
g
10
11
12
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14
stay after school to assist him with any task. Nor is there any indication that the Archdiocese
gave permission or could have anticipated any student would remain on school grounds after
the end of the school year. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the Archdiocese was
15
16
17
18
19
aware of Ms. Morris' act of giving her daughter permission to assist Siddons on the day she
was abused. It would be unjust for the Archdiocese to be held liable for actions that occurred
outside the scope of its supervision,
consistently limited the types of harms that schools such as St. John's must protect students
against. See e.g. Scott v. Blanchet, 50 Wn. App. at 45.
20
uU .
Strict Liability and Res Ipsa Loquitor do not apply to the present
case.
21
22
Irrespective of whether or not the Archdiocese owed Plaintiff a duty due to prior
23
knowledge of allegations of sexual abuse, Plaintiff cannot show that the Archdiocese breached
24
that duty. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Archdiocese breached its duty "by allowing A.W. to
25
be sexually abused despite the fact that it [knew] or should have known of that danger." See
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
Plaintiffs Complaint at
5.3. The Court should not allow Plaintiff to rely upon the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to support most, if not all of her allegations because res ipsa does not apply to
The mere occurrence of an incident and an injury does not necessarily imply
negligence. Tinder v. Nordstrom, Inc., 84 Wn.App. 787, 792, 929 P.2d 1209 (1997) (citing Las
v. Yellow Front Stores, Inc., 66 Wn.App. 196, 201-02, 831 P.2d 744 (1992)). For the doctrine
to apply, it must be established that: (1) the accident or occurrence producing the injury is of a
kind which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of someone's negligence, (2) the injuries
are caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and
10
11
12
13
14
15
(3) the injury-causing accident or occurrence is not due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff. Id. Further, where the circumstances show that an incident might
have happened as the result of one of two causes (or more) the rule fails and cannot be invoked.
Wellons v. Wiley, 24 Wn.2d 543, 550, 166 P.2d 852 (1946). Moreover, res ipsa is "sparingly
applied, in peculiar and exceptional cases, and only where the facts and the demands of justice
make it application essential." Curtis v. Leini169 Wn.2d 889, 239 P.3d 1078 (2010).
Here, Plaintiff attempts to show negligence occurred by merely showing the abuse
16
occurred. This application of res ipsa loquitor should not be allowed. First, damages relating to
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
sexual abuse is the type of injury that can happen in the absence of negligence. Sexual abuse is
an intentional tort, and as an intentional tort, is completely apart from negligence concepts such
as "fault."
Price v. Kitsap Transit, 125 Wn.2d 456, 464, 886 P.2d 556 ("intentional torts are
part of a wholly different legal realm and are inapposite to the determination of fault pursuant
to RCW 4.22.070(1)."); Schmidt v. Cornerstone Invs., Inc., 115 Wn.2d 148, 162, 795 P.2d 1143
(1990) ("the Legislature's intent to exclude intentional conduct from the definition of fault is
clear"). In fact, the Archdiocese has not been able to locate a single case in Washington where
res ipsa has been applied in the context of an intentional tort. The Court of Appeals in Vernon
25
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 16
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
v. Bethel School Dist., 2012 WL 3679624, *12, 170 Wn. App. 1016 (Div. 2, Aug. 28, 2012)
Second, Siddons was not within the exclusive control of the Archdiocese.
Archdiocese's lack of exclusive control is evidenced by the fact that Siddons' actions
constituted an intentional tort, and not an act done at the direction of the Archdiocese,
Moreover, applying res ipsa to the current matter would work an injustice against the
Archdiocese under the res ipsa analysis. The exclusive control element requires the defendant,
who is the person most likely to know how the accident happened, to come forward with the
^
10
11
12
13
14
15
explanation. Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wn.2d 431, 437, 69 P.3d 324 (2003). But if the defendant
does not have exclusive control, "he cannot offer a complete explanation, and it would work
an injustice upon him to presume negligence on his part and thus in practice demand of
him an explanation when the facts indicate such is beyond his ability." Pacheco, 149
Wn.2d at 437(citing Morner v. Union P.R. Co., 31 Wash.2d 282, 196 P.2d 744 (1948)
(emphasis added)).
Siddons as well as Siddons himself, are all deceased. Accordingly, Plaintiff has no evidence as
to what level of control was being exercised over Siddons at the time of the abuse, or even if he
16
was on duty.
17
18
19
20
21
complete explanation of the abuse. While Plaintiff may argue that res ipsa is required to meet
her demands for justice, such an argument ignores the rights of a defendant. Here, Plaintiff is
attempting to shift the burden to the Archdiocese to prove that their actions were reasonable
r i n nA c .
i r i V4-V/J.
r , +I. + n ^
> <Wa^
c r |_S
\ A n + V i r.L<Wa O
k_ J.
22
C. Plaintiffs Claim of outrage fails because there is no evidence in the record of any
intentional or reckless action by the Archdiocese.
23
24
"outrage"), a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or
25
reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) severe emotional distress on the part of the
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
plaintiff.
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
civilized community. Saldivar v. Momah, 145 Wn. App. 365, 186 P.3d 1117 (Div. II 2008).
Washington courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts 46 as a whole and "must
consider" the following factors when determining extreme and outrageous conduct:
(a) the position occupied by the defendant; (b) whether plaintiff was peculiarly
susceptible to emotional distress, and if defendant knew this fact; (c) whether
defendant's conduct may have been privileged under the circumstances; (d) the
degree of emotional distress caused by a party must be severe as opposed to
constituting mere annoyance, inconvenience or the embarrassment which
normally occur in a confrontation of the parties; and, the actor must be aware that
there is a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress
and he must proceed in a conscious disregard of it.4
7
8
9
10
11
Here, Plaintiffs claim fails as there is no evidence in the record of any intentional or
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
reckless action of the Archdiocese that led to Plaintiffs claimed emotional distress, as required
under the above Washington law. Reckless action is "[cjharacterized by the creation of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious (and sometimes
deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk... [rjeckless conduct is much more than
mere negligence: it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do." Black's
Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).
Accordingly, in order for Plaintiff to establish that the Archdiocese was reckless, she
19
20
21
22
would need to show that there was a deliberate indifference to prior claims of sexual abuse by
Siddons. However, Plaintiff has no evidence that the Archdiocese was reckless or deliberately
indifferent.
The evidence regarding what the Doug Arthur's response was to allegations
against Siddons is no longer available. This issue alone is fatal to Plaintiffs claim for Outrage.
23
24
25
Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wn. App. 382, 387-88 (1981) (paraphrasing factors as set forth in Jackson v. Peoples
Federal Credit Union, 25 Wn. App. 81, 86-87 (1979) under the Restatement (Second) of Torts 46, Comments e,
f, and g) (emphasis added); accord Doe v. Corp. of Church of Latter-Day Saints, 141 Wn. App. 407, 429-30
(2007)).
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 18
4
528679
Moreover, Plaintiff cannot sustain her burden to show intent by the Archdiocese to
1
2
inflict severe emotional and psychological, distress on others..." Compl., "[ 5.8. Without any
connection to the specific victim, the Archdiocese cannot have the requisite intent to harm
Archdiocese refused to report Siddons sexual abuses as alleged in her Complaint. Id. at 5.6.
7
8
g
10
11
12
15
Similarly, even if it were assumed that the Archdiocese did not report any of Siddons sexual
abuses, there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs accusations that it had done so to "conceal its
own bad acts, to protect its reputation, and to prevent victims from
Essentially, Plaintiff has no evidence of the alleged behavior she is claiming is extreme or
outrageous, nor does she have any evidence of any intent on behalf of the Archdiocese.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim of outrage should be dismissed.
In addition, Plaintiff does not distinguish any damages she may have suffered by the
13
14
alleged actions of the Archdiocese, as opposed to the actions of Siddons himself. As expressed
in Boy 1 v. Boy Scouts of America, 832 F.Supp.2d 1282 (2011), a plaintiffs failure to
distinguish the emotional distress they may have suffered by the acts of an organizational
16
defendant from the acts of the abuser is fatal to a claim of Outrage. As Plaintiff has not made
17
18
19
20
Plaintiffs Outrage claim arises out of the same conduct as her negligence claim. Both
21
are based in part on the allegation that the Defendant knew or should have known about
22
23
distress damages for the same act. As such, if Plaintiffs negligence claim is not dismissed,
24
D.
25
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 19
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
A plaintiff may recover emotional distress damages as a result of Outrage while at the
same time recovering emotional distress damages caused by other independent tort actions of a
defendant. See, e.g Doe v. Corp. of Church of Latter-Day Saints, 141 Wn. App. 407 (jury
found church-defendant liable for negligence and liable for outrage, awarding separate damages
recover separate emotional distress damages under multiple tort theories, the plaintiff must
establish that the emotional distress damages related to the outrage claim are based on separate
8
2
10
11
12
13
facts from the plaintiffs other causes of action. Compare Doe, 141 Wn. App. 407 (2007), with
Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wn.2d 48, 61-62 (1987) and Francom v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 98
Wn. App. 845 (2000). If a claim of outrage is based on the same conduct as another claim
affording emotional distress damages, Washington courts do not allow both claims to go to the
jury. See, e.g., Rice, 109 Wn.2d at 61-62 ("outrage should allow recovery only in the absence
of other tort remedies").
In the present case, Plaintiffs Outrage and negligence claims are both based on the
14
15
16
However, to
allegation that the Archdiocese knew about Siddons. As such, if the Court does not dismiss
Plaintiffs negligence claim, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs Outrage claim to prevent double
recovery for the same act
17
18
19
The doctrine of laches prohibits A.W. from recovering on any of his claims against the
20
Archdiocese because Plaintiff delayed in bringing the present lawsuit for 28 years, and as such,
21
prevents the Archdiocese from obtaining necessary information for its defense.
22
Laches is an equitable defense applied in addition to, but independent of, statutes of
23
limitations. Amende v. Pierce County, 70 Wn.2d 391, 397, 423 P.2d 634 (1967). The defense
24
of laches is grounded in the principle of equitable estoppel, which "will not permit the late
25
assertion of a right where other persons, by reason of the delay, will be injured by the
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 20
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
assertion." Id. at 398. In other words, "Public policy requires that private claims come to rest
at some time." Amende, 70 Wn.2d at 396. The purpose of laches is to prevent injustice and
Laches is applied when the following elements are present: (1) The plaintiff had
such facts; (2) there was an unreasonable delay in commencing the action; and (3) there is
damage to the defendant resulting from the delay. Amende, 70 Wn.2d at 397; In re: Marriage
9
10
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12
13
14
15
Brost v. L.A.N.D., Inc., 37 Wn. App. 371, 375, 680 P.2d 453 (1984). However, such unusual
circumstances are recognized where the defendant has changed its position such that it "cannot
be restored to [its] former state." Brost, 37 Wn. App. at 375-76. A change of position is
recognized where the defendant cannot mount a meaningful defense because of a loss of
evidence due to the passage of time. Davidson v. State, 116 Wn.2d 13, 27, 802 P.2d 1374
(1991).
Unusual circumstances exist here that warrant dismissal.
16
known about the abuse since it occurred in 1983. Plaintiff unreasonably delayed commencing
17
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19
the present action by waiting at least 28 years to file this claim. Plaintiffs delay is unduly
prejudicial because crucial testimony and needed the Archdiocese needs to litigate this case is
now lost or unavailable due to the passage of time.
20
21
Plaintiff Has Had Knowledge of the Facts Forming the Basis of Her
Abuse Claims for at Least 28 Years.
22
Laches applies once the plaintiff has "knowledge of the facts constituting the cause of
23
action." Hunter, 52 Wn. App. at 270. Unlike the level of knowledge necessary to trigger the
24
statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.340, a laches defense does not require that the plaintiff
25
first connects her injuries to the abuse. In the present case, A.W. had knowledge of the facts
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
giving rise to her allegation of abuse by Siddons since 1983, 33 years before she brought forth
this claim. On the same day that the abuse occurred, A.W. told her parents what had happened.
Then in a police report she gave soon thereafter, A.W. described the details of the abuse. A.W.
provides a great level of detail, including the events leading up to the abuse, as well as what
happened immediately after. As to her allegation of sexual intercourse, A.W. alleges that at the
time she did not have enough knowledge about human anatomy to know that the abuse by
Siddons included sexual intercourse. She made this realization four or five years later in an
g
10
eighth grade sexual education course. Therefore, at the latest, Plaintiff would have had the
knowledge of facts forming the basis of her abuse claim in 1986 or 1987, still more than 28
years before she brought her claim.
11
12
A.W.'s failure to bring her claim in the last 28 years constitutes unreasonable delay
13
given that she knew about all of the facts of the alleged abuse since at least 1987, and there was
14
nothing preventing her from bringing this claim. A delay is considered unreasonable if it
15
16
Funds v. Shopland Supermarket, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 939, 948-49 (1982). Washington courts have
17
found that periods of time as short as 15 years constitutes unreasonably delay. See In re
18
Parentage of Hilborn, 114 Wn. App. 275, 279 (2002) (holding that a mother's decision to wait
19
15 years before seeking child support payments from the father was unreasonable because she
20
knew where her child's father was and knew she was entitled to support from him.). A.W.
21
waited 28 years, and perhaps as long as 33 years before bringing this claim, despite knowing
22
about the alleged abuse since the time it occurred. Nothing prevented A.W. from pursuing this
23
24
25
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 22
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
Unavoidable loss of defense evidence due to the length of time passed can establish
material prejudice under the doctrine of laches. Davidson, 116 Wn.2d at 26-27 (holding that
the plaintiffs delay in bringing suit deprived defendant of substantial evidence, including
witnesses who had personal knowledge of facts giving rise to plaintiffs claim and documents
relevant to those facts); see also Amende, 70 Wn.2d at 399 (holding that plaintiffs 35-year old
claim barred by laches was in part due to "unavailability of old records" relevant to claim).
The death of a critical witness is sufficient to show prejudice supporting the application of the
doctrine of laches. "[I]f a deceased witness could have given testimony both relevant and
JQ
important to the determination of the action, that witness' death can be enough to satisfy a
11
12
showing of prejudice." 27 A Am. Jur. 2nd Equity 152, (section cited with approval in
LaVergne v. Boyson, 82 Wn. 2d 718, 721, 513 P.2d 547 (1973)).
The passage of time between the alleged abuse and when this suit was filed severely
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
comprises the Archdiocese's ability to mount a sufficient and effective defense. Due to the
passage of time, and the lack of record keeping procedures at the time, documentary evidence
is sparse. The State did not retain any records regarding Siddons, so it is impossible to know if
anyone made reports regarding Siddons. In the case that the school reported Siddons, it is also
impossible to know the nature and findings of the investigations performed by DSHS or CPS
because such reports have been destroyed.
As for testimonial evidence, the following individuals are all dead: Doug Arthur, Father
20
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24
25
comprehensive defense to Plaintiffs allegation that the Archdiocese had prior knowledge of
Siddons' propensity, and failed to act.
administrators who had decision-making power with regards to personnel. If alive, they could
have testified to whether they knew of any misconduct by Charles Siddons prior to 1983, and
what actions they took in response. But both Arthur and Boyle are dead. Charles Siddons, who
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 23
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
would have had knowledge about any prior conduct, and the school's knowledge of such
conduct, is also dead. Pauline Haslam is the secretary that Mya Thomas and Delores Thomas
allegedly told about Mya Thomas' abuse by Siddons. If alive, she could have testified to
Thus the jury will be left with testimonies of individuals such as A.W. and Mya
Thomas, who are bringing a claim against the Archdiocese. Jodi Declos testified that Mr.
Arthur would not have reported back to her about any steps he took with regards to any
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10
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allegations against Siddons. Kate Brune is alive, but her testimony does not show personal
knowledge as to the extent to which Doug Arthur took any action in response to allegations
against Siddons. Other witnesses, such as Dan Sherman or Father Picton, worked at St. John's
after Siddons was fired in 1983, and therefore lack any personal knowledge of any prior
allegations against Siddons.
knowledge about Father Boyle's responsibilities are dead. In the absence of other testimonial
evidence Plaintiff will ultimately benefit from this lopsided presentation of evidence.
In light of A.W.'s allegation that the abuse included sexual intercourse, which was not
15
16
mentioned in her report in 1983, nor admitted by Charles Siddons, the Archdiocese is unable to
challenge the credibility of these claims. If alive, Charles Siddons, could have confirmed or
17
18
19
20
21
22
statement, could have offered testimony about his impressions of A.W. and her credibility,
especially in light of her more recent allegation that Siddons forced sexual intercourse upon
her. Only A.W.'s testimony is left. However, her testimony is unreliable, for A.W. admits that
her own memories of the events are unclear. She testified that she only remembers the incident
up to a certain point, and then nothing after that.
23
24
25
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
information regarding any changes in A.W.'s behavior and to what she attributed these
changes. Records regarding any sessions with a counselor cannot be found as long as Plaintiff
Archdiocese will bear the brunt of the lack of evidence caused by Plaintiffs delay.
The
Plaintiff is barred from bringing her claim because the statute of limitations began to
run when she connected issues later on in her life to the alleged abuse.
All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by any person
for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse
shall be commenced within the later of the following periods:
8
9
Within three years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition;
10
Within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act; or
11
12
13
Within three years of the time the victim discovered that the act caused the injury
for which the claim is brought.
14
RCW 4.16.340. The appropriate standard for this Court to use in evaluating Plaintiffs claims
15
is whether he or she knew or should have known of a causal connection between the alleged
16
abuse and the claimed injuries. Oostra v. Holstine, 86 Wn. App. 536, 543, 937 P.2d 195
17
(1997), rev. denied 133 Wn.2d 1034 (1998) (holding that statute of limitations for civil action
18
based on childhood sexual abuse began to run when abuse victim traced her problems in adult
19
life to the sexual abuse by her stepfather); but see B.R. v. Horsely, 186 Wn. App. 294, 302-03,
20
345 P.3d 836 (2015) (finding that plaintiff was not time-barred from bringing her child sexual
21
abuse claim because she victim had not yet connected her problems in her adult life to her
22
23
Like the plaintiff in Oostra, and unlike the plaintiff in B.R., the Plaintiff here not only
24
experienced symptoms of the abuse, she also connects the abuse to her damages, more than
25
three years prior to bringing the claim. When questioned on how she came to believe that
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 25
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
Charles Siddons had forced sexual intercourse upon her, Plaintiff testified in response that
during a sexual education class in 8th grade she experienced a strong emotional reaction and felt
terrified, embarrassed, and ashamed. She stated that at this point she understood that Siddons
5
g
A.W. testified:
Any children?
No.
Yes.
After what happened to me, I didn't want to risk having a child and having
them go through what I did.
And when you say that, you mean the rape of-
Yes.
10
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12
13
14
15
Id. at 16:5-16.
Plaintiffs best friend of 17 years, Denise Jones, also discussed Plaintiffs connection of
16
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18
Yes.
her damages with the abuse as far back as 2004. Ms. Jones testified in pertinent part the
following:
19
Q. Ma'am, I'm going to ask you again: Did she or did she not talk to you about the
abuse in 2004?
20
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22
23
Q. Okay.
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Q. Can you talk to me about what she said back in 2004 when she talked to you about
molestation?
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 26
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
A. What comes to mind is how she had to walk past his office every day going up and
down the stairs. Every you know, going to school, going to her different classes, she
had to pass by that place every day. And that's what was very painful for her at that
time. And I think that's when she first started realizing and, you know, putting things
together.
2
3
^
5
6
Q. So when in 2004 was she talking about how that molestation impacted her life?
Did she talk to you about that?
Id. at 51:5-8. Ms. Jones then went on to provide a lengthy discussion about what Plaintiff told
her in 2004 on how she was addressing the impact the abuse had on her life and how her drive
10
to overcome the abuse "permeates every area of her life." Id. at 51:9-52:6. Ms. Jones also
11
testified about a conversation that took place in 2006 where Plaintiff described the impact
12
being held back a year and attending St. John's following the abuse impacted her life. She also
13
testified that Angela was also previously aware of her injuries associated with the abuse, but
14
delayed discussing them until a point when her mother was able to participate. In addition, Ms.
15
Jones testified that in approximately 1999-2004, she spoke with Plaintiff about her own
16
experience with being sexually assaulted and Plaintiff questioned her on how she addressed her
17
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19
hindsight, it appeared to her that Plaintiff was asking these questions for her own benefit. Id. at
115:9-14.
Plaintiff will argue that she never made the connection between her injuries and abuse.
20
21
22
23
However, this argument is especially suspect when Plaintiff and her mother also claim that she
saw a counselor for a year a couple years after the incident due to her alleged falling grades. In
fact Rose Morris testified:
Q:
And you didn't think to discuss the sexual abuse with Siddons as a
possible source of her problems with the psychologist?
A*
I'm not sure. It seems to me that we might have said something, but I can't
say 100 percent absolutely.
24
25
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
Id. at Ex. A, Morris Dep., 150:19-24. Then when referencing the story she wrote, Rose Morris
again thinks she may have told the counselor about Chuck Siddons:
Q:
And then on the next paragraph you mention, "My husband and I shared a
concern with the psychiatrist of an incident that had happened at the
school that may be related to our daughter's troubles here." Are you
referring to Chuck Siddons in this?
A*
Right. And that's what I'm trying to think, you know. I think we did, but
- you know, I think we did. I don't know for certain.
4
5
6
7
Id. at 169:5-13.
Plaintiff, and those close around her, appear to have connected several of the alleged
damages she has suffered to her abuse by Siddons several years before she brought this claim.
As such, Plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
10
VI. CONCLUSION
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There is no genuine issue of material fact in this case on these issues and the Seattle
Archdiocese is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Given the fact that key witnesses are
now deceased, and the fact that DSHS and CPS records have been expunged, Plaintiff lacks
evidence necessary to prove her claims. Plaintiff cannot show that the Archdiocese's actions
regarding Siddons were not reasonable as Plaintiff cannot show what acts the Archdiocese
actually took with respect to Siddons. Moreover, Siddons actions did not take place at a time
when Plaintiff was in the custody of the Archdiocese or even at a time when the Archdiocese
was aware that she was on campus. Plaintiffs lack of evidence warrants dismissal on summary
judgment.
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In addition, Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed because they were brought beyond
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the statute of limitations. By Plaintiffs own testimony she was aware of her damages and their
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connection with the abuse as early as 8th grade, and this knowledge was further solidified when
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Summary judgment is also warranted on the grounds that Plaintiff waited too long to
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bring her claim, thereby damaging the Archdiocese ability to raise a defense. Had Plaintiff
DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 28
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
brought her claim at a time when witnesses like Doug Arthur were still alive, the Archdiocese
could have evidence available to them to address Plaintiffs allegation that its actions were
unreasonable.
alleged year-long therapy following the abuse would also have been available. This loss of
evidence is not due to the actions of the Archdiocese, but rather due to Plaintiff s own delay.
Child sexual abuse is undoubtedly a tragic event, and deserving of redress given
appropriate facts, and evidence. However, the Archdiocese has rights as defendant, and should
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not be denied its ability to respond to allegations, and assist the fact finder in reaching an
appropriate determination of justice for both parties, not just Plaintiff. The Archdiocese has
been denied these rights due to Plaintiffs delay in bringing her claim.
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Therefore, the
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PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
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gy/
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//
Vx)
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 29
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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be delivered via the method listed below the document to which this Certificate of Service is
attached (plus any exhibits and/or attachments) to the following:
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METHOD OF DELIVERY
Electronic Mail
ABC Legal Messenger Service
Regular U.S. Mail
Other:
I certify under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of Washington, that the
foregoing is true and correct.
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DATED this
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IA
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DEFENDANT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 30
528679
PATTERSON BUCHANAN
FOBES & LEITCH, INC., P.S.