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Dattco, Inc. v. Comm'r of Transportation, No. SC19558 (Conn. Dec. 27, 2016)
Dattco, Inc. v. Comm'r of Transportation, No. SC19558 (Conn. Dec. 27, 2016)
Jeffrey J. Mirman, with whom was David A. DeBassio, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Eileen Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom
were Charles H. Walsh, assistant attorney general, and,
on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Alan
N. Ponanski, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
According to the plaintiffs, the new busway incorporates some of the routes over which the plaintiffs currently operate, and the state sought to hire new
companies to operate buses over these routes. The
plaintiffs claim that their certificates give them exclusive rights to operate over the routes at issue, precluding the commissioner from authorizing other operators
to use them unless the commissioner properly suspends
or revokes their certificates for cause.
In a separate action that is not the subject of this
appeal, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the commissioner
from allowing other companies to operate motor buses
over their designated routes. The trial court in that case
issued a preliminary injunction precluding the commissioner from transferring the routes at issue to new operators pending the outcome of the litigation.
While that case was pending, however, the commissioner condemned the certificates pursuant to the
states power of eminent domain, prompting the plaintiffs to file the actions that are the subject of this appeal.
The plaintiffs each claim that the commissioner lacks
the statutory authority to condemn their certificates.
They seek permanent injunctive and other relief preventing the commissioner from carrying out the condemnations.
The trial court consolidated all of the actions, and
the parties filed motions for summary judgment. The
plaintiffs argued that the commissioner lacked the
authority to take the certificates as a matter of law,
whereas the commissioner claimed that the General
Statutes clearly vested him with such power. The disagreement between the parties centered on the term
facilities, as used in 13b-36 (a), which vests the
commissioner with the power of eminent domain. That
statute authorizes the commissioner to take land,
buildings, equipment or facilities if he deems their
taking necessary. General Statutes 13b-36 (a). The
commissioner argued that the word facilities has a
broad meaning and includes anything that promotes
the ease of any action. According to the commissioner,
the certificates are facilities inasmuch as they enable
the plaintiffs to carry out their businesses. The plaintiffs
disagreed, however, claiming that the term facilities,
as used in the statute, refers only to tangible assets,
not intangible rights like the certificates at issue, which
represent a government bestowed operating right.
The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment but granted the commissioners motion
for summary judgment. The trial court agreed with the
commissioners interpretation and concluded that
13b-36 (a) gave the commissioner authority to condemn the certificates. The trial court then rendered
judgment in favor of the commissioner in each of the
consolidated cases. This appeal followed.
that has considered a similar question, the court concluded that the term facility does not refer to a companys operating rights.2 Lynnwood Utility Co. v.
Franklin, Tennessee Court of Appeals, Docket No. 89360-II (April 6, 1990) (determining, in condemnation
case, that [a] [c]ertificate of [c]onvenience and [n]ecessity is not a facility).
We therefore conclude that interpreting facilities
to refer not just to what makes an action easier, but
also to the very authority that authorizes the action
altogether, would unduly stretch the meaning of that
term too far. This is especially true considering that we
must construe a delegation of eminent domain power
strictly and against the power of the condemner.
Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. Bridgeport, supra, 259
Conn. 601. Adopting the commissioners broad interpretation would contradict that principle.
B
Even if we were to assume, however, that the term
facilities, standing alone, could arguably refer to
operating rights, the context in which that term is used
in the provision at issue and other related provisions
convinces us that the legislature did not intend for the
term facilities, as used in 13b-36 (a), to encompass
the certificates at issue.
In addition to considering the dictionary definition
of the term facilities, we must consider its meaning
also in the context that it is used in the provision at
issue and in related provisions. See General Statutes
1-2z. The text of the provision at issue, 13b-36 (a),
strongly suggests that the term facilities refers to
tangible assets, not intangible operating rights.
Section 13b-36 (a) groups the term facilities with
three other nouns describing what the commissioner
may condemn, namely, land, buildings, equipment,
and each refers to tangible objects. Typically, when a
statute sets forth a list or group of related terms, we
usually construe them together. See, e.g., Staples v.
Palten, 214 Conn. 195, 199200, 571 A.2d 97 (1990).
This principlereferred to as noscitur a sociis
acknowledges that the meaning of a particular word
or phrase in a statute is ascertained by reference to
those words or phrases with which it is associated.
Id., 199. As a result, broader terms, when used together
with more narrow terms, may have a more restricted
meaning than if they stand alone. See id. (noscitur a
sociis . . . acknowledges that general and specific
words are associated with and take color from each
other, restricting general words to a sense . . . less
general [emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted]).
The legislatures grouping of the term facilities with
other nouns that all denote tangible objects favors a
conclusion that the term facilities also refers to tangi-
The plaintiffs are Dattco, Inc., Collins Bus Service, Inc., Nason Partners,
LLC, and The New Britain Transportation Company. Each brought a separate
action against the commissioner to enjoin him from taking their respective
certificates, and those actions were consolidated.
2
One court has interpreted the term facilities to include a companys
operating rights, but the court reached that conclusion because a contrary
construction in that case would have rendered the statute at issue unconstitutional. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Clarksdale, 288 So. 2d 9, 12
(Miss. 1973) (concluding that statute [could not] be constitutionally applied
in [the] case unless the word facilities [was] construed as including [a
power companys] operating rights). There was no claim in that case that
the ordinary meaning of the term facilities extended to operating rights.
See id., 11.
3
Certain provisions in title 13b of the General Statutes refer to one form
of an intangible facilitya credit facility. See, e.g., General Statutes 13b79r (d) (4). But when the provisions of title 13b refer to a credit facility,
they do so by pairing the words credit and facility rather than using
facility alone. See, e.g., General Statutes 13b-79r (d) (4). This indicates
that, when the legislature intended to refer to an intangible facility, it did
so expressly.
4
The dissent would apply a much broader meaning of the term facilities,
relying in significant part on a decision from the Missouri Supreme Court;
see Mashak v. Poelker, 367 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1963); giving a broader meaning
to the term facilities. Significantly, however, that case has little bearing
on our decision because it did not involve a delegation of the takings power,
and adopting a broad interpretation of the meaning of facilities in the face
of a more limited interpretation would violate the well established principle
that we must strictly construe any delegation of the takings power. Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. Bridgeport, supra, 259 Conn. 601.
5
The commissioner did not cite 13b-23 as authority for the condemnation
in his notices of condemnation issued to the plaintiffs. We will nevertheless
briefly address the commissioners arguments based on this statute because
the plaintiffs have not objected to the commissioners arguments concerning
this provision, and, in any event, those arguments are unavailing.
6
The commissioner has also claimed that 13b-34 (c) also empowers him
to condemn the certificates, but we disagree. That provision does not clearly
confer eminent domain power but, instead, appears to empower the commissioner to purchase or dispose of property. Notably, that provision does not
expressly refer to the commissioners power to take property, as in 13b36 (a); nor does it prescribe the procedures for instituting a taking, as 13b36 (a) does. If 13b-34 (c) authorizes a taking, as the commissioner claims,
we would expect to see procedures for exercising that power, as such
procedures would be required to afford a property owner due process of law.