USA v.

GUINTO
182 SCRA 644
FACTS:
The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. In GR No. 76607, private respondents re suing several officers of the
US Air Force in connection with the bidding for barbering services in Clark Air
Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust
operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a
complaint for damages claiming that because of the acts of the respondents, he
lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No. 80258,
complaint for damage was filed by the respondents against petitioners for injuries
allegedly sustained by plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of state immunity
as ground to dismiss the same.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners immune from suit?
HELD:
It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their
official functions. They cannot be directly impleaded for the US government has
not given its consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners are not immune for
restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of damages by Genove
cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence presented. Barber shops are
also commercial enterprises operated by private persons, thus, petitioners in GR
No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed. In GR No. 80258,
the respondent court will have to receive the evidence of the alleged irregularity
in the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in what
capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

. Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was
bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe
injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act
2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the
negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from
suit
or
did
it
also
concede
its
liability
to
the
plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to
his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.

Amigable v Cuenca [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back
of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of
the government of

any

right

or

interest

in

the

property. Without

prior

expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for
the construction of

the

Mango

and

Gorordo

Avenues.

On

1958,

Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of

the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th
Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the
Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner
of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot.
According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed

first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action
for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had
not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against
the

defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue
the government.
Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that
when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
the

aggrieved

party

may

properly

maintain

suit

against

the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from

suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favour of
the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government,
then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover
possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot
has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to
make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking

Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and
Intermediate Appellate Court, respondents-appellants.
March 12, 1987
Yap, J:
Facts:
Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property
of Feliciano and the rest of the property reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to
set aside the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been
in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not
appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand,
presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision
and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was
reopened to allow them to present their evidence.
Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot
prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of
land.
Held:
No
Ratio:
A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to
Feliciano, hence the government is not being divested of any of its properties.
Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)
FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza
gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents,
money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration
order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos
filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe
Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of
at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.
The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the
sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to
repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of
the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that
the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse
was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion
to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration
order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2
agents. Hence the certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.
HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a
sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the
properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the
prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan.
Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were
given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would
warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the
Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how
Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be
validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that
Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void,
the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.
*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on
the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another
civil case.
USA v. RUIZ
GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for
certain naval projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation
and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company received two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price. In June 1972, the copany received a letter which
said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. The

company then sued the United States of America and individual petitioners
demanding that the company perform the work on the projects, or for the
petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties concerning the
project.
ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of states. However, state immunity
now extends only to governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of
State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this case, the projects are integral part of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of the USA and Philippines which
is, indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by virtue of state
immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the
US government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.

The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.

G.R. No. 101949
01 December 1994
FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous
with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal
of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties
has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating
the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to
Tropicana.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted

the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this
affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part
of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the
society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in
the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed
that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature
in the Philippines.
he Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is nonproprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but
for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal
thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell
the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation.
Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the
Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
respondents.
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:
Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd,
Gavino Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final
and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces
of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received
the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and
allowances of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations
of AFP.

Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution
against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and
void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is
valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269,

November 11, 1993
Sunday,
January
25,
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner

2009

Department

Posted

of

Agriculture

by Coffeeholic

(DA)

and

Writes

Sultan

Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be

provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint
for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as
well

as

for

damages

against

the

DA

and

the

security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally
liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not
appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute
the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency.

Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
DA.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State

applies

in

Held: The basic postulate

the

case

enshrined in the Constitution that the State

may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a
recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A
sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law

on

which

the

right

depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not
be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The
States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may
be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the
other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of
the

other

contracting

party

and

to

have divested itself

of

its

sovereign immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver
of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended
to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does

not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards
clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the
State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract,

express

or

implied.

Pursuant,

however,

to

Commonwealth Act327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must

first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

Borja, Jr v COMELEC
GR 133495
September 3, 1998
MENDOZA, J
Petitioner: Benjamin U. Borja, Jr.
Respondents: COMELEC, Jose T. Capco, Jr.
Facts: Capco, Jr was elected vice-mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending
June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding
elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor. On March 27,
1998, Petitioner sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter
would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,
1998 and is therefore ineligible to serve for another term.
Issue: Did Capco serve his three-terms?
Held: No. Capco is still eligible for his second re-election as he has not served
his third term. The Constitution should be understood bearing in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption and the evils if any sought to be

prevented or remedied. Article X of the Constitution does not only seek to prevent
the establishment of political dynasties but also to preserve the freedom of
choice of the people that is why the Constitutional Commission rejected a
proposal to perpetually disqualify local and legislative officials from running for
the same position after their three-term limit.

GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE 415
SCRA 44
Certiorari and prohibition
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions
of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against
the petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House Committee on
Justice, sufficient in form and substance on grounds that she was
denied due process and that the said resolutions violated the one-year
bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable
officers. Court dismissed the petition.
Facts:

22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first

session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim
and spouses Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment
complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao


27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business

3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother

Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite
and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment
complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives
Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on

Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen
transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on
August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints

to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010,

found both complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment

Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010

found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition

challenging Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was

denied due process and that these violated the one-year bar rule on
initiating impeachment proceedings

Issue/s:
1.

Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

2.

Whether the belated publication of the Rules of

Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner

3.

Whether the simultaneous referral of the two

complaints violated the Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:
1.

1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty
of the judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof.
These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.

-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to

the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, judicially
discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise
of such discretion, through the power of judicial review
1.

2.
DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish
as a mode of promulgation the Rules of Procedure
of Impeachment Proceedings?

(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance

of the impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of
the HCOJs, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the
Sandiganbayan

Presumption of regularity

The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the

express grant of rule-making power in the HOR

the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the

constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that
the substance requirement is met if there is a recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee

The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of

promulgating the Rules.


impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a
body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender

1.

3.

THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with

Congress taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the
complaint to the Committee on Justice)

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the

one-year bar is two-fold: 1)to prevent undue or too frequent
harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal
task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year,
such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can
no longer rekindle the candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)