5) Palmares vs. Court of Appeals
5) Palmares vs. Court of Appeals
____________________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
423
423
424
the debtor shall pay. Stated differently, a surety promises to pay the
principals debt if the principal will not pay, while a guarantor agrees that
the creditor, after proceeding against the principal, may proceed against the
guarantor if the principal is unable to pay. A surety binds himself to perform
if the principal does not, without regard to his ability to do so. A guarantor,
on the other hand, does not contract that the principal will pay, but simply
that he is able to do so. In other words, a surety undertakes directly for the
payment and is so responsible at once if the principal debtor makes default,
while a guarantor contracts to pay if, by the use of due diligence, the debt
cannot be made out of the principal debtor.
425
the agreement, which is precisely the situation obtaining in this case before
the Court.
Same; Same; Same; A surety is not even entitled, as a matter of rights
to be given notice of the principals default.Even if it were otherwise,
demand on the sureties is not necessary before bringing suit against them,
since the commencement of the suit is a sufcient demand. On this point, it
may be worth mentioning that a surety is not even entitled, as a matter of
right, to be given notice of the principals default. Inasmuch as the creditor
owes no duty of active diligence to take care of the interest of the surety, his
mere failure to voluntarily give information to the surety of the default of
the principal cannot have the effect of discharging the surety. The surety is
bound to take notice of the principals default and to perform the obligation.
He cannot complain that the creditor has not notied him in the absence of a
special agreement to that effect in the contract of suretyship.
Same; Same; Same; A surety is liable as much as his principal is liable
and absolutely liable as soon as default is made without any demand upon
the principal whatsoever or nay notice of default.The alleged failure of
respondent corporation to prove the fact of demand on the principal debtors,
by not attaching copies thereof to its pleadings, is likewise immaterial. In
the absence of a statutory or contractual requirement, it is not necessary that
payment or performance of his obligation be rst demanded of the principal,
especially where demand would have been useless; nor is it a requisite,
before proceeding against the sureties, that the principal be called on to
account. The underlying principle therefor is that a suretyship is a direct
contract to pay the debt of another. A surety is liable as much as his
principal is liable, and absolutely liable as soon as default is made, without
any demand upon the principal whatsoever or any notice of default. As an
original promisor and debtor from the beginning, he is held ordinarily to
know every default of his principal.
Same; Same; Same; A creditors right to proceed against the surety
exists independently of his right to proceed against the principal; The rule,
therefore, is that if the obligation is joint and several, the creditor has the
right to proceed even against the surety alone.A creditors right to
proceed against the surety exists independently of his right to proceed
against the principal. Under Article 1216 of the
426
426
Civil Code, the creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously. The rule, therefore, is that if the
obligation is joint and several, the creditor has the right to proceed even
against the surety alone. Since, generally, it is not necessary for a creditor to
proceed against a principal in order to hold the surety liable, where, by the
terms of the contract, the obligation of the surety is the same as that of the
principal, then as soon as the principal is in default, the surety is likewise in
default, and may be sued immediately and before any proceedings are had
against the principal. Perforce, in accordance with the rule that, in the
absence of statute or agreement otherwise, a surety is primarily liable, and
with the rule that his proper remedy is to pay the debt and pursue the
principal for reimbursement, the surety cannot at law, unless permitted by
statute and in the absence of any agreement limiting the application of the
security, require the creditor or obligee, before proceeding against the
surety, to resort to and exhaust his remedies against the principal,
particularly where both principal and surety are equally bound.
Same; Same; Penalty; Court shall equitably reduce the penalty when
the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the
debtor.This notwithstanding, however, we nd and so hold that the
penalty charge of 3% per month and attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the
total amount due are highly inequitable and unreasonable. It must be
remembered that from the principal loan of P30,000.00, the amount of
P16,300.00 had already been paid even before the ling of the present case.
Article 1229 of the Civil Code provides that the court shall equitably reduce
the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly
complied with by the debtor. And, even if there has been no performance,
the penalty may also be reduced if it is iniquitous or leonine.
Same; Same; Attorneys Fees; Court may reduce such attorneys fees
xed in the contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable
or unreasonable.With respect to the award of attorneys fees, this Court
has previously ruled that even with an agreement thereon between the
parties, the court may nevertheless reduce such attorneys fees xed in the
contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. To that end, it is not even necessary to show, as in other
contracts, that it is contrary to morals or public policy. The grant of
attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total amount due is, in our opinion,
unrea427
427
Rollo, 38.
428
428
Rollo, 76.
429
adverted to the fact that the petitioner admitted her liability in her
Answer although she claims that the Azarraga spouses should have
been impleaded. Respondent court ordered the imposition of the
stipulated 6% interest and 3% penalty charges on the ground that the
Usury Law is no longer enforceable pursuant
____________________________
7
Annex A, id., ibid., 36; Associate Justice Jose C. de la Rama, ponente, with
430
431
Rollo, 50.
432
432
tions without fully realizing the nature and extent of her liability. On
the contrary, the wordings used in the third paragraph are easier to
comprehend. Second, the law looks upon the contract of suretyship
with a jealous eye and the rule is that the obligation of the surety
cannot be extended by implication beyond specied limits, taking
into consideration the peculiar nature of a surety agreement which
holds the surety liable despite the absence of any direct
consideration received from either the principal obligor or the
creditor. Third, the promissory note is a contract of adhesion since it
was prepared by respondent M.B. Lending Corporation. The note
was brought to petitioner partially lled up, the contents thereof
were never explained to her, and her only participation was to sign
thereon. Thus, any apparent ambiguity in the contract should be
strictly construed against private respondent pursuant to Art. 1377 of
9
the Civil Code.
Petitioner accordingly concludes that her liability should be
deemed restricted by the clause in the third paragraph of the
promissory note to be that of a guarantor.
Moreover, petitioner submits that she cannot as yet be compelled
to pay the loan because the principal debtors cannot be considered in
default in the absence of a judicial or extrajudicial demand. It is true
that the complaint alleges the fact of demand, but the purported
demand letters were never attached to the pleadings led by private
respondent before the trial court. And, while petitioner may have
admitted in her Amended Answer that she received a demand letter
from respondent corporation sometime in 1990, the same did not
effectively put her or the principal debtors in default for the simple
reason that the latter subsequently made a partial payment on the
loan in September, 1991, a fact which was never controverted by
herein private respondent.
Finally, it is argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
awarding the amount of P2,745,483.39 in favor of private
____________________________
9
433
11
12
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119706, March
434
Abella vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 107606, June 20, 1996, 257 SCRA
482.
14
Inciong, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96405, June 26, 1996, 257
SCRA 578.
435
435
Having entered into the contract with full knowledge of its terms
and conditions, petitioner is estopped to assert that she did so under
a misapprehension or in ignorance of their legal effect, or as to the
15
legal effect of the undertaking. The rule that ignorance of the
contents of an instrument does not ordinarily affect the liability of
one who signs it also applies to contracts of suretyship. And the
mistake of a surety as to the legal effect of her obligation is
16
ordinarily no reason for relieving her of liability.
Petitioner would like to make capital of the fact that although she
obligated herself to be jointly and severally liable with the principal
16
17
Northern State Bank of Grand Forks vs. Bellamy, 125 N.W. 888.
18
19
436
21
22
23
437
25
Rollo, 67-68.
26
438
____________________________
27
28
29
30
31
32
439
34
35
36
37
440
39
40
41
Standard Accident Insurance Co. vs. Standard Oil Co., 133 So. 2d 539; School
District No. 65 of Lincoln County vs. universal Surety Co., 135 N.W. 2d 232; Depot
Realty Syndicate vs. Enterprise Brewing Co., 171 P. 223.
441
441
43
44
45
46
47
48
442
cipal, he may pay the debt himself49and become subrogated to all the
rights and remedies of the creditor.
It may not be amiss to add that leniency shown to a debtor in
default, by delay permitted by the creditor without change in the
time when the debt might be demanded, does not constitute an
50
extension of the time of payment, which would release the surety.
50
50
51
52
443
444
collect from her principal rst, and she offered to pay only
in case the creditor fails to collect. The delay, if any, was
occasioned by the fact that respondent corporation merely
acquiesced to the request of petitioner. At any rate, there
was here no actual offer of payment to speak of but only a
commitment to pay if the principal does not pay.
2. Petitioner made a second attempt to settle the obligation by
offering a parcel of land which she owned. Respondent
corporation was acting well within its rights when it refused
to accept the offer. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the
creditor to receive a different one, although the latter may
be of the same value, or more valuable than that which is
54
due. The obligee is entitled to demand fulllment of the
obligation or performance as stipulated. A change of the
object of the obligation would constitute novation requiring
55
the express consent of the parties.
3. After the complaint was led against her, petitioner
reiterated her offer to pay the outstanding balance of the
obligation in the amount of P30,000.00 but the same was
likewise rejected. Again, respondent corporation cannot be
blamed for refusing the amount being offered because it fell
way below the amount it had computed, based on the
stipulated interests and penalty charges, as owing and due
from herein petitioner. A debt shall not be understood to
have been paid unless the thing or service in which the
obligation consists has been completely delivered or
rendered, as the case
____________________________
54
55
Padilla, A., Civil Code Annotated, Vol. IV, 1987 ed., 434.
445
445
57
Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
446
446
equitably reduced. The purpose for which the penalty interest is intended
that is, to punish the obligorwill have been sufciently served by the
effects of compounded interest. Under the exceptional circumstances in the
case at bar, e.g., the original amount loaned was only P15,000.00; partial
payment of P8,600.00 was made on due date; and the heavy (albeit still
lawful) regular compensatory interest, the penalty interest stipulated in the
parties promissory note is iniquitous and unconscionable and may be
59
equitably reduced further by eliminating such penalty interest altogether.
parties, the court may nevertheless reduce such attorneys fees xed
in the contract when the amount thereof appears to be
60
unconscionable or unreasonable. To that end, it is not even
necessary to show, as in other contracts, that it is contrary to morals
61
or public policy. The grant of attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of
the total amount due is, in our opinion, unreasonable and
immoderate, considering the minimal unpaid amount involved and
the extent of the work involved in this simple action for collection of
a sum of money. We, therefore, hold that the amount of P10,000.00
62
as and for attorneys fee would be sufcient in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the penalty
interest of 3% per month is hereby deleted and the award of
attorneys fees is reduced to P10,000.00.
____________________________
59
Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 112614, May 16, 1994,
Security Bank & Trust Co., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117009,
Medco Industrial Corporation, et al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
447
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Appealed judgment afrmed with modication.
Note.Although a contract of surety is ordinarily not to be
construed as retrospective in the end the intention of the parties as
revealed by the evidence is controlling. (Willex Plastic Industries
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 478 [1996])
o0o