Galo Monge, vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No.

170308 March 7, 2008

Facts: The barangay tanods in Iriga City found petitioner Monge and Potencio transporting
three pieces of mahogany lumber. When asked for the necessary permit from the DENR,
Monge and Potencio were not able to give one. Both of them were charged with violation of
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines providing for the criminal offense of
cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.
Both Monge and Potencio pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. During trial, Potencio was
discharged as state witness testifying that it was Monge who owned the lumber, and that the
latter merely asked him to help him transport it from the mountain. The trial court found Monge
guilty. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Monge questioned the discharge of Potencio as state
witness since the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute
necessity for his testimony. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, Monge filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Monge is guilty of violating Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Ruling: Yes. Monge is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277.
The mere possession of Monge and Potencio of the lumber without the required permit had
already consummated their criminal liability under Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. The
Revised Forestry Code is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum
prohibitum. Regardless of the good faith of Monge, the commission of the prohibited act
consummated his criminal liability. Good faith, which is the absence of malice or criminal intent,
is not a defense. It is also immaterial as to whether Potencio or Monge owned the lumber as the
mere possession thereof without the proper documents is unlawful and punishable
Additional info: Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct
and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations. DENR Administrative
Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and
other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires for the transport of lumber be
accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first
offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting gathering, collecting and removal of forest
products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the
requisite documents consummates the crime.

Merida v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA
Facts: A certain Tansiongco discovered that Sesinando Merida cut a narra tree in his private
land, the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to the punong barangay who
summoned petitioner to a meeting. During that meeting, Merida made extrajudicial admissions
that he did cut the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix, who,
he alleges, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco. Tansiongco again reported the matter,
this time with the DENR. Merida made the same extrajudicial admissions. Tansiongco filed a
complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor charging Merida with violation of Section 68 of PD No.
705. The Prosecutor found probable cause and filed the information with the trial court. The trial
court found Merida guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment.
Issues:
(1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering that it was filed by a
private individual and not by a DENR forest officer.
(2) Whether Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction. According to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the list of cases which must be initiated by the complainant does not include cases
concerning Section 68 of PD No. 705. Moreover, Section 80 of PD No. 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of
PD No. 705, as amended.
(2) Yes. Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705. Merida constantly represented to
the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Therefore, his extrajudicial
admissions are binding on him.

Almuete vs. People G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013

FACTS: Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, with violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines," as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277.Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
provides that: Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without
License shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. The RTC held the accused, Almuete, Ila and Lloren guilty, each are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of 18years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum period
to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum period. (as prescribed in Article 310, RPC)
Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly convicted by the RTC
because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.33 He argues that his conviction
was based on circumstantial and hearsay evidence as he was convicted only because he owns
the truck containing the lumber.34 Thus, he contends that his earlier acquittal by the CA was
proper,35 and that his acquittal can no longer be assailed without violating the principle of
double jeopardy.36
Issue:

1. Whether the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner Almuete of the charge against him
passed the requisite conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Whether or not the penalty as prescribed in Article 310, RPC which is two degrees
higher than those specified in Article 309, RPC should be imposed.
Ruling:
1. NO. It is in accordance with Admin Circular 16-931 :
Promulgation of judgment in CA and SC is effected by filing a signed copy of the
judgment with the Clerk of Cour . This is not for promulgation or reading thereof to the
defendant but for the execution of the judgment against him. The duty of the RTC (court
of first instance) in respect to such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed
when in their nature the intervention of the court of first instance is necessary to that
end. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for
promulgation of judgment is therefore immediately discontinued
The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in criminal cases,
differs from that prescribed for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals where
promulgation is effected by filing the signed copy of the judgment with the Clerk of Court
who causes true copies thereof to be served upon the parties. The procedural
consequence of this distinction was reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of
Prisons, to wit: By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in
relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment is entered
15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the

court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. In the case of
People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it was explained that the
certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court
under section 9 of rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant,
but for the execution of the judgment against him, it not being necessary to promulgate
or read it to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney
had already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of
the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51), and that the duty of the court of
first instance in respect to such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed when
in their nature the intervention of the court of first instance is necessary to that end.
2. No, Article 310, RPC would apply only if the theft was committed under any the following
circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the
stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances is
present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be that
which is prescribed under Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is P57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be
imposed in its maximum period plus an additional one (1) year for each additional
P10,000 pesos in excess of P22,000.00 or three more years. Thus, the correct
imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower
than that prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which is anywhere between two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Accordingly, the Courts "primordial and most important duty is to render justice. It
cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner hence, the
Decision of the RTC was modified insofar as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned.
The accused Almuete, Ila and Lloren are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.

AQUINO v. PEOPLE
GR No. 165448 July 27, 2009
FACTS: The Teachers Camp filed with the DENR an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet
pine trees within their area in Baguio City. The trees were to be used for the repairs of Teachers
Camp.
After the inspection of the trees to be cut, the Executive Director of the DENR issued a permit
allowing the cutting of 14 trees.Thereafter, a group of forest rangers received information that
pine trees were being cut without proper authority at the Teachers Camp. They went to the site
where they found petitioner Aquino, a forest ranger from CENRO, another forest ranger, two
supervisors, and two sawyers. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12
were covered by the permit.
An information was then filed against the five individuals for cutting without permit the nine (9)
pine trees in conspiracy. The trial court ruled that despite the existence of a permit, the trees cut
exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut and that the cutting of trees went
beyond the period stated in the permit. Nonetheless, all of the accused have been acquitted in
the trial court and on appeal, except for the petitioner.
Petitioners defense was that he was merely sent to supervise the cutting of trees at the
Teachers Camp and he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still
supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the
inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees
because he was just alone and that he feared one of the sawyers, Santiago.

ISSUE: WoN petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705
RULING: NO. Section 68 of PD 705 punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority.
In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit.
He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the
contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the
lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of
conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges
against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from
cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the CA ruled, petitioner could have
informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of
PD 705.

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 205015, November 19, 2014
Facts:
1. Eufemio Abaniel, the Chief of the Forest Protection unit of DENR together with other Forest
Rangers, went to the petitioner's house.
2. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of petitioner and at the
shoreline about two meters away from the house petitioner's house.
3. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner
of the lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership.
4. Thereafter, DENR personnel entered the premises of the petitioner's house without a search
warrant.
5. When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner's claim of
ownership, the latter showed to them an official receipt issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where
she allegedly bought the said lumber.
6. However, when the DENR scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and species
of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt.
7. Since petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the
lumber and told petitioner that they were going to transport the same to the DENR office for
safekeeping.
8. Petitioner was charged with violation of section 68 of P.D. 705.
9. RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner.
10. Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA.
11. However, the CA dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to furnish the
OSG a copy of the appellants brief in violation of the rules of court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the outright dismissal is justified.
2. Whether or not the seizure of the lumber is valid
Ruling:
1. (The petitioner submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to to the incompetence
and ignorance of her former counsel who even lied about the fact that he has indeed filed an
Appellant's Brief)
As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as
to call for the appellate court's indulgence except:
(1) where the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of
law
(2) when the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients's Liberty or
property
(3) when the interest of justice so requires
The Supreme Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled
on the merits of the appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than petitioner's Liberty.
2. The constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nonetheless, the
constitutional prohibition against warrant less search and seizures admits of certain exceptions,
one of which is seizure of evidence in the "plain view". Under the plain view doctrine, objects

falling in the plain view of an officer, who has the right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant. When
they arrived at the petitioner's house, the lumbers were lying under the latter's house and at the
shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the
said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure falls within the purview of the plain
view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant.
Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer of employee of the DENR to
arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in the Forestry Code.
The decision of the RTC is affirmed.