Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Galo Monge, vs. People of The Philippines G.R. No. 170308 March 7, 2008
Galo Monge, vs. People of The Philippines G.R. No. 170308 March 7, 2008
Merida v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA
Facts: A certain Tansiongco discovered that Sesinando Merida cut a narra tree in his private
land, the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to the punong barangay who
summoned petitioner to a meeting. During that meeting, Merida made extrajudicial admissions
that he did cut the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix, who,
he alleges, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco. Tansiongco again reported the matter,
this time with the DENR. Merida made the same extrajudicial admissions. Tansiongco filed a
complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor charging Merida with violation of Section 68 of PD No.
705. The Prosecutor found probable cause and filed the information with the trial court. The trial
court found Merida guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment.
Issues:
(1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering that it was filed by a
private individual and not by a DENR forest officer.
(2) Whether Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction. According to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the list of cases which must be initiated by the complainant does not include cases
concerning Section 68 of PD No. 705. Moreover, Section 80 of PD No. 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of
PD No. 705, as amended.
(2) Yes. Merida is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705. Merida constantly represented to
the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Therefore, his extrajudicial
admissions are binding on him.
1. Whether the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner Almuete of the charge against him
passed the requisite conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the penalty as prescribed in Article 310, RPC which is two degrees
higher than those specified in Article 309, RPC should be imposed.
Ruling:
1. NO. It is in accordance with Admin Circular 16-931 :
Promulgation of judgment in CA and SC is effected by filing a signed copy of the
judgment with the Clerk of Cour . This is not for promulgation or reading thereof to the
defendant but for the execution of the judgment against him. The duty of the RTC (court
of first instance) in respect to such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed
when in their nature the intervention of the court of first instance is necessary to that
end. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for
promulgation of judgment is therefore immediately discontinued
The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in criminal cases,
differs from that prescribed for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals where
promulgation is effected by filing the signed copy of the judgment with the Clerk of Court
who causes true copies thereof to be served upon the parties. The procedural
consequence of this distinction was reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of
Prisons, to wit: By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in
relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment is entered
15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the
court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. In the case of
People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it was explained that the
certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court
under section 9 of rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant,
but for the execution of the judgment against him, it not being necessary to promulgate
or read it to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney
had already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of
the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51), and that the duty of the court of
first instance in respect to such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed when
in their nature the intervention of the court of first instance is necessary to that end.
2. No, Article 310, RPC would apply only if the theft was committed under any the following
circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the
stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances is
present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be that
which is prescribed under Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is P57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be
imposed in its maximum period plus an additional one (1) year for each additional
P10,000 pesos in excess of P22,000.00 or three more years. Thus, the correct
imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower
than that prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which is anywhere between two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Accordingly, the Courts "primordial and most important duty is to render justice. It
cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner hence, the
Decision of the RTC was modified insofar as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned.
The accused Almuete, Ila and Lloren are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
AQUINO v. PEOPLE
GR No. 165448 July 27, 2009
FACTS: The Teachers Camp filed with the DENR an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet
pine trees within their area in Baguio City. The trees were to be used for the repairs of Teachers
Camp.
After the inspection of the trees to be cut, the Executive Director of the DENR issued a permit
allowing the cutting of 14 trees.Thereafter, a group of forest rangers received information that
pine trees were being cut without proper authority at the Teachers Camp. They went to the site
where they found petitioner Aquino, a forest ranger from CENRO, another forest ranger, two
supervisors, and two sawyers. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12
were covered by the permit.
An information was then filed against the five individuals for cutting without permit the nine (9)
pine trees in conspiracy. The trial court ruled that despite the existence of a permit, the trees cut
exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut and that the cutting of trees went
beyond the period stated in the permit. Nonetheless, all of the accused have been acquitted in
the trial court and on appeal, except for the petitioner.
Petitioners defense was that he was merely sent to supervise the cutting of trees at the
Teachers Camp and he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still
supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the
inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees
because he was just alone and that he feared one of the sawyers, Santiago.
ISSUE: WoN petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705
RULING: NO. Section 68 of PD 705 punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority.
In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit.
He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the
contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the
lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of
conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges
against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from
cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the CA ruled, petitioner could have
informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of
PD 705.
falling in the plain view of an officer, who has the right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant. When
they arrived at the petitioner's house, the lumbers were lying under the latter's house and at the
shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the
said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure falls within the purview of the plain
view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant.
Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer of employee of the DENR to
arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in the Forestry Code.
The decision of the RTC is affirmed.