Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Barrack Fees
Barrack Fees
11cv733 (WHP)
OPINION & ORDER
-1-
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this action is described in this Courts prior opinions
and orders. See Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Ben. Plan v. Bank of America Corp., 275
F.R.D. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Penn. Public Sch. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Bank of America
Corp., 874 F. Supp. 2d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Penn. Public Sch. Employees Retirement Sys. v.
Bank of America Corp., 939 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
A. Procedural Background
This Settlement is the product of nearly six years of litigation, which included
several motions to dismiss and a protracted mediation. This Court appointed PPSERS as Lead
Plaintiff and Barrack as Lead Counsel in June 2011 (ECF No. 56), and PPSERS filed the
Consolidated Class Complaint several months later (ECF No. 59). Defendants moved to dismiss,
with mixed results. This Court dismissed the Securities Act claims against all Defendants with
prejudice and the Exchange Act claims against the Executive Defendants without prejudice, but
denied the motion with respect to the Exchange Act claims against BofA. (ECF No. 148.) BofA
moved for reconsideration, which this Court denied in August 2012. (ECF No. 167.)
Another round of procedural sparring broke out after PPSERS filed the Amended
Class Complaint (ECF No. 158), which ended with the denial of Defendants motion to dismiss
and the Executive Defendants motion for reconsideration in mid-2013 (see ECF Nos. 183, 222).
The parties then shifted their focus to class certification. PPSERS moved to certify the class in
November 2013 (ECF No. 243), and three months later Defendants stipulated to class
certification without further motion practice (ECF No. 253).
-2-
The class certification stipulation largely marked the end of formal litigation,
aside from several discovery disputes. Thereafter, the parties agreed to mediation. That
mediation consisted of three sessions over the course of ten months, and involved ongoing
discovery and detailed written submissions, which Barrack claims were akin to briefs and
supporting exhibits that a party plaintiff would file in support of a summary judgment motion.
(Lead Plaintiffs Post-Hearing Submission (Post-Hearing Sub.), ECF No. 371 at 5.) At the
third mediation session in August 2015, the parties agreed to settle all claims for a $335 million
cash payment by BofA.
B. The Settlement Agreement and Plan of Allocation
The Settlement covers a class consisting of purchasers of BofA common stock
between February 27, 2009 and October 19, 2010 and creates a $335 million fund (the Fund)
to compensate class members for losses due to the alleged artificial inflation in the prices of
BofAs common stock during the time that each member held shares. On June 15, 2016 the
Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement and directed the parties to begin the notice
process. (ECF No. 338.) To date, the Claims Administrator has received nearly 375,000 timely
Proofs of Claim and only one timely objection, 1 which the individual subsequently withdrew.
(See ECF No. 362.) Fifty-one class members asked to be excluded from the Settlement,
including a single institutional investor that had previously entered into a tolling agreement with
BofA. The Plan of Allocation directs Lead Counsel to reallocate any funds remaining six
The Court received one other objection from an individual who may or may not have been a class member.
(See ECF No. 370.) This objection was untimely by more than a month and did not conform to the requirements set
out in the Notice Form for objecting to the Settlement. Specifically, it does not contain any dates, prices, or
numbers of shares/units of BofA stock to show that the individual is a class member. This objection is deemed
waived.
-3-
months after the initial distribution among those class members who have cashed initial checks.
Any residual monies will then be donated to the New York Bar Foundation.
C. Attorneys Fees and Expenses
Barrack, which has litigated on behalf of the class on a contingency basis, seeks
approval of fees and expenses in the following amounts, drawn from the Settlement Fund:
(1) attorneys fees of $51,675,000; (2) litigation expenses of $1,386,167.33; and (3) costs and
expenses incurred by PPSERS as Lead Plaintiff in the amount of $130,323.70. Over the course
of this action, Barrack devoted the time of forty-two attorneys and seven paralegals working at a
blended rate of approximately $450 per hour. (See Declaration of Mark R. Rosen (Rosen
Decl.), ECF No. 357; Post-Hearing Sub., Exs. AE.) In total, Barrack recorded 77,026.25
billable hours for a lodestar of $34,450,696.50. (See Rosen Decl., Ex. D.)
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Approve the Settlement and Plan of Allocation
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the District Court must approve any
class action settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The Court must carefully scrutinize the
settlement to ensure its fairness, adequacy and reasonableness, and that it was not the product of
collusion. DAmato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations
omitted). This is a two-part inquiry wherein the Court must determine whether both the
negotiating process leading to a settlement and the settlement itself are fair, adequate, and
reasonable. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 263 F.R.D. 110, 122 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
-4-
i.)
Procedural Fairness
The procedural fairness prong requires that the settlement be the result of arms-
length negotiations and that plaintiffs counsel have possessed the experience and ability, and
have engaged in the discovery, necessary to [effective representation] of the classs interests.
Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 1982). Negotiation processes are presumed
fair when these elements are present. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d
96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005). This Settlement is the product of nearly a full year of arms-length
mediation between able and experienced counsel, as well as a discovery process that involved
more than eight million pages of documents and required Barrack to hire sixteen attorneys
dedicated solely to this matter. (See Rosen Decl, 3437, 6874.) Although the parties
ultimately stipulated to class certification, the mediation occurred after PPSERS had briefed the
issue. See DAmato, 236 F.3d at 85 (When a settlement is negotiated prior to class certification
. . . it is subject to a higher degree of scrutiny in assessing its fairness.). Accordingly, this Court
finds that the negotiation process leading to this Settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable.
See Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at 116.
ii.)
Substantive Fairness
At the substantive fairness stage of settlement approval, courts in the Second
Circuit consider the nine factors set forth in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.: (1) the complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3)
the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing
liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action
through trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand greater judgment; (8) the range of
-5-
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of
the litigation. 495 F.2d 488, 463 (2d Cir. 1974). [N]ot every factor must weigh in favor of
settlement, rather the court should consider the totality of these factors in light of the particular
circumstances. In re Global Crossing Sec. and ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 456 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Grinnell factors weigh in favor of approving the Settlement. This
case was a complex securities class actiona breed of litigation that courts have recognized as
notably difficult and notoriously uncertain, In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No.
02-CV-3400, 2010 WL 4537550, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010)that began in 2011 and
reached a resolution through the exhaustive efforts of both parties. As discussed above,
Defendants tested PPSERSs claims twice through motions to dismiss and the ensuing motions
for reconsideration. The parties also took thirty-four depositions and briefed a discovery motion
concerning Defendants assertion of the bank examiner privilege. (See Rosen Decl. 4344,
4755.) Furthermore, the absence of objections to the Settlement and substantial number of
timely Proofs of Claim is extraordinarily positive. Dial Corp. v. News Corp., --- F.R.D. ----,
2016 WL 6426409, at *4; see also Maley v. Del. Global Tech. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (It is well-settled that the reaction of the class to the settlement is perhaps the
most significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy.).
Although Defendants stipulated to class certification, they reserved their right to
move to alter or amend the certification order if the parties failed to reach an agreement. (See
Rosen Decl. 96.) This Settlement allows class members to recover part of their losses as soon
-6-
as possible and without the need for expert discovery, summary judgment motions, trial, and any
appeal. See Maley, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (Settling avoids delay as well as uncertain outcome
at summary judgment, trial and on appeal.). As with any complicated securities action, the
class faced the very real risk that a jury could be swayed by experts . . . who could minimize or
eliminate the amount of Plaintiffs losses. In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc., Sec. Litig.,
127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 42627 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Settlement
and Plan of Allocation is fair, reasonable, and adequate under the Grinnell standard. The parties
are directed to submit a revised judgment that designates the New York Bar Foundation as the
recipient of any cy pres funds and provides that Plaintiffs attorneys fees may be paid when 75%
of the Settlement Fund has been distributed.
B. Motion for Attorneys Fees and Expenses
i.)
Attorneys Fees
In a class action settlement, courts must carefully scrutinize lead counsels
application fee in order to ensure that the interests of the class members are not subordinated to
the interests of . . . class counsel. Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072,
1078 (2d Cir. 1995). A courts role in this context is to act as a fiduciary who must serve as a
guardian of the rights of absent class members. McDaniel v. Cty. Of Schenectady, 595 F.3d
411, 419 (2d Cir. 2010). The trend in the Second Circuit is to assess a fee application using the
percentage of the fund approach, which assigns a proportion of the common settlement fund
toward payment of attorneys fees. Dial Corp., 2016 WL 6426409, at *6. As a cross-check on
the reasonableness of the requested percentage, however, courts also look to the lodestar
multiplier, which should be a reasonable multiple of the total number of hours billed at a
-7-
standard hourly rate. Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 2000). In this
case, Barrack has submitted billing records reflecting 77,026.25 hours for a lodestar of
$34,450,696.50. (See Rosen Decl., Ex. D.) The requested fee of $51,675,000 thus represents
approximately 15.4% of the Fund and a lodestar multiplier of 1.5.
When assessing a fee application under the percentage of the fund method, courts
consider the six Goldberger factors: (1) the time and labor expended by counsel; (2) the
magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of litigation; (4) the quality of
representation; (5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy
considerations. 209 F.3d at 50. In class actions involving mega fundsi.e. funds of more
than $100 millioncourts typically account[] for these economies of scale by awarding fees in
the lower ranges. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 52. Here, the Court finds that the second, third, and
fourth factors weigh in favor of the requested fee, while the remaining three factors support a
reduction.
a.)
This case was lengthy, complex, and vigorously contested up to the point of class
certification. Plaintiffs brought two different types of complicated allegations: (1) the rep and
warranty claims, regarding BofAs alleged misleading statements to investors about its
exposure to repurchase demands in connection with mortgage-backed securities; and (2) the
MERS claims, focusing on institutional risks from BofA and Countrywides reliance upon a
national mortgage database to track changes in the quality of loans secured by residential
properties. These claims survived two motions to dismiss, but even if Plaintiffs had prevailed on
liability they faced considerable risk in establishing damages at trial. With the assistance of able
-8-
and experienced counsel, the class obtained a favorable result that obviates the uncertainties
associated with summary judgment, trial, and appeals. Thus the second, third, and fourth
Goldberger factors favor approval of Barracks fee application.
b.)
-9-
-10-
401(k) plans, not one of the sixteen remains at the firmthe group as a whole stayed an average
of twelve months, some as few as one month. (See Rosen Decl. 34, n.2; Post-Hearing Sub.,
Ex. F.) The new hires billed nearly 40% of the total hours in the case and generated $10,805,725
(or 31% of the lodestar) in legal fees for Barrack. (See Rosen Decl., Ex. D.) However, hiring a
group of temporary associates and billing them out at more than $350 per hour for work that is
typically the domain of contract attorneys or paralegals seems excessive.
On this point, Barracks citation to In re Citigroup Inc. Bond Litig., 988 F. Supp.
2d 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) is instructive. In that case, Judge Stein drew a distinction between
contract attorneys and staff attorneysthe latter being full-time employees of the law firm
who are provided benefits and ongoing legal educationto determine the appropriate
reduction in a fee application where plaintiffs counsel had billed its staff attorneys at $385 per
hour. In re Citigroup, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
Barrack makes much of the Citigroup courts reference to a submission showing
that defense counsel in that casePaul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLPhad
submitted a fee application in an unrelated bankruptcy case with a blended rate of $333 per hour
for staff attorneys, who performed document review and similar routine tasks. 988 F. Supp. 2d
at 377. But that ignores Judge Steins finding that $200 per hour [is] a fair approximation of the
rate a reasonable paying client with bargaining power would pay for the type of work
performed by a contract attorney (e.g. first-cut document review), as well as the fact that Paul
Weisss clientsunlike the class members in this casehave the benefit of ex ante negotiations
as to what they will pay for legal services. Citigroup, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 377. If it is true, as
Barrack submits, that [t]here were no so-called contract lawyers hired either directly by
-11-
[Barrack] or through an external attorney provider, then this Court must conclude that the
sixteen new hires performed work that might otherwise have been handled by contract attorneys.
See Rosen Decl., 34, n.2; see also Dial, 2016 WL 6426409, at *11 (To Counsels credit, this
[contract] attorney time was accounted as an expense rather than included in the lodestar.). The
blended rate charged by Barrack for that work is unreasonable and warrants a reduction in the
attorneys fees.
It must be noted that this reduction is not a rebuke of Barracks structure as a lean,
partner-heavy firm that hires associates when necessary to prosecute large actions such as this
one. Indeed, it is debatable which route more effectively advances a young lawyers career:
temporary placement through a staffing agency on a document-review project, or brief full-time
employment with the understanding that the job ends with the discovery deadline. This Court
does not presume to resolve that question here. Rather, this Court simply concludes that a
reduction in the requested fees is warranted to avoid a windfall to Barrack for charging more
than $350 per hour for associates who are contract attorneys in all but name, while
simultaneously overstaffing the substantive legal work with high-priced partners. 2
Considering all the circumstances, the simplest resolution is to reduce the lodestar
multiplier from 1.5 to 1.2, resulting in attorneys fees of $41,340,835.80, or 12% of the Fund.
This percentage and multiplier is within the range of fees awarded in similar cases in this Circuit.
See In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
([W]here a class recovers more than $75$200 million . . . fees in the range of 610 percent and
Barrack also assigned seven paralegals to this matter, billing them at rates between $270 and $325 per
hourthe same lofty range that weighed in favor of a fee reduction in a similar case before this Court. See Dial,
2016 WL 6426409, at *11; Rosen Decl., Ex. D.
-12-
even lower are common.); In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (awarding 12% of a $75 million settlement fund); In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb
Sec. Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (awarding 3% of a $300 million fund); In re
Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 991 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D.N.Y.
2014) (awarding 9.6% of a $5.7 billion settlement).
ii.)
Litigation Expenses
Barrack also seeks reimbursement of $1,386,167.33 in litigation expenses. In
class action settlements, [a]ttorneys may be compensated for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
incurred and customarily charged to their clients. In re Currency Conversion, 263 F.R.D. at
131. When the lions share of expenses reflects the typical costs of complex litigation such as
experts and consultants, trial consultants, litigation and trial support services, document imaging
and copying, deposition costs, online legal research, and travel expenses, courts should not
depart from the common practice in this Circuit of granting expense requests. In re
Visa/Mastermony Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). In this case, the
Court finds that Barracks itemized litigation expenses reflect these traditional costs of
maintaining a complex securities action. (See Rosen Decl., Ex. E.) The motion for
reimbursement of these expenses from the Fund is approved.
iii.)
role as Lead Plaintiff. Under the PSLRA, the Court may award reasonable costs and expenses
(including lost wages) directly relating to the representation of the class to any representative
party serving on behalf of the class. 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(4). These awards compensate lead
-13-
plaintiffs for the substantial time and effort the class representatives incurred, including written
discovery, being deposed, reviewing and editing submissions, and attending hearings. In re
Currency Conversion, 263 F.R.D. at 131. Here, PPSERS actively participated in this litigation
throughout the action and should be compensated for its time and effort in bringing about a
favorable result. (See Rosen Decl., Ex. A.) The amount requested represents less than one
hundredth of a percent of the Fund. This award is comfortably below the rate awarded in similar
cases, and is approved. See In re Currency Conversion, 263 F.R.D. at 131 (award representing
approximately 0.1% of the fund); Roberts v. Texaco, 979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (0.18%
of the total fund).
CONCLUSION
The motion to approve the Settlement and Plan of Allocation is granted. The
motion to approve the application for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and Lead Plaintiffs
expenses is granted in part and denied in part. The litigation expenses and Lead Plaintiffs
expenses are approved, and the fee request is approved in the amount of $41,340,835.80. The
litigation expenses and Lead Plaintiffs expenses may be reimbursed immediately. Attorneys
fees may be paid once 75% of the Settlement Fund has been distributed. Plaintiff is directed to
submit a revised judgment in accord with this Opinion and Order forthwith. The Clerk of Court
is directed to close the motions pending at ECF Nos. 350 and 352.
Dated: December 27, 2016
New York, New York
SO ORDERED:
_____________________________
WILLIAM H. PAULEY III
U.S.D.J.
-14-