Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Michelle MacDonald - Referee Findings Fact, Conclusion of Law, Recommendation For Discipline - January 03, 2017
Michelle MacDonald - Referee Findings Fact, Conclusion of Law, Recommendation For Discipline - January 03, 2017
January 3, 2017
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
______________________________________________________________________
In Re Petition for Disciplinary Action against
MICHELLE LOWNEY MacDONALD,
A Minnesota Attorney
Registration No. 0182370
REFEREES FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISCIPLINE AND
MEMORANDUM
______________________________________________________________________
The above-entitled matter came before The Honorable Heather L. Sweetland,
acting as Referee by an Order of Appointment of the Minnesota Supreme Court filed
September 14, 2016, for hearing on November 15-16, 2016.
Director Susan M. Humiston (License No. 0254289), 1500 Landmark Towers,
345 St. Peter Street, St. Paul, MN 55102-1218, appeared on behalf of the Office of the
Lawyers Professional Responsibility.
Paul C. Engh (License No. 134685), 200 South Sixth Street, Suite 420,
Minneapolis, MN 555402, appeared on behalf of Respondent Michelle Lowney
MacDonald who was present at all times during the hearing.
The hearing was held based on the Directors July 13, 2016, Petition for
Disciplinary Action. District Court Judge David Knutson, Attorney Lisa Elliott and the
Respondent testified at the hearing. Exhibits 1-64 (hereinafter D. Ex.) were offered and
admitted, with no objection, on behalf of the Director. Exhibits 101-129 (hereinafter R.
Ex.) were offered and admitted, with no objection, on behalf of the Respondent. The
referee takes judicial notice of the documents filed in the Register of Actions for the
10. Since 2011, Respondent believes she has a calling to abolish the Minnesota
family court system. In Respondents opinion, Minn. Chap. 518, et.seq., is
unconstitutional due to its complexity and the States interference in matters
best left to the family to resolve. (R. Test.)
11. Respondent filed her Certificate of Representation in the Grazzini-Rucki case
on January 18, 2013. (D. Ex. 1)
12. Respondents filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of Minn. Chap.
518, et.seq., generally and specifically as it was applied in Ms. GrazziniRuckis case based on the September 7, 2012 Order entered by Judge
Knutson. (D. Ex. 1; R. Test.) In that Order, custody of the five minor children
was given to a third party (the childrens aunt) in the family home. (R. Ex.
104)
13. Respondent has argued the constitutionality of Minn. Chap. 518, et.seq., in
several courts. No court has given Respondents clients relief based on
Respondents arguments. (R. Test.)
14. Based on Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis rendition of the events of September 2012 and
Respondents review of the file, Respondent believed the September 7, 2012,
Order was the result of ex parte contact between Judge Knutson and Lisa
Elliott, Mr. Ruckis attorney. (R. Test.) Respondent testified she believed
Judge Knutson signed the Order presented to him by Ms. Elliott without
reviewing it. (R. Test.; D. Ex. 24)
15. Respondent did not contact Ms. Elliott to discuss the background surrounding
the entry of the September 7, 2012, Order, prior to filing the constitutional
the basis for the motion (the September 7, 2012 Order) was in error. (D. Ex.
64, pp. 11-12) Judge Knutson ruled on numerous other arguments made by
Respondent on behalf of Ms. Grazzini-Rucki. (D. Ex. 64)
20. Judge Knutson explained in the Order that Elizabeth Henry, Ms. GrazziniRuckis prior counsel, drafted the September 7, 2012 Order, and it was
reviewed by Ms. Elliott and Ms. Friedrich. Judge Knutson outlined the
procedural history, noted the involvement of counsel for both parties and the
guardian ad litem, that a telephone hearing on the record had taken place
prior to the Order being entered and that it was based on the
recommendations of Dr. Paul Reitman. (D. Ex. 64, pp. 12-13)
21. After the issuance of the April 19, 2013, Order, two of the Grazzini-Rucki
children (Samantha and Gianna) ran away and were not located until 2016.
Ms. Grazzini-Rucki was convicted of two felony counts of Deprivation of
Parental Rights for her abduction of the children. (R. Test.)
22. On May 7, 2013, Judge Knutson entered an Order dismissing the guardian ad
litem, Julie Friedrich, at her request. (D. Ex. 2) On May 20, 2013, an Order
was entered noting any successor guardian ad litem would be designated a
party to the proceedings. (D. Ex. 3)
23. On April 24, 2013, Ms. Grazzini-Rucki, pro se, filed for a stay of all
proceedings to the Minnesota Court of Appeals regarding the April 19, 2013,
Order. (R. Test.; R. Ex. 103) In addition, Ms. Grazzini-Rucki filed a Petition
for a Writ of Mandamus to the Minnesota Court of Appeals on April 29, 2013.
(D. Ex. 1) The Court of Appeals denied both of these requests on June 13,
2013. (D. Ex. 1; D. Ex. 4, p. 20) Ms. Grazzini-Rucki petitioned for review of
these denials to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Petition for Review was
denied on August 20, 2013. (D. Ex. 1) Respondent notified Judge Knutson
she was petitioning for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. (D. Ex.
7, p. 6) The Petition was denied. (R. Test.)
24. Respondent filed a separate motion on behalf of Ms. Grazzini-Rucki to stay all
proceedings. The motion was heard on June 12, 2013. (D. Ex. 4)
Respondent interrupted the Court several times during the hearing. (D. Ex. 4,
pp. 3, 9, 10 (two times), 39, 48). Respondent was instructed by Judge
Knutson to not interrupt the Court but she continued her behavior. The
Respondents interruptions disrupted the proceedings. During the instant
hearing, Respondent testified that things just had to be stopped. (R. Test.)
25. During the June 12, 2013, hearing, a reference was made to a separate civil
Summons and Petition filed by Respondent on behalf of Ms. Grazzini-Rucki
asking that Judge Knutsons Orders in the pending dissolution action be
overturned. (D. Ex. 4, pp. 27-29) Judge Knutson did not deal with the Notice
to Remove filed with the separate pleadings since the new pleadings had
been filed in the original dissolution action. (D. Ex. 4, pp. 26, 29) In
summary, Respondent filed a separate action asking for the same relief as
requested in the original dissolution action.
26. At the end of the June 12, 2013, hearing, Judge Knutson scheduled trial for
September 11-12, 2013, to address custody, parenting time and child
support. (D. Ex. 4, p. 51) The Court stressed the matter had been pending
for over two years (D. Ex. 1) and a third party had custody of the children. (R.
Ex. 104, Order filed September 7, 2012) Respondent was present at the
hearing when Judge Knutson noted Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis lack of cooperation
with the guardian ad litem and other court-appointed professionals working on
the custody and parenting time issues. (D. Ex. 4, p. 47)
27. Judge Knutson denied the motion to stay the proceedings. (D. Ex. 4, p. 24)
Grazzini-Rucki-Subpoena Issue
28. On August 30, 2013, and September 3, 2013, Respondent directed an
associate to serve subpoenas on Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis former counsel (Evans
(represented Ms. Grazzini-Rucki in a separate proceeding), Olup and Henry)
for their appearance at the trial scheduled for September 11-12, 2013. (R.
Test.; D. Ex 7; D. Ex. 8) Respondent believed the attorneys testimony would
be required to lay foundation for their bills. (R. Test.; D. Ex. 7, p. 9) A
hearing was scheduled for 8:30 a.m. on September 6, 2013 on prior counsels
motions to quash the subpoenas. (R. Test.) Prior to serving the subpoenas,
Respondent did not contact the recipients to find out whether the billing
information could be provided without the need for a subpoena or their
testimony. (R. Test.; D. Ex. 7, p. 19 (Evans), pp. 21-22 (Olup)), Respondent
and/or her associate did not comply with Minn. Rule of Civil Procedure
45.03(c). Respondent did not contact Ms. Elliott to find out her position on the
foundational issue prior to the issuance of the subpoenas. (Elliott Test.; R.
Test.)
29. No motion for attorney fees was pending at the time of the issuance of the
subpoenas but fees are usually an issue in a dissolution trial. (D. Ex. 7)
30. The hearing of September 6, 2013, was held on an emergency basis since
trial was scheduled for September 11-12, 2013. (R. Ex. 104) The Courts
Order setting the hearing for September 6, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. was received
by Respondents office (via facsimile) on September 5, 2013, at 2:01 p.m. (R.
Ex. 104-Order filed September 5, 2013)
31. At the September 6, 2013, hearing, Ms. Elliott stated on the record that
Respondent had Ms. Elliott served at her residential address with a notice of
Respondents intention to have Ms. Elliott be held personally responsible for
Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis fees. (D. Ex. 7, p. 17) Ms. Elliott testified at the instant
hearing that she would not have stipulated to the attorney billings. (Elliott
Test.)
32. As noted in the September 6, 2013, transcript (D. Ex. 7), there are a number
of ways in dissolution actions to provide fee information to a court without
prior counsel testifying under subpoena. This includes having the client, Ms.
Grazzini-Rucki, testify regarding the amounts. (D. Ex. 7)
33. Respondent was twenty minutes late for the hearing. (D. Ex. 7, p. 5)
Respondent interrupted the Court several times. (D. Ex. 7, pp. 7, 25, 30 (four
times), 31) Judge Knutson asked a bailiff to step towards the Respondent to
maintain order in the court. (D. Ex. 7, pp. 30-31) Judge Knutson told
Respondent she was being disruptive. Respondent replied The rules are
that an attorney cant talk in court? (D. Ex. 7, p. 31)
38. On December 26, 2013, Respondent sent letters to Luloff, on behalf of Henry,
(D. Ex. 23), Olup (D. Ex. 24), and Evans (D. Ex. 25) and made offers of
compromise. Copies of the letters were sent to the Lawyers Board of
Professional Responsibility. (D. Ex. 23, p.2; Ex. 24, p. 2; Ex. 25, p.2)
Grazzini-Rucki Trial-September 11, 2013
39. On September 11, 2013, the first scheduled day of trial in the Grazzini-Rucki
dissolution proceeding, Respondent, on behalf of Ms. Grazzini-Rucki, filed a
civil rights lawsuit in Minnesota U.S. District Court against Judge Knutson,
personally and not in his position as a Minnesota District Court Judge,
alleging violations of the law. (D. Ex. 9) Findings regarding the federal lawsuit
will be outlined below.
40. After hearing in limine motions in the dissolution case, Respondent moved
Judge Knutson to recuse himself from hearing the Grazzini-Rucki case due to
the filing of the federal lawsuit and its demand for compensatory damages in
the amount of $330,499.861.32. (D. Ex. 10, pp. 22-25; Knutson Test.; R.
Test.)
41. Judge Knutson denied Respondents motion believing the Code of Judicial
Conduct required him to put aside his own personal concerns and interests.
He believed he could be impartial and decide the Grazzini-Rucki matter on its
merits. (Knutson Test.)
42. After denying Respondents motion for recusal, Respondent questioned the
impartiality of Judge Knutson. Respondent stated, And you are telling me
that you can be impartial in this trial which you havent done since day one.
[sic] (D. Ex. 10, p. 24, lines 1-3)
43. Respondents statement regarding Judge Knutsons lack of impartiality since
day one was false and made in reckless disregard of the truth.
44. After Judge Knutson asked Respondent to call her first witness, Respondent
stated, Your Honor, Im not going to proceed. I do not think this is at all fair.
(D. Ex. 10, p. 24, lines 22-23)
45. In the instant disciplinary hearing, Respondent did not provide any evidence
of bias on the part of Judge Knutson other than her disagreement with his
prior orders. (R. Test.)
46. In expectation Judge Knutson would recuse himself on the morning of
September 11, 2013, Respondent admitted she was not prepared to proceed
with the scheduled trial. (D. Ex. 10, p. 23, lines 18-19) Judge Knutson
testified he did not believe Respondent was ready for trial. (Knutson Test.)
47. Respondent called Ms. Grazzini-Rucki as her only witness. (D. Ex. 10, Direct
Examination, pp. 26-68; Redirect Examination, pp. 105-115)
48. At one point during the testimony, Respondent called the proceeding a
pretend trial. (D. Ex. 10, p. 116, line 24) At another time, she interrupted
Ms. Elliotts cross-examination of Ms. Grazzini-Rucki. (D. Ex. 10, p. 91)
Respondent argued with opposing counsel (Elliott) during the testimony. (D.
Ex. 10, pp. 111; pp. 220-223)
49. At the end of the first day of trial, Judge Knutson directed the case would
continue the next day, September 12, 2013, at 9 a.m. (R. Test.; Knutson
Test.; D. Ex. 10, p. 250, lines 3-4)
Grazzini-Rucki Trial-September 12, 2013
50. On September 12, 2013, Judge Knutson took the bench at 9:01 a.m. and
waited for all parties to arrive. (D. Ex. 14) Respondent approached Judge
Knutsons court reporter, demanded a transcript from the preceding day and
accused the court reporter of not recording the prior days testimony
accurately. (Knutson Test.; D. Ex. 11) Since the bailiff and some of the
parties and/or counsel were not present, Judge Knutson left the bench at 9:14
a.m. (Knutson Test.; D. Ex. 14; D. Ex.11, p. 3)
51. After Judge Knutson left the courtroom, Respondent off-the-record made, in
summary, statements that if the court reporter was not going to record
everything that happened in the courtroom, Respondent would do so. (Elliott
Test.; D. Ex. 32, p. 22) Respondent began taking pictures of people in the
courtroom (including a deputy) and the clock. (D. Ex. 14, Time: 9:15:25;
Elliott Test.) No one gave Respondent permission to take their picture. (R.
Test.)
52. Deputies assigned to the courtroom approached Respondent and informed
her she knew she wasnt allowed to take pictures. (D. Ex. 14; Elliott Test.; D.
Ex. 32, p. 22) It is standard procedure for courtroom deputies to advise court
attendees that no recording devices of any type are allowed in the courtroom.
(Elliott Test.) At the instant hearing, Respondent denied she was ever told to
not take pictures. (R. Test.)
53. The Grazzini-Rucki case was the subject of social media coverage and
picketing at the Dakota County Courthouse. As a result, heightened security
was in place for hearings. A number of Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis supporters
(including Dee Dee Evavold) were present in the courtroom during the trial.
(Elliott Test.; D. Ex. 14)
54. A courtroom deputy took Respondents camera. Respondent planned to use
her cell phone for photographs. (D. Ex. 32, p. 24) Respondent denies she
ever told the deputy she would take pictures with her cell phone. (R. Test.)
The deputy then took Respondents cell phone. (D. Ex. 14; D. Ex. 32, pp. 2425) Respondent was upset but Ms. Grazzini-Rucki was able to settle her
down. (Elliott Test.)
55. Judge Knutson had not retaken the bench. (D. Ex. 14) Courtroom deputies
talked to Judge Knutson in a hallway outside of the courtroom and advised
him that they had observed Respondent take pictures within the courtroom.
(D. Ex. 14, Time: approx.. 9:18-19; D. Ex. 32, pp. 25-26)
56. Minnesota Rule of General Practice 4.01 (first paragraph) states:
Except as set forth in this rule, no pictures or voice recordings, except the
recording made as the official court record, shall be taken in any courtroom, area
of a courthouse where courtrooms are located, or other area designated by order
of the chief judge made available in the office of the court administrator in the
county, during a trial or hearing of any case or special proceeding incident to a
trial or hearing, or in connection with any grand jury proceeding.
57. The Honorable William Macklin, then chief judge of the First District, issued
an Order in 2005 which states in relevant part:
No pictures or voice recording, except the recording made as the official court
record, shall be taken in any courtroom or area of the Judicial Center where
courtrooms are located.
Upon the request and at the direction of the presiding judge by written order,
this Order may be modified with respect to specific matters pending before
the presiding judge.
(D. Ex. 50, para. 1, 4)
58. When Judge Knutson returned to the courtroom, he stated on the record what
the deputies advised had happened during the recess. He then told
Respondent that, as an attorney, she knew there was no recording or picture
taking or videoing of any court proceedings in the courtroom. (Knut. Test.; D.
Ex. 11, p. 4)
59. At the time, Respondent did not state, as she did at the instant disciplinary
hearing, that she was free to take pictures during a recess when a judge is
not on the bench since she did not consider it was during a trial or hearing.
(R. Test.; D. Ex 11)
60. Respondents purpose in taking pictures was to gather evidence in support of
her federal lawsuit against Judge Knutson. (R. Test.)
61. The trial proceeded after Judge Knutson made a record of what had occurred
during the recess. A morning recess was taken when Respondent needed a
2011 calendar to cross-examine Laura Miles, the guardian ad litem. (D. Ex.
14, Time: 10:26:10) Deputies approached Respondent and advised her she
would be issued a citation for contempt of court based on her actions of
taking pictures within the courtroom and asked her to accompany them so
they could fill out the citation. (D. Ex. 32, p. 28)
62. Respondent left the courtroom with the deputies. (Elliott Test.; D. Ex. 14,
Time: 10:26:59-10:27:11) Courtroom and court holding area security
cameras recorded these events although there is no audio. (D. Ex. 14-16)
63. Immediately upon Respondents departure from the courtroom, Ms. GrazziniRucki and Dee Dee Evavold began packing up all of Respondents trial
materials in boxes and were out of the courtroom security camera coverage in
less than three minutes. (D. Ex. 14, Time: 10:29:30; Elliott Test.) Judge
Knutson saw Ms. Grazzini-Rucki with boxes in the parking lot area of the
courthouse. (Knutson Test.) Ms. Grazzini-Rucki did not return to the
courtroom. (D. Ex. 14)
64. As Ms. Grazzini-Rucki and Ms. Evavold were packing up the trial materials,
Ms. Elliott informed them Respondent would be right back and would want
her trial materials. (Elliott Test.; D. Ex. 14-Ms. Elliott seen talking to Ms.
Grazzini-Rucki)
65. Respondent was taken to the court holding area where the deputies
attempted to fill out a citation for contempt of court. (Resp. Test.; D. Ex. 13;
Dr. Ex. 15; D. Ex. 32, p. 28) The deputies could not complete the citation
because Respondent refused to give her legal name, date of birth and
address. (D. Ex. 11; D. Ex. 15; R. Test.; D. Ex. 32, p. 28-29) When asked
her name, Respondent replied, You know my name. (R. Test.)
66. Respondents legal name is Michelle Lowney MacDonald Shimota.
Professionally, she is known as Michelle Lowney MacDonald. (R. Test.)
67. The deputies spent 14-15 minutes (D. Ex. 15, Time: 10:28:57-10:43)
requesting the information from Respondent and explaining if she gave it to
them, she would be allowed to return to the courtroom. Deputies requested
the information multiple times. (D. Ex. 32, p. 30) Respondent refused to give
the information to the deputies. (R. Test.; D. Ex. 32, pp. 28-29)
68. The request for a legal name, date of birth and address is standard procedure
for all people being given a citation. (D. Ex. 13) Respondent testified it was
ludicrous for the deputies to request the information. (R. Test.)
Subsequently, the deputies used the Department of Motor Vehicles website
for Respondents legal name and used her business address. They still
needed her date of birth. (D. Ex. 32, pp. 31-32)
69. Contrary to Respondents testimony in the disciplinary proceeding, she was
not in custody until she refused to give the deputies her legal name, address
and date of birth. She was placed in custody due to her refusal to provide the
information. (D. Ex. 32, p. 32) Deputies added a charge of misdemeanor
obstruction of justice due to Respondents actions.
70. Directors Exhibit 15 shows Respondent being placed in custody including the
removal of jewelry, glasses and shoes and a pat down search. Respondent
was placed in a holding cell with the door open. (D. Ex. 15)
71. When advised she needed to return to the courtroom, Respondent refused to
cooperate with the deputies. She refused to stand or walk and, as a result,
the deputies placed her in a wheelchair. (D. Ex. 15, Time: 10:57-10:58:37;
Knutson Test.; D. Ex. 32) Respondent was handcuffed to a belt. (D. Ex. 15;
R. Test.)
72. Directors Exhibit 15 shows Respondent being offered her glasses. (D. Ex.
15, Time: 10:50) Respondent ignored the offers. Respondent was told she
could put on her shoes but would not do so. (D. Ex. 15, Time: 10:48)
Respondents property (including her glasses) was photographed and placed
in an inventory bag (D. Ex. 15) and the inventory bag is seen being held by a
courtroom deputy when Respondent was returned to the courtroom. (D. Ex.
14, Time: 11:02) Respondent denied she was offered her glasses when
questioned during the disciplinary hearing. (R. Test.) Directors Exhibit 15
shows Respondent being offered her glasses. (D. Ex. 15) Deputy Gonder
advised Judge Knutson of Respondents lack of cooperation regarding her
shoes and glasses. Respondents cell phone could be returned to her at a
moments notice. (D. Ex. 11, p. 54, line 8)
73. Respondent did not consider her obligation as an attorney to competently
represent her client, her obligation to not engage in conduct intended to
disrupt the court or her obligation not to interfere with the administration of
justice on September 12, 2013. (R. Test.)
74. Additional findings regarding the misdemeanor charges will be made below.
75. Upon return to the courtroom, deputies advised Respondent and Judge
Knutson, on the record, that Respondent would be released from custody
when she provided her legal name, address and date of birth. (D. Ex. 11, pp.
44-45)
76. Judge Knutson asked Respondent how she wished to proceed since her
client and trial materials were not present. (D. Ex. 11, pp. 44-45)
Respondent was reminded by the Court of her obligation to her client. (D. Ex.
11, p. 46; Knutson Test.) Respondent was asked if she needed to contact
someone to get her trial materials. (D. Ex. 11, p. 46) Respondent did not
verbally reply to Judge Knutson. (D. Ex. 11, pp. 45-46)
77. Respondent was given a number of opportunities to provide the needed
information, receive the citation, contact her client and retrieve her file but she
did nothing. (D. Ex. 15; Knutson Test.; R. Test.)
78. Respondent did not ask for any accommodation during the hearing. (Knutson
Test.; D. Ex. 11, pp. 44-98; R. Test.) Respondent was told the situation was
of her own making and could be remedied but she did nothing. (D. Ex. 11, p.
54-55) Even during the disciplinary hearing, Respondent stated there was
nothing she could do to correct the situation. (R. Test.)
79. At first, Respondent refused to respond to Judge Knutsons questions or
comments. (D. Ex. 11, pp. 45-47, 52) Later, she made objections to the
proceedings and to certain testimony. (D. Ex. 11, p. 51, et.seq.)
Respondent requested the minor children be immediately returned to the
custody of Ms. Grazzini-Rucki. (D. Ex. 11, p. 51)
80. The record reflects Respondents unwillingness to resolve the contempt of
court citation issue disrupted the trial and was aimed at making a record for
either an appeal, a mistrial and/or to garner information for Respondents
federal lawsuit against Judge Knutson. Respondent filed an Amended
Complaint in the federal lawsuit after the events of September 12, 2013. (D.
Ex. 20; R. Ex. 115)
81. Respondents involvement in the rest of the trial was minimal. (D. Ex. 11)
Respondent briefly cross-examined David Rucki. (D. Ex. 11, pp. 86-87)
Respondent made numerous objections to the entire proceeding. (D. Ex. 11)
Respondent agrees she did not competently represent her client but testified
at the disciplinary hearing that it was due to her illegal arrest and the way the
deputies treated her. (R. Test.)
82. At the instant hearing, Respondent blamed Judge Knutson, opposing counsel
and the deputies for what happened on September 12, 2013. (R. Test.)
83. Judge Knutson issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, an Order for
Judgment and Judgment and Decree in the Grazzini-Rucki case on
November 25, 2013. (D. Ex. 22) Judge Knutson outlined the procedural
background of the case and, more importantly for the disciplinary proceeding,
what happened during trial. (D. Ex. 22, pp. 16-21)
84. Respondent appealed not only the November 25, 2013, Judgment and
Decree but a number of previous orders (including the sanctions orders
regarding the subpoenas) in January 2014. The appeal was dismissed.
Respondent did not serve the attorney for the guardian ad litem who was
made a party to the action on May 14, 2013. (D. Ex. 44, pp. 1-3)
Respondents request for reconsideration was denied on May 29, 2014. (D.
Ex. 46)
85. Respondent petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review of the Court
of Appeals dismissal on June 13, 2014. (R. Ex. 125) The Petition was
denied.
86. Respondent filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court on November 1, 2014. (D. Ex. 123) The Petition was
denied.
87. Ms. Grazzini-Rucki did not file a complaint against Respondent with the
Lawyers Board of Professional Responsibility (R. Test.) nor did she file a
lawsuit alleging malpractice against the Respondent. (R. Test.)
State v. MacDonald Shimota Contempt of Court Proceeding
88. Respondent was issued a citation for contempt of court and obstruction of
justice due to her actions on September 12, 2013. (D. Ex. 13)
89. Judge Wermager of the Dakota County District Court ordered Respondent be
released from custody and the citation issued to her without all of the
standard information (i.e., address, date of birth) on it. Respondent was in
custody for about thirty hours. (R. Test.)
90. Respondent demanded a complaint. The only charge in the complaint was
criminal contempt of court.
91. A hearing took place on November 21, 2013, regarding several issues in the
criminal case before Judge Leslie Metzen of the Dakota County District Court.
In an order filed January 23, 2014, Judge Metzen found probable cause for
the charge of criminal contempt for willful disobedience to the lawful process
97. Respondent testified during the instant hearing that she has sent color of
law letters to opposing counsel and parties in other proceedings. (R. Test.)
98. Judge Knutson was served with the federal lawsuit on October 21, 2013. (D.
Ex. 19)
99. On November 12, 2013, following completion of the Grazzini-Rucki trial but
before entry of the Judgment and Decree on November 25, 2013,
Respondent signed an Amended Complaint on behalf of Ms. Grazzini-Rucki
in Minnesota U.S. District Court. (D. Ex. 20; Knutson Test.)
100.
Respondent testified she had the right to file the federal lawsuit based on
malice against Ms. Grazzini-Rucki and Respondent (D. Ex. 20, Intro.Para. 5,
Fact Alleg. 104, 182), compromised MNCIS (D. Ex. 20, Factual Alleg. 25, 28,
32, 33, 139, 140), usurped case files in concert with opposing counsel (D.
Ex. 20, Factual Alleg. 34, 35, 36, 49, 68, 69, 78, 96, 107, 113, 170), signed
documents that Judge Knutson knew were false (D. Ex. 20, Factual Alleg. 69,
144, 153), and used professionals to gather data Judge Knutson knew was
false. (D. Ex. 20, Factual Alleg. 37, 54, 73, 76, 101, 153, 156, 164)
103.
authorization to enter orders. (D. Ex. 20, Intro. Para. 5, Factual Alleg. 30,
40,147, 166, 169)
104.
entered before January 15, 2013 (the date Respondent filed her Certificate of
Representation) and an additional 64 orders after January 15, 2013. The
orders include notices for hearings, orders regarding any child support
obligation, orders regarding Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis multiple petitions for in
forma pauperis status, etc. It appears Respondents over 3,400 comments
may have alluded to individual paragraphs of various orders. (D. Ex. 1)
106.
At the instant hearing, Respondent, when asked for the basis of these
allegations, said the record speaks for itself. (R. Test.) Respondent did
testify to the following: (a) Judge Knutsons assignment of cases associated
with the Grazzini-Rucki dissolution case was an usurping of cases; (b)
Judge Knutsons insistence she continue the second day of trial while in a
wheelchair was evidence of his retaliation against her for the filing of the
federal lawsuit; (c) Judge Knutson continuing with the trial despite the
disappearance of two children and his decision to quash the subpoenas was
evidence he was obstructing evidence of his own wrongdoing; (d) Judge
Knutsons signing of orders allegedly including civil rights violations that he
should have noticed was evidence he signed documents he knew were false;
and (e) Judge Knutson did not hold evidentiary hearings prior to entering
orders and, therefore, he knew the information contained in the orders was
false. (R. Test.)
107.
U.S. District Court Judge Susan Nelson presided over the federal lawsuit
court record and materials (D. Ex. 45, pp. 2-13) and the appellate history of
the dissolution case. (D. Ex. 45, pp. 13-16) Judge Nelson dismissed all of
the claims because they were futile (D. Ex. 45, p. 32) and wrote nothing in
the record supports these allegations. (D. Ex. 45, p. 30) Judge Nelson
found the complaint was clearly based on Judge Knutsons actions taken in
his capacity as a state court judge. (D. Ex. 45, p. 32)
110.
The factual allegations within the federal lawsuit were, in part, false and
Circuit Court of Appeals on September 25, 2014. (R. Ex. 116) Judge
Nelsons Order was affirmed on March 31, 2015. (D. Ex. 117, p. iii of
Supreme Court Petition for Writ of Certiorari) Respondent filed a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. (D. Ex. 117) The
Petition was denied. (R. Test.)
112.
throughout the Grazzini-Rucki matter that she was representing her client pro
bono. Upon review of the documents within District Court File No.19AV-FA11-1273, it is noted there is an attorney lien in favor of Respondent in the
amount of $193,190.05 and against Ms. Grazzini-Rucki. (D. Ex. 1)
DCosta Case
113.
Mulrooney issued an Order for Trial setting trial for June 16-17, 2014. (D. Ex.
52)
116.
The Order for Trial (scheduling order) included deadlines for the exchange
of hard copies of exhibits (D. Ex. 52, para. 3(C), para. 1), financial disclosures
(D. Ex. 52, para. 3(E)), submission of transcripts of audio tapes being offered
as exhibits (D. Ex. 52, para. 3(C), sub-para. 2), and filing of proposed findings
of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment and judgment and decree (D.
Ex. 52, para. 4). Respondent received a copy of the Order for Trial. (R.
Test.)
117.
Respondent admitted she did not comply with all of the Order for Trial
although she tried to substantially comply. (R. Test.) Respondent did not
provide hard copies of her clients exhibits on time; some were a day late but
most were provided eleven days late. (D. Ex. 58, Findings 168, 177).
Respondent did not provide proposed findings of fact as directed stating she
waived her clients right to file them. (R. Test.)
118.
Originally set for two days, the DCosta trial took all or parts of nine days
due, in part, to Respondent and her clients failure of preparation. (D. Ex. 58,
Finding 181) The District Court found, in part, But for the conduct of
[DCosta] and his counsel [Respondent herein] including disorganization,
noncompliance with trial scheduling orders, nonresponsive and argumentative
and narrative testimony, and poor trial preparation, each sides trial time
would not have exceeded 10 hours and the trial would have taken no more
than 4 days. (D. Ex. 58, Finding 181)
119.
times and had to be ordered to stop talking when the court was speaking. (D.
Ex. 56, pp. 616-620; D. Ex. 57, pp. 894, 1088-1090) Respondents behavior
was disruptive and disrespectful to the Court. (D. Ex. 56, pp. 616-620; D. Ex.
57, p. 1089-90)
120.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree and ordered
Mr. DCosta to pay $20,000 in conduct-based attorneys fees. Mr. DCostas
former spouse was awarded an additional $20,000 in property to satisfy this
order. (D. Ex. 58, Finding 183)
121.
Minnesota Court of Appeals on April 22, 2015. (D. Ex. 59; R. Test.) The
appellate panel called the constitutional challenge vague and unclear (D.
Ex. 60, p. 4) and said it was saddled with numerous procedural deficiencies.
(D. Ex. 60, p. 3)
123.
124.
Mr. DCostas monthly gross income at the time of the entry of the
Judgment and Decree was $3,464. (D. Ex. 58, Child Support Worksheet
appended to Judgment and Decree) An award of $16,000 in appellate fees
was significant.
125.
attorney, for the issues at trial and on appeal. (R. Test.) Respondent knew or
should have known she was responsible for what was presented at trial,
compliance with court scheduling orders and, if necessary, making a record to
be reviewed on appeal.
126.
Joseph DCosta did not sue Respondent for any alleged errors in her
representation of him (R. Test.) nor did he file a complaint with the Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board. (R. Test.)
Letters to Board of Judicial Standards
127.
(Knutson Test.) In her letters of December 26, 2013 and February 7, 2014,
Respondent asked for Judge Knutsons removal from the Board. (R. Ex. 114;
D. Ex. 36) On January 28, 2014, Thomas Vasaly, the director of BJS,
responded and stated Judge Knutson could not be removed from the Board
since he was appointed by the Governor. (R. Ex. 114)
129.
with the BJS. Upon receipt of a complaint, the staff determines whether
investigation is required or if the complaint should go to the Board. The
question for the Board is whether there is reasonable cause to proceed. If
there is reasonable cause, the judge is then notified of the complaint and
asked to respond. (Knutson Test.) If a complaint is about a member of the
Board, the named judge is not part of the process. (Knutson Test.) Judge
Knutson was unaware of Respondents complaints to the BJS until the current
proceeding. (R. Test.) Since Judge Knutson was unaware of Respondents
complaints to the BJS, it is reasonable to believe the Board determined no
investigation was required based on Respondents letters and attachments.
130.
Respondent believes her complaint to the BJS was the reason Judge
The letters to the BJS include the same complaints made within the
federal lawsuit outlined above. Respondent sent copies of all of her letters to
the BJS to numerous elected officials. (R. Ex. 114)
132.
As with the federal lawsuit, Respondents statements were false and made
133.
Respondent offered testimony regarding her pro bono work, her work as a
Respondent maintains she did nothing wrong and, during the disciplinary
hearing, blamed others including Judge Knutson, Ms. Elliott, and Joseph
DCosta. (R. Test.) This is an aggravating factor.
135.
she was sorry for whatever I did. (R. Test.) This reflects Respondents lack
of insight into how her acts affected others. This is an aggravating factor.
136.
on her right to be critical of the court system and her attempts to challenge
the constitutionality of the family law statute. (R. Test.) She testified the
Petition for Disciplinary Action was in retaliation for her running for a position
on the Minnesota Supreme Court. (R. Test.) This is neither a mitigating nor
aggravating factor.
137.
is an aggravating factor.
138.
Respondent has a lengthy record of practicing family law. She has been
an attorney for almost thirty years. (D. Ex. 120) This is an aggravating
factor.
139.
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Referee makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
failed to properly prepare for the first day of trial in the Grazzini-Rucki
proceeding, failed to competently represent Ms. Grazzini-Rucki during the
second day of trial by not asking for accommodation to get her client and file
back in the courtroom and failed to perfect Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis appeal.
Respondent violated Rule 1.1 of the Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct (MRPC).
2. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
conduct in pursuing subpoenas against her clients former counsel violated
Rule 3.1 (MRPC); Rule 3.4(c) (MRPC); Rule 4.4(a) (MRPC) and 8.4(d)
(MRPC)
3. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
conduct in pursuing false claims against Judge Knutson violated Rule 3.1
(MRPC) and Rule 8.4(d) (MRPC).
4. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
conduct in taking pictures in violation of Court rule and District Court Order
violated Rule 3.4(c) (MRPC) and Rule 8.4(d) (MRPC).
5. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
conduct in repeatedly interrupting the court, being arrested and being
detained during the Grazzini-Rucki trial violated Rule 3.5(h) (MRPC).
6. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
false statements made with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of those
statements about Judge Knutsons impartiality and integrity in multiple forums
violated Rule 8.2(a) (MRPC) and Rule 8.4(d) (MRPC).
7. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
conduct in knowingly failing to follow the DCosta Order for Trial regarding the
disclosure of exhibits and proposed findings violated Rule 3.4(c) (MRPC) and
Rule 8.4(d) (MRPC).
8. The Director has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
conduct in interrupting the Court on multiple occasions during the DCosta
trial violated Rule 3.5(h) (MRPC).
9. The attached Memorandum is incorporated herein by reference.
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and after
consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors, the undersigned recommends
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a minimum of sixty (60) days
followed by two years of probation.
Dated this 31st day of December, 2016.
MEMORANDUM
The issues before this referee during the disciplinary hearing can be broadly
grouped into three parts: (a) statements and actions by Respondent towards Judge
Knutson during and after the Grazzini-Rucki proceeding and Referee Mulrooney during
the DCosta matter; (b) Respondents alleged incompetence regarding the issuance of
subpoenas and appeals; and (c) actions taken by Respondent to disrupt court
proceedings.
False Statements and Conduct
Respondent argues any statements she made are protected by the First
Amendments right to free speech. Respondent relies, in part, on State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 104 Minn. 88 (1908) in support of her
argument. Her reliance is misplaced.
In Hart, the statements made in a letter to the Chief Justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court and the Governor concerned cases that had been completed
through the appellate process. As cited in Hart, an attorney publishing false charges
against a judge to influence his action or discredit his proceedings in a matter still
undetermined [citing In re Collins, 147 Cal. 8, 81 Pac. 220] can be disciplined. In
another cited case [Ex parte Cole, 1 McCreary 405, Fed. Cas. No. 2,973], an attorney
urged publication within a newspaper of disparaging comments about a judge in some
matter that was still pending. The court found it was done with intent to intimidate the
judge in a pending matter. (Hart, supra, at 113)
The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether the First
Amendment offers protection to attorneys who bring serious charges against judges and
legal officials impugning their integrity. In Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453
N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2000), the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue. While
Hart protected attorneys when those rights were exercised to criticize rulings of the
court once litigation was complete or to criticize judicial conduct or even integrity, the
protection has not been absolute and an attorneys abuse of that right makes the
attorney subject to discipline. (In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn. 1987))
The Minnesota Supreme Court has found Rule 8.2 consistent with the
constitutional limits placed on defamation actions by the United States Supreme Court
including New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) cited by Respondent.
As noted in Graham,
Because of the interest in protecting the public, the administration of justice and
the profession, a purely subjective standard is inappropriate. The standard applied
must reflect that level of competence, of sense of responsibility to the legal system, of
understanding of the legal rights and of legal procedures to be used only for legitimate
purposes and not to harass or intimidate others, that is essential to the character of an
attorney practicing in Minnesota. Thus, we hold that the standard must be an objective
one dependent on what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his
professional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances. (Graham,
supra, at 322)
Impugning the integrity of judges and public legal officers by stating as certainties
that which was based on nonexistent evidence or mere supposition is conduct that
reflects a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements made in violation of
Rule 8.2(a). (Graham, at 324)
In the present case, Respondent made statements and impugned the integrity of
Judge Knutson while the Grazzini-Rucki matter was pending. This included statements
made directly to Judge Knutson in court on September 11 and 12, 2013, and factual
allegations in the federal lawsuits Amended Complaint. The first two letters to the
Board of Judicial Standards, although sent after the entry of the Grazzini-Rucki
Judgment and Decree, were sent before the time of appeal had expired.
In re Petition for Discipline Action Against Lynne A. Torgerson, 870 N.W.2d 602
(Minn., 2015) confirms the standard for judging statements as false. The standard is an
objective one under the rule of professional conduct prohibiting a lawyer from making a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false with reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. (Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 8.2(a)).
Respondent knew her comments regarding entry of the September 7, 2012,
Order were false with certainty after the April 19, 2013, Order was entered. Respondent
would have been aware of Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis counsels involvement in the telephone
conference and the drafting of the order. Respondents on-going statements and
factual allegations within the federal lawsuits Amended Complaint were false and in
reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. The filing of the lawsuit appears to be the
same as the case of Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Nathan, 671 N.W.2d 578
(Minn. 2003). Merely cloaking an assertion of fact as an opinion does not give that
assertion constitutional protection. (Nathan, at 584, citing In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d
829, 832-33 (Mo. 1991))
The Supreme Court in Torgerson confirmed that an attorneys disrespectful
comments to a judge can be subject to discipline. As in Torgerson, Respondent
interrupted Judge Knutson and Referee Mulrooney multiple times as outlined in the
findings. Neither Judge Knutson nor Referee Mulrooney imposed sanctions against
Disruption of Proceedings
It appears from review of the lengthy Register of Actions in the Grazzini-Rucki
matter (D. Ex. 1) that one of Respondents purposes was to disrupt the proceedings.
Many of those actions are noted in the Findings, supra.
Respondent had an absolute right to bring the constitutional challenge to Minn.
Stat. 518, et.seq., but she based it on the September 7, 2012, Order that she knew or
should have known was entered after a telephone conference on the record with Ms.
Grazzini-Ruckis attorneys involvement.
From the records provided and the testimony at the hearing, Respondent also
sent a color of law letter to Judge Knutson. This hearing referee believes it was done
with the intent to intimidate the judge. Of concern to this referee was Respondents
testimony that she has sent color of law letters to opposing litigants and attorneys in
the past.
Respondent followed up with the federal lawsuit which was filed the first day of
the Grazzini-Rucki trial. U.S. District Court Judge Nelson found the allegations to be
baseless and futile. The Eighth Circuit agreed.
Respondents commencement of a federal lawsuit against Judge Knutson
personally and not in his position as a Minnesota District Court Judge can only be
construed as an attempt to intimidate the judge and force his removal from the case
and, possibly, the bench. A reasonable attorney under these circumstances would not
have made such serious, unsubstantiated allegations against a judge. (Torgerson, at
610, citing In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990) As noted earlier,
Impugning the integrity of judges and public legal officers by stating as certainties that
which was based on nonexistent evidence or mere supposition is conduct that reflects a
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of statements made. (Graham, Id.; emphasis
added in Torgerson)
Counsel for Respondent argues Respondent had the good faith right to rely on
her clients statements. (Respondents Argument, p.15) When attorneys have
information disputing what their client is saying, the attorney must rely on the record and
make proper factual allegations and arguments. The allegations in the Amended
Complaint were not true and Respondent would know they werent true from the written
orders filed in Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis case.
Respondents letter to opposing counsel that Respondent intended to have Ms.
Elliott be personally responsible for Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis attorneys fees was done with
the intent to intimidate counsel.
Even Respondents arrest during the trial appears to have been orchestrated so
the trial would not continue. While Respondent suggested Judge Knutson or Ms. Elliott
could have remedied the situation, in fact, Respondent could have given the deputies
the required information, received the citation and continued with the trial.
Ms. Grazzini-Ruckis immediate departure from the courtroom with all of
Respondents trial materials, her not returning to the courtroom and Respondents
failure to ask for accommodation appears to have been orchestrated to disrupt the trial.
Respondent began taking pictures in the courtroom when there was a standing
order against such behavior. When advised she was not allowed to take pictures,
Respondent told deputies that she would use her cell phone. These actions were taken
with the intent to disrupt the court proceedings.
Conclusion
The recommendation based on Respondents violations of the Rules of
Professional conduct is minimal under the circumstances. If probation is imposed by
the Supreme Court, the referee recommends Respondent be required to obtain a
mental health evaluation and follow through with the recommendations, if any, as one of
the probationary terms.