THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146594. June 10, 2002.]

REBECCA
T.
CABUTIHAN ,
petitioner,
vs .
LANDCENTER
CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION , respondent.

Prospero A. Anave for petitioner.

Francisco E. Antonio for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner led an action for speci c performance with damages against the respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that the respondent be
ordered to execute the necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a portion of a
property situated in Kay-biga, Paraaque, Metro Manila covered under TCT No. S-30409,
corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area, as compensation for the undertakings she
and her companions had performed and accomplished in favor of the respondent. The
RTC, however, dismissed the complaint on grounds of improper venue, non-joinder of
necessary parties, and nonpayment of the proper docket fees. Hence this petition.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
area where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal
actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides. In the present case, petitioner sought payment of her services in accordance with
the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for
specific performance or for rescission.
The Court held that neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action because parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on
motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action. The RTC
should have ordered the joinder of such party, and non-compliance with the said order
would have been ground for dismissal of the action. Moreover, the non-inclusion of a
necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding with the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such party.
Anent the non- ling of appropriate docket fee, the Court clari ed that the Rule requiring
that the assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in
computing the ling fees, does not apply to an action for speci c performance which is
classi ed as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation, such as the case at bar. The
Court granted the petition and ordered the remand of the case to the court of origin.
SYLLABUS
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1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VENUE OF ACTIONS; RULE; BREACH OF
CONTRACT GIVES RISE TO A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR FOR
RESCISSION; CASE AT BAR. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an
answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an
interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand,
all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides. In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her
services in accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives
rise to a cause of action for speci c performance or for rescission. If petitioner had led
an action in rem for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have
been proper on the ground of lack of cause of action.
2.
ID.; ID.; CIVIL ACTIONS; PARTIES; MISJOINDER AND NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES
NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION; REASON; NECESSARY PARTIES; NONINCLUSION THEREOF DOES NOT PREVENT THE COURT FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE
ACTION; CASE AT BAR. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on
motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action. The RTC
should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the said order
would have been ground for dismissal of the action. Although the Complaint prayed for the
conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading the companions of
petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded with the case as far
as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent.
This fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no nal
determination can be had. At best, they are mere necessary parties who ought to be
impleaded for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding with
the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of
such party.
3.
ID.; ID.; DOCKET FEES; ASSESSED VALUE OF REAL ESTATE, SUBJECT OF AN
ACTION, NOT CONSIDERED IN THE COMPUTATION THEREOF WHERE ACTION IS NOT
CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner insists that the value
of the real property, which was the subject of the contract, has nothing to do with the
determination of the correct docket or ling fees. The RTC ruled that although the amount
of damages sought had not been speci ed in the body of the Complaint, one can infer
from the assessed value of the disputed land that it would amount to P50 million. Hence,
when compared to this gure, the P210 paid as docket fees would appear paltry. We hold
that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the case
and to tri e with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the
assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing
the ling fees. But the Court has already clari ed that the Rule does not apply to an action
for speci c performance, which is classi ed as an action not capable of pecuniary
estimation.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT THEREOF WITHIN REASONABLE TIME, ALLOWED BUT IN NO
CASE BEYOND REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. Besides, if during the course of the trial,
petitioner's 20 percent claim on the Fourth Estate Subdivision can no longer be satis ed
and the payment of its monetary equivalent is the only solution left, Sunlife Insurance
Of ce, Ltd . v. Asuncion holds as follows: "Where the ling of the initiatory pleading is not
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accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within
a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period."
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J :
p

Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for speci c performance or for
rescission. A suit for such breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the
assessed value of the real estate, subject of the said action, should not be considered in
computing the ling fees. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for
dismissal of an action, because parties may be dropped or added at any stage of the
proceedings.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Orders dated
September 8, 2000 and November 21, 2000, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 263. 1 The first assailed Order disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Court hereby resolves to
dismiss the instant complaint." 2

Reconsideration was denied in the second challenged Order. 3

The Facts
Culled from the pleadings, the facts of this case are as follows.
On December 3, 1996, herein respondent Landcenter Construction & Development
Corporation, represented by Wilfredo B. Maghuyop entered into an Agreement 4 with
Petitioner Rebecca Cabutihan. The Agreement stipulates:
"WHEREAS, [respondent corporation], . . . is the absolute owner, . . . of a parcel of
land situated at Kay-biga, Paraaque, Metro Manila covered under Transfer
Certi cate of Title No. (S-30409) (partially cancelled by TCT Nos. 110001 to
110239) and particularly described as follows:
'A parcel of land (Plan Psu-80206, Case No. 290, G.L.R.O. Record No.
2291), situated in the Barrio of Kay-biga, Municipality of Paraaque,
Province of Rizal. Bounded on the NE., by properties of Eulogio Cruz and
Isidro Alano; on the E., by property of Justo Bernardo; on the SE., by
properties of Marcelo Nofuente and Lorenzo Molera; on the SW., by
properties of Higino and Pedro P. Lopez; on the W., by property of Odon
Rodriguez; and on the NW., by properties of Evaristo de los Santos and
Pastor Leonardo . . . ; containing an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVEN
THOUSAND AND FORTY SEVEN (107,047) SQUARE METERS, more or
less.'
"WHEREAS, [respondent corporation] decided to engage the assistance of
[petitioner] and . . . herein called the FACILITATOR for the purpose of facilitating
and arranging the recovery of the property in question, as well as the nancing of
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such undertakings necessary in connection thereto;

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and of the mutual covenants of the parties,
they have agreed, as follows:
1.
The FACILITATOR undertakes to effect the recovery of the property
subject hereof, including the nancing of the undertaking, up to the
registration of the same in the name of [respondent corporation], except
any and all taxes due;
2.
The FACILITATOR shall be responsible for whatever arrangements
necessary in relation to the squatters presently occupying [a] portion of the
property, as well as the legitimate buyers of lots thereof;
3.
As compensation for the undertaking of the FACILITATOR, [she]
shall be entitled to Twenty [Percent] (20%) of the total area of the property
thus recovered for and in behalf of [respondent corporation].

xxx xxx xxx." 5

Armed with Board Resolution No. 01, Series of 1997, 6 which had authorized her to
represent the corporation, Luz Baylon Ponce entered into a February 11, 1997 Deed of
Undertaking with a group composed of petitioner, Wenifredo P. Forro, Nicanor Radan Sr.
and Atty. Prospero A. Anave. The Deed states the following:
"WHEREAS, the UNDERTAKER [respondent corporation] solicited, engaged and
hereby voluntarily acknowledges the assistance of certain persons, in recovering,
arranging and nancing the undertaking up to completion/consummation of the
same;
"WHEREAS, the UNDERTAKER freely, voluntarily, unconditionally and irrevocably
agreed, committed and undertook to compensate . . . said persons, in the manner,
specified hereinbelow;
"WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing premises, and the mutual covenants of
the parties, the UNDERTAKER hereby unconditionally and irrevocably [c]ommit[s]
and [u]ndertake[s], as follows:
"1.
To pay or compensate the following persons, based on the gross area of
the afore-described parcel of land or gross proceeds of the sale thereof, as the
case may be, to wit:
Rebecca T. Cabutihan

20%

Wenifredo P. Forro

10%

Nicanor Radan, Sr.

4%

Atty. Prospero A. Anave

TOTAL

2.5%

36.5%

"2.
Execute a Deed of Assignment unto and in favor of each of the persons
above-mentioned corresponding to their respective shares in the subject parcel of
land or in the proceeds thereof;
"3.

This Undertaking as well as the Deed of Assignment above-stated shall be

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effective and binding upon the heirs, successors-in-interest, assigns or designates

of the parties herein." 7

An action for speci c performance with damages was led by petitioner on October 14,
1999 before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 263. She alleged:
"[6.]
[Petitioner] accomplished her undertakings under the subject Agreement
and the Undertaking. So in a letter dated 18 April 1997, . . . , [respondent
corporation] was informed accordingly thereof. Simultaneously, [petitioner]
demanded upon [respondent corporation] to execute the corresponding Deed of
Assignment of the lots in the subject property, as compensation for the services
rendered in favor of the [respondent corporation]. The subject letter was duly
received and acknowledged receipt, by then Acting Corporate Secretary of the
[respondent corporation].
"[7.]
[Respondent corporation] failed and refused to act on . . . said demand of
[petitioner]. Hence, [she] sent a letter dated May 8, 1997, to the Register of Deeds
for Paraaque, to inform . . . said Office of . . . [her] claim . . . ;
"[8.]
. . . [T]he subject property was already transferred to and registered in the
name of [respondent corporation] under Transfer Certi cate of Title No. -123917-,
of the Registry of Deeds for Paraaque City . . . ;
xxx xxx xxx
"[10.]
With . . . said title of the property now in the possession of the
[respondent corporation], [petitioner] is apprehensive that the more that [she] will
not be able to obtain from [respondent corporation], compliance with the
aforestated Agreement and Undertaking, to the extreme detriment and prejudice
of [petitioner] and her group, . . . ;
xxx xxx xxx
"[12.]
Then in a letter, 8 dated 10 September 1999, [petitioner] through counsel
sent to [respondent corporation] a Formal Demand, to comply with its obligation .
. . but . . . [respondent corporation] did not heed the demand. . . . ." 9

Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that respondent corporation be ordered to execute the
appropriate document assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots
in her favor. The lots represented compensation for the undertakings she performed and
accomplished, as embodied in the Agreement.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging the following:
"5.
Because of the troubled situation obtaining at the management level of
[respondent corporation], the sale between [respondent corporation] and PCIB
regarding the Fourth Estate Subdivision was not registered with the Register of
Deeds of ce, although [respondent corporation] continued holding the deed of
sale over the Fourth Estate Subdivision.
"6.
A group of persons led by one Wilfredo Maghuyop, including herein
[petitioner], Wenifredo Forro, Nicanor Radan, and others, taking advantage of the
management mess at [respondent corporation], tried to grab ownership of the
[respondent corporation], and with use of fraud, cheat, misrepresentation and
theft of vital documents from the of ce of [respondent corporation], succeeded in
ling with the Securities and Exchange Commission false papers and documents
purporting to show that the Articles of Incorporation of [respondent corporation]
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had been amended, installing Maghuyop as president of [respondent corporation].

It was on these occasions that [petitioner] and her companions . . ., with use of
fraud, stealth, tricks, deceit and cheat succeeded in letting Luz Baylon Ponce sign
a so-called 'Deed of Undertaking' by virtue of which [respondent corporation] is
duty-bound to give to [petitioner], Forro, Radan and Atty. Prospero Anave 36.5% of
the land area of the Fourth Estate Subdivision as compensation for alleged
services and expenses made by these people in favor of [respondent corporation].
They also caused said . . . Maghuyop to sign an 'Agreement' with [petitioner]
expressing an obligation on the part of [respondent corporation] to give a big part
of the land . . . to [petitioner]. These 'Agreement' and 'Deed of Undertaking' are
being made by herein [petitioner] as her causes of action in the present case.
"Wilfredo Maghuyop was a stranger to [respondent corporation], and he was an
impostor used by [petitioner] and her companions to barge into the management
of [respondent corporation] for the purpose of stealing and creating an obligation
against [respondent corporation] in their favor.
"7.
But Luz Baylon Ponce, whose signature appears on the instrument
denominated as 'Deed of Undertaking,' vehemently denies that she signed said
instrument freely and voluntarily. She says that Wenifredo Forro and Nicanor
Radan were once real estate agents of [respondent corporation] who promised to
help sell lots from her project Villaluz II Subdivision located [in] Malibay, Pasay
City. According to Luz Baylon Ponce, the Board of Directors of [respondent
corporation] negotiated with Forro and Radan for the latter to sell units/lots of
Villaluz II Subdivision, and to help obtain a nancier who would nance for the
expenses for the reconstitution of the lost title of the Fourth Estate Subdivision
situated [in] Sucat, Paraaque City. Shortly thereafter, these two men resigned
from [respondent corporation] as agents, after they manipulated the signing of . . .
said 'Deed of Undertaking' by Luz Baylon Ponce on February 11, 1997. The latter
is an old woman 80 years of age. She is weak, has . . . poor sight, and is feeble in
her mental ability. Forro and Radan inserted the 'Deed of Undertaking' among the
papers intended for application for reconstitution of [respondent corporation's]
title which these men caused Luz Baylon Ponce to sign, and she unknowingly
signed the 'Deed of Undertaking.' . . . ." 1 0

In the Motion, respondent sought the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds of (1)
improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (3) nonpayment of the
proper docket fees. Specifically, it contended:
"8.

That venue is improperly laid

xxx xxx xxx

"(b)
In other words, the present case led by [petitioner] is for her recovery
(and for her companions) of 36.5% of [respondent corporation's] land (Fourth
Estate Subdivision) or her interest therein. . . . therefore, . . . the present case led .
. . is a real action or an action in rem.
"(c)
. . . [Following] Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended . . . the
present case should have been led by [petitioner] with the proper court in
Paraaque City which has jurisdiction over the . . . Fourth Estate Subdivision
because said subdivision is situated in Paraaque City. Since [petitioner] led the
present case with this . . . [c]ourt in Pasig City, she chose a wrong venue . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
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claim

"9.

That the [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
xxx xxx xxx

"(c)
. . . Wenifredo P. Forro, Nicanor Radan, Sr. and Atty. Prospero A. Anave
are not named as plaintiffs in the complaint. [Petitioner] . . . is not named as
representative of Forro, Radan and Anave by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
or other formal written authority. According to the Rules, where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
duciary capacity, the bene ciary shall be included in the title of the case and
shall be deemed to be the real party in interest (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court, as
amended . . . ).
xxx xxx xxx
"10.
That a condition precedent for
complied with

ling the claim has not been

xxx xxx xxx

(b)
Obviously, [petitioner] has not paid the docket or ling fees on the value of
her land claim . . . . Thirty-six percent (36%) . . . is P180,000,000.00, . . . ." 1 1

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC ruled that the allegations in the Complaint show that its primary objective was to
recover real property. Equally important, the prayer was to compel respondent to execute
the necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a portion of the property
corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area or, in the alternative, to hold respondent
liable for the value of the said portion, based on the prevailing market price. The RTC
further ruled that, since the suit would affect the title to the property, it should have been
instituted in the trial court where the property was situated. 1 2

Furthermore, the action was led only by petitioner. There was no allegation that she had
been authorized by Forro, Radan and Anave to represent their respective shares in the
compensation.
Finally, since this case was an action in rem, it was imperative for petitioner to pay the
appropriate docket or ling fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty she
failed to discharge. Consequently, following Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 1 3 the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, this Petition. 1 4

Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner phrases the issue in this wise:
"Whether or not the dismissal of the [C]omplaint was in accordance with the
pertinent law and jurisprudence on the matter." 1 5

She argues that the RTC erred in dismissing her Complaint on the grounds of (1) improper
venue, (2) non-joinder of necessary parties, and (3) non-payment of proper docket fees.

This Court's Ruling

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The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Proper Venue
Maintaining that the action is in personam, not in rem, petitioner alleges that the venue was
properly laid. The fact that "she ultimately sought the conveyance of real property" not
located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is, she claims, an anticipated
consequence and beyond the cause for which the action was instituted.
On the other hand, the RTC ruled that since the primary objective of petitioner was to
recover real property even though her Complaint was for speci c performance and
damages her action should have been instituted in the trial court where the property was
situated, in accordance with Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals. 1 6
We agree with petitioner. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an answer
to the issue of venue. 1 7 Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an
interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand,
all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides.
I n Commodities Storage cited earlier, petitioner spouses obtained a loan secured by a
mortgage over their land and ice plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Because they had failed to
pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed and the ice plant auctioned. Before the RTC of
Manila, they sued the bank for damages and for the xing of the redemption period. Since
the spouses ultimately sought redemption of the mortgaged property, the action affected
the mortgage debtor's title to the foreclosed property; hence, it was a real action. 1 8 Where
the action affects title to the property, it should be instituted in the trial court where the
property is situated. 1 9
I n National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals , 2 0 the Court held that "an action in which
petitioner seeks the execution of a deed of sale of a parcel of land in his favor . . . has been
held to be for the recovery of the real property and not for speci c performance since his
primary objective is to regain the ownership and possession of the parcel of land."
However, in La Tondea Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada , 2 1 private respondents led an action
for speci c performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants
allegedly reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land located in Bago City a
piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner while the case was pending before the
said RTC. Private respondent did not claim ownership but, by annotating a notice of lis
pendens on the title, recognized defendants' ownership thereof. This Court ruled that the
venue had properly been laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in
Bago.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals , 2 2 private respondent led a case for speci c performance
with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of
petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal.
The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's order allowing an amendment of the original
Complaint for speci c performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners' position that
the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located
in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court
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reiterated the rule that a case for speci c performance with damages is a personal action
which may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside.
A close scrutiny of National Steel and Ruiz reveals that the prayers for the execution of a
Deed of Sale were not in any way connected to a contract, like the Undertaking in this case.
Hence, even if there were prayers for the execution of a deed of sale, the actions led in the
said cases were not for specific performance.
In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the
undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for
speci c performance or for rescission. 2 3 If petitioner had led an action in rem for the
conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the
ground of lack of cause of action.

Second Issue:
Non-Joinder of Proper Parties
Petitioner claims that she was duly authorized and empowered to represent the members
of her group and to prosecute their claims on their behalf via a Special Power of Attorney
executed by Forro, Radan and Anave. Besides, she argues that the omission of her
companions as plaintiffs did not prevent the RTC from proceeding with the action,
because whatever judgment would be rendered would be without prejudice to their rights.
In the alternative, she avers that the trial court may add or drop a party or parties at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just.
The RTC ruled that there was no allegation anywhere in the records that petitioner had
been authorized to represent Forro, Radan and Anave, who were real parties-in-interest
with respect to their respective shares of the 36.5 percent claim. Such being the case, the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of their claims.
Again, we side with petitioner. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground
for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on
motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action. 2 4 The RTC
should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the said order
would have been ground for dismissal of the action.
Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without
impleading the companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately
proceeded with the case as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned,
independent of the other 16.5 percent. This fact means that her companions are not
indispensable parties without whom no nal determination can be had. 2 5 At best, they are
mere necessary parties who ought to be impleaded for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action. 2 6 The non-inclusion of a necessary party
does not prevent the court from proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered
therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such party. 2 7

Third Issue:
Correct Docket Fees
Petitioner insists that the value of the real property, which was the subject of the contract,
has nothing to do with the determination of the correct docket or filing fees.
The RTC ruled that although the amount of damages sought had not been speci ed in the
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body of the Complaint, one can infer from the assessed value of the disputed land that it
would amount to P50 million. Hence, when compared to this gure, the P210 paid as
docket fees would appear paltry.
We hold that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of
the case and to tri e with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires
that the assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in
computing the ling fees. But the Court has already clari ed that the Rule does not apply
to an action for speci c performance, 2 8 which is classi ed as an action not capable of
pecuniary estimation. 2 9
Besides, if during the course of the trial, petitioner's 20 percent claim on the Fourth Estate
Subdivision can no longer be satis ed and the payment of its monetary equivalent is the
only solution left, Sunlife Insurance Of ce, Ltd. v. Asuncion 3 0 holds as follows: "Where the
ling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin which is ordered to PROCEED with
deliberate speed in disposing of the case. No costs.
TAECSD

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., is abroad, on official leave.
Footnotes

1.

Presided by Judge Danilo B. Pine.

2.

Rollo, p. 16.

3.

Ibid., p. 17.

4.

Agreement (Annex "C"); rollo, pp. 52-53.

5.

Rollo, pp. 52-53.

6.

Annex "D"; rollo, p. 54.

7.

Deed of Undertaking (Annex "E"); rollo, pp. 55-56.

8.

Letter signed by Atty. Prospero A. Anave (Annex "J") rollo, pp. 67-68.

9.

Complaint, Annex "E"; rollo, pp. 39-41.

10.

Motion to Dismiss (Annex "F"); rollo, pp. 76-78.

11.

Annex "F"; rollo, pp. 78-81.

12.

Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals , 274 SCRA 439, June 19,
1997.

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13.
14.

149 SCRA 562, May 7, 1987.

This case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Court's receipt on November
9, 2001 of the Memorandum for respondent, signed by Atty. Francisco E. Antonio.

15.

Memorandum for petitioner, signed by Atty. Prospero A. Anave, p. 5; rollo, p. 116.

16.

274 SCRA 439, June 19, 1997.

17.

"SEC. 1.
Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated."
xxx xxx xxx
"SEC. 2.
Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff."

18.

Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 450.

19.

Ibid., p. 451.

20.

302 SCRA 522, 529, February 2, 1999, per Mendoza, J.

21.

264 SCRA 540, 544, November 21, 1996.

22.

303 SCRA 186, 196, February 15, 1999.

23.

Art. 1165 & 1191 of the Civil Code; Davao Abaca Plantation Company, Inc. v. Dole
Philippines, Inc., 346 SCRA 682, 688, December 1, 2000. See also Villamil v. Court of
Appeals, 208 SCRA 643, 650-651, May 8, 1992; Robleza v. Court of Appeals , 174 SCRA
354, 363, June 28, 1989.

24.

11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides: "SEC. 11.

Misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an
action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately."

25.

7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, states: "SEC 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable

parties. Parties in interest without whom no nal determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."

26.

8, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides: "SEC. 8. Necessary party . A necessary party
is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief
is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action."

27.

Agro Conglomerates, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 450, 460, December 18, 2000.

28.

Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, 181 SCRA 687, 689, January 30, 1990.

29.

Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 203, 211, September 30, 1988.

30.

170 SCRA 274, 285, February 13, 1989.

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