106-Wells Fargo Bank and Union vs. Collector 70 Phil 325
106-Wells Fargo Bank and Union vs. Collector 70 Phil 325
CIR
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States Supreme Court in four cases (Farmers Loan & Trust Company vs. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204; 74 Law. ed.,
371; Baldwin vs. Missouri, 281 U.S., 586; 74 Law. ed., 1056, Beidler vs. South Carolina Tax Commission 282 U.
S., 1; 75 Law. ed., 131; First National Bank of Boston vs. Maine, 284 U. S., 312; 52 S. Ct., 174, 76 Law. ed., 313;
77 A. L. R., 1401), to the effect that an inheritance tax can be imposed with respect to intangibles only by the State
where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death, and that, under the due-process clause, the State in
which a corporation has been incorporated has no power to impose such tax if the shares of stock in such
corporation are owned by a non-resident decedent. It is to be observed, however, that in a later case (Burnet vs.
Brooks, 288 U. S., 378; 77 Law. ed., 844), the United States Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Federal
Government to impose an inheritance tax on the transmission, by death of a non-resident, of stock in a domestic
(America) corporation, irrespective of the situs of the corresponding certificates of stock. But it is contended that
the doctrine in the foregoing case is not applicable, because the due-process clause is directed at the State and not
at the Federal Government, and that the federal or national power of the United States is to be determined in
relation to other countries and their subjects by applying the principles of jurisdiction recognized in international
relations. Be that as it may, the truth is that the due-process clause is "directed at the protection of the individual
and he is entitled to its immunity as much against the state as against the national government." (Curry vs.
McCanless, 307 U. S., 357, 370; 83 Law. ed., 1339, 1349.) Indeed, the rule laid down in the four cases relied upon
by the appellant was predicated on a proper regard for the relation of the states of the American Union, which
requires that property should be taxed in only one state and that jurisdiction to tax is restricted accordingly. In other
words, the application to the states of the due-process rule springs from a proper distribution of their powers and
spheres of activity as ordained by the United States Constitution, and such distribution is enforced and protected by
not allowing one state to reach out and tax property in another. And these considerations do not apply to the
Philippines. Our status rests upon a wholly distinct basis and no analogy, however remote, cam be suggested in the
relation of one state of the Union with another or with the United States. The status of the Philippines has been
aptly defined as one which, though a part of the United States in the international sense, is, nevertheless, foreign
thereto in a domestic sense. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244, 341.)
At any rate, we see nothing of consequence in drawing any distinct between the operation and effect of the dueprocess clause as it applies to the individual states and to the national government of the United States. The
question here involved is essentially not one of due-process, but of the power of the Philippine Government to tax.
If that power be conceded, the guaranty of due process cannot certainly be invoked to frustrate it, unless the law
involved is challenged, which is not, on considerations repugnant to such guaranty of due process of that of the
equal protection of the laws, as, when the law is alleged to be arbitrary, oppressive or discriminatory.
Originally, the settled law in the United States is that intangibles have only one situs for the purpose of inheritance
tax, and that such situs is in the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death. But this rule has, of late, been
relaxed. The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, upon which the rule rests, has been described as a mere "fiction
of law having its origin in consideration of general convenience and public policy, and cannot be applied to limit or
control the right of the state to tax property within its jurisdiction" (State Board of Assessors vs. Comptoir National
D'Escompte, 191 U. S., 388, 403, 404), and must "yield to established fact of legal ownership, actual presence and
control elsewhere, and cannot be applied if to do so result in inescapable and patent injustice." (Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. vs. Virginia, 280 U. S., 83, 91-92) There is thus a marked shift from artificial postulates of law,
formulated for reasons of convenience, to the actualities of each case.
An examination of the adjudged cases will disclose that the relaxation of the original rule rests on either of two
fundamental considerations: (1) upon the recognition of the inherent power of each government to tax persons,
properties and rights within its jurisdiction and enjoying, thus, the protection of its laws; and (2) upon the principle
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that as o intangibles, a single location in space is hardly possible, considering the multiple, distinct relationships
which may be entered into with respect thereto. It is on the basis of the first consideration that the case of Burnet
vs. Brooks, supra, was decided by the Federal Supreme Court, sustaining the power of the Government to impose
an inheritance tax upon transmission, by death of a non-resident, of shares of stock in a domestic (America)
corporation, regardless of the situs of their corresponding certificates; and on the basis of the second consideration,
the case of Cury vs. McCanless, supra.
In Burnet vs. Brooks, the court, in disposing of the argument that the imposition of the federal estate tax is
precluded by the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment, held:
The point, being solely one of jurisdiction to tax, involves none of the other consideration raised by
confiscatory or arbitrary legislation inconsistent with the fundamental conceptions of justice which are
embodied in the due-process clause for the protection of life, liberty, and property of all persons citizens
and friendly aliens alike. Russian Volunteer Fleet vs. United States, 282 U. S., 481, 489; 75 Law ed., 473,
476; 41 S. Ct., 229; Nicholas vs. Coolidge, 274 U. S., 531; 542, 71 Law ed., 1184, 1192; 47 S. Ct., 710; 52
A. L. R., 1081; Heiner vs. Donnon, 285 U.S., 312, 326; 76 Law ed., 772, 779; 52 S. Ct., 358. If in the
instant case the Federal Government had jurisdiction to impose the tax, there is manifestly no ground for
assailing it. Knowlton vs. Moore, 178 U.S., 41, 109; 44 Law. ed., 969, 996; 20 S. Ct., 747; MaGray vs.
United States, 195 U.S., 27, 61; 49 Law. ed., 78; 97; 24 S. Ct., 769; 1 Ann. Cas., 561; Flint vs. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S., 107, 153, 154; 55 Law. ed., 389, 414, 415; 31 S. Ct., 342; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1312;
Brushaber vs. Union p. R. Co., 240 U.S., 1, 24; 60 Law. ed., 493, 504; 36 S. Ct., 236; L. R. A., 1917 D; 414,
Ann. Cas, 1917B, 713; United States vs. Doremus, 249 U. S., 86, 93; 63 Law. ed., 439, 496; 39 S. Ct., 214.
(Emphasis ours.)
And, in sustaining the power of the Federal Government to tax properties within its borders, wherever its owner
may have been domiciled at the time of his death, the court ruled:
. . . There does not appear, a priori, to be anything contrary to the principles of international law, or hurtful
to the polity of nations, in a State's taxing property physically situated within its borders, wherever its
owner may have been domiciled at the time of his death. . . .
As jurisdiction may exist in more than one government, that is, jurisdiction based on distinct grounds the
citizenship of the owner, his domicile, the source of income, the situs of the property efforts have been
made to preclude multiple taxation through the negotiation of appropriate international conventions. These
endeavors, however, have proceeded upon express or implied recognition, and not in denial, of the
sovereign taxing power as exerted by governments in the exercise of jurisdiction upon any one of these
grounds. . . . (See pages 396-397; 399.)
In Curry vs. McCanless, supra, the court, in deciding the question of whether the States of Alabama and Tennessee
may each constitutionally impose death taxes upon the transfer of an interest in intangibles held in trust by an
Alabama trustee but passing under the will of a beneficiary decedent domiciles in Tennessee, sustained the power
of each State to impose the tax. In arriving at this conclusion, the court made the following observations:
In cases where the owner of intangibles confines his activity to the place of his domicile it has been found
convenient to substitute a rule for a reason, cf. New York ex rel., Cohn vs. Graves, 300 U.S., 308, 313; 81
Law. ed., 666, 670; 57 S. Ct., 466; 108 A. L. R., 721; First Bank Stock Corp. vs. Minnesota, 301 U. S., 234,
241; 81 Law. ed., 1061, 1065; 57 S. Ct., 677; 113 A. L. R., 228, by saying that his intangibles are taxed at
their situs and not elsewhere, or perhaps less artificially, by invoking the maxim mobilia sequuntur
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personam. Blodgett vs. Silberman, 277 U.S., 1; 72 Law. ed., 749; S. Ct., 410, supra; Baldwin vs. Missouri,
281 U. S., 568; 74 Law. ed., 1056; 50 S. Ct., 436; 72 A. L. R., 1303, supra, which means only that it is the
identify owner at his domicile which gives jurisdiction to tax. But when the taxpayer extends his activities
with respect to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit of the laws of another
state, in such a way as to bring his person or properly within the reach of the tax gatherer there, the reason
for a single place of taxation no longer obtains, and the rule even workable substitute for the reasons may
exist in any particular case to support the constitutional power of each state concerned to tax. Whether we
regard the right of a state to tax as founded on power over the object taxed, as declared by Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316; 4 Law. ed., 579, supra, through dominion over
tangibles or over persons whose relationships are source of intangibles rights, or on the benefit and
protection conferred by the taxing sovereignty, or both, it is undeniable that the state of domicile is not
deprived, by the taxpayer's activities elsewhere, of its constitutional jurisdiction to tax, and consequently
that there are many circumstances in which more than one state may have jurisdiction to impose a tax and
measure it by some or all of the taxpayer's intangibles. Shares or corporate stock be taxed at the domicile of
the shareholder and also at that of the corporation which the taxing state has created and controls; and
income may be taxed both by the state where it is earned and by the state of the recipient's domicile.
protection, benefit, and power over the subject matter are not confined to either state. . . .(p. 1347-1349.)
. . . We find it impossible to say that taxation of intangibles can be reduced in every case to the mere
mechanical operation of locating at a single place, and there taxing, every legal interest growing out of all
the complex legal relationships which may be entered into between persons. This is the case because in
point of actuality those interests may be too diverse in their relationships to various taxing jurisdictions to
admit of unitary treatment without discarding modes of taxation long accepted and applied before the
Fourteen Amendment was adopted, and still recognized by this Court as valid. (P. 1351.)
We need not belabor the doctrines of the foregoing cases. We believe, and so hold, that the issue here involved is
controlled by those doctrines. In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled therein. And besides, the certificates of stock have remained in this country up to the
time when the deceased died in California, and they were in possession of one Syrena McKee, secretary of the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, to whom they have been delivered and indorsed in blank. This
indorsement gave Syrena McKee the right to vote the certificates at the general meetings of the stockholders, to
collect dividends, and dispose of the shares in the manner she may deem fit, without prejudice to her liability to the
owner for violation of instructions. For all practical purposes, then, Syrena McKee had the legal title to the
certificates of stock held in trust for the true owner thereof. In other words, the owner residing in California has
extended here her activities with respect to her intangibles so as to avail herself of the protection and benefit of the
Philippine laws. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Philippine Government to tax must be upheld.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.