Hospicio de San Jose vs. Dar
Hospicio de San Jose vs. Dar
ISSUE
IS the land transfer under the
PD 27 and CARL can be
considered as conventional
Sale under Civil Laws?
RULING
No. It is a Forced Sale.
1. The obligation arises by compulsion of law Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibits the sale under any consideration of the lands donated to the
Hospicio. But the land transfers mandated under P.D. No. 27 cannot be considered a conventional sale under our civil laws.Generally, sale arises out of
a contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent.[13] Consent implies an act of
volition in entering into the agreement. The absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable.In this case, the deprivation of the
Hospicios property did not arise as a consequence of the Hospicios consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on
one hand, and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract that is to serve ultimately as
the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27.
No. It contemplates a conventional sale. Therefore, it cannot be exempted from PD 27 or CARP where the sale involved is forced sale. The prohibition
does not apply.
1. The word sale pertains to its concept in civil law with the consent being present The contemporaneous construction of Section 4 indicates that the
prohibition intended by the crafters of the law pertained only to conventional sales, and not forced sales. The law was promulgated in 1925, or when
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was in effect. The provisions in the Civil Code referring to forced sales were not derived from the Spanish Civil Code.
On the other hand, the consensual nature of the contract of sale, and of contracts in general, is recognized under the Spanish Civil Code. Under Article
1261 of the Spanish Civil Code, there is no contract unless the consent of the contracting parties exists.Evidently, the word sale, as contemplated by
the framers of the law in 1925, pertains to its concept in civil law, with the requisite of consent being present. It cannot refer to sales or dispositions that
arise by operation of law, such as through judicial execution, or, as in this case, expropriation.Thus, we can hardly characterize the acquisition of the
subject properties from the Hospicio for the benefit of the tenants as a sale, within the contemplation of Section 4 of Act No. 3239. The transfer arises
from compulsion of law, and not the desire of any parties. Even if the Hospicio had voluntarily offered to surrender its properties to agrarian reform, the
resulting transaction would not be considered as a conventional sale, since the obligation is created not out of the mandate of the parties, but the will of
the law.(Note: The court refused to rule that Section 4 of Act 3239 is repealed. Instead, it ruled on non-applicability of the prohibition in s.4, Act 3239.)
No.
We have held that the States exercise of police powers may prevail over obligations imposed by private contracts. Especially in point is Kabiling v.
NHA,[33] wherein a law authorizing the expropriation of properties in favor of qualified squatter families was challenged on the basis of the nonimpairment clause. The Court held:
The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the
comprehensive development plans for this depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the police power of the State. The police
power of the State has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers." It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measure to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.
The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals and
general welfare.[34]