Professional Documents
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Ariel v. Orlando
Ariel v. Orlando
b.
Section 4 of the IRR lists the following persons as those authorized to carry their dutyissued firearms outside their residences, even without a PTCFOR, whenever they are on duty:
SECTION 4. Authority of Personnel of Certain Civilian Government
Entities and Guards of Private Security Agencies, Company Guard Forces and
Government Guard Forces to Carry Firearms. The personnel of the following
civilian agencies commanding guards of private security agencies, company
guard forces and government guard forces are authorized to carry their duty
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issued firearms whenever they are on duty detail subject to the specific
guidelines provided in Sec. 6 hereof:
a. Guards of the National Bureau of Prisons, Provincial and
City Jails;
b. Members of the Bureau of Customs Police, Philippine Ports
Authority Security Force, and Export Processing Zones Authority
Police Force; and x
c. Guards of private security agencies, company guard forces,
and government guard forces.
Section 5 of the guidelines, on the other hand, enumerates persons who have the authority
to carry firearms outside their residences, viz:
5.
b.
c.
d.
e.
It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not one of those
authorized to carry firearms outside their residences unless armed with the appropriate PTCFOR
under the Guidelines.4[45]
However, we find merit in respondents contention that the authority of Aguillon to carry
his firearm outside his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866 but,
rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local Government Code (LGC).
In People v. Monton,5[46] the house of Mariano Montonthe Barrio Captain of Bacao,
General Trias, Cavitewas raided, and an automatic carbine with one long magazine containing
several rounds of ammunition was found hidden under a pillow covered with a mat. He was
charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm, but this Court acquitted him on the basis
of Section 88(3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337(B.P. 337), the LGC of 1983, which reads:
In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall
be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearms within his territorial
jurisdiction subject to existing rules and regulations on the possession and
carrying of firearms.
Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, repealed B.P. 337. It retained the foregoing
provision as reflected in its Section 389 (b), viz:
CHAPTER 3 - THE PUNONG BARANGAY
SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions.
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(b) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay
shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial
jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations.
Provincial Prosecutor Dusabans standpoint on this matter is correct. All the guidelines
and rules cited in the instant Petition refers to civilian agents, private security guards, company
guard forces and government guard forces. These rules and guidelines should not be applied to
Aguillon, as he is neither an agent nor a guard. As barangay captain, he is the head of a local
government unit; as such, his powers and responsibilities are properly outlined in the LGC. This
law specifically gives him, by virtue of his position, the authority to carry the necessary firearm
within his territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner does not deny that when he found Aguillon openly
carrying a rifle, the latter was within his territorial jurisdiction as the captain of the barangay.
In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, this Court will give credence to the
finding and determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary investigation.6[47]
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This Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the
Ombudsman's investigatory powers.7[48] It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such
discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant this Courts reversal of the Ombudsmans
findings.8[49] This, petitioner has failed to do.
The Court hereby rules that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was no probable cause to hold respondent Aguillon
for trial.
The Dissent contends that probable cause was already established by facts of this case,
which show that Aguillon was found carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence without a
PTCFOR. Thus, Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal Complaint. However, even though Aguillon did not possess a PTCFOR,
he had the legal authority to carry his firearm outside his residence, as required by P.D. 1866 as
amended by R.A. 8294. This authority was granted to him by Section 389 (b) of the LGC of
1991, which specifically carved out an exception to P.D. 1866.
Following the suggestion of the Dissent, prosecutors have the authority to disregard
existing exemptions, as long as the requirements of the general rule apply. This should not be the
case. Although the Dissent correctly declared that the prosecutor cannot peremptorily apply a
statutory exception without weighing it against the facts and evidence before him, we find that
the facts of the case prove that there is no probable cause to charge Aguillon with the crime of
illegal possession of firearm.
In interpreting Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, the Dissent found that the factual
circumstances of the present case show that the conditions set forth in the law have not been met.
Thus, the exemption should not apply.
Contrary to the allegation of the dissent, there is no question as to the fact that Aguillon
was within his territorial jurisdiction when he was found in possession of his rifle.
The authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their
territorial jurisdiction is necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within the
barangays. Owing to the similar functions, that is, to keep peace and order, this Court deems
that, like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as a peace officer that must be
discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer, a barangay captain may be called by his
constituents, at any time, to assist in maintaining the peace and security of his barangay.9[50] As
long as Aguillon is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong
barangayto maintain peace and order.
As to the last phrase in Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, stating that the exception it
carved out is subject to appropriate rules and regulations, suffice it to say that although P.D. 1866
was not repealed, it was modified by the LGC by specifically adding to the exceptions found in
the former. Even the IRR of P.D. 1866 was modified by Section 389 (b) of the LGC as the latter
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provision already existed when Congress enacted the LGC. Thus, Section 389 (b) of the LGC of
1991 added to the list found in Section 3 of the IRR of P.D. 1866, which enumerated the persons
given the authority to carry firearms outside of residence without an issued permit. The phrase
subject to appropriate rules and regulations found in the LGC refers to those found in the IRR of
the LGC itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866 and not those that it has already amended.
Indeed, petitioners mere allegation does not establish the fact that Aguillon was drunk at
the time of his arrest. This Court, however, is alarmed at the idea that government officials, who
are not only particularly charged with the responsibility to maintain peace and order within their
barangays but are also given the authority to carry any form of firearm necessary to perform
their duty, could be the very same person who would put their barangays in danger by carelessly
carrying high-powered firearms especially when they are not in full control of their senses.
While this Court does not condone the acts of Aguillon, it cannot order the prosecutor to
file a case against him since there is no law that penalizes a local chief executive for imbibing
liquor while carrying his firearm. Neither is there any law that restricts the kind of firearms that
punong barangays may carry in the performance of their peace and order functions.
Unfortunately, it also appears that the term peace and order function has not been adequately
defined by law or appropriate regulations.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor dated 10 September 2008, as well as the Resolution and the Order of
the Office of the Ombudsman dated 17 February 2009 and 23 July 2009, respectively.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives for whatever appropriate action they may deem warranted by the
statements in this Decision regarding the adequacy of laws governing the carrying of firearms by
local chief executives.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.