Case Digest
Case Digest
Caunca v. Salazar
GR NO. L-2690, January 01, 1949
FACTS:
Estelita Flores, who is an orphan and illiterate, is working to Julia Salazar, in which the latter is
running the Far Eastern Employment Bureau. Estrelita wanted to leave the house of Julia Salazar and to
go along with her cousin Bartolome Caunca, but Julia Salazar (resp) and Estrella Justro (resp) did not
allow Estrelita to leave without paying first the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other
transportation expenses of Estelita from Buruanga to Manila.
Estrelita did not leave the house of Julia Salazar despite the fact that no physical force has been
used against her. Bartolome testified that Estrelita did not leave the house because the respondents
opposed about it. Moreover, due to Estrelitas low mentality and social superiority, the respondents have
successfully deprived Estelita of her personal liberty and of the freedom to go with her cousin.
From this, Bartolome, in behalf of Estrelita Flores, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
WON an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?
RULING:
No. An employment agency has no right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave.
In this case, Estelita is restrained of her personal liberty and not free to go with her cousin at her
will.
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee has
no power to curtail the freedom of movement of said employee. The fact that power to control said
freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for
jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a
fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business
enterprise.
A maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she has not yet paid the amount
advanced for her transportation from the province, by an employment agency which was then effectively
detaining her because of the moral duress extended on her.
The individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
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but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that:
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The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by,
in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights,
the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with
respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men
are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women
domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or
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It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment.
From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided
by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic
policy to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making
authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
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of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed
Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not
mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as
manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government.
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not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as
a controlling economic way of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No. 25 has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In pursuant to the
provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, the provincial governor issued
Executive Order No. 2 directing all Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
Petitioners challenge the validity of this Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
RULING:
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is constitutional.