Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 2015

Volume 1 Fall 2015
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
GEOPOLITICAL REVIEW
Perspectives on Strategic Cooperation
in the Eastern Meditteranean
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EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
GEOPOLITICAL REVIEW
Volume 1 Fall 2015
CONTENTS
ESSAY
Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Strategic Relations
Phoivos Klokkaris
ARTICLES
The Geostrategic Position of Cyprus:
Israels Prospect for Strategic Depth in the Eastern Mediterranean
Petros Savvides
The Israeli-Cypriot Relations under the Law of the Sea
Nicholas A. Ioannides
The New Geopolitical Landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean:
the Israeli Perception
Zenonas Tziarras
6
21
32
The Geopolitical Importance of the Eastern Mediterranean Airspace

Panayiotis Hadjipavlis
44
Strategic Surveillance in the Eastern Mediterranean

Athanasios Potsis
61
Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review (EMGR)

Editor: Petros Savvides, [email protected]
Assistant Editor: Michalis Kontos, [email protected]
Provisional Editorial Board:
Andreas Theophanous, University of Nicosia, Cyprus
Petros Savvides, CEIA, University of Nicosia, Cyprus
Michalis Kontos, University of Nicosia, Cyprus
ISSN print: ISSN 2421-8057
ISSN online: ISSN 2421-8065
URL: http://www.emgr.unic.ac.cy/
Journal: The Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review is an annual scholarly journal published
by the Center for European and International Affairs of the University of Nicosia, that seeks to
encourage scholarship on historical and contemporary issues which affect and influence the
Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East as well as European and global affairs. It intends to
facilitate the publication of high-quality research contributions that examine and analyse
perspectives and questions that pertain to a wide range of disciplines such as geopolitics,
economics, political science, history, diplomacy, international law, security, defence, intelligence,
political geography, and other related fields.
Copyright: 2015 Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia.
Article Copyright: 2015 the Authors.
All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright owner. Requests for
such permissions may be addressed to the Editor.
Personal use: The reproduction of any essay or article is permitted only for the purpose of
private research, on the condition that this will be used solely for personal use. The public use
of the contents of the journal is strictly prohibited without the written permission of the
copyright owner.
Disclaimer: The responsibility for opinions and statements expressed in the essays and the
articles belong to their authors and not to the editors, the advisory board, the copyright
owner, the Center for European and International Affairs or the University of Nicosia.
Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review
Center for European and International Affairs
University of Nicosia
P.O. Box 24005, CY-1700 Nicosia, Cyprus
t. +357 22841600, f. +357 22357964
http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy
The publication of the first volume

of the journal was made possible
with the generous support of
Agora Dialogue
http://agora-dialogue.com
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Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review Vol. 1 (Fall 2015), iii-iv.
A Note from Professor Andreas Theophanous,

Executive Chairman of the Center
for European and International Affairs,
The Center for European and International Affairs is an independent non-profitmaking think-tank of the University of Nicosia. Since its establishment in 1993
the Center (formerly known as Research Center-Intercollege), has sought to
advance academic and policy-oriented research, contribute to the study and
analysis of important economic, political, social and strategic issues of concern
to Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the European Union. These include
issues of European political and economic integration, ethnic conflict and
governance in biethnic and multiethnic societies, political economy, themes
revolving around Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Not
surprisingly issues involving Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean have
always received a substantial share of attention.
This work has been advanced though the engagement in national,
European and international research projects, the organization of international
symposia, conferences, round-table discussions, seminars, as well as the
publication of books, policy-papers, studies, conference papers and research
reports. The Center aims at further enhancing strategic thinking in Cyprus,
encourage debate and analysis of current affairs, promote a constructive
dialogue and create fruitful partnerships. It also aspires to upgrade its
contribution in issues of regional, European and international interest.
In addition to its close collaboration with the University of Nicosia for the
coordination of various BA, MA and Ph.D programs of the Department of
European Studies and International Relations the Center cooperates with other
academic and research institutions in various countries. These relationships as
well as networks of cooperation are useful as they provide opportunities for
fruitful exchange of information, knowledge and critical analysis.
For years we have been thinking to proceed with the publication of a
journal to address regional issues in a more systematic manner. The Eastern
iv
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A Note from the Executive Chairman
Mediterranean has always been a very important region as it is a meeting point

of three continents, of three major world religions, of the East and the West and
of the Economic North and South.
A modest ambition of this publication, the Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical
Review, is to contribute to a meaningful debate on these issues. Furthermore, a
major objective is to enhance policy-oriented analysis within this framework.
Last but not least there will be special emphasis on Cyprus given that
developments in the broader region have also been affecting this island-state
over time in several ways.
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Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review Vol. 1 (Fall 2015), v-vi.
Editors Note
A new scholarly endeavour in the Eastern Mediterranean
The life roots in the Levantine basin date back to the beginning of prehistoric
experience when the region began growing into a fertile nucleus of influential
civilizations, sacred religions and vital trade routes, as well as a geo-nautical pole
for ambitious conquerors and rulers that coveted the regions geo-historical
importance and affluence. The industrial revolution that accompanied the
emergence of the modern era expanded its vital geopolitical importance to the
adjacent energy-rich Middle East, while Cold War rivalry extended its
geostrategic significance as far as the Asian heartland. Today, the collapse of
regional Arab states and growing instability in the volatile Middle East and
northern Africa, as well as the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the
Levantine basin urgently prescribe the necessity for the transformation of the
Eastern Mediterranean into a vital security bastion between the three intersecting
continents. This imperative is also underlined by global challenges, such as the
developing existential complexities in relation to the European integration
process, re-emerging East-West antagonism, growing traces of clashing
civilization principles, fomenting regional nuclear proliferation, and invisibly
spreading asymmetrical threats.
In a rapidly evolving world where human reasoning, political thinking, and
geostrategic perceptions cannot always explain the intricacies and comprehend
the challenges of the post-modern era, scientific research and academic
conception acquire a new contributing role in the sophisticated intellectual
demands of contemporary life. The Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review
(EMGR), published by the Center for European and International Affairs (CEIA)
of the University of Nicosia, aspires to become a leading review of interdisciplinary scholarly analysis. It aims at examining critical questions and
complex issues that pertain to the geopolitical arena of the Eastern
Mediterranean and analysing their effects, influences and implications in the
context of Middle Eastern, Eurasian and global affairs. It envisages the attraction
of original research contributions by established as well as emerging academics,
researchers and analysts from a diverse variety of scientific disciplines and
research fields such as geopolitics, economics, political science, history,
diplomacy, international law, security, defence, intelligence, political geography,
and other related fields.
vi
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Editors Note
The first thematic issue of the journal under a provisional advisory

academic board examines the emerging perspectives of strategic cooperation
between the Republic of Cyprus and neighbouring states in areas such as
security and intelligence, the law of the sea, EEZ delimitation, bilateral political
relations, airspace security, and maritime surveillance. The second thematic
issue of the journal will concentrate on the analysis of the Cyprus Problem and
its geopolitical implications on regional and European affairs under the present
status quo and on the eventuality of a successful agreement for the solution of
the fifty-year old problem.
Petros Savvides
Editor
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Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review Vol. 1 (Fall 2015), 1-5.
Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Strategic Relations

Phoivos Klokkaris
Lieutenant-General (ret.)
The recent developments in the geopolitical environment of the Middle

East and the Eastern Mediterranean have severely affected the security
conditions and the political and financial affairs of regional states. The danger
arising from asymmetrical and conventional threats, and the growing
instability, have also raised the necessity for the development of new strategic
approaches among neighbouring states with the intention of safeguarding their
national and regional interests.
Eastern Mediterranean
The new conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly encompass the vital
issues of energy and security; factors that, directly or indirectly, influence global
peace, stability, prosperity and world economy. Recently, the Eastern Mediterranean crossroad of commerce and energy transfer has been transformed into
a region of energy production as well. The discovery of underwater
hydrocarbon resources offshore Egypt, Israel and Cyprus, and the potential
discovery in the seas of Lebanon and Greece, convert the global energy map
and create new conditions in the wider geopolitical equation. As a consequence
of this development, the geopolitical gravity of the energy-producing states
increases accordingly, as well as the security and cooperation imperatives
among them, due to the proximity of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).
Today, security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East
already burdened by longstanding and unresolved disputes such as the Cyprus
problem, the Palestinian question, the Kurdish problem, and the Arab-Israeli
conflict is undermined by unpredictable violence, barbaric acts of terror, mass
Lieutenant-General (ret.) Phoivos Klokkaris is former Deputy Chief of the Cyprus National
Guard and former Minister of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus.
2015 Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia.
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Klokkaris | Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Strategic Relations
migration, terrorist mobility, and other problems, that threaten global security,
such as: internal upheavals and bloody clashes in the Arab counties of the
region; the extermination of Christian communities by radical Islamists; the
evolving inter-Moslem antagonism and clashes between Sunnies and Shias; the
radically expanding Islamic Jihad that pursues, through violence and brutality,
the formation of an Islamic State (a caliphate) founded on the moral principles
of sharia; the destabilizing role of Tayyip Erdogans Islamist Turkey.
Turkey
Ankaras ambitious national policies and precarious initiatives in the Middle
East and the Eastern Mediterranean undoubtedly cause complications and
difficulties in the region; futhemore, the objectives of the recently launched air
strikes against ISIS and PKK targets have not been clarified. Turkey indirectly
encourages and supports Islamic Jihadist action in Syria and Iraq aiming at
enhancing its political objectives against the Kurds and the Assad regime in
Syria; it wishes to see the Kurdish movement near its borders weakening, as
well as the establishment of an Islamic regime in Syria that would be friendly
to Ankara and hostile to Tehran. Its geopolitical manoeuvers have caused the
Turkish Kurds frustration, while its controversial domestic policies have
generated Western speculation regarding Ankaras reliability and devotion to
democracy; the recent cases of suppressing the freedom of speech and other
liberties by the despotic administration of Erdogan have strengthened this
belief. Beyond its long-term disputes with Greece, Cyprus and Armenia,
Ankaras hegemonic tendencies and ambition to become a regional power and
leader of the Moslem world in the Middle East, have also aggravated its foreign
relations with other neighbouring states such as Syria, Iran, Israel, Egypt.
Turkey aggressively contests 28% of Greek EEZ and almost 70% of Cypriot
EEZ, in violation of international law and the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although it had not signed the UNCLOS
Agreement, it questions the fact that the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean and
in the Kastellorizo complex can be entitled to their own continental shelf and EEZ
rights; this argument was the main reason for its refusal to sign the Agreement.
Ankara illegally claims rights in the Aegean Sea east of the 25E meridian
(essentially half of the Aegean), as well as all the sea area between Rhodes and
Cyprus, where it illegally incites the delimitation of its EEZ with Egypt without
consideration of the Greek and Cypriot EEZs. It also arbitrarily and irrationally
claims that Cyprus has no EEZ rights west of the 321618E meridian.
Turkey refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), a European
Union member state, and questions its EEZ rights as they derive from the
UNCLOS 1982 articles about island states. It also disputes the RoCs right for the
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Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 3
exploitation of its hydrocarbon resources before the final settlement of the

Cyprus Problem, which was actually created by itself with its military invasion
of 1974 and the continuing illegal occupation of the northern territory of the
Republic. Since 2011, Ankara through the aggressive deployment of its navy
and illegal exploration activities by research vessels K. Piri Reis (2011) and
Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa (2013-2015) in the Cypriot EEZ pursues a policy of de
facto usurping the RoCs EEZ. Moreover, it foments the channeling of Eastern
Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources to Europe through Turkey and militates
against the prospect of the creation of an energy corridor connecting Israel,
Cyprus and Greece with the rest of Europe. Instead, Ankara is interested in
transforming itself into a regulating energy hub with important political and
financial benefits through which hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian Sea,
Norther Iraq, Eastern Mediterranean and Russia will be transferred to Europe.
Furthermore, the rupture of Turkish-Israeli relations is linked to Ankaras effort
to undertake a protectors role for Palestinian rights, and reflects its ambition to
develop a hegemonic role among the Arab-Moslem states; an endeavour that
has failed, at least for the time being.
Cyprus-Greece-Israel
The emerging geopolitical situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (hydrocarbon
resources, turbulence in the Arab World, islamic fundamentalism, Turkish
hegemonic ambitions), in correlation with the Ukrainian crisis that jeopardizes
Russian natural gas flow to Europe, have created a window of opportunity for
the development of new strategic partnerships between regional state actors.
Especially, there is a growing imperative for cooperation between Cyprus,
Greece and Israel, principally for security reasons and other which relate to the
effective exploitation of the three states hydrocarbon resources. The existing
regional conditions and the consequent convergence of interests comprise the
foundation for the development of strong bonds and a viable cooperation. These
three parties, the only non-Moslem states in the Eastern Mediterranean, share
democratic systems of governance and a Western cultural identity; they may
play a key role for the stabilization of the region and for the containment of
threatening phenomena such as Jihadism, global terrorism, and anti-Western
hatred. Their potentially energy-rich EEZs provide for a geographic bond that
facilitates the development of a new energy axis (Israel-Cyprus-Greece-EU) that
could contribute significantly to EUs energy needs and energy security. The
common energy interests the EU shares with these natural gas producing states
also provides the basis for the implementation of such an axis, either in the form
of a natural gas pipeline or an LNG plant.
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Klokkaris | Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Strategic Relations
The core idea for the development of such a tripartite, or even multiparty,
cooperation is founded on various levels of approach:
Energy Security: Apart from the development of a joint energy axis, another
promising perspective is the joint exploitation of neighbouring energy reserves,
with mutual benefits for the cooperating parties. There are common security
needs deriving from the unstable political environment of the Eastern
Mediterranean (especially due to the emergence of terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism), as well as due to the Turkish tendency for revisionism. The
latter should be contained through the development of a joint deterrence
strategy, based on a reliable security system.
Military Cooperation: The military capacity of these states is the most significant
factor that could create and safeguard the security conditions necessary for the
achievement of uninterrupted exploitation of regional energy resources, and the
prevention of crises. Coordination of cooperation and action, common military
planning and joint training could maximize the effectiveness of Greece and
Israels existing military capabilities and technological air-naval means. Despite
Cypruss urgent need for reinforcement of its naval and air capabilities, the use
of its infrastructure (ports, airports, early warning systems) could be vital for the
protection of regional energy production and distribution facilities.
Cooperation in other areas: political cooperation, tourism, environment,
telecommunication, health system, search and rescue, military technology, trade, etc.
The benefits of such a cooperation can be multiple for all three states in all
areas and, particularly, those of security and energy. Greece and Cyprus will
strengthen their capability of deterrence against Turkish aggressiveness, while
their geopolitical gravity as EU member states (with a role in Europes energy
supply and security) would increase. Similarly Israel, which is surrounded by
Moslem states and possesses limited air space, will gain strategic depth towards
the Mediterranean and effective access to the EU through Cyprus and Greece.
The use of the two countries sea and air space may effectively serve the
operational needs of the Israeli Air Force in the fields of training, exercises and
operational effectiveness; in the past, before the decline of Israeli-Turkish
relations, these vital needs were offered by Turkey.
The prerequisites for the effective, long-term implementation of a tripartite
strategic cooperation between Cyprus, Greece and Israel are the following:
mutual contribution among all contracting parties and coordination of their
actions; development of programs and mechanisms for rapid and effective
implementation of this cooperation; decisiveness in the realization of the
cooperation, solidarity and avoidance of any unilateral actions inconsistent with
the interests of any one of the three parties; delimitation of Greek EEZ with
Cyprus and Egypt; safeguard of the Republic of Cyprus independent existence.
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Any settlement of the Cyprus Problem that would place the island under the
strategic control of Turkey would contradict with the interests of Greece, Israel,
and other states in the region (such as Egypt), and would overturn the evolving
multilateral strategy in the areas of energy and security.
Conclusion
The strategic cooperation between Cyprus, Greece and Israel is both possible and
imperative for the benefit of the three states, as well as the EU, but also for the
stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean. The cooperation may also be
beneficial to Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, to the extend that these states interests
converge with those of Cyprus, Greece and Israel; the Cairo joint declaration
between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, concluded on 3 November 2014 and the
Nicosia joint declaration of 29 April 2015 already serves these prospects. The
Republic of Cyprus and Greece may serve as a link between Israel and the Arab
World as part of the development of regional cooperation in the Eastern
Mediterranean that will contribute to peace and stability in the wider region.
Turkeys aggressive and hegemonic behavior encourages neighboring states to
cooperate for its prevention and discouragement.
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The Geostrategic Position of Cyprus:

Israels Prospect for Strategic Depth in the
Eastern Mediterranean
Petros Savvides
University of Birmingham
The article examines the geostrategic significance of the island of Cyprus in the postSecond World War era, its exclusive strategic utilization by the United Kingdom and the
United States, and the failed attempts of Nicosia to capitalize on the islands vital
geographic position. It describes how the discovery of hydrocarbon fields in the Levantine
basin introduced both Israel and Cyprus to the Eastern Mediterranean and turned into a
catalyst for bilateral cooperation in energy as well as security issues. It analyzes how the
emergence of strategic and new unconventional threats in the Middle East prescribe the
consideration of alternative security options by Jerusalem, including the prospect for the
expansion of its strategic depth in the Mediterranean.
Since antiquity the pivotal position of the island of Cyprus long thought of as
the very crossroads of three continents and its importance for access and
domination in the Eastern Mediterranean, had a catalytic influence in
transforming this strategic land,1 into a nucleus of rivalry among foreign
conquerors in the past and a geostrategic apple of discord in the modern era.
Benjamin Disraeli (1878) regarded Cyprus as the key of Western Asia,2 Henry
Petros Savvides, PhD candidate Modern History (Birmingham), MPhil History (Glasgow), is
a Defence Analyst and Research Associate of the Center for European and International
Affairs at the University of Nicosia.
1
Francis Henn, Cyprus - the Geo-strategic Dimension, Contemporary Review 289:1685 (2007),
175-181; Strategic Colonies and their Future (London: Fabian Publications and Victor Gollancz,
1945), 3-5, 27-37; A. M. Pamir, ed., Turkey and Cyprus: A Survey of the Cyprus Question with Official
Statements of the Turkish Viewpoint (London: Turkish Embassy Press Attaches Office, 1956);
Georgios Grivas (ret. General), Apomnemonevmata Agonos EOKA 1955-1959 [Memoirs of the
EOKA struggle 1955-1959], (Athens: [n. pub.], 1961), 8-11; Brednan OMalley and Ian Craig, The
Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion (London: Tauris, 1999), 1-7, 77-86.
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Kissinger (1957) as a staging post for the Middle East,3 and John Kennedy
(1961) considered that Cyprus real estate and strategic location are of
considerable importance to us and our allies.4
Sixty-five years after the formal rise of the Cyprus Question for selfdetermination in January 1950, as well as endless inter-communal negotiations
between 1968 and 2015, the prospect for a just, secure and viable political solution
of the Cyprus Problem5 vanished and has been substituted by a profound ambiguity
for the strategic future of the island. Today, Nicosia is faced with a pseudo-dilemma:
either to continue its strategic-less ephemeral policies and eventually submit6 to
Ankaras long-term objectives7 for the strategic control of the island and the
liquidation of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) through an Anan Plan-type solution;8
2
On 5 May 1878, the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli wrote to Queen Victoria that
If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by the Porte, and England, at the same time, enters
into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the
power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in the region, and your
Majestys Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia:
quoted in William Flavelle Monypenny and George Earl Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli,
Earl of Beaconsfield, 3 vols, (London: John Murray, 1929), II, 1163.
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper Brothers [for the
Council of Foreign Relations], 1957), 165.
Secret, John F. Kennedy to Secretary of State, National Security Action Memorandum No.
71, 22 August 1961, Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) PD00728.
5
The term Cyprus Question, which pertains to the 1950s Greek Cypriot anti-colonial claim for selfdetermination, is often confused with the term Cyprus Problem. The latter concept emerged with
the inter-communal strife of 1963-64 that ended with the secessionist creation of armed, semiautonomous Turkish Cypriot enclaves within the newly established Republic and was formalised
with the 1974 Turkish invasion and illegal occupation of 36.4% of the Republic of Cyprus soil.
6
Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,
International Security 19:1 (1994), 72-107.
The rise (electoral victory of 26 April 2015) of progressive Turkish Cypriot leader Mustapha
Akinci to the presidency of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not expected to
overcome Turkeys acute positions on critical issues of the inter-communal negotiations: such
as Ankaras demand for guarantor rights over a European Union member state; its refusal for
demilitarization and its insistence for the presence of Turkish forces on the island; its demand
to identify the political future and fate of the island with Turkish progress in EU negotiations;
its demand to control the perspective export of Cypriot hydrocarbon resources by a pipeline
through Turkish soil.
Klearchos A. Kyriakides, Legitimising the Illegitimate: The Origins and Objectives of the
Annan Plan, in The Case Against the Annan Plan, ed. Van Coufoudakis and Klearchos
Kyriakides (London: Lobby for Cyprus, 2004), 17-44, 45-48; Claire Palley, An International
Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-Generals Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004
(Oxford and Portland OR: Hart, 2005); Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond, ed.
Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009).
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Savvides | The Geostrategic Position of Cyprus
or awake from the self-inflicted coma of the past and formulate a strategy for the
future9 by safeguarding the existence of the Republic and encouraging strategic
cooperations with states that have direct interests in the region (Israel, France,
Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom). Such a strategy will not only
enhance the Republics geopolitical gravity as a peaceful predictable factor of stability
in the wider volatile and unstable region, but will also raise the cost against the
lawless tactics of Ankara in the Eastern Mediterranean.
A strategic asset for London and Washington

Since its establishment in August 1960, the young Republic not only failed to
capitalize the importance of its geographic position, but also turned a blind eye
to the extensive utilization of the island both by the United Kingdom and the
United States for important strategic purposes.10 Under the pretext of Sovereign
Base Area (SBA) rights, the two British military bases as well as many other
Retained Sites have been utilized for strategic activities on many occasions
without the knowledge and consent of the Republic.11 During the Cold War,
Cypriot soil had been secretly used for the storage of British Red Beard (15/25 kt)
9
Michalis Kontos, Strategic Security and Survival Planning of the Republic of Cyprus: The
Choices of the Past and the Prospects of the Future, in E Kypros se Nea Epochi: Geostratigikes
Parametroi, Economia, Exoteriki Politiki [Cyprus in a new era: geostrategic parameters,
economy, foreign policy], ed. Christina Ioannou et al. (Nicosia: Hippassus, 2014), 81-98.
10
The United States has a general interest in the availability of Cyprus for use by the United
States and its allies for strategic purposes: Secret, National Security Council, US Policy
toward Cyprus: Contingencies and Options, 7 July 1971, 14, DNSA PR00736; also Petros
Savvides, The strategic value of the British Bases in Cyprus [in Greek], Phileleftheros, 30
September 2014, 15.
11
The three main US ELINT stations operating on Cypriot soil from the early 1950s until the
Turkish invasion of 1974 were:
i. CIA Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Med Bureau at Karavas (since 1949);
ii. NSA Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) Station USN-16, known as Naval Facility
(NAVFAC) Nicosia, at Yerolakkos (since 1950), which was initially (1950-1957) operated by the
CIA as USF-61 under the cover-name Project APPLESOUCE: National Security Agency,
Confidential, [writer not declassified], The History of Applesauce, Cryptologic Spectrum 3:1
(1973), 9-12; NSA, Top Secret, Director of Naval Intelligence to Director of Strategic Plans Division,
Evacuation of Applesauce Personnel in Emergency, 16 January 1952, DNSA HN00689;
iii. NSA United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) 14th Radio Squadron Mobile
(RSM) at Mia Milia (since 1952).
In 1968, under the presidency of Archbishop Makarios, the Government of Cyprus claimed
and achieved a ten-year agreement with Washington for the operation of US facilities on
Cypriot soil, with an annual compensation of more than one million dollars per year: Secret,
National Security Council, US Policy toward Cyprus: Contingencies and Options, 7 July
1971, 12, DNSA PR00736.
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Page 9
and later of WE.177B (450 kt) nuclear bombs,12 as a RAF forward deployment
nuclear air base,13 and as a NATO communications cell.14 It has also been utilized
as a critical Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTH-R) location for the monitoring of
strategic activities in the Asian heartland15 (Figures 1 and 2), as an invaluable
hub for military intelligence gathering across the region16 for the British
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the American
National Security Agency (NSA)17 (Figure 3), an air base for USAF U-218 strategic
reconnaissance missions,19 and lately for the first time as a combat base for
RAF Tornado air strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.20
12
Tom Rhodes, Britain Kept Secret Nuclear Arsenal on Cyprus, The Sunday Times, 31
December 2000.
13
[] a RAF base committed to NATO but publicly identified with CENTO: Secret,
National Security Council, US Policy toward Cyprus: Contingencies and Options, 7 July
1971, 12, DNSA PR00736. References about the deployment of nuclear weapons in Cyprus are
found in the following files: Top Secret, Nuclear Bases, Commonwealth Relations Office
(CRO) POL 21/176/1, 1960-1963, The National Archives (TNA) DO 204/3; Top Secret,
Nuclear Weapons in Cyprus, CRO CON 14/95/1, 1960-1963, TNA DO 161/21.
14
Retained Site A6 at Cape Greco was a NATO Communications Station of the HIGH ACE
system while the A7 Site at Yailas on the Pentadaktylos Range was described as a NATO
Relay Station.
15
The first OTH Radar code-named Project Sandra was installed in Cyprus in 1963 and
was replaced in the 1970s by another OTH system code-named Cobra Shoe, that monitored
and provided early warning for strategic activities (nuclear tests, ballistic missile tests, etc.)
in the USSR and China: Peter Laurie, An Eye on the Enemy Over the Horizon, New Scientist
64:922 (7 November 1974), 420-423; Richard J. Alsbrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of
Britains Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: Harper, 2011), 321-323. The existing OTH
Pluto system, installed in 1998 and 2002-03 at Akrotiri (transmitter) and Ayios Nikolaos
(receiver), monitors strategic activities in Asia at a range of 5000+ km.
16
Nick Hopkins et al., GCHQ: Inside the Top Secret World of Britains Biggest Spy Agency,
The Guardian, 2 August 2013, 8.
17
According to the documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the NSA subsidises half of the
operational cost of British interception facilities in Cyprus: Nick Hopkins and Julian Borger,
Exclusive: NSA Pays 100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ, The Guardian, 2 August 2013, 1.
18
The CIA Detachment G of two U-2s was deployed for the first time at RAF Akrotiti in
August 1970, under Operation Even Steven. Since April 1974 a USAF U-2 detachment has
been operating from Akrotiri under Operation Olive Harvest.
19
In 2008, USAF U-2s from RAF Akrotiri were carrying out strategic reconnaissance missions
for the benefit of foreign governments; Operation Highland Warrior, covering eastern Turkey
and northern Iraq, offered intelligence for Kurdish PKK activities to the Turkish Government,
while Operation Cedar Sweep over Lebanon collected Hezbollah intelligence for the Lebanese
Government: Secret NOFORN-SIPDIS, US Embassy London, 001115 (18 April 2008), 001159
(24 April 2008), 001350 (14 May 2008), and 001412 (20 May 2008), Wikileaks:
10
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Figure 1: The map, published in the New Scientist, presents the coverage of the
OTH Cobra Shoe transmitter at Akrotiri Cyprus and the respective receiver in
Okinawa (and vice versa), for transmitter powers of 200 kW and 300 kW.
1974 New Scientist, published by Reed Business Information Ltd, England. All
Rights Reserved. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency.
Beyond its own inconspicuous use of the SBAs for half a century,21 Whitehall
exchanging terrain for technology 22 has been silently offering Cypriot soil to
Washington without the acquiescence of the Government of Cyprus (GOC); in
http://www.wikeleaks.org/cable/2008/04/08LONDON1115.html; http://www.wikeleaks.
org/cable/2008/04/08LONDON1159.html; http://www.wikeleaks.org/cable/2008/05/
08LONDON1350.html; http://www.wikeleaks.org/cable/2008/05/08LONDON1412.html, [all
accessed 19 October 2013]. Richard Norton-Taylor and David Leigh, UK Overruled on Lebanon
Spy Flights from Cyprus, Wikileaks Cables Reveal, The Guardian, 3 December 2010, 9.
20
House of Commons, Hansard Debates, 26 September 2014, Vol. 585, No. 39, Col. 1255-1366;
House of Commons, Louisa Brook-Holland and Claire Mills, ed., ISIS: The Military Response
in Iraq and Syria, SN/IA/6995, 8 December 2014, 7-14, http:// www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/sn06995.pdf [accessed 11 September 2015].
21
The decolonization of the Middle East gradually transformed Cyprus into a safe heaven
for overt and covert British communication monitoring and propaganda activities: Alsbrich,
GCHQ, 155-157, 160-163, 320-321.
22
Alsbrich, GCHQ, 7.
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11
both cases their controversial use by both the UK and the USA23 deprived Nicosia
of any political advantage. The responsibility does not pertain exclusively to
HMGs unilateral interpretation and invisible abuse of the Treaty of Establishment;24
it also derives from Nicosias misconception that under the burden of Turkish
Figure 2: The two transmitter antennae of the HF 1 MW OTH PLUTO System at

Akrotiri in the Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA) installed in 1998 (PLUTO
I antenna, height 58 m) and 2002-2003 (PLUTO II antenna, width 196 m and height
96 m) provide the capability of monitoring strategic activities in the Asian
heartland at a range of 5000+ km. 2015 Google Earth.
Figure 3: The interception facilities of the Joint Service Signal Unit (JSSU) Cyprus at
Ayios Nikolaos in the Eastern Sovereign Base Area (ESBA), jointly operated by
the services of the British Armed Forces, provide vital intelligence to the GCHQ
and the NSA from the wider Middle Eastern region. 2013 Petros Savvides.
23
Cyprus continues to remain one and irreplaceable intelligence, communications, radar and
transmission centre for Britain, the United States and NATO: D. E. Hawkins, Joint Planning
Staff, Cyprus: Review of Strategic Requirements, 7 January 1959, TNA.
24
Cyprus, Cmnd. 1093 (London: HMSO, 1960).
12
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occupation of the islands northern part any claims for the strategic use of its
territory by third parties one of which is also a guarantor power could question
its ambivalent loyalty to the West.
Failed attempts of Nicosia

Unsurprisingly, the two strategic attempts of the RoC to strengthen its security
and increase its geopolitical gravity failed. The promising adoption, between
1993-2001, of the Dogma Eniaiou Amyntikou Xorou Elladas Kyprou (DEAXEK)
[doctrine for common defense space among Greece and Cyprus]25 ultimately
collapsed when it was erroneously projected, by the Clerides Government, as a
political catalyst under the active volcano theory26 for the extraction of a
political solution, rather than as a defensive tool which would primarily
enhance the Republics military deterrence against threatening Turkish
offensive capabilities, both on the island and the southern Anatolian mainland.27
The intentional leak and mass-media promotion of the Russian S-300PMU-1
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system purchase by Nicosia eventually turned into
a missile crisis (1997-1998)28 which accompanied by Turkish threats for its
preemptive destruction and Israeli annoyance ended with a GOC retreat and
the deployment of the defensive system in Crete rather than on the Eastern
Mediterranean island. Likewise, the political expectation of Nicosia that the
strategic objective for European Union (EU) membership in 2004 would also
serve as a security shield against Ankaras hegemonic ambitions over Cyprus
as well as a catalyst in favour of a European solution soon vanished, after realizing
25
Giorgos Kentas, E Asphaleia sto Plaisio Lysis tou Kypriakou [Security in the framework of a
solution of the Cyprus Problem], (Athens: Livanis, 2013), 89-96; Aristos Aristotelous, To
Dogma tou Eniaiou Amyntikou Chorou Elladas-Kyprou [The Greece-Cyprus common defence
space dogma], (Nicosia: Cyprus Center for Strategic Studies, 1995).
26
President Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, attributes heightened US interest to
Washingtons realization that the densely militarized island is not an extinct volcano, and that
any eruption could suck in the feuding NATO allies, Greece and Turkey: Michael Theodoulou,
Divided Island Faces Critical Year of Talks, The European, 3-9 April 1997, 24. Also Andreas
Hatzikyriakos, Mr Clerides Great Dilemma [in Greek], To Vima, 23 August 1998,
http://www.tovima.gr/relatedarticles/article/?aid=102260 [accessed 26 December 2014].
27
Letter of Andreas D. Mavroyiannis [permanent representative of Cyprus to the UN] to

Secretary General, 23 February 2007, http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/
4FC90989378 EAD00C225729000290986 [accessed 13 January 2015].
28
For a chronology of the S-300PMU-1 Missile Crisis: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, The Sale of Russian S-300PMU-1 Missile Systems to Cyprus: Selected
CNS Missile Database Abstracts, http://cns.miis.edu/cyprus/abstract.htm [accessed 26
December 2014].
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13
that the EUs internal dynamics are not always compatible with the principles
of equality and justice, especially whenever Great Power interests are at stake.29
Among other causes, there are three inherent reasons that may explain both
failures. Firstly, GOCs lack of a long-term national security strategy; secondly, its
mistaken perception further burdened by the political elites incapacity of
understanding geopolitical dynamics that the limited size of the Republic,
especially in comparison to Turkey, prohibits the development of an autonomous
strategic identity, which could be enriched by strategic cooperations with regional
and other parties; thirdly, and most importantly, by the fallacious and selfentrapping political consideration that the solution of the Cyprus Problem is the
principal long-term strategic objective, and sole duty, of Nicosia. The Greek
Cypriot political fixation for a solution is primarily founded on GOC effort to avoid
any responsibility for a prospective failure of the talks, rather than an effective
negotiating strategy, with multiple options, which would uncompromisingly
adhere to the values of human rights and the principles of European and
International law. Consequently, Nicosias monolithic insistence for a solution
only succeeds in encouraging Turkish and foreign pressures and continually leads
to retreats in the bilateral talks that endanger not only the existence and continuity
of the Republic, but also the security and the future of the 80% Greek Cypriot
majority on the island.30
During the last few years, and while the quality of the inter-communal talks
continually degenerates due to Ankaras aggressive demands in the negotiations
and its militarized interventions in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)31
and the Nicosia FIR, as well as prejudiced UN negotiating tactics32 GOCs
perception regarding its potential geopolitical role in the Eastern Mediterranean
gradually began to change33 as a result of three factors: a) the early understanding
of the prospective financial and geopolitical value of its EEZ (since the CyprusEgypt delimitation agreement, February 2003); b) Nicosias effective actions
30
Phoivos Klokkaris (ret. Lieutenant-General), Tourkiki Apeili kata tou Ellinismou tis Kyprou
[Turkish threat against Cypriot Hellenism], (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2011).
31
Michalis Kontos, The Mini Crisis of September 2011: Comparative Evaluation of the
Power Indicators of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus [in Greek], National Guard and
History 31, June 2013, 19-25.
32
Achilleas Aimilianides, Michalis Kontos, Giorgos Kentas, Symademeni Trapoula: Ta Aporrita
Eggrafa ton Diapragmatefseon Christofia-Talat [Marked cards: the secret documents of the
Christophias-Talat negotiations], (Nicosia: Power, 2010).
33
Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides speech at the conference Cyprus in the New
Era, 18 June 2014, in Kypros Nea Epochi, 11-18.
14
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towards developing an active diplomatic role in the region (since the Lebanon
crisis, 2006); c) its approach to Israel after the decline of Israeli-Turkish relations34
(from the Mavi Marmara incident, May 2010).
Radical threats
Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the security of the Jewish
state and consequently the safety and prosperity of its people has been the
principal strategic concern of Jerusalem. For many decades, the conventional
military threats by the surrounding Arab countries as well as the limited geographic
size of its territory and the lack of operational space and strategic depth, were
effectively responded by a strategic doctrine that prescribed powerful armoured
and mechanized Israeli Defence Force (IDF) formations that could confront the
enemy within its own borders, under the dominance of a superior Israeli Air Force
(IAF) in the air.35 The strategic existence of Israel was further safeguarded by the
development of an independent Israeli nuclear deterrent36 in the 1960s a strategic
necessity for survival in a profoundly threatening environment.
Today, beyond the recognised conventional ballistic missile threat from Shia
Islamist Iran, as well as the unorthodox threats posed by Sunni Hamas in Gaza
and Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel may soon be faced with two types of interrelated strategic threats: Irans opaquely evolving nuclear warhead program37 and
chemical-biological38 warfare; a remote, worst-case, scenario may involve massive
saturation strikes on major Israeli cities and military bases by Iranian ballistic
missiles and Hezbollah-Hamas rockets, both with unconventional charges.
34
Banu Eligur, Crisis in Turkish-Israel Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From

Partnership to Enmity, Middle East Studies 48:3 (2012), 429-459; Oziem Tur, Turkey and
Israel in the 2000s: From Cooperation to Conflict, Israel Studies 17:3 (2012), 45-66.
35
Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, Andrew J. Bacevich, Israels Revolution in Security

Affairs, Survival 40:1 (Spring 1998): 48-67; Uri Bar-Joseph, The Paradox of israeli Power,
Survival 46:4 (Winter 2004-05), 137-156.
36
Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Peter V.
Pry, Israels Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984); Avner Cohen, Before the
Beginning: The Early History of Israels Nuclear Project, Israel Studies 3:1 (1998), 112-139.
37
Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West (Washington, DC: Regnery,
2009); Lynn E. Davies et al., Irans Nuclear Future: Critical US Policy Choices (Santa Monica,
CA: Rand, 2011); Bijan Mossavar-Ragmani, Irans Nuclear Power Programme Revisited,
Energy Politics 8:3 (1980), 189-202.
38
Harald Doornboos and Jenan Moussa, Found: The Islamic States Terror Laptop of Doom,
28 August 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terrorlaptop-of-doom/ [accessed 15 June 2015].
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15
While such contingencies may appear irrational in western thinking, recent

intelligence failures such as 9/11, the reverse impact of Arab Spring, and the
emergence of the Islamic State tend to indicate that a reliable forewarning of
threats and the concept of absolute strategic security may after all belong to the past.
Despite the technological sophistication of the intelligence community, the deep
roots and militant ideology of an evolving radical Islam are, for the time being,
beyond the comprehension of Western political-military conception and
intelligence analysis.39 While Bernard Lewis (1990)40 and Samuel Huntington
(1993)41 prophetically predicted a possible cultural-religious chasm in global
affairs and the rise of ethnic-cultural conflicts,42 it appears that the formal
appearance of conservative political Islam on institutional-state level (Turkey)
and the invisible global growth of divergent forms of ultra-militant radical Islam
(al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Muslim Brotherhood, Boko Haram, etc.), even in western
cities,43 may indeed pertain to characteristics of a prospective clash of civilizations.44
Evolving security cooperation

Amid growing over-the-horizon threats against Israel over the last two decades,
the latest discovery of extensive hydrocarbon resources in the Levantine basin
39
Petros Savvides, Jihad v Reason: The Failure of Western Intelligence in the Middle East,
In Depth [bimonthly electronic newsletter] 11:5 (October 2014), http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=413&Itemid=413 [accessed 26 August 2015].
40
Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, The Atlantic Monthly 266:3 (1990), 47-60.
41
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs 72:3 (1993), 22-49.
42
Shirleen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Jonathan Fox, Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflicts: Islam
and the West, Journal of Peace Research 38:4 (2001), 459-472; Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict
in the Late Twentieth Century: A General Theory (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).
43
Dan Bilefsky, Cartoons Ignite Cultural Combat in Denmark, The New York Times, 30
December 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/30/world/europe/30iht-islam9.html
[accessed 8 July 2015]; Ian Austen and Rick Gladstone, Gunmans Attack on Parliament
Shakes Ottawa, The New York Times, 23 October 2014, 1; Michelle Innis, Sydney Hostage
Siege Ends with Gunman and 2 Captives Dead as Police Storm Caf, The New York Times,
15 December 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/world/asia/sydney-australiahostages.html [accessed 8 January 2015]; Dan Bilefsky and Maia de la Baume, Terrorists
Strike Paris Newspaper, Leaving 12 Dead, The New York Times, 8 January 2015, 1.
44
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). The term firstly appeared in 1925 in Basil Mathews,
Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations (New York: Friendship Press, 1926).
16
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had turned, for the first time, Israeli geostrategic attention towards the sea;
Jerusalem foresaw not only the financial prospects of its EEZ, but also the strategic
potential of the Mediterranean in a dangerously unstable Middle East. Indicative of
this shift is Jerusalems interest for strengthening the Israeli Navy with state-ofthe-art nuclear-capable submarines45 and its recent approach towards EU island
member and only non-Moslem neighbouring state Cyprus.
Jerusalem, realizing after the decline of Israeli-Turkish relations the
importance of alternative options and the dominant geopolitical location of
Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, responded positively to Nicosias
approach for the delimitation of the EEZs of the two states. The signing of the
Cyprus-Israel agreement on 17 December 2010 despite Turkish threats against
Nicosia and demarches against Jerusalem46 turned into a landmark for bilateral
relations that led to the growth of diplomatic bonds and cooperation in energy
exploitation, telecommunications, tourism and art, as well as other sensitive
areas47 such as security and intelligence. The first signs of security cooperation
appeared in the area of Search and Rescue (SAR), when the initiatives of the Joint
Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC - Larnaca) in the Eastern Mediterranean were
positively responded by the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC Haifa),
ultimately bringing about, in February 2012, the signing of a bilateral agreement
for SAR cooperation. The close exchanges between the two SAR centers were
soon followed by a series of Search and Rescue Exercises (SAREX), organized
by the JRCC Larnaca and featuring the participation of Israeli Navy units. The
45
The Israeli Navy received two new AIP Dolphin 2 class submarines INS Tanin (2014)
and INS Rahav (2015) and a third one was ordered in March 2012 and is expected by 2017:
Ramit Plushnick-Masti, Israel Buys 2 Nuclear-Capable Submarines, The Washington Post, 25
August 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/
AR2006082401050.html [accessed 15 January 2015]. Yaakov Lappin, Navy Undergoing
Unprecedented Upgrade in Capabilities, Jerusalem Post, 7 August 2013, http://www.jpost.com/
Defense/Navy-undergoing-unprecedented-upgrade-in-capabilities-322294 [accessed 15
January 2015].
46
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release Regarding the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Greek Cypriot Administration and
Israel, No. 288, 21 December 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-288_-21-december-2010_press-release-regarding-the-exclusive-economic-zone-_eez_-delimitation-agreement-signedbetween-greek-cypriot-administration-and-israel.en.mfa [accessed 27 December 2014].
47
http://cyprus-mail.com/civil-protection/cyprus-and-israel-sign-agreement-civil
protection/20121221; http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-greece-cyprus-sign-energy- andwater-deal/; http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/08/08/historic-plan-for-water-and-electricity/
[all accessed 13 January 2015].
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17
first bilateral SAREX was carried out on 23 April 201348 and was followed up, on
10 April 2014, by the multinational SAREX NEMESIS-2014 with the
participation of air and naval units from Cyprus, Israel, Greece and the USA.49
The exercise was meaningfully carried out in the area of the delimitation line of
the Cypriot and Israeli EEZs Cypriot Block 12 and Israeli Leviathan 95 nm
(175 km) from the Cypriot coast. The Israeli Navy also participated in the
multinational SAREX ARGONAFTIS 2014 that was carried out in the Nicosia FIR
on 21 May 2014,50 while in a night time SAR operation (22 October 2014) for the
discovery of a small twin-engine aircraft, Israel immediately responded to the
effort with two IAF CH-53 helicopters and two C-130 airplanes.
Although Israeli interest for military cooperation with the Cypriot National
Guard (NG) was discreetly expressed to the previous administration,51 which
in its turn permitted the use of the Republics two international airports at
Larnaca and Paphos for IAF refueling and touch-and-go activities, it was the
Anastasiades Government that eventually encouraged the development of this
sensitive cooperation. Following a two-day, helicopter Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR) exercise by the IAF in the mountainous areas of Troodos on 1819 June 2013,52 the NG-IDF cooperation continued in 2014 and 2015 with three
important Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) exercises on the island,
the scenarios of which provided for IAF offensive missions against Russianmade SAM systems of the National Guard, in an intense Electronic Warfare
(EW) environment: Joint Exercise ONESILOS-GEDEON 2014 was carried out
48
The State of Israel participated with Saar 4-class missile boat INS Nitzachon and four fast
patrol boats of the Israeli Navy; the Republic of Cyprus contributed with four helicopters, two
fast patrol boats and an air coordination aircraft: http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/CJRCC.nsf/
All/4FE4F75278324DDBC2257C78002F530E [accessed 03 January 2015].
49
The multinational aeronautical exercise between Cyprus, Greece, Israel and the United
States prescribed the coordination between JRCC Larnaca, JRCC Piraeus, RCC Haifa, and
NAVEUR/PRCC in Naples Italy in the conduct of SAR operations in the EEZs of Cyprus and
Israel. The tabletop phase of the exercise was carried out on 26 February 2014: LCCC NICOSIA
NOTAM A0230/14; http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/mod.nsf/All/2242EF10C1ECC3EDC
2257C910041FC91; http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/mod.nsf/all/75FE7EEE0FAF9C43C2257CB
40021E967; http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/CJRCC.nsf/All/361A60F5101E6C33C2257CB4001
ED5A7 [all accessed 03 January 2015].
50
The Israeli Navy participated with Saar 4.5-class missile boat INS Tarshish and four fast
patrol boats: LCCC NICOSIA NOTAMS A0404/14 and A405/14.
51
The leftist government of Demetris Christofias (28 February 2008 - 28 February 2013).
52
LCCC NICOSIA NOTAM A0533/13.
18
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on 11 February 201453 while ONESILOS-GEDEON 2/14 was conducted on 21

October 201454 (Figure 4) and ONESILOS-GEDEON 1/15 on 14 May 2015.55
Figure 4: The operational situation in the Eastern Mediterranean on 21 October

2014 included increased air activity of the Israeli Air Force in the Nicosia FIR for the
joint ONESILOS-GEDEON 2/14 SEAD/EW Exercise (A1056/14, A1049/14,
A1050/14, A1043/14, A1055/14), a Russian Navy fire exercise (A1057/14), illegal
exploration activities by the Turkish research vessel Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa in
Cypriot EEZ (NAVTEX 765/14), GOC exploration activities in Blocks 2, 3, 8, 9 of
Cypriot EEZ (NAVAREA 454/14), and drilling activities of platform SAIPEM 10000
by the ENI-KOGAS consortium (NAVAREA 503/14) at the potential Onasagoras
field in Block 9. 2014 Petros Savvides (background image: Google Earth).
53
The joint exercise was carried out in the southern coastal areas of Paphos (NG Air Base Andreas
Papandreou) and Mari-Zygi (NG Naval Base Evangelos Florakis). The IAF participated with
32 F-16 and F-15 fighter jets in SEAD missions and were complimented by other aircrafts in EW
and combat support roles. The NG participated with Mistral MANPADS/ATLAS elements, a
Skyguard/Aspide SHORADS Squadron, a Russian TOR-M1 SHORADS Squadron, a MRADS
Squadron, and air defence radars. Also http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/mod.nsf/ All/1A753EB58
EC1A067C2257C7D00244FFE, [accessed 21 February 2015].
54
The joint exercise was carried out in the southwestern coastal area of Paphos (NG Air Base
Andreas Papandreou) and the mountainous area of Troodos (NG Air Early Warning System).
The IAF participated with two strategic UAVs, 24 F-16 and F-15 fighter jets, and other EW and combat
support aircrafts. The NG participated with units similar to the ones that took part in the previous
exercise: LCCC NICOSIA NOTAMS A1043/14, A1049/14, A1050/14, A1055/14, A1056/14.
55
The joint exercise was carried out in the southwestern coastal area of Paphos, the northeastern
coastal area of Polis and the mountainous area of Troodos. The IAF participated with five
strategic UAVs, 34 F-16 and F-15 fighter jets, eight Apache helicopters, and other EW and combat
support aircrafts. LCCC NICOSIA NOTAMS A0547-A0553/15, A0567/15, A0568/15.
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19
Strategic depth in the Eastern Mediterranean

Although the strategic significance of the island was monopolized by Whitehall
and invisibly by Washington, its strategic control was heavily aspired by Turkey
since the 1950s.56 Ankaras hegemonic ambition of Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic
Depth] in the region,57 directly threatens not only the remaining sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, but also the stability in the region and
the strategic interests of neighbouring states, including Israel and Egypt. Nicosia,
acknowledging its political loneliness after the collapse of the Greek economy and
the demystification of Brussels at the Cypriot bail-in crisis of March 2013, began
realizing that its predictable, non-threatening, democratic stability offers multiple
advantages and is attractive to neighbouring states.58 Its traditionally friendly
relations with the Arab countries and its evolving understanding with Israel create
a unique pole for multilateral cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, offering
promising benefits in Middle East stability and to the EU.
On the other side, although Jerusalems historical record on strategic
cooperation with third parties is burdened by disappointments and failures
(France, Northern Africa, Turkey, etc.), a factor which may very well prove
impeding both to Nicosia and Athens, its permanent unchangeable geographical
proximity to Cyprus offers a unique foundation for the development of a strategic
understanding between Jerusalem, Nicosia and Athens; a cooperation that can
ultimately be completely independent of future Israeli-Turkish relations. In spite
of Israels indisputable conventional military superiority and nuclear deterrent
in the Middle East, the emergence of strategic and unconventional threats against
Israel prescribe the consideration of alternative security options. Furthermore,
56
For the Turkish conception of strategic encirclement, see Pamir, Cyprus and Turkey. For the
Nihat Erim reports regarding the partition of the island: Nihat Erim, Bildigim ve Gurdugum
Olculerle Kibris [Cyprus with the dimensions I know and see], (Ankara: Ajans-Turk
Matbaacilik Sanayii, 1975), 15-42. For the ultra-secret Kibris Istirdat Projesi (KIP) [Cyprus
Recapture Project], prepared by Major Ismail Tansu of the Seferberlik Tektik Kurulu (STK)
[mobilization supervision committee] in Ankara: Ismail Tansu, Aslinda Hic Kimse
Uyumuyordu: Yaraltinda Silahli Bir Gizli Orgut, Hem de Devlet Eliyle ... TMT [In reality no one
was sleeping: An underground armed secret organization with the support of the state ...
TMT], (Ankara: Minpa Matbaacilik, 2001), 32-54.
57
Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu [Strategic depth: the
international position of Turkey], (Istanbul: Kure, 2001); Alexander Murinson, The Strategic
Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies 42:6 (2006), 945-964;
Gokturk Tuysuzolu, Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish
Eurasianism, Mediterranean Quarterly 25:2 (2014), 85-104.
58
Andreas D. Mavroyiannis, The Geopolitical Role of Cyprus in the Wider Context of the
European Union, Mediterranean Quarterly 25:1 (2014), 54-64.
20
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the cooperation of the two neighboring states based on the principles of

reciprocality and equality on security, defense, and intelligence issues offers
multiple advantages to both parties. The proximity of the island to Israel may
provide a vital geopolitical expansion of its critically minute strategic space. Already
the Nicosia FIR is being utilized with the full consent of the GOC by the Israeli
Air Force for large-scale exercises that include air refueling of IAF squadrons
and the prolonged sustainment of aerial operational readiness. Not only may
the ports and airports of the island prove precious to Jerusalem, but also the
Republics territory, along with its air and naval early warning capabilities, can
very well offer an additional advantage to its security and intelligence needs. By
adopting the terrain for technology concept, Israel could similarly provide valuable
technological hardware and expertise that can strengthen the security of the
island Republic as well as the collective effort for regional security in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The upgrade of Cypriot Israeli-made naval radars on the island,
the offer of UAV strategic reconnaissance capabilities to Nicosia, and the
enhancement of Cypriot EW and ELINT capabilities on the island are among the
issues that can be privately, rather than publicly, discussed between the two
parties.
Overview
Although the strategic location of the island, in the post-Second World War, era
is being monopolised by London and Washington, Ankaras long-term objective
for the strategic control of Cyprus through de facto occupation or a de jure
solution had never ceased since the 1950s. The two principal efforts of
Nicosia to strengthen its strategic existence against Turkish ambitions eventually
collapsed as a consequence of the fallacious Greek Cypriot perception that the
unconditional solution of the Cyprus Problem even through the dissolve of the
Republic of Cyprus, a EU member state is the ultimate means for the
termination of Turkish occupation in the northern part of the Republic.
The discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Levantine basin amid
growing over-the-horizon threats against Israel and aggressive Turkish
manuevers against Cypriot EEZ and FIR turned both Jerusalems and Nicosias
strategic attention towards the Mediterranean and, after the decline of IsraeliTurkish relations, to each other. The evolving diplomatic, energy and security
relations between the two neighbouring non-Moslem states, during the last five
years, offer multiple advantages to both parties. On the one hand it increases
Nicosias geopolitical value in the region and on the other it offers the prospect for
the expansion of Jerusalems strategic space in the Mediterranean. Although the
historical past indicates that, in a continually evolving world of growing interests,
strategic relations are more ephemeral rather than permanent, geography may
eventually turn into an indispensable ally rather than a creeping foe.
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The Israeli-Cypriot Relations under

the Law of the Sea
Nicholas A. Ioannides
University of Bristol
At the threshold of the 21st century, the discovery of offshore hydrocarbon reserves in the
Eastern Mediterranean Sea (East Med) marked a turning point in terms of maritime affairs
in the region. Cyprus has been a pioneer in concluding bilateral agreements with its
neighbors on maritime issues. It has been closely collaborating with one of the regional
states, Israel, which although it had either signed or ratified the 1958 Geneva Conventions
on the Law of the Sea, it did not sign and has yet to accede to the 1982 United Nations Law
of the Sea Convention (LOSC). Nevertheless, Israel has been implementing many of the
LOSC provisions, which form part of customary international law, and this facilitated the
signing of three significant agreements between Israel and Cyprus; namely, an exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) delimitation agreement (2010), a search and rescue agreement (2012),
and an agreement on exchange and non-disclosure of confidential information regarding
hydrocarbons (2014). This article deals with how the sea has linked the two states and argues
that activities pertaining to the sea domain, exercised within the ambit of the law of the sea
apparatus, provide a unique opportunity for cooperation between the East Med states.
Since time immemorial the sea has been a connecting bridge amongst lands and
peoples; the East Med could have not been an exception. A range of peoples and
cultures flourished around its coasts1 and the maritime domain has frequently
been at the epicentre of all major developments in the region. At the threshold of
Nicholas A. Ioannides, International Lawyer, PhD candidate in Public International Law

(University of Bristol), Research Associate of the Center for European and International
Affairs, University of Nicosia.
1
Cyprian Broodbank, The Making of the Middle Sea: A History of the Mediterranean from the
Beginning to the Emergence of the Classical World (London: Thames & Hudson 2013), 363; Irini
Papanicolopulu, Mediterranean Sea, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), electronic edition, http://www.mpepil.com, para.
4 [accessed 30 March 2015].
22
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Ioannides | The Israeli-Cypriot Relations under the Law of the Sea
the 21st Century, the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves offshore Israel, Egypt
and Cyprus2 turned anew the attention of the regional states towards the sea.
With Cyprus at the forefront of regional co-operation, the East Med states have
concluded maritime boundary delimitation as well as an array of other
agreements between them regarding maritime affairs.3 Of course, the horizons
for further cooperation remain wide open and, arguably, the law of the sea
2
The first offshore Israeli gas reserve, found in 1999, was named Noa after the Biblical hero;
similarly, other reserves off the Israeli coasts were named after Biblical figures such as
Tamar, Dalit, Leviathan. Likewise, the prospective reserve sites in the Cypriot EEZ were
named after Greek historical and mythological figures such as Aphrodite, Onasagoras, Zenon.
3
Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the
Delimitation of The Exclusive Economic Zone (17 February 2003), http://www.un.org/depts/
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES /PDFFILES/TREATIES/EGY-CYP2003EZ.pdf [accessed
30 March 2015].
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt on Merchant Shipping (26 November 2006), Republic of Cyprus
Government Gazette 4076, 20 December 2006, 245-275, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/
gpo/gpo.nsf/All/ AADF835E948405DCC225724 A004082C3/$file/4076%2020.12.2006%20
Parartima%207o.pdf?OpenElement [accessed 27 February 2015].
Republic of Lebanon on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (17 January 2007)
(pending ratification by Lebanon), David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, eds, International
Maritime Boundaries VI (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005-2011), 4452.
Co-operation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the
Government of the Republic of Lebanon on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
(16 January 2008) (pending ratification by Lebanon), Republic of Cyprus Government Gazette
4105, 04 July 2008, 865-886, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/gpo/gpo.nsf/All/
EA0198C82FE14748C225747C00340E81/$file/4105%204.7.2008%20Parartima%201o%20Me
ros%20III.pdf [accessed 27 February 2015].
State of Israel on Merchant Shipping (13 January 2010), Republic of Cyprus Government
Gazette 4118, 21 January 2010, 49-75, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/gpo/gpo.nsf/All/
730894552D14FDF6C22576BA003140B0/$file/4118%2029.1.2010%20PARARTIMA%207o.p
df [accessed 30 March 2015].
State of Israel on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (17 December 2010),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/
cyp_isr_eez_2010.pdf [accessed 30 March 2015].
State of Israel on the Coordination of Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
Services (16 February 2012), Republic of Cyprus Government Gazette 4165, 29 June 2012, 40014033, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/ gpo/gpo.nsf/All/493E69557A81AB4BC2257A2
C002EF03B/$file/4165%20%2029%206%202012%20%20PARARTIMA%20%201o%20%20M
EROS%20%20III.pdf [accessed 30 March 2015].
State of Israel on Exchange and Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information (28 April 2014),
Republic of Cyprus Government Gazette No. 4195, 04 July 2014, 10617-10644
http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/gpo/gpo.nsf/All/5F4B14A1A6C1674AC2257D0B00415505/
10/14/15
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23
edifice, namely both conventional and customary rules, offer a functional

framework within which maritime issues could be adequately addressed. What
follows is a scrutiny of the Israeli-Cypriot relations under the prism of the law of
the sea and a brief analysis of the pertinent bilateral agreements, as it is widely
accepted that the two states collaboration in terms of maritime issues has
enabled them to strengthen their relations and has further contributed to the
consolidation of a broader scheme of cooperation in the East Med.
Israel and the law of the sea

In the first place, it must be noted that Israel did not sign and has yet to accede
to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)4 due to its
opposition to the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III,
1973-1982) the conference that led to the LOSC as well as the signing of the
Final Act of the Conference by the PLO.5 Another reason related to the Israeli
belief that the LOSC did not adequately address important maritime issues,
such as the freedom of the seas and the regime of straits, which were of utmost
importance for Israel in light of the Aqaba Gulf conundrum.
For decades, Israel and the Arab states bordering the Gulf of Aqaba (Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan) quarreled over freedom of navigation in those waters as
the Arabs purported to hinder vessels heading to the Israeli port of Aqaba from
passing through the Strait of Tiran and traversing the waters of the Gulf up to
Aqaba. Nonetheless, in 1979 Israel and Egypt signed a Peace Treaty, Article V(2)
of which envisages the unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of
navigation and overflight in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba; ergo,
there was serious concern on the part of Israel that the LOSC provisions on the
regime of straits would supersede the more liberal provisions of the Peace
$file/ 4195%204%207%202014%20PARARTIMA%201o%20MEROS%20III.pdf [accessed 30

March 2015].
Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the
Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the Development of Cross-Median
Line Hydrocarbons Resources (12 December 2013), Republic of Cyprus Government Gazette
4196, 25 July 2014, 10692-10707, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/gpo/gpo.nsf/All/
A88D02909DC27F10C2257D20002C1DB5/$file/4196%2025%207%202014%20PARARTIMA
%201o%20MEROS%20III%20.pdf [accessed 30 March 2015].
4
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (signed on 10 December 1982, entered into
force on 16 November 1994), United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 1833 (1994), 396-581.
5
Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. XVI,
A/CONF.62/L.129 and A/CONF.62/L.138, Vol. XVI, A/CONF.62/SR.182, para 74, Vol.
XVII, A/CONF.62/SR.190, para 24.
24
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Page 24
Treaty, impairing the Israeli interests.6 However, it should not escape attention
that Israel is a signatory to the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea,
although it has not ratified all of them;7 this demonstrates the significance Israel
attached to regulation of maritime affairs. Even though the LOSC is not binding
upon a 1958 Geneva Conventions state party, the contemporary Israeli stance on
maritime issues indicates that Israel accepts and implements a range of LOSC
provisions,8 many of which, at any rate, form part of customary international
law. Israels tendency towards compliance with the LOSC norms is aptly
illustrated by the agreements Israel has signed with Cyprus. Given that Israel is
surrounded by hostile nations, its strategic depth lies in the Mediterranean Sea
and the cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and the European Union.9 Of course,
Israels determination to act in conformity with the law of the sea would
probably be a catalyst in terms of normalization of Israeli relations with its Arab
6
Andrea Gioia, Gulf of Aqaba, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), electronic edition, http://www.mpepil.com, para.
17 [accessed 30 March 2015].
Some Israeli scholars argue that the 1979 Treaty is compatible with or even prevails over the
LOSC: Ruth Lapidoth, The Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace
Between Egypt and Israel, The American Journal of International Law 77:1 (1983), 84-108 (106107); A. E. Danseyar, Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: From
Customary International Law to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Boston College
International and Comparative Law Review 5:1, 127-174 (172).
7
Israel signed and ratified the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, and the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf; Israel, also signed the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas and the Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes: Audiovisual Library of International Law, Status of
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/
gclos.html [accessed 30 March 2015].
8
Israel has established a twelve nautical miles territorial sea belt according to the Territorial
Waters Law 1956, as amended in 1990, and enacted legislation in respect of its continental
shelf (Submarine Areas Law 5713/1953). Additionally, Israel signed an EEZ delimitation
agreement with Cyprus in 2010, without having declared such a zone prior to the conclusion
of the agreement. Also, the Israeli government has drafted a new bill, the Maritime Areas
Law 2014, which enshrines most of the LOSC provisions into the Israeli domestic legal order.
Israel, Cyprus and Greece signed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy and water
in August 2013, Globes, Israel, Greece, Cyprus sign new energy MoU, 8 August 2013,
http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000870108 [accessed 30 March 2015]. The European
Commission has also included the Euro Asia Interconnector (an underwater electricity
cable between Israel, Cyprus and Greece), an LNG storage facility in Cyprus, and a pipeline
from offshore Cyprus to mainland Greece via Crete in the Projects of Common Interest
(PCI) for the construction of which the interested states are likely to receive funding:
European Commission, Press Release, Energy: Commission unveils list of 250
infrastructure projects that may qualify for 5,85 billion euro of funding (14 October 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-932_en.htm [accessed 30 March 2015].
10/14/15
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25
neighbors since the legal scheme governing maritime affairs provides states
with the necessary tools for addressing any discrepancies. Therefore, it is argued
that observance of international law rules, those of the law of the sea in
particular, could play a vital role in mitigating tensions in the East Med and
enabling the regional states to reap benefits from the oil and gas boon.
The Israeli-Cypriot agreements10

The 2010 EEZ delimitation agreement. Over the last few years in reality after
the Mavi Marmara incident and the decline of Israeli-Turkish relations Israel and
Cyprus have forged stronger ties, through the conclusion of agreements relevant to
the maritime domain which is utterly significant for both states in light of the
offshore oil and gas findings in the region. Maritime boundary delimitation is a
pivotal function within the realm of the law of the sea and as the Arbitral Tribunal in
Bangladesh/India arbitration stressed:
The importance of stable and definitive maritime boundaries is all the
more essential when the exploration and exploitation of the resources of
the continental shelf are at stake [] the sovereign rights of coastal States,
and therefore the maritime boundaries between them, must be determined with
precision to allow for development and investment.11
In 2010 the two States signed an agreement on the delimitation of their

EEZs12 from which useful conclusions can be drawn. An interesting point arises
from the perusal of the Preamble where the contracting parties recall the
provisions of the LOSC on the EEZ. This fact not only illustrates the universal
10
The agreement on merchant shipping will not be addressed in this paper owing to its
purely commercial character falling outside the scope of Public International Law.
11
Authors emphasis; Bangladesh/India Award (2014) para. 218, www.pca-cpa.org/

showpage.asp?pag_id=1376 [accessed 30 March 2015].
12
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of
the State of Israel on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (17 December 2010),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/
cyp_isr_eez_2010.pdf [accessed 30 March 2015]. Israel has not signed any maritime
boundary delimitation in the East Med either with Egypt or Lebanon. Nonetheless, Israel in
2011 unilaterally submitted to the UN a list of geographical coordinates regarding its
claimed maritime boundary (territorial sea and EEZ) with Lebanon, http://www.un.org/
depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/isr_eez_northernlimit2011.pdf
[accessed 30 March 2015]. On its part, Lebanon deposited with the UN Secretary-General a
list of geographical coordinates concerning its EEZ boundaries in 2010 (revised in 2011), as
a reaction to the Israeli-Cypriot EEZ delimitation agreement, since Lebanon maintains that
the said agreement encroaches upon the southern segment of its maritime space.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/mzn8
5ef.pdf [accessed 30 March 2015].
26
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Page 26
application of the LOSC provisions, but, most importantly, highlights the

willingness of Israel to act in conformity with the LOSC, at least in terms of the
particular provisions, which in any event form part of and parcel of customary
international law;13 thus, even non-member states to the LOSC are entitled to use
and shall observe them.14 Moreover, by virtue of Article 1 of the delimitation
agreement the maritime limit between the two states is the median line, viz. a
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is
measured.15 At this juncture it should be stressed that the EEZ boundaries
between Egypt-Cyprus and Lebanon-Cyprus have also been effected according
to the median/equidistant line method (Figure 1).16
Figure 1: Delimitation agreements of Cyprus with Egypt, Israel

and Lebanon. 2015 PS
13
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Judgment) [1982] ICJ Rep. 18, para. 100;
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area [1984] ICJ Rep. 246, para. 94;
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyia/Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep. 13, para. 34.
14
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, para 60; H. Thirlway, The
Sources of International Law, in International Law, ed. Malcolm D. Evans, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2014), 97, 102; Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2005), 157, 162.
15
16
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 15.
Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the
Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Article 1; Agreement between the Republic
of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Lebanon on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic
Zone, Article 1.
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27
The mutual acceptance and use of the median line evinces the
entrenchment of a common understanding in the East Med favoring this
method, with the exception of Turkey, which has diachronically been rejecting
the median/equidistant line principle; instead, Turkey has been advocating the
vague equitable principles method,17 which provides that all relevant factors
should be considered in order to reach an equitable result.18
However, it should not escape notice that any future Palestinian maritime
claims offshore the Gaza Strip19 are likely to introduce some deviations with respect
to the usage of the equidistance/median line method in the region. The reason is
that the coast of Gaza is slightly concave thus an equidistant line drawn between
Gaza and Israel would converge towards the Egyptian maritime area and as the
maritime space allocated to Gaza would be limited that might call for an adjustment
of the equidistant line. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether such modification
would affect the Israeli-Cypriot maritime boundary (Figure 2). The concavity of the
coast does not always lead to the modification of a delineation line unless it
diminishes the maritime entitlement of one of the parties;20 thus, any dispute that
may occur should be dealt with according to its own peculiar characteristics.
Figure 2: The Palestinian maritime claims off the Gaza Strip.

[source: BG Group]
17
Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Vol. II,
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.19, para 37 and Vol. XVI, A/CONF.62/SR.160, para 11.
18
North Sea Cases, paras 23, 57-58, 85,101.
19
Palestine Liberation Organization, Negotiations Affairs Department, Maritime Boundary

Issue, http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=10&more=1#1 [accessed 30 March 2015].
20
North Sea Cases, paras 89, 91; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, para. 292, 297. Bay of Bengal
Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India (2014) paras 402, 408
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2705 [last accessed 30 March 2015].
28
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Page 28
Furthermore, Article 1(e) addresses a possible review and/or modification

of the extreme ends of the demarcation line and the determination of a tri-point
in case either state reaches a maritime delineation agreement with a third state
(this term is found in the Egypt-Cyprus and Lebanon-Cyprus agreements too).
This clause is quite crucial as it provides the contracting parties with the
capacity to adjust their demarcation lines if they come to a consensus. Although
Egypt has not protested against the Israeli-Cypriot delimitation, it cannot be
argued that a tri-point has been defined since explicit agreement between all the
three states is required for this to happen. However, serious predicaments have
occurred regarding the tri-point between Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon the
Israeli-Cypriot agreement stops short of the said tri-point as the latter deems
the Israeli-Cypriot agreement injurious to its interests. In particular, Lebanon
asserts sovereign rights over a maritime space of 850 km2, which according to
the agreement under examination has been allocated to Israel (Figure 3).21
Despite the above, Israels northern maritime blocks do not encroach upon the
disputed area, whereas the Lebanese blocks 8 and 9 fall within that area (Figure
4).22 Notwithstanding the mediation efforts on the part of the USA, Cyprus and
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the aforementioned
controversy to date remains unsettled.23
21
Republic of Lebanon, Letter dated 20 June 2011 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Emigrants of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning
the Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the
Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, signed in Nicosia
on 17 December 2010; Letter dated 3 September 2011 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Emigrants of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
concerning the geographical coordinates of the northern limit of the territorial sea and the
exclusive economic zone transmitted by Israel: http://www.un.org/depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ STATEFILES/LBN.htm [accessed 30 March 2015]. D.
Meier, Lebanons Maritime Boundaries: Between Economic Opportunities and Military
Confrontation, Centre for Lebanese Studies, St. Anthonys College, University of Oxford,
2013, 2, 4, lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/maritime.pdf [accessed 30
March 2015]. T. Scovazzi, Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, The
German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2012, 9, www.gmfus.org/file/2674/download
[accessed 30 March 2015]; M. Whlisch, Israel-Lebanon Offshore Oil & Gas Dispute - Rules
of International Maritime Law (05 December 2011), ASIL Insights, Vol. 15 Issue 31,
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/31/israel-lebanon-offshore-oil-gas
dispute- %E2%80%93-rules-international-maritime [accessed 30 March 2015].
22
23
Meier, Lebanonss Maritime Boundaries, 6, 11.
Meier, Lebanonss Maritime Boundaries, 11-12; Natural Gas Europe, The Lebanese-Israeli
Maritime Border Conflict Explained (05 May 2014), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/
lebanese-israeli-maritime-border-conflict-explained [accessed 30 March 2015]; Fox News,
Cyprus offers mediation between Lebanon, Israel to solve undersea oil, gas dispute (3
December 2012) http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/12/03/cyprus-offers-mediationbetween-lebanon-israel-to-solve-undersea-oil-gas/ [accessed 30 March 2015].
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Figure 3: The Israeli-Lebanese disputed

maritime area. [Source: huffingtonpost.com]
29
Figure 4: Lebanese offshore blocks within the

disputed area [Source: Executive Magazine]
Article 2 of the Israeli-Cypriot delimitation agreement provides for

cooperation in the event straddling hydrocarbons reserves (stretching from the
EEZ of one Party to the EEZ of the other) are discovered. This clause is also met in
Cyprus relevant agreements with Egypt24 and Lebanon and reflects the
exhortation set forth by international juridical organs in terms of promoting joint
exploitation of underwater natural resources among neighboring states.25 Finally,
Article 4(b) of the delimitation agreement envisages the possibility of recourse to
arbitration following an agremment to this end between the two states in case
the two Parties do not settle the dispute within a reasonable period of time
through diplomatic channels. The importance of this term lies in the fact that
Israel has always been disinclined to and still remains reluctant to be subjected to
the compulsory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals (i.e.
International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court). Therefore, the
acceptance on the part of Israel of the likelyhood of an arbitration procedure is
indicative of the significance Israel ascribes to the agreement together with its
willingness to establish a strong, long-term cooperation framework with Cyprus.
The 2012 Search and Rescue agreement. Prior to examining this agreement,
it should be borne in mind that the LOSC accentuates the duty of every coastal
state not only states that are parties to it to promote the establishment,
operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue
service and cooperate with neighboring States for this purpose.26 Although
Israel is not a party to the LOSC, it has been acting in compliance with the said
24
A joint exploitation agreement has already been concluded between Egypt and Cyprus in
2014 (see note 2).
25
See note 3.
26
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 98(2).
30
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provision as well as to the rules set forth in the 1974 International Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea,27 in Annex 12 to the 1944 Convention on International Civil
Aviation28 (Israel and Cyprus are parties to these conventions) and in the Annex
to the 1979 Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue29 (Cyprus is a party,
Israel not), by virtue of which the two contracting states pledge to take action, as
stated in the Preamble of the agreement under scrutiny. On the whole, the
agreement sets the framework of cooperation within which the two states will
collaborate when aeronautical search and rescue operations take place.
A point worthy of attention is the provision of Article 2 of the agreement,
whereby the Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) of the Parties are defined. As
regards Cyprus, the Nicosia Flight Information Region (FIR) is determined as its
SRR; this clause consolidates even more Cyprus as the sole legitimate authority
entitled to control flights within the Nicosia FIR, despite the efforts of Turkey to
achieve recognition of the illegal airport of Tympou (so called Ercan) in the
northern occupied part of Cyprus.30 Also, in contradiction to the EEZ delimitation
agreement and the agreement on exchange and non-disclosure of confidential
information between the two states, Article 13 envisages that any dispute
concerning interpretation and/or application of the agreement should be
resolved through direct negotiations or diplomatic channels; this probably stems
from the character of the agreement, which aims at merely coordinating search
and rescue operations within the FIRs of the two states and does not entail
allocation of maritime space and/or sharing of natural resources and/or any
other issues pertaining to sovereignty/sovereign rights.
The 2014 agreement on exchange and non-disclosure of confidential
information. In 2014 Israel and Cyprus concluded the abovementioned
agreement. Interestingly enough, the parties reaffirmed their adherence to the
median line method and, as is set out in the Preamble, they undertake the
obligation to mutually exchange Confidential Information relevant to the
hydrocarbons identified on either side of the Median Line, as such term is
defined in Article 1 of the Agreement on Delimitation of the Exclusive
Economic Zone. The Preamble, also, stresses that the exchange of information
27
International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (signed on 1 November 1974,
entered into force on 25 May 1980) 1184 UNTS 278 .
28
Convention on Civil Aviation (signed on 7 December 1944, entered into force 04 April
1947) 15 UNTS 295.
29
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (signed on 27 April 1979,

entered into force on 22 June 1985) 1405 UNTS 97.
30
LCCC NICOSIA (ACC/FIC): NOTAMs A0440/01, A0151/02, A0110/02, A0557/05,

A1133/12, A0692/12.
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31
relates to Block 12 of Cyprus and Ishai of Israel. In respect to dispute resolution,

Article 6 stipulates that failing any diplomatic efforts to resolve a
disagreement, recourse to arbitration may be sought unilaterally by either
party, thus in such case no prior agreement is necessary in contradiction to
what is envisaged by the respective clause in the EEZ delimitation agreement;
again as in the EEZ delimitation agreement this marks an exception to
Israels long-standing disdain vis--vis compulsory dispute settlement
mechanisms and signifies the central role of these agreements in the bilateral
relations of the two states.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the hydrocarbons windfall if dealt with wisely will lead to the
growth of energy efficiency, financial prosperity, and the geopolitical upgrading
of the East Med states in global affairs (the discovery of the enormous reserve
Zohr offshore Egypt affirms the energy potential of the region). Against this
backdrop, the regional states appear to realize the potential opportunities and
have already taken steps towards grasping this valuable momentum. Among
these states are Israel and Cyprus, which have signed pivotal agreements on
EEZ delimitation, search and rescue operations, and exchange and nondisclosure of confidential information regarding straddling hydrocarbons
reserves. Back in 1958 Israel had been a champion of the law of the sea rules
since its interests were served, but it chose not to sign the LOSC as it deems some
of its provisions detrimental. Nevertheless, as depicted in the analysis of the
agreements Israel has concluded with Cyprus, the former is keen on
implementing several law of the sea norms either conventional or customary.
Moreover, Israel demonstrates its willingness to participate in the nascent
regional cooperation network acting in accordance with international law.
Indeed, given that progress and prosperity in the volatile East Med can be
facilitated through the application of international law, the Israeli-Cypriot
partnership seems to be developing in the right direction.
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The New Geopolitical Landscape in the

Eastern Mediterranean: the Israeli Perception
Zenonas Tziarras
The article investigates the role of Israel in Eastern Mediterranean affairs, and particularly
the dynamics of its participation in the new partnership with Cyprus and Greece, through
the prism of its past and future relations with Turkey. It identifies the background context
that led to current regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, evaluates the character
and objectives of the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek (and Egyptian) partnership, and examines the
prospects of this multiparty cooperation and mutual exclusiveness, under the light of
future Turkish-Israeli relations.
An enquiry about Israels geopolitical position in the region could notably be

related to current Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglus well-known
monograph Strategic Depth: Turkeys International Position;1 what he laid out in
2001 about his vision of Turkeys international position, is directly linked to
the current affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.
Among others, Davutoglu argued that Turkeys strategic relations with Israel
in the mid-1990s favored Israel and alienated Turkey from its Arab neighbors;2
an implication that called for the reevaluation of [Turkeys] broader Middle
East policy and its inter-regional outcomes and the unburdening of the
country from the passive image that it presents in its relations with Israel.3
Dr Zenonas Tziarras, PhD Politics & International Studies (Warwick), MA International

Relation and Strategic Studies (Birmingham), is a Political Analyst on Security and Turkey,
and a Research Associate of the Diplomatic Academy at the University of Nicosia.
1
Ahmet Davutolu, To Stratigiko Vathos: Oi Diethnis Thesi tis Tourkias [Strategic Depth:
Turkeys International Position (Stratejik Derinlik: Trkiyenin Uluslararas Konumu, 2001)],
trans. Nikolaos Raptopoulos (Athens: Poiotita, 2010).
2
Davutolu, Stratigiko Vathos, 108, 631.
Davutolu, Stratigiko Vathos, 637.
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33
In order to understand and evaluate contemporary international relations in

the Eastern Mediterranean, and Israels position in particular, one needs to take
into account the evolution of Turkish foreign policy since the early 2000s,
including its perceived need to distance itself from Israel. This article looks at
Israels relations with the Eastern Mediterranean states, particularly Cyprus and
Greece by factoring in Turkeys regional policy. The aim is threefold: firstly, to
identify the historical and geopolitical background of the current Eastern
Mediterranean affairs in conjunction with Turkish foreign policy; secondly, to
evaluate the character and goals of the developing Israel-Cyprus-Greece (and
Egypt) cooperation; thirdly, to explore the future of the new partnership and
Israels position in the light of Turkish-Israeli relations. Although geopolitical
antagonism is the name of the game in the Eastern Mediterranean, regional
relations should not be considered as mutually exclusive in the long run.
Regardless of any changes in the geopolitical setting, Israels regional stature has
a lot to gain from sustainable ties with Cyprus and Greece and this could
constitute a new era in Jerusalems foreign policy; one of more stable regional
relations.
Turkish Foreign Policy and the Eastern Mediterranean

Todays geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean are driven by
three main factors: Turkeys history of bad political relations with Greece and
Cyprus; the gradual deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations since 2002, and
particularly after 2008; and the discovery of hydrocarbons in the Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs) of Cyprus and Israel. Unquestionably, the political
disputes between Turkey and Greece over the years (e.g. Greek Cypriot claim
for self-determination, national minorities, delimitation of maritime areas in
the Aegean, etc.) and the Cyprus Problem particularly the 1974 Turkish
invasion and occupation of the islands north have shaped, to a great extent,
the regions patterns of enmity and amity. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus
(RoC), given their close political, cultural and ethnic ties, have been in
diplomatic cooperation and close coordination towards their problematic
relations with Turkey; the nature of this bilateral relationship has changed
little overtime and is thus an important component of the current geopolitical
equation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
For its part, Israel had not been a traditional partner of Greece and Cyprus
as the two countries have, over the years, been more closely affiliated with the
Arab World. On the other hand, Turkey was the first Muslim country to
recognize the State of Israel; though Turkey and Israel maintained a mostly
34
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Tziarras | The New Geopolitical Landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean
covert relationship since 1948,4 they found themselves forming a strategic

cooperation in 1996. Apart from the fact that the special relationship was
established by the most important allies of the United Sates in the Middle East,
two main elements led to its formation: the improvements in the Arab-Israeli
peace process in the early 1990s and the mutual security threat perceptions
particularly towards Syria. The promising Oslo Accords5 signed in 1993 by
then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat alleviated, at least temporarily, the
main cause of friction between Israel and Turkey.6 After that, and despite the
fact that their geopolitical bond became official in 1996, the deepening of their
relationship was almost instantaneous as they were both aware of the mutual
strategic benefits. Furthermore, Syria as a fierce Palestinian supporter, a
traditional military threat to Israel, and a security threat to Turkeys territorial
integrity via its support for the militant-secessionist Kurdistans Workers
Party (PKK) became an important driving force towards the Turkish-Israeli
partnership.7
But it did not take long for this dynamic to be reversed. In 1998 Turkey
and Syria escaped a full-scale war when Damascus eventually complied with
Ankaras demands over the PKK question.8 Thereafter, Turkish-Syrian
relations, and by extension Turkish-Iranian relations, entered a period of
booming and multileveled cooperation. At the same time, in 2000, after the
failure of Camp David Summit, the Palestinian al-Aqsa intifada broke out and
the Arab-Israeli peace process collapsed.9 Therefore, by the early 2000s the two
Jacob Abadi, Israel and Turkey: From Covert to Overt Relations, The Journal of Conflict
Studies 15:2 (1995), https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/4548
[accessed 10 April 2015].
5
U.S Department of State, The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, 2014,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo [accessed 10 April 2015].
Alan Makovsky, Tansu Ciller in Israel: Pursuing Turkish-Israeli Partnership,The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 03 November 1994, http://www.washingtoninstitute.
org/policy-analysis/view/tansu-ciller-in-israel-pursuing-turkish-israeli-partnership [accessed
10 April 2015].
7
Amikam Nachmani, The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie, Middle East Quarterly 5:2
(1998), 19-29 (19). The Greek-Syrian developing alliance was also an issue of security
concern for Turkey; see, Daniel Pipes, Syria Beyond the Peace Process, Policy Paper No.
40 (1996), The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 57.
8
Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, From Distant Neighbours to Partners? Changing
Syrian-Turkish Relations, Security Dialogue 37:2 (2006), 217-236 (217-218).
9
U.S Department of State, The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.
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35
main catalysts that gave rise to and kept together the Turkey-Israel bond were
no longer in place. In 2002, this geopolitical conjuncture coincided with the rise
to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Being
characterized by a (Turkish) political Islamic ideology that aspired to elevate
Turkey to the leadership of post-Ottoman geopolitical and geocultural
existence, the AKP signified a break with the traditional, and mostly
isolationist, Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment.10 Although
Turkeys relations with the region improved significantly, through increasing
economic and diplomatic relations,11 this strategic vision was not adopted
entirely in policy-making until after 2008, when AKP managed to largely
marginalize the Kemalist political and military elites.12
As the AKP began dominating domestic political life, its ideology became
aligned with policy-making and the revisionist character of Turkish foreign
policy became more evident. This change enabled the AKP to implement
policies described in Davutoglus Strategic Depth regarding Israel and the wider
region. Turkeys reevaluation of the Turkish-Israeli partnership had both an
ideological and a pragmatic basis; the latter stemmed from the fact that Turkeys
dissociation from Israel would allow it to grow deeper relations with the Arab
World and pursue a more independent foreign policy. After all, Arab disproval
of the Turkish-Israeli cooperation was one of the main reasons behind
Davutoglus criticism of it. This new policy was notably expressed during the
2008-2009 Gaza War, when Turkey heavily criticized Israeli methods and
policies. Similarly, at the 2009 Davos World Economic Forum, Prime Minister
Tayyip Erdogan publicly embarrassed the Israeli President Shimon Peres
accusing him that when it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.13 On
10
See Behlul Ozkan, Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism, Survival 56:4
(2014), 119-140; Alexander Murinson, The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign
Policy, Middle Eastern Studies 42:6 (2006), 945-964.
11
Nader Habibi and Joshua W. Walker, What Is Driving Turkeys Reengagement with the
Arab World?, Middle East Brief 49 (2011), Crown Centre for Middle East Studies.
12
Michael Reynolds, Echoes of Empire: Turkeys Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an
Alternative Foreign Policy, Brookings Analysis Paper 26 (2012), The Saban Center for Middle
East Policy; Dariush Zahedi and Gokhan Bacik, Kemalism is Dead, Long Live Kemalism,
Foreign Affairs, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66391/dariush-zahedi-andgokhan-bacik/kemalism-is-dead-long-live-kemalism [accessed 10 April 2015].
13
Gl, Erdoan lash out at Israel for ongoing Gaza assault, Todays Zaman, 17 January
2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_gul-erdogan-lash-out-at-israel-forongoing-gaza-assault_164329.html [accessed 10 April 2015]; Katrin Bennhold, Leaders of
Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel, The New York Times, 29 January 2009,
http://www.nytimes. com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html [accessed 10 April 2015].
36
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the following year, the Mavi Marmara affair a deadly Israeli raid on the Turkish
ship that was currying humanitarian aid to Gaza undermined even more the
bilateral relations between the two former partners, while in September 2011, the
release of the United Nations Palmer Report on the Gaza flotilla incident, with
which Turkey disagreed, further downgraded its relations with Israel.14 Thus by
2011 Israel was facing significant political problems with Turkey and became
more isolated in an already hostile and unstable region, especially after the
outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings.15
In the meantime, Israel in the late 2000s discovered significant natural gas
reserves in the Tamar and Leviathan fields; apart from the regional security
issues and the declined relations with Turkey, hydrocarbons became another
important issue that called for the reconfiguration of Israels regional relations.
At that moment, Cyprus which launched its own hydrocarbons exploration
program in 2011 appeared in the emerging geopolitical environment in need
for security and energy partnerships. For Israel, Cyprus and consequently
Greece was a reasonable choice since both shared similar security concerns
and were interested for potential energy cooperation. After all, as Efraim Inbar
noted, about 90 percent of Israels foreign trade is carried out via the
Mediterranean Sea, making freedom of navigation in this area critical for the
Jewish states economic well-being.16
Israel-Cyprus-Greece (and Egypt)

It was against this geopolitical background that the Israel-Cyprus-Greece
cooperation emerged, while recently, another partnership began developing
between Cyprus, Greece and Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, as
Cairos relations with Turkey have also deteriorated after the ouster of the
14
Carol Migdalovitz, Israels Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and its
Aftermath, CRS Report for Congress (June 2010), Congressional Research Service; Sebnem
Arsu, Amid Tensions With Israel, Turkey Threatens Increased Naval Presence, The New
York Times, 6 September 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/world/middleeast/
07turkey.html [accessed 10 April 2015]; PM: Turkey to impose more sanctions on Israel,
boost presence in east Med, Todays Zaman, 6 September 2011, http://www.todayszaman.com/
news-255903-pm-turkey-to-impose-more-sanctions-on-israel-boost-presence-in-east-med.html
15
Efraim Inbar, The Strategic Implications for Israel, in The Arab Spring, Democracy and
Security: Domestic and International Ramifications, ed. Efraim Inbar (New York: Routledge,
2013), 145-165 (145-157).
16
Efraim Inbar, Israels Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East Quarterly
21:4 (2014), 1-12 (1).
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37
Muslim Brotherhood from power a development Turkey criticized

ferociously. The two trilateral partnerships have been further strengthened by
agreements on various political, economic, energy and military issues.17 The
Cairo Declaration that followed the trilateral summit of Egypt, Greece and
Cyprus in Egypt, on 08 November 2014, noted: We share the conviction that
this first Summit Meeting will pave the way to a new era of tripartite
partnership promoting peace, stability, security and prosperity in the Eastern
Mediterranean in all fields (political, economic, trade, culture, tourism).18
In the same document the leaders of the three states also acknowledged
the vital security problems in the Middle East region, the need for the
resolution of the Cyprus Problem and the need to deal with the security threats
and to collaborate in the energy sector in favour of regional security and
stability.19 These goals and sentiments were reiterated in the Nicosia
Declaration, the product of their second trilateral summit that took place in
Cyprus on 29 April 2015.20
It is evident that today there is a new set of perceptions and convergences
of interests that could affect the Eastern Mediterranean balance of power,
having though in mind that it would be premature to argue that new
alliances have been formed. Although there are many benefits that can come
out of these developing relationships, the glue that is holding them together is
17
For example, Amanda Midkiff, Shifting Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean: The
Developing Relationship Between Greece and Israel, Perspectives on Business and Economics,
30 (2012), 45-53; Greek Cyprus Ratifies Military Cooperation Deal with Israel, Todays
Zaman, 03 July 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById
action?newsId=285431 [accessed 10 April 2015]. See also, Greece, Israel sign pact on
security cooperation, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (05 September 2011), http://www.jta.org/
2011/09/05/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/greece-israel-sign-pact-on-security-cooperation
[accessed 13 April 2015]; EuroAsia Interconnector, 2014, http://www.euroasiainterconnector.com/ [accessed 13 April 2015]; Israel, Cyprus sign defense agreements reports, Globes, 10 January 2012, http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000714277 [accessed
13 April 2015]; Asher Zeiger, Israel, Greece, Cyprus sign energy and water deal, The Times
of Israel, 08 August 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-greece-cyprus-sign-energyand-water-deal/ [accessed 13 April 2015].
18
Egypt-Greece-Cyprus Trilateral Summit Cairo Declaration, 09 November 2014,

http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/B2AF4B08214D31D5C2257D8D002AF831
?OpenDocument [accessed 13 April 2015].
19
20
Ibid.
Nicosia Declaration, Cyprus News Agency, 29 April 2015, http://www.cna.org.cy/

webnewsEN.asp?a=e4f1917b4c3f45858481a187b28740d5 [accessed 30 April 2015]
38
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Turkey. Its power projections and its efforts to impose its hegemony over the
region have naturally produced opposition. Against the backdrop of poor
relations with Turkey, Cyprus and Greece have joined forces with Israel and
Egypt, giving rise to an opposing geopolitical pole that contradicts the aims of
Turkish foreign policy. In the traditional realpolitik sense, this is an effort to at
least balance out Turkeys relative power stature in the Eastern Mediterranean;
at the same time, it can be seen as a form of political and ideological resistance
to Turkeys hegemonic efforts over the Middle Eastern region. For the RoC, the
emerging partnerships also constitute a way of drawing international support
for its efforts to resolve the long-standing Cyprus Problem.
Unquestionably, the emerging bilateral dynamics challenges Ankaras
strategic objectives to an important extent. To begin with, it is reflective of the
fact that Turkey lost much of its post-Arab Spring ideological and political
clout in the Arab World and especially in Egypt. Perhaps more importantly,
Turkey seems to have been frozen out of the plans for energy and security
collaboration in the Eastern Mediterranean, at least for the time being.21 As a
result, it could potentially face obstacles in the achievement of at least two of
its strategic energy goals: to emerge as a regional energy hub and to become an
energy supplier of the European market. With regard to the former, Ankara
stated that after the completion of a number of projects it is anticipated that 6
to 7 % of global oil supply will transit Turkey and that Ceyhan will become a
major energy hub and the largest oil outlet terminal in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The Ceyhan Terminal has already been designed to receive
crude oil from different countries.22
The same aspirations apply for natural gas. Of course the European Union
(EU) still considers Turkey as an alternative energy supplier to Russia.23 And
21
Daniel Dombey, Heba Saleh, and John Reed, Egypt and Cyprus Freeze out Turkey in
Possible Gas Deal, Financial Times, 25 November 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
90dcafea-74bb-11e4-8321-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3VsfjYqsw [accessed 30 April 2015];
Gedalyah Reback, Israeli-Greek-Cypriot Alliance Challenges Turkey in the Med, Israel
National News, 09 March 2015, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/
192357#.VRwZEvmVIuI [accessed 30 April 2015]. Moreover, there is the perception that the
rift between Turkey and Egypt is very personal and concerns the enmity between Erdogan
and al-Sisi. This makes their (energy) cooperation an even more difficult problem to solve
while at the same time entails that should one of these leaders leaves the political scene,
Turkey and Egypt may well mend fences. From authors discussion with an Egyptian official
from Egypts oil and gas industry (March, 2015).
22
Turkeys Energy Strategy, 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa

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39
while Europes energy supply from Turkey, and the rest of the countries of the
Eastern Mediterranean, is not necessarily mutually exclusive, Ankaras
options and energy-hub potential decrease when Cypriot and Israeli gas are
removed from the equation. In this light it can be suggested that the new
geopolitical landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Israel-CyprusGreece partnership in particular, pose obstacles to Turkish foreign policy
without that, however, necessarily entailing that Turkey is completely isolated
or marginalized.
The partnerships future and the Israeli position

The Israel-Cyprus-Greece partnership has a lot of potential and it is not
implausible to see it evolving even further. However, its character and goals in
the long run are far from certain; they are in many ways related to Israels
foreign policy decisions and its relations with Turkey. Leaving aside the mutual
energy and economic benefits that derive from the trilateral relationship, for
Cyprus and Greece it is important to have Israel by their sides as a means of
dealing with Turkey. This dynamic, however, may not be sustainable as it
deepens the gap between Turkey and Israel. According to one analyst:
While Israel has increased its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, at times
coming to the defense of Cypriot interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is
also cautious not to further damage its relationship with Turkey. In
conclusion, Israels interests in maintaining the status quo with Turkey has
established a ceiling on how enthusiastic its relationship can be with other
regional actors, like Greece and Cyprus.24
From this perspective, the trilateral partnership functions at least for Cyprus
and Greece as a strategic counterweight to Turkey. Thus one may assume that
a Turkish-Israeli rapprochement and the Israel-Cyprus-Greece relationship are
mutually exclusive; yet Israels understanding is different. Jerusalem
appreciates the strategic benefits of its relation with Cyprus and Greece and,
23
European Commision, European Energy Strategy, Communication from the Commision

to the European Parliament and the Council, COM 330 Final (2014); Miguel Arias Canete,
EU-Turkey High Level Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation, European
Commision, 17 March 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/arias-canete/
announcements/eu-turkey-high-level-energy-dialogue-and-strategic-energy cooperation_en
24
Authors Interview with Gabriel Mitchell, PhD candidate in Government & International
Affairs at Virginia Tech University and the Israel-Turkey Project Coordinator at Mitvim
the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (March, 2015).
40
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provided the necessary political will exists, it is even open to see the
partnership evolving to a more solid strategic cooperation.25 At the same time,
Israel sees its relations with Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece independently from
each other,26 in an effort to maintain a multidimensional regional foreign policy
that would minimize the costs and maximize the benefits.
In this sense, the partnership in question could also signify a break from
Israels tradition of uneasy and temporary alliances (see France, South Africa
and most recently Turkey),27 by becoming permanent and stable. Both
geographic proximity and energy prospects could contribute to a future of
common interests. Moreover, the fact that the multileveled cooperation between
Israel, Cyprus and Greece does not face any significant opposition from Arab
states or Great Powers creates an even more favoring environment. Minor
challenges may be expected from the Palestinian lobby, Lebanon and Iran. With
regards to the former, the traditionally good relations that Cyprus and Greece28
maintain with the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular29 may
lead to some yet limited Palestinian pressure for less cooperation with
Israel.30 In parallel, the maritime dispute between Israel and Lebanon31 is an
25
Authors interview with Israeli official A [name of interviewee in possession of the

author] (March, 2015).
26
Ibid.
27
Jane Hunter, The Israeli-South African-U.S. Alliance, The Link 19:1 (1986), 1-13; Guy Ziv,
Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance, 1954-1959, Journal of Contemporary History
45:2 (2010), 406-429.
28
The election of Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left) to power in Greece (January, 2015)
stirred fears among Israeli circles that pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli feelings would
increase in the Greek Government, given Syrizas past political stance on these matters.
However, not only did the new government not challenge Greeces relationship with Israel,
but vowed to deepen it. See The Victory of Syriza in Greece is bad new for Israel, The
Jerusalem Post, 26 January 2015, http://www.jpost.com/International/Analysis-Thevictory-of-Syriza-in-Greece-is-bad-news-for-Israel-388960 [accessed 30 April 2015]; Herb
Keinon, Visiting Greek Specialist: Core of Jerusalem-Athens ties Remain Strong, The
Jerusalem Post, 12 March 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-AndDiplomacy/Visiting-Greek-specialist-Core-of-Jerusalem-Athens-ties-remain-strong-393653
29
See Cyprus recognizes Palestinian states within 1967 borders, Haaretz, 30 January 2011,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/report-cyprus-recognizes-palestinianstates-within-1967-borders-1.340169 [accessed 30 April 2015]; Cyprus formally recognizes
State of Palestine, Al Akhbar, 08 February 2013, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/14906
30
Authors interview with Israeli official A.
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41
issue in which Iran may have some interest; and while Israel is concerned
about the potential of sabotage of its offshore platforms by Iranian proxies []
the subject is outside of Tehrans purview.32
Turkish-Israeli Relations
Eventually, what will matter are Israels strategic assessments and the regional
repercussions of Turkish foreign policy. Currently, it seems that Turkey under
the AKP, and President Erdogan more specifically, has a difficult time to
distinguish between its relations with Israel33 and its pro-Arab/Muslim
communication policy. In spite of Israeli political will for reconciliation with
Turkey,34 Ankaras actions, as expressed through frequent criticism of Israel and
tolerance of anti-Semitism, indicate a reluctance to normalize its relations with
Jerusalem; this, arguably, has some impact on the character of the trilateral
partnership and the involvement of Egypt.
Although Israels declared policy is to have positive relations with all state
players in the region and to maintain creative ties with both Turkey as well as
Cyprus-Greece, a fundamental shift in Turkish-Israeli relations will
undoubtedly affect the Israel-Cyprus-Greece partnership. This does not mean
that diplomatic relations will automatically deteriorate but, in such an
occasion, arguably the character of the partnership will probably change,
especially if Jerusalem decides to orientate its energy exports toward Turkey.
Such an undertaking would entail significant geopolitical risk and, as proven
in the past few years, uncertain political repercussions. In this regard, it is
highly questionable whether the estimated less expensive option of an IsraeliTurkish pipeline would actually be the most beneficial one (as opposed to a
Cyprus-Israel pipeline and a Liquefied Natural Gas plant in Cyprus).35
31
See Martin Whlisch, Israel-Lebanon Offshore Oil & Gas Dispute - Rules of International
Maritime Law, ASIL Insights 15:31 (2011), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/
issue/31/israel-lebanon-offshore-oil-gas-dispute-%E2%80%93-rules-international maritime
32
Authors Interview with Gabriel Mitchell.
33
This refers mainly to their security, diplomatic, military and energy ties. On the economic
front, and specifically trade, Turkish-Israeli relations have reached record high levels
despite political problems; see Koray Tekin, Turkish-Israeli trade booms despite harsh
rhetoric, Todays Zaman, 20 January 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/business_
turkish-israeli-trade-booms-despite-harsh-rhetoric_370381.html [accessed 30 April 2015].
34
Israels apology to Turkey in March, 2013, for the Mavi Marmara incident was a big step to
that direction but it has not borne fruits thus far.
35
See Theodore Tsakiris, The Case Against an Israeli-Turkish Export Pipeline, ELIAMEP
Briefing Notes, 25/2013 (2013).
42
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For Jerusalem, a strong Turkey-Israel cooperation makes sense because of

military-intelligence issues and Western interests, as much as cooperation with
Cyprus and Greece is imperative due to vital maritime trade and energy
export routes, to say the least36 regardless of the political problems between
Greece-Cyprus and Turkey. Therefore, Israel should take into account all these
parameters while trying to develop a multidimensional foreign policy in the
Eastern Mediterranean; a foreign policy that will be able to build stable,
sustainable and beneficial relationships in a region that is already greatly
hostile to Israel.
Another rather timely scenario that might alter Eastern Mediterranean
dynamics, presumably for the best, is the potential resolution of the Cyprus
Problem. Given that it has thus far been an obstacle to regional cooperation, it
would not be implausible to see Greek-Turkish and Cypriot-Turkish relations
undergoing positive changes should a viable, functional and socially
acceptable settlement occurs in Cyprus. Such a prospect could easily prompt
improvements in the relations between Turkey and Israel, while Israel itself
supports the peace process in Cyprus with the hope that a settlement will open
up new possibilities for peace and stability.37
Conclusions
This paper set out to evaluate regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean
and Israels position in particular. It examined the historical background and
the motivations behind the newly developed partnership between IsraelCyprus-Greece, and interpreted its character, prospects, and Israels role and
importance in the region, under the light of Turkish-Israeli relations. It
suggested that Turkish foreign policy provided the ground for the closer
cooperation between Israel, Cyprus and Greece, and later Egypt. The new
partnership, which acts as a regional counterweight to Turkeys relative power,
also expands to significant sectors of cooperation such as energy, economy and
security. Provided that the necessary political will among the partners
continues, the future of the partnership is generally deemed promising though
its character may change on the eventuality of a Turkish-Israeli reconciliation.
36
See Gedalyah Reback, Israeli-Greek-Cypriot Alliance Challenges Turkey in the Med;

Thanos Dokos, The Prospects for Greek-Israeli Relations: A View from Athens, ELIAMEP
Briefing Notes, 11/2013 (2013); Theodoros Tsakiris, Shifting Sands or Burning Bridges,
ELIAMEP Policy Paper, 22 (2014), 30-37.
37
Authors interview with Israeli official A.
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43
As noted earlier, the resolution of the Cyprus Problem would also be an

important development that could, under conditions, have a positive impact
on the international relations of the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkish-Israeli
relations more specifically. A significant point of regional geopolitical friction
would belong to the past. That would be an ideal state of affairs for all states
involved and the region more generally. But even from todays point of view,
Israels regional and international position will certainly benefit, in the short
and long term, from a deeper relationship with Greece and Cyprus, as they
constitute important partners in the Eastern Mediterranean and a vital
political, energy, security and economic link between Israel and Europe.
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The geopolitical importance of the

Eastern Mediterranean airspace
Panayiotis Hadjipavlis
University of Newcastle, UK
The article examines the geopolitical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean region
through the lens of a number of classical and neo-classical geopolitical models and describes
Cyprus predominant geostrategic post regarding the effective control of this region. As
airspace constitutes an inextricable part of every territory, its mastery is imperative for the
effective control of the area in question. Peace and stability in this volatile and complex
region could not be achieved without the effective control of its airspace. The location of
Cyprus that occupies a central position in the Levantine basin seems to be ideal for the
conduct of all sorts of air operations. Cyprus important location was realised by the British
in the late 19th Century, long before the advent of the aeroplane. The UK still maintains
several strategic surveillance facilities along with an airbase of critical importance, however
the island has been the cats paw for many regional or international actors. The article
explains the pivotal role of the airspace concerning the control of the Eastern Mediterranean
in combination with Cyprus significant position in this region.
The Eastern Mediterranean region is located at the cross-roads of three

continents Europe, Africa and Asia whilst it also comprises a large part of
the Middle East one of the tensest and war-torn zones in the human history;
most of the empires that played a prominent role throughout the history of the
western world were born and thrived there; it is the cradle of three worldwide
monotheistic creeds.1 The island of Cyprus, apart from being an inextricable
Panayiotis Hadjipavlis, Deffence Specialist, PhD candidate in Geopolitics (Newcastle, UK),
Master II in Religions, Cultures and Politics in Modern and Contemporary Europe, (Sorbonne,
Paris), Professional Master in Superior Military Studies (Ecole de Guerre, Paris), MSc in Air
Safety Management, (City University, London), MBA (Sunderland), BSc in Aviation (Hellenic
Air Force Academy, Athens).
1
Ioannis Parisis, I Kath Imas Thalassa, Geostratigiki Analyse tis Mesogeiou [Our sea, geostrategic
analysis of the Mediterranean sea], (Athens: Livanis, 2013), 21, 120-145; Bouchra Rahmouni
Benhida and Younes Slaoui, Gopolitique de la Mditaranne [Geopolitics of the Mediterranean
Sea], (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013), 5, 25-54; Alexandre Defay, Gopolitique du
Proche-Orient [Geopolitics of the Near-East], 6th edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2013), 6-7, 37-51.
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part of this region, occupies a predominant geostrategic position able to serve

any regional or world power that has aspirations for controlling the area.
Undoubtedly, the legal government of the island has the only and paramount
say on any potential strategic cooperation with these global or regional powers,
aiming to protect its raison dtat.
Land and sea comprise two major components of a territory that every
ambitious power has to command effectively in order to hold sway and be the
absolute master of a particular area. However, the importance of the third
dimension the airspace was only recognized in the early years of the 20th
century along with the invention of the aeroplane, whilst it was only during
World War II when the Great Powers comprehended its strategic value.2 The
technological evolution in aviation, along with continuous developments in
the field of utilization of the aeroplane as a war platform have rendered the
airspace a seamless element of the whole space that could not be ignored3; in
fact it has to be taken into serious consideration as its control determines to a
large degree whether a power shall gain regional predominance.
Geopolitical models and the Eastern Mediterranean Region

A number of geopolitical models were introduced in the late 19th and early 20th
Centuries in order to explain how international politics were influenced or
even determined by geography. The Westphalian model rendered the state the
most important unit of social organisation in world politics. The sovereign
states became pivotal actors whose unilateral acts and interactions with their
counterparts form the global political landscape. Hence the territory of each
state has become its political terrain, the space where it exercises its sovereign
power over a society delimited by its frontiers.
Based on the aforementioned, various intellectuals have articulated world
models in an attempt to bring the geographical factor into political discourse and
the formation and implementation of foreign policy.4 Notwithstanding a number
of considerable criticisms, that have been aired mainly during the last two decades
of the 20th Century, these world models and their geopolitical perceptions
Stephen Shrewsbury, September 11th and the Single European Sky-developing Concepts of
Airspace Sovereignty, The Department of the Air Force, AFIT/CIA (2002), C102-128; Peter Adey,
Aeromobilties: Geographies, Subjects and Vision, Geography Compass 2:5 (2008), 1318-1336.
3
Alison Williams, Hakumat al Tayarat: The Role of Air Power in the Enforcement of Iraqs
Boundaries, Geopolitics 12:3 (2007), 505-528.
4
Geoffrey Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge,
1985), 7-14; Patrick OSullivan, Geopolitics (New York: Routledge, 1986), 5-6, 23-38.
46
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Hadjipavlis | The geopolitical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean airspace
although heterogeneous still influence and in some cases dominate the modus
vivendi and the modus operandi of a number of powerful states.5
The vast majority of those models define the Eastern Mediterranean as a
region of major importance, where the fermented political developments
occurring there may have a global impact that is, all the major world or
regional powers are entangled in regional affairs in order to protect their
perceived raison dtat. This is not, in the least, an exaggeration since the world
model proposed by Halford Mackinder6 and then further elaborated by
Nicholas Spykman7 situates the specific region in the Inner or Marginal
Crescent or the Rimland. The control of this area determines the dominant
power of Eurasia thereby governing the whole world. Mackinder himself
corroborates the aforementioned statement by making a special reference to
Greece as a state bounded by water and therefore accessible to sea power and
arguing that the possession of Greece by a great Heartland power would
probably carry it with the control of the World-Island. 8 Needless to say,
Greece constitutes an inextricable part of the Eastern Mediterranean region, or
vice versa, the region cannot be delineated without the incorporation of Greece.
Alfred Mahans prominent premise regarding the unquestionable importance
of the sea power in comparison with that of land power adds more value to this
specific region.9 In addition to Mahans renowned suppositions, French
political theorist Charles Maurras has also championed the great value of a
Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought, 120-138; OSullivan, Geopolitics, 2-8, 23-38; Gerard O
Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, (London: Routledge, 1996), 53-55; V.D. Mamadouh,
Geopolitics in the nineties: one flag, many meanings, GeoJournal, 46 (1998), 237-253 (237241); Christopher J. Fettweis, On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then
and Now, Foreign Policy Research Institute (Spring 2015), 233-248 (233, 240-248).
O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 25-36, 75-110; Geoffrey Sloan, Sir Halford Mackinder: The
Heartland Theory Then and Now, in Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, ed. Colin S. Gray
and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), 15-38.
7
Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 2nd edn (Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 2-23.
8
Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideas and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction,
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919), cited in Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of
Geography (New York: Random House, 2012), 77.
O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 38-43; Jon Sumida, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician in
Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, ed. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 1999), 39-62; Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007),
27-28; Alexandre Defay, La Gopolitique [Geopolitics], 2nd edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 2012), 18-19; Pascal Gauchon and Jean-Marc Huissoud, Les 100 mots de la Gopolitique
[The 100 words of geopolitics], (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 9-10.
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47
mighty fleet, yet referring mainly to the French Republic.10 Every world power
that espouses Mahans thesis cannot turn a blind eye to this region. The Eastern
Mediterranean Sea constitutes a critical hub for the world economy where large
quantities of crude oil and natural gas are transferred from the Middle East via
the Suez Canal or pipes either to Europe or to America.11 The Suez Canal itself
constitutes a world transit corridor; 20% of total oil transport and 30% of world
trade of goods are conducted via this waterway.12 Furthermore in the
northwest, the Dardanelles Strait is Russias only sea-passage to warm waters,
rendering it a point of paramount strategic importance.
These Western geopolitical theories have diachronically impacted on the
foreign policy of the British Empire and, later on the United States of America.13
The latter remained the only global power, a world hegemon after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.14 Many eminent policy makers have in
large adopted the aforementioned geopolitical models, thereby embracing the
respective geopolitical posture regarding the importance of the Eastern
Mediterranean region.15 Like Mackinder who referred particularly to Greece,
Brzezinski has recently classified Turkey as a geopolitical pivot being one out
of six countries namely a state whose importance is derived not from its
power and motivation but rather from its sensitive location.16 Thus, the two
countries Greece and Turkey that are evidently part of the Eastern
Mediterranean region are considered to be of crucial importance to global
geopolitical affairs. In addition to that, Brzezinski echoes Mackinders and those
of the old British colonial imperialist bureaucrats ideas, who considered the
Eastern Mediterranean as a stronghold for securing particular areas in the
Middle East that are rich in energy resources.17
10
Aymerique Chauprade, Gopolitique: Constantes et Changements dans lHistoire [Geopolitics :

Constants and Changes throughout History], 3rd edn (Paris: Ellipses, 2007), 64-71.
11
Parisis, Kath Imas Thalassa; Benhida and Slaoui, Gopolitique de la Mditaranne, 77-81.
12
Guillaume Lagane, Premiers pas en Gopolitique [Basic steps in geopolitics], (Paris: Ellipses,
2012), 424.
13
Cohen, Geopolitics, 25.
14
Cohen, Geopolitics, 85.
15
Gerry Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire, The Legacy of Halford Mackinder (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009). Klauss Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, Introduction:
Geopolitics and its Critics, in The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics, ed.
Klauss Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 1-14.
16
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives
(New York: Basic Books, 1997), 41.
17
Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire, 226-227.
48
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Furthermore, new world models have been propounded based on the same
premises as the old ones; the postulate of the panoramic view, a tour dhorizon of
the world and the presupposition that the globe has become a system of closed
space where events in one part inevitably have their consequences in all other
parts constitute the grounds of these models.18 Huntingtons well-known thesis
concerning the clash of civilisations, again stresses the great significance of the
Eastern Mediterranean region, a junction of various different cultures where the
tense political environment inevitably generates confrontation and turmoil.19
Huntingtons comprehensive elaboration of fault lines, characterising them as
zones where intra- or interstate war could escalate and erupt into a global one,
renders the region the cradle of three civilisations one of the most volatile
areas of the world.20 The French geopolitical school, even though more local and
detailed in its analysis, is fundamentally based on historical, cultural and regional
factors and aspects of view, thus adopting the same principles regarding the role
of civilisation with Huntingtons world model.21 Another theory vastly founded
on the classical Cartesian world view is that of the Shatterbelt. In accordance
with this, great powers compete in those regions because they perceive an
interest in doing so and because they have opportunities in gaining alliance
footholds with states in the region. Rival footholds of major powers are present
here.22 Again, Middle East (of which the Eastern Mediterranean region
constitutes an inseparable part) figures prominently on the list.23
Against the Pax Brittanica and the Pax Americana, the Russian Empire and
later its successor, the USSR, strived to expand its sphere of direct influence
and control even though the communists had long rejected the orthodox
theories of geopolitics due to their connection with the Nazi regime.24
However, the lordly spirit, the animus dominandi as Luther called it, impelled
the foreign policy of the Eastern camp as well, as expansionism and support of
surrogate states were always in its agenda.25 Post-USSR Russia has embraced
18
O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 27.
19
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order,
(London: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
20
Huntington, Clash of Civilisations, 312.
21
Benhida and Slaoui, Gopolitique de la Mditaranne, 44-46.
22
Philip L. Kelly, Escalation of Regional Conflict: Testing the Shatterbelt Theory, Political
Geography Quarterly 5:2 (1986), 161-180.
23
Kelly, Escalation of Regional Conflict, 161-176.
24
OSullivan, Geopolitics, 18-19; Geoffrey Parker,The Geopolitics of Domination (New York:

Routledge, 1988), 76-132; Cohen, Geopolitics, 201-226.
25
Cohen, Geopolitics.
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classical geopolitical views mainly drawing on those of the German School led
by Haushofer, whilst Mackinders views still retain their honoured position as
well.26 Notwithstanding the grand changes in ideologies and regimes occurred
in Russia during the past century, Middle East and more particularly Eastern
Mediterranean have been always in the epicentre of the Russian foreign
policy.27 Thus the region has long been the field where world and regional
powers constantly antagonise for control and supremacy.
All these classical and neo-classical geopolitical models and theories are
assuredly not flawless; they are castegated by a number of renowned opponents for
merely being over-simplified world views that are oblivious of the particularities of
the space qua historical and geographical. However they still consist a substantial
tool for the formulation of the foreign policy of the regional and world powers.
Hence, the Eastern Mediterranean remains one of the most important geopolitical
regions on the globe, regardless of any world-model or kind of analysis.28
According to Vamvakas, the competition for the control of this geostrategic
crossroads has been reignited for three main reasons: the perception of a weakened
America, the increased interest for commercial activity of traditional and new
antagonists and the domestic political unrest throughout the region.29
Cyprus an island of great geostrategic importance

Throughout the centuries the island of Cyprus has repeatedly been the apple of
discord between opposing regional or even world powers.30 Its history is
fraught with invasions, occupations, conquests and battles of control and
domination.31 Evidently, this fate of history has not occurred by chance.
26
Mark Bassin, The Two Faces of Contemporary Geopolitics, in Alexander B. Murphey et

al., Is there a Politics to Geopolitics?, Progress in Human Geography 28:5 (2004), 619-640,
(623-624).
27
Grard Claude, La Mditerrane, Gopolitique et Relations Internationales [The Mediterranean,

geopolitics and international relations], (Paris: Ellipses, 2007), 100-112; William Mallinson,
Cyprus, Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations (New York: I.B.
Tauris, 2010), 31; Benhida and Slaoui, Gopolitique de la Mditerrane, 35-36; Evagoras L.
Evagorou, Oi Ellinotourkikes Scheseis apo to 1923 eos simera, Theoria Dietnon Scheseon kai
Strategikes [The Greco-Turkish Relations since 1923, Theory of International Relations and
Strategy], (Vari Attikis: Poiotita Editions, 2010), 109, 111.
28
Petros Vamvakas, Global Stability and the Geopolitical Vortex of the Eastern
Mediterranean, Mediterranean Quarterly 25:4 (2015), 124-140.
29
Vamvakas, Global Stability, 125.
30
William Mallinson, Cyprus, A Historical Review, (Nicosia: Press and Information Office,
2008), 10-20; William Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 2-6.
31
Mallinson, Cyprus, 10-20; Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History, 2-6, 90.
50
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Cyprus is considered to be a central geostrategic location in the Eastern

Mediterranean region.32 Several powers that envision playing a significant role
in the region, espoused the foregoing premise. A reference made by the
Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, former diplomat and prominent
academic, in his book Strategic depth, is distinctive of and utterly highlights the
geostrategic value of the island. Davutoglu bluntly admits that:
[A]ny state that ignores Cyprus cannot play a resolute role in the politics
of the region or globally. It would not be effective in the world politics
because this small island is situated in such a geographical position that
can impact directly on the strategic junctions between Asia and Africa,
Europe and Africa and Europe and Asia. Moreover, it [the ignorant state]
would not be effective in regional politics, because Cyprus with its east
tip likens an arrow headed to the Middle East, whilst with its west tip
constitutes the cornerstone of the strategic balances of the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Balkans and the North Africa.33
The British Empire that realised these important particularities of the island
before any other power, and leased it from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, aiming
to use it as a bastion in the Eastern Mediterranean a place darmes according
to Taylor in support of its imperialist objectives in the region, and in order to
safeguard the passage to India.34 Moreover, Western nations foreign policy in
the region has also been stimulated by the Russian threat, especially during the
Cold War.35
Cyprus geopolitical value vis--vis the western powers increased
enormously after the Suez debacle.36 Mainly due to the decolonisation trend that
followed World War II, new independent states emerged forcing the western
colonial powers to retreat. Thus, Cyprus constituted Britains last stronghold in
the region. Despite its eventual independence, Cyprus has essentially remained
under British and Western control, in accordance with the related clauses of its
32
Andrekos Varnava, British Imperialism in Cyprus (New York: Manchester University Press,
2009), 9.
33
Ahmet Davutoglu, Strategiko Vathos: E Diethnis Thesi tis Tourkias [Strategic depth: Turkeys
international position], trans. Nikolaos Raptopoulos, 5th edn (Athens: Poiotita, 2010), 275.
34
William Mallinson, Cyprus, Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International
Relations, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 34.
35
Claude, La Mditerrane, Gopolitique et Relations Internationales, 100-112; Mallinson, Cyprus,

A Modern History, 12-15; Mallinson, Cyprus, Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in the
International Relations, 53.
36
Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History, 21.
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constitution (which was in fact imposed on it) that provides for two sovereign
military bases on the island and a number of other facilities for the United
Kingdom. The geostrategic importance of these two bases one of which has
been converted to a modern military airbase is encapsulated in the following
words of Henry Kissinger then US Secretary of State on 16 November 1974, in
a letter to the British Prime Minister James Callaghan. At the time, the UK was
considering relinguishing its bases on the island.
I do want you to know of my very strong belief that the elimination of the
SBAs [Sovereign British Area] in Cyprus could have a destabilising effect
in the region as a whole, encouraging the Soviet Union and others to
believe that the strategic position of the West has been weakened in the
area, and damage Western flexibility to react in unpredictable situations. I
hope, therefore that whatever decision you feel obliged to make can be
flexible enough not undermine our overall position in the Mediterranean.37
Being in the middle of the Levantine basin and situated at an exceptionally

important geostrategic point of the Eastern Mediterranean, the islands position
could contribute to the control not only of two of the most significant world
marine arteries (those of the Atlantic Ocean-Mediterranean Sea-Indian Ocean and
the Black Sea-Mediterranean Sea-Indian Ocean) but also of all the oil and gas pipes
that ends to the shores of the Near East.38 Furthermore, the recent explorations of
natural gas in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Israel and Cyprus, along with the
officially confirmed intentions of the Greek government to proceed to seismic
surveys in search for hydrocarbons, augments the geopolitical prominence of the
region whilst at the same time transform the existing dynamics.39
The airspace aspect

The evolution of technology has rendered airspace at least as important as the
other components of a territory; land and sea. Nowadays, a state in order to be
de facto sovereign has to control effectively not only its land and territorial
waters but also the relevant airspace above them.40
37
FCO 46/1178, file DP 13/441/2, part C cited in William Mallinson, Britain and Cyprus, Key
Themes and Documents since World War II, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 92.
38
Parisis, Kath Imas Thalassa, 217-218.
39
John Sitilides, The Modern Geopolitics of the Cyprus Question, Mediterranean Quarterly
25:1, (2014), 77-94.
40
Williams, Hakumat al Tayarat: The Role of Air Power in the Enforcement of Iraqs
Boundaries, 513; Stuart Banner, Who Owns the Sky? The Struggle to Control Airspace from the
Wright Brothers on, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 261.
52
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In a similar vein, a global or regional power has to be in the position to assert

itself in all these three elements of a specific area, in order to be the indisputable
master. Thus, a mighty air force presence is imperative for fulfilling the above
goal. Even though, the military value of the aeroplane was recognised soon after
its invention, it was only a century after, at the dawn of the 21st Century and
more specifically during the US-led war against Iraq that the strategic importance
of the air force as a distinct branch, but at the same time seamlessly operating in
concert with the other two, was fully comprehended.41 Air superiority and power
projection is impossible without the existence of a strong, capable and adequately
equipped air force.42
In addition, the civil and commercial facet of the aviation is also of great
importance for the global economy.43 In our epoch, a large part of human
transportation is conducted by aviation means as it has become much more
convenient in terms of time reduction and overcoming impermeable
geographical obstacles. However, the security of commercial aviation is vastly
threatened due to the emergence of terrorism. The 9/11 tragic events in the
heart of the American territory, along with the manifested failure of the US-led
coalition in Iraq, have reduced the credibility of Western powers whilst in
parallel a perception of an Islamist victory has been created especially in the
Arab world. Hence, the threat of terrorist attacks by using commercial
aeroplanes remains high.44
The Eastern Mediterranean region, described above as a global geopolitical
hub, has also been designated by Renner as one out of the six most important
strategic zones that serve as corridors for the military and commercial aviation.45 It
is more than evident that the area is vastly affected by evolutions in the aviation
sector. Even though each state is exclusively responsible for the control of its
national airspace, as an inextricable part of its sovereign rights, the Eastern
Mediterranean mainly consists of international airspace. The Nicosia, Athens and
Cairo Flight Information Regions (FIRs) constitute the largest part of the
41
Etienne de Durand, Le Renouveau de la Puissance Arienne [The Revival of the Air

Power], Aviation et Gopolitique 114 (2004), 17-34.
42
Yves Lacoste, Aviation et Gopolitique: les Projections de Puissance [Aviation and

Geopolitics : The Projection of Power], Aviation et Gopolitique 114 (2004), 5-16.
43
Durand, Le Renouveau, 17-34.
44
Durand, Le Renouveau, 17-34.
45
Serge Gadal, LAviation et la Gopolitique : LApport de George Rennel [Aviation and

Geopolitics : The contribution of George Rennel], in Approches de la Gopolitique, de lAntiquit
au XXIe Sicle [Approaches of Geopolitics, from Antiquity to 21st Century], ed. H. CoutauBgarie and M. Motte, (Paris : Economica, 2013), 542-543.
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international airspace of the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece and Egypt, though

both beset by different internal and external issues, are in a position to control
effectively their part of the international airspace, due to the existence of strong,
capable and well-equipped air forces. Cyprus however a small state with very
limited air force capabilities is not in the position to effectively control its own
part. It is noted that effective control of the airspace is not confined to the provision
of air traffic information; issues of border control, terrorism and the protection of
sovereignty rights and jurisdictions all fall also into its scope. Yet, Cyprus as
argued above, is still very essential for the whole regional security system.
Bearing this in mind, the Nicosia FIR remains a critical element of the
regions security (Figure 1). It is situated at the centre of the regions airspace
covering almost the whole Levantine basin, whilst the puzzle is completed by
all the other littoral states FIRs.46 The telling size of the Nicosia FIR is likened
Figure 1: The Nicosia Flight Information Region in the Eastern Mediterranean.

[source: author]
46
The Nicosia FIR was officially delimited during the 3rd (Paris 1952) and the 4th (Geneva
1958) European Regional Aviation Conferences: Panayioitis Hadjipavlis and Demetris
Petrou, Cyprus Airspace: Legal and Political Issues, (dissertation, Hellenic Air Force
Academy, Athens, 1996.
54
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to that of Malta, both being British colonies at the time of the FIR European
regional arrangements47 (Figure 2). This fact constitutes convincing evidence of
how the British assessed the importance of the airspace element regarding the
overall control of an area. At this point, it is important to stress that the state
which is responsible for providing air traffic control and search and rescue
services within the limits of its FIR, has sovereign rights only in that part that
coincides with its national airspace.48
Figure 2: The Nicosia Flight Information Region in relation to other Mediterranean FIRs.
2015 PS
Despite the close cooperation that has recently developed in the field of
search and rescue among a number of states Cyprus has been admittedly the
coordinator of this effort a vacuum still remains regarding all the other
matters of airspace security, including the anticipation and effective resolution
of terrorist air incidents. In addition, the complete absence of communication
between Nicosia and Ankara FIRs due to the continuous denial of the Turkish
47
48
Hadjipavlis and Petrou, Cyprus Airspace,Annex, 43, Chart 15.
Angelos Yiokaris, Oi Diadikasies tou Paraktiou Kratous ston Enaerio Horo, Ethniko kai Diethi
[The processes of the coastal state in the national and international airspace], (Athens:
Sakoulas, 1991), 23, 55-56, 134-139.
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55
side to recognise and contact with the Cyprus civil aviation authorities,
along with the creation of the ERCAN airspace over the illegal entity of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)49, has augmented the
insecurity in the civil aviation sector whilst several safety incidents have
already been reported.50
The air force, despite the fact of being a special corps for the airspace, cannot
operate without the utilisation of adequately equipped air bases on the ground;
hence the paradox of an air-force largely dependent on ground facilities and
operations. Maintenance, refuelling and logistics support are essential ground
operations for the effective conduct of any kind of air operations. Furthermore,
timely additional instructions and situation appraisals are transmitted from
ground radar installations specialised for these kind of tasks to the aircraft in
order to assist the pilots for accomplishing their mission. The aircraft as war
platforms can only operate for few hours without ground support in contrast to
warships that can conduct operations for days or even months without the need
of anchorage. To mention Mackinder once again, he insightfully claimed that
today armies [] have, too, the aeroplane, which is of a boomerang nature, a
weapon of land-power as against sea power.51 Even though, during recent
military campaigns in Iraq, Libya, or Mali air tankers and the procedure of air
refuelling were used and applied to a large extent, aircraft capabilities still remain
reliant on the existence of ground airbases close to the battlefield.52 When the air
operation is conducted from a close base the number of sorties is increased due
to the short flight time whilst the fighters weapons are more specified to fit
their exact missions, as situation on the ground constantly changes. Moreover,
the role of the human factor is also crucial for the missions accomplishment.
Human fatigue constitutes a critical factor that might determine the missions
outcome an advantage of short range missions over the long range ones. Thus,
the existence of air bases close to the area of operations is considered to be a
critical factor for the conduct of effective air operations. This conclusion is not
only fully aligned but at the same time strengthens sustainability, a principle of
war according to the UK Defence Doctrine.53 However, on the opposite side of the
49
Resolution 541 (1983) of the UN Security Council considers the declaration of the TRNC as
legally invalid and calls for tis withdrawal.
50
Hadjipavlis and Petrou, Cyprus Airspace; Letter of the President of the ICAOs council
Mr. Kotaite (19-3-1977), Doc 4.
51
Halford, J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction,
(Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1944), 86.
52
Lacoste, Aviation et Gopolitique, 5-16.
53
UK Defence Doctrine, 5th edn, Ministry of Defence: Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (2014), 31.
56
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Page 56
spectrum, the air force allows a power to conduct parallel attacks since, according
to Warden, airpower transcends geography.54 This premise stresses the great
importance of the air force, as an independent branch, for military campaigns
despite its innate flaws.
Cyprus, being an important vantage point in the Eastern Mediterranean,
could be effectively exploited for the patrol of the regions vast airspace. Even
though it can afford only meagre means by itself, its military air base, situated at
Paphos, could be used by a joint force comprised of European and other states,
aiming to guarantee the regions aviation security. This could be extended
towards securing peace and stability in this volatile area taking into account the
recent developments related to the civil war in Syria and the emergence of the
Islamic State.55 The direct threat of terrorist attacks in European soil along with a
possible wave of refugees coming from the Near and the Middle East war-torn
countries, have to be tackled proactively and effectively by the Western states. The
European Unions role has to be prominent and determinant as its member states
are directly affected. Paphos air base is used by a number of European air forces in
the context of UNIFIL and for other logistical purposes, yet not in a coordinated
and combined fashion.56 The European Union has to be resolute in anticipating all
the foregoing threats and risks by taking advantage of Cyprus geostrategic
position. The scenario of a permanent European force comprising of an air fleet
capable of patrolling and surveying the area has to be seriously elaborated by the
Republic of Cyprus and the European institutions, since stability and peace of the
Eastern Mediterranean region affects directly Europes security and prosperity.
Cyprus geostrategic value has been once more confirmed as the Royal Air
Force has been conducting air strikes against the Islamic State from Akrotiri,
a British sovereign base in the islands south.57 Moreover, American U-2 spy
planes operate frequently from the British airbase at Akrotiri for conducting
54
Clayton K. S. Chun, John Wardens Five Ring Model and the Indirect Approach to War,
in USAWC Guide to National Security Issues, Vol I: Theory of War and Strategy, (United
States: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (SSI), 2008), 295-307.
55
Cyprus Ministry of Defence, press release, 08-11-2013; Cyprus Ministry of Defence, press
release, 11-11-2014.
56
Speech by ambassador Andreas Mavroyiannis at the Hellenic American bankers

associations annual charitable event New York, Cyprus: an Emerging Player in a Volatile
Region, 9 November, 2006.
57
Patrick Wintour and Richard Norton-Taylor, More Tornados to join Iraq Missions says
Cameron on Visit to Cyprus Airbase, The Guardian, 2 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.
com/uk-news/2014/oct/02/tornados-iraq-mission-cameron-visit-cyprus-airbase [accessed
03 June 2015].
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57
surveillance operations over the Middle East. This occurs with the implicit
consent of the Cyprus Government, as the bases have to be used only for the
security interests of the UK, in accordance with the Treaty of Establishment of
the Republic of Cyprus.58 According to Kissinger, the USA considers Cyprus
and especially the British Sovereign Bases on the island a seamless part of its
security strategy in the region.59 In addition to Akrotiri, strategic surveillance is
also conducted by the over-the horizon radar installations, with a range of
thirty seven hundred miles, which are considered among the most important
Western intelligence posts in the Eastern Mediterranean.60
Furthermore, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) has created new realities in the region. In accordance with UNCLOS
III, coastal states have the right to establish Exclusive Economic Zones of a
maximum width of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
territorial sea is measured.61 Therefore, the Eastern Mediterranean states have
acquired significant sovereign rights and jurisdictions far beyond their territorial
waters.62 Yet, the question is; how capable are these states to protect and
preserve their sovereign rights and jurisdictions from external aggressive
aspirations and other direct threats? Even though the aforementioned sovereign
rights and jurisdictions refer to the sea, it has become evident that strong naval
forces are not enough by themselves. Instead, they have to be combined with a
capable and technologically modern air force in order to be able to safeguard the
sovereign rights and jurisdictions provided by the convention.
Despite the fact that when it comes to regional cooperation, as far as the
demarcation and the eventual exploitation of the hydrocarbons reserves is
concerned, substantial improvement has been achieved, a loud cacophony still
exists. Turkey, a regional power itself, has not yet signed UNCLOS.63 In
addition, it claims an enormous continental shelf, by not recognising the
agreements Cyprus has already signed with its neighbouring states Lebanon,
Israel and Egypt whilst it applies a gunboat diplomacy against Cyprus and
58
Open Source IMINT, Historical Imagery: U-2 at RAF Akrotiri Cyprus, 29 August 2013,
http://osimint.com/2013/08/29/historical-imagery-u-2-at-raf-akrotiri-cyprus/ [accessed
03 June 2015].
59
FCO 46/1178, file DP 13/441/2, part C cited in William Mallinson, Britain and Cyprus,
Key Themes and Documents since World War II, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 92.
60
Sitilides, The Modern Geopolitics, 86.
61
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Article 57.
62
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Article 56.
63
Theodoros Karyotis, E AOZ tis Ellados [Greeces EEZ], (Athens: Livanis, 2014); Sitilides,
The Modern Geopolitics, 77-94.
58
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Greece.64 This Turkish attitude adds to the insecurity in the region, whilst it
hinders further progress.
The Eastern Mediterranean states are compelled to maintain modern
capable military forces in order to preserve their independence and protect
their territorial integrity and sovereign rights provided by international law
due to aggressiveness, hostility and expansionist ambitions of some states or
regional non-state actors and the volatile environment of the region. However,
a modern capable military force cannot exist without the incorporation of a
mighty air force. This fact has been completely understood by Israel that from
the very beginning immediately after its creation captured the strategic value
of the air force.65 Deprived of hinterland, and be limited by the sea, Israels
only obvious solution was the formation of a potent air force.
The Greek and Cypriot effort to establish a strategic alliance under a joint
defence space doctrine during the last decade of the 20th Century was purely
intended to counter Turkish aggressiveness.66 At the time, both countries
invested significantly in strengthening their air force and air defence
capabilities, understanding their critical importance.67 The frequent Hellenic
Air Force exercises between Crete and Cyprus along with Cyprus official
intent to purchase the Russian long range surface-to-air missile system S300PMU1 have induced vehement reactions from all the affected powers.68 The
Russian systems impressive capabilities, concerning both surveillance and
interception,69 along with the intent of Russian officers to be permanently
64
Christos Kassimeris, NATO and the Aegean Disputes, Defence and Security Analysis 24:2
(2008), 165-79; Yiorghos Leventis, Warm waters: 70 Days ahead, International Security
Forum 12 (November 2014), http://www.inter-security-forum.org/warm-waters-70-hotdays-ahead/ [accessed 4 June 2015].
65
Frderic Encel et Franois Thual, Israel: le Salut par les Airs [Israel: the salute from the
air], Aviation et Gopolitique 114, (2004), 52-55.
66
Aristos Aristotelous, O Eniaios Amyntikos Horos Elladas-Kyprou [The unified defence space
between Greece and Cyprus], (Nicosia: Cyprus Centre of Strategic Studies, 1998), 71-73; Aristos
Aristotelous, To Dogma tou Enieou Amyntiku Chorou Elladas - Kyprou [The Doctrine of the
unified defence space between Greece and Cyprus], (Nicosia: Cyprus Centre of Strategic
Studies, 1998), 76-82; Stavros Lygeros, Kypriako i airetiki lysi [The Cyprus problem The
heretical solution], (Athens: Patakis Editions, 2014), 86-90.
67
Aristotelous, Eniaios Amyntikos Horos, 77; Aristotelous, To Dogma tou Enieou Amyntiku
Chorou Elladas - Kyprou , 147-149.
68
69
Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 101.
The maximum range of the surveillance radar is 300Km, whilst the maximum range for
interception is 150Km.
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59
stationed on the island, have worried the Western allies who loudly expressed
their discontent. The Greek-Cypriot strategic alliance itself, along with a robust
navy and air force presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, would have
changed the regions balance of power. Apart from Turkey, neither the British,
nor the Americans and their allies, the Israelis, could consent to this new order
the Greek-Cypriot coalition would have imposed.70 What irritated them the
most was the perspective of significant airspace control that could be achieved
as a result of the introduction of a variety of air defence means. Eventually, the
so-called Doctrine of the unified defence space (as the coalition between
Greece and Cyprus was called) faded away in the following years.
Since then, the geopolitical map of the region has changed. As mentioned
above, the explorations of hydrocarbons reserves, the emergence of new
terrorist threats such as the Islamic State, the civil war in Syria, the
deterioration in Turco-Israeli relations, and the potential rapprochement
between the USA and Iran are but a few of the new realities. Therefore, a new
wind is now blowing in the region calling for close cooperation between states
with converging interests. The air force qua a distinct branch of every nations
forces is again at the forefront showing the way forward. Being the extended
arm of Greece and Israel, the air force has contributed to the formation of a
new strategic cooperation through the conduct of joint exercises.71 Cyprus
participates as well, since its geostrategic role cannot be ignored.72
Conclusion
The Eastern Mediterranean region constitutes one of the worlds most crucial
geostrategic pivots. Its importance is confirmed by all the well-known
geopolitical world models. Thus, any disturbance, disorder or aberration
occurring in the region could have a global impact. Being situated at the centre of
the Levantine basin, Cyprus occupies a prominent position. Hence, any power
that aspires to play a critical regional or global role has to take into account this
island.
70
Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History Cyprus, 101.
71
Ben Ariel, Greece planning joint military exercises with Israel, Arutz Sheva 7, Israel
national news.com, 12 February 2015, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/
News.aspx/191241 [accessed 4 June 2015].
72
Defense Update Israeli Fighter Jets Challenge Cypriot Air Defense in Mock Battle
Exercise, 17 February 2014, http://defense-update.com/20140217_israel_cyprus_air_
force_exrcise.html [accessed 4 June 2015]; Cyprus and Israel mount joint military exercise,
Cyprus Mail, 11 February 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/cyprus-and-israelmount-joint-military-exercise [accessed 4 June 2015].
60
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Territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the Eastern Mediterranean

along with the exercise of their sovereign rights and jurisdictions provided by the
international law are critical factors for progress and prosperity in a region that
impacts on the global affairs. The airspace constitutes an indivisible element of
every territory whilst its geopolitical importance has been only recently
apprehended in its full extent, almost a century after the invention of the
aeroplane. The effective control of the third dimension is considered to be critical
for the Eastern Mediterraneans stability and peace. However, the effective control
of the vast space cannot be achieved only by a strong naval presence; the
contribution of the air force is also vital since without air superiority this control is
unattainable. Each state, either tiny or powerful, aiming for different strategic
objectives has to bear in mind the strategic importance of airspace.
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Strategic Surveillance in the Eastern

Mediterranean
Athanasios Potsis
Hellenic Industrial Space Association
The article proposes that the recent deterioration of the security situation in the Middle East
and North Africa and the rapid growth of various types of asymmetrical threats, necessitate
the establishment of a sophisticated strategic maritime surveillance system in the East
Mediterranean to effectively supplement the existing security mechanism of the European
Union in its sensitive southern border. It briefly explains the technological and operational
aspects of contemporary maritime surveillance in European Unions security strategy and
examines the prospects of operational and technological cooperation between Greece, Cyprus
and Israel for the creation of a joint strategic maritime surveillance system in the East
Mediterranean.
Security situation
The recent fall of several governments on the southern shores of the
Mediterranean Sea1 has created, on many occasions, internal security chaos and
regional instability in a territory that stretches from Damascus to Tripoli and
Rabat. The upheaval in Libya, the on-going Syrian civil war and the recent
Sunni-Shia crisis in Yemen, have uncovered Pandoras boxes that directly affect
North Africa and the Middle East, and influence, in multiple ways, the security
of several European countries, including Cyprus and Greece, as well as Israel.
The repercussions of this wave of extreme violence have already hit the
Mediterranean basin, which is a European border as fragile as important, that
Athanasios Potsis, PhD Electrical and Computer Engineering (National Technical University,
Athens), is President of the Hellenic Industrial Space Association and Director of Offsets and
Industrial Cooperation in Aerospace Ventures Group (Athens, Greece).
1
Spyridon Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, eds, The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition:
Multipolarity, Politics and Power (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).
62
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Potsis | Strategic Surveillance in the Eastern Mediterranean
has grown, during the last decade, into a maritime zone of strategic importance
for both the European Union and Israel.
With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, there was an exponential increase of
irregular migration into the Eastern Mediterranean, especially of irregular
immigrants and asylum seekers through Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Likewise,
the unobserved flow of extremist recruits from and to European countries that
support the cause of terrorist groups fighting in North Africa and the Middle East,
and the accompanying increase of asymmetrical threats, such as arms smuggling,
terrorism, drug trafficking and other criminal activities, have created a
complicated security situation in the Mediterranean.2 It is realized that, despite
some modest results, the common European Security Strategy3 presents a
situation that is not so idyllic. It is more than obvious that the operational security
mechanism already developed at a European Union level4 FRONTEX,5
EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System),6 EUROMARFOR (European
Maritime Force),7 etc. needs to be supplemented by a highly sophisticated
intelligence collection network. The EEZ delimitation in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the recent discovery of hydrocarbon deposits in the Levantine
Basin as well as the urgent need for the establishment of an effective energy
security mechanism against conventional military and unconventional terrorist
2
Peter Apps, Arab Spring fallout fuels Mediterranean smuggling rise, Reuters, 8 November
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/08/us-crime-mediterranean-for-will-watermanidUSBRE9A708620131108 [accessed 5 January 2015]
3
Sven Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership (Farnham: Ashgate, 2003).
Council of the European Union, Plan for the Management of the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union, 10019/02, 14 June 2002; Council of the European
Union, Effective Management of the External Borders of the EU Member States, 10274/03,
06 June 2003; European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Council Regulation
Establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders (COM (2003) 687 C5-0613/2003 2003/0273 (CNS)), A5 0093/2004, 24
February 2004.
5
Sarah Leonard, The Creation of FRONTEX and the Politics of Institutionalization in the EU
External Borders Policy, Journal of Contemporary European Research 5:3 (2009), 371-388; A. W.
Neal, Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX, Journal of
Common Market Studies 47:2 (2009), 333-356.
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions: Examining the Creation of a European Border Surveillance System
(EUROSUR), COM (2008) 68 FINAL, 13 February 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0068&rid=7 [accessed 15 March 2015].
http://www.euromarfor.org.
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63
threats, further highlight the need for multilateral cooperation. The development
of a strategic maritime surveillance system in the East Mediterranean by Cyprus,
Greece and Israel can not only improve regional security but also provide a
turnkey solution to the European Union.8 This would contribute to the Unions
effort to overcome a major obstacle, namely the shift from a policy of reaction to
the current situation, to a strategy of pro-action for preventing it.
The technology
Before examining the characteristics of a strategic surveillance system it is
pertinent to define the term strategic. Depending on the territory (maritime/
land), surveillance activities can be grouped in distinct progressive phases based
on three levels: a) The tactical level pertains to the conduct of elements of an
operation and involves the selection of elementary actions in (almost) real time
or as close to real time as possible, utilizing preselected systems and sensors. b)
The operational level refers to the planning and execution of operations in a
specific, predefined area, where operation is defined as a sequence of actions in
a pre-planned framework of assets, personnel and time according to a predefined plan and a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). c) The strategic level
refers to the planning of sequences of operations and the collection and analysis
of intelligence needed to make that planning.9
Furthermore, maritime surveillance10 is identified as the intention to detect,
classify and identify at least 80% of all vessels of interest, within a predefined,
designated area of fixed size, using different platforms and sensors. The 80% of
the criteria for detection and classification may be achieved through the fusion of
both space (satellite) and aerial MPA/UAV (Maritime Patrol Aircraft/ Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles) observation assets; identification should be provided for vessels
larger than 10-12 m.
The level of intelligence collection, utilizing various technological products,
systems and sensors, triggers the four phases of maritime surveillance operations.
8
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States
of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, L 349/1-11, 25 November 2011,
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/frontex_ regulation_en.pdf [accessed 15
March 2015].
9
European Commission Report, Application of Surveillance Tools to Border Surveillance

Concept of Operations, V 1.4, 07 July 2011, 10-11, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
policies/security/files/doc/conops_gmes_en.pdf [accessed 15 March 2015].
10
Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, Maritime Security and Surveillance Case
Study, January 2011, 2-6, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/
maritime_case_study_cses_en.pdf [accessed 15 March 2015].
64
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Obviously the same products may be used in each of the above-presented levels,
but in a different way and with different data collection scenarios and CONOPS.
Phase 1, at the strategic level, involves the identification and monitoring of a
prospective target prior or during its departure towards the controlled area of
interest (e.g. EEZ, FIR maritime responsibility, etc.). Phases 2 and 3, at an operational
level, refer to the surveillance of the target at least 200 nm from the controlled area
and within the EEZ respectively. Phase 4, at a tactical level, pertains to the
monitoring of maritime traffic within the range (<40 nm) of coastal maritime
radars.
The strategic level of maritime surveillance (Phase 1) is defined by two
distinct objectives: to monitor the ports and sea of a specific third country with
the aim of determining if/when a specific vessel, which based on intelligence
has already been identified as being suspicious, has departed; and to monitor
coastal areas that may harbour departure points for small boats used by
terrorists. The corresponding requirements for strategic level surveillance
include the following technical capabilities: a) to recognize preparatory activities
such as the gathering of vehicles, and the placement of boats on the beach, with
sensors that detect targets at a resolution greater than 3 m; b) to define whether
the identified vessels are equipped with a cooperative identification system such
as AIS (Automatic Identification System); c) to discriminate ships from one
another and from the docks with sensors that have a resolution of at least 3-5 m;
d) to identify areas of personnel and equipment gathering in preparation of
missions that need specific logistic support for activities in the sea. The
platforms usually selected, in order to fulfil the above requirements, are
satellites and Long Endurance UAV Systems with Optical and IR/Thermal
Imagery, Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR) with inherent coherent detection
and Moving Target Indicator (MTI), and Cooperative Transponders like AIS
and LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking System).
The operational level (Phases 2 and 3) of maritime surveillance includes the
intention to track, identify and intercept a medium to large size vessel coming
from a distant third country port, heading for the controlled waters. This vessel
has been identified before departure or at an early stage of its journey (at Phase 1
described above). This service heavily depends on the use of cooperative systems
like AIS, LRIT and VMS. It is extremely difficult to track small vessels (smaller
than 8 m) utilizing Satellite Optical Imagery and SAR, but these sensors could be
used to verify the information received by the cooperative systems. One single
platform cannot provide alone sufficient coverage to track any type of vessel,
therefore a combination of platforms and sensors has to be utilized. Traditionally,
Maritime Patrol Aircraft play an important role in maritime surveillance. Usually
equipped with a variety of sensors, an MPA can be tasked to patrol large areas to
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65
discover suspicious activities or to relocate a vessel or boat, based either on

intelligence information or past recording data if it was previously under
surveillance. UAV technology has emerged during recent years and today there
is adequate operational experience in deploying UAVs in support of maritime
surveillance. Strategic UAVs could be used to detect and track suspicious vessels
based on intelligence, but the utilization of UAVs in maritime surveillance is
strictly related to the capability to carry a maritime radar; a prerequisite that
severely limits the list of systems currently available for such missions. The
corresponding requirements of operational level maritime surveillance include
mainly two actions: the detection, track and re-location of vessels of interest; the
estimation of speed and heading, as well as the level of threat. 11
The prospect of Maritime Surveillance in Eastern Mediterranean

Having defined the distinction between strategic and operational maritime
surveillance, it is now appropriate to examine their potential application in the
Eastern Mediterranean,12 particularly in relation to the emerging cooperation
between Greece, Cyprus and Israel.13 The analysis will focus on ranges greater
than 40 nautical miles from shore, which is the physical-technical limitation of
coastal radars for the detection of maritime targets.14 Beyond the obvious aspect
of geography, political and economic considerations have to be taken into
account. The prospects of developing a strategic cooperation for maritime
surveillance in the Eastern Mediterranean are enhanced by three important
factors: a) the recent discoveries of hydrocarbon deposits in the Cypriot and
Israeli EEZs offer the necessary financial encouragement; b) the widely
recognized cultural, political and democratic stability of the three states
provides an important security motivation; c) the abundance of state-of-the-art
solutions available in Israel offers a technological incentive.
The Israeli defence industry can effectively support Greece and Cyprus on
the issue of satellite maritime surveillance services developed by the European
Union while it can equally provide supreme solutions on UAV systems equipped
11
European Commission Report, Application of Surveillance Tools to Border Surveillance

Concept of Operations, V 1.4, 07 July 2011, 10-14.
12
Sarah Wolf, The Mediterranean Dimension of the European Unions Internal Security (New York:
Pelgrave Macmillan, 2012).
13
14
Aristotle Tziampiris, The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation (New York: Springer, 2015).
Due to the earth curvature effect, a costal radar range is limited to 40nm-50nm. This range
can be extended by using ESM-ELINT systems but only for radiating targets within the
frequency range of the receivers.
66
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with maritime radars for the monitoring of national EEZs and for safeguarding
security in the Eastern Mediterranean [Figure 1]. While sophisticated technology
deriving from Israel can support the strategic cooperation between the three
countries in ensuring security in East Mediterranean, political and economic
constrains can impose obstacles on the materialisation of this prospect. It is not
yet clear whether Jerusalem is willing to allow the export of sophisticated long
endurance UAV systems, equipped with maritime radar, to the Cypriot
Government.
Figure 1. The prospective cooperation between Greece and Cyprus with Israel for the
strategic maritime surveillance of the Eastern Mediterranean offers, with minimum cost and
human risk, multiple national and geopolitical advantages to Athens and Nicosia, since they
could also offer valuable intelligence to European and international security organizations
for asymmetrical threats in the sensitive zone of the Mediterranean. The figure depicts an
actual surveillance scenario where two UAV systems equipped with maritime radars
provide sustainable surveillance over the East Mediterranean for several hours. 2015
EMGR (concept Athanasios Potsis).
The recent failure in the negotiations between the two governments for the
purchase of two Israeli-made fast patrol boats,15 may indicate the current export
restrictions of the more capable Israeli-made strategic surveillance systems;
which means that political considerations are still strongly influencing the
15
http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/top-stories/885/176993/ypograftike-i-symfonia-giaagora-dyo-opv-tis-ef-apo-to-israil [accessed 20 April 2015].
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67
unrestricted cooperation between the two states. Furthermore, the economic

crisis introduces additional obstacles to the implementation of a strategic
cooperation. Greece, facing severe financial problems, was not able to take full
advantage of the technologies offered by the Israeli defence and homeland
security industry. During the past five years the Greek Government
procurement program for the development of a strategic maritime surveillance
system was limited to conventional rather than strategic systems. Today,
although Greece is operating a powerful naval fleet and an even stronger air
force, the absence of modern MPAs and strategic UAVs, as well as its limited
satellite surveillance capabilities (it currently utilizes only the EU HELIOS-II
Strategic Reconnaissance System), do not permit the operation of a reliable
strategic reconnaissance maritime system in the East Mediterranean.
In conclusion, technology wise, the strategic cooperation between Cyprus,
Greece and Israel can be fully supported by state-of-the-art sensors and systems.
It is only the political and economic limitations that have to be resolved in order
to develop in a very short time one of the most reliable maritime surveillance
systems in the world. A system that will provide high level of security, currently
in one of the hottest regions in the world, the East Mediterranean.
The first thematic issue of the journal Eastern Mediterranean

Geopolitical Review examines the prospects of strategic
cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean between Cyprus,
Greece and Israel, as well as other neighbouring states such
as Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, in vital geopolitical issues
that pertain to regional stability, multilateral cooperation
and peace. The articles examine alternative perspectives and
analyse principal questions such as regional security,
national defence, the Law of the Sea, EEZ delimitation,
airspace, energy exploitation, Great Power and EU role in
the Eastern Mediterranean, and interpret the potential
repercussions in the growingly volatile Middle East.
ISSN 2421-8065

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 2015

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Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 2015

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Volume 1 Fall 2015

The Geopolitical Importance of the Eastern Mediterranean Airspace

Strategic Surveillance in the Eastern Mediterranean

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review (EMGR)

The publication of the first volume

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review Vol. 1 (Fall 2015), iii-iv.

A Note from Professor Andreas Theophanous,

A Note from the Executive Chairman

Mediterranean has always been a very important region as it is a meeting point

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review Vol. 1 (Fall 2015), v-vi.

The first thematic issue of the journal under a provisional advisory

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review Vol. 1 (Fall 2015), 1-5.

Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Strategic Relations

The recent developments in the geopolitical environment of the Middle

Klokkaris | Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Strategic Relations

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 3

exploitation of its hydrocarbon resources before the final settlement of the

Klokkaris | Cyprus-Greece-Israel: Strategic Relations

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 5

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review Vol. 1 (Fall 2015), 6-20.

The Geostrategic Position of Cyprus:

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 7

Savvides | The Geostrategic Position of Cyprus

A strategic asset for London and Washington

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review 9

Savvides | The Geostrategic Position of Cyprus