Continental Steel v. Montano
Continental Steel v. Montano
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SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura and
Peralta, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.A grant of annulment of marriage or legal
separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion, hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state
for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256
SCRA 158 [1996])
One accused of bigamy has the burden of adducing in
evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of the first spouse as required by Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of
the Family Code. (Manuel vs. People, 476 SCRA 461 [2005])
o0o
CONTINENTAL
STEEL
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. ACCREDITED
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATIONSOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
(NMCSCSUPER), respondents.
Civil Law Civil Personality Death of a Party Sections 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death
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*THIRD DIVISION.
622
622
While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may
be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could dieone need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.Sections
40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality
could die. And third, death has been defined as the cessation of
life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the
State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to
the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Same Same Same Labor Law Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs) Bereavement Leave and Death Benefits The
unborn child can be considered a dependent under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the parties in the instant
case.The unborn child can be considered a dependent under the
CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who
relies on another for support one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else. Under said
general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 3839 weeks of
its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the
CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee or the parent, brother, or
sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child
shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the
unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
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4CA Rollo, p. 26.
5Rollo, pp. 8492.
6Id., at p. 93.
7Id., at p. 86.
626
626
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8 Id., at p. 33.
9 CA Rollo, p. 60.
10Id., at p. 67.
11Id., at p. 46.
12Id., at p. 25.
13Id., at pp. 6265.
14Id., at pp. 6672.
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628
that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from
the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never
acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered
dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never
needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be
supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the
CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the
parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally
accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically
accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have
unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as
used in the CBAthe death of whom would have qualified
the parentemployee for bereavement leave and other
death benefitsbound the Union to the legally accepted
definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases
involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel
and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant
and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union
sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and
other death benefits to the parentemployee for the loss of
an unborn child constituted company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17
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mean as follows:
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19Id., at pp. 218.
Art. 262A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section 7, Rule
XIX of Department Order No. 4003 series of 2003 provides that the
decision, order, resolution or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be
final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of
the award or decision by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
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