Chan Vs CA (G.R. No. 147999)
Chan Vs CA (G.R. No. 147999)
147999
In their Answer to the Complaint, petitioners denied owing private respondent the amounts claimed by the latter.
They alleged that the late Ramon Chan had paid all the rentals due up to March 15, 1998. Moreover, they need
not pay any balance owing on the rentals as they were required to pay two (2) months advance rentals upon
signing of the contract and make a guarantee deposit amounting to P220,000. On the matter of unpaid realty
taxes, petitioners alleged that private respondent was responsible therefor as the owner of the leased premises,
notwithstanding any contrary stipulations in the contract.
On July 19, 1999, petitioners filed a Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging that they were
neither parties nor privies to the Contract of Lease, hence they are not the real parties-in-interest.
Private respondent filed a Reply and Opposition to petitioners Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss
dated August 2, 1999, praying for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss for having been belatedly filed in direct
contravention of Section 1, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 He further alleged that petitioner
Chan, as the owner of the business and petitioner Co as the agent of petitioner Chan, are clearly real parties-ininterest in the case. Private respondent pointed to their continuous dealings with him in all transactions relating
to the contract after the death of Ramon Chan and even after the expiration of the Contract of Lease.
On January 11, 2000, the RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss dated July 19, 1999 filed by defendant through
counsel against plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court pointed out that petitioners continued to transact business with private respondent after the death
of Ramon Chan as shown by the communications between the parties. It also declared that private respondents
acquiescence to petitioners continued occupation and enjoyment of the leased premises and the latters
recognition of the formers ownership of said premises reflected an oral agreement between the parties to
continue the Lease Contract.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on the ground that any claim should be filed against the estate of Ramon
Chan in an estate proceeding pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86, of the Revised Rules of Court 6 since Ramon
Chans estate is the real party-in-interest. The court denied said motion and declared that Section 5, Rule 86 is
inapplicable in the case. It pointed out that the unpaid rentals being claimed were those for the period April
1993 to December 1998. These were incurred by petitioners and not by the late Ramon Chan, who died on
August 5, 1989.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action of certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61889. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the RTC Orders, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition having no merit in fact and in law is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and ACCORDINGLY ORDERED DISMISSED. The assailed Orders are resultantly
AFFIRMED WITH COSTS TO PETITIONERS.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, the instant petition submitting as sole issue for our resolution:
whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error in law in affirming the RTC Orders
denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.8
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTCs Orders because they are not the real
parties-in-interest and hence, were improperly impleaded in the complaint as defendants. Petitioners insist that
they were neither parties nor were they privy to the Contract of Lease between the late Ramon Chan and
Napoleon Medalla. They vigorously assert that any claim for unpaid rentals should be made against the estate of
Ramon Chan pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We find for private respondent. Prefatorily, it bears stressing that petitioners Motion to Dismiss was
filed after an Answer had already been filed. This alone warranted an outright dismissal of the motion for
having been filed in contravention of the clear and explicit mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure. Under this section, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. 9 Here, petitioners filed their Supplemental Answer with
Motion to Dismiss almost two months after filing their Answer, in clear contravention of the aforecited rule.
The Court of Appeals stated that the grant or denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order, and it
cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper remedy in such a case is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered, the CA said. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The function of a petition for certiorari is
limited to keeping an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary
acts, acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. Certiorari is not designed to
correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court. 10 On this score, we are in agreement with the
appellate court.
At any rate, we find no merit to petitioners contention that they are not real parties-in-interest since they are not
parties nor signatories to the contract and hence should not have been impleaded as defendants. It is undeniable
that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and, together with petitioner Co, was a successor-in-interest to
the restaurant business of the late Ramon Chan. Both continued to operate the business after the death of
Ramon. Thus, they are real parties-in-interest in the case filed by private respondent, notwithstanding that they
are not signatories to the Contract of Lease.
A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are transmissible
to the heirs.11 The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessorsin-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2)
stipulation or (3) provision of law.12 In the subject Contract of Lease, not only were there no stipulations
prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission
of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to their respective heirs and successors. The contract is the law
between the parties. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves a
property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract.13
Finally, as to petitioners contention that any claim should have been filed before the estate proceeding of
Ramon Chan pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 86, the trial court found that the unpaid rentals sought to be claimed
were for the period April 1993 to December 1998. Note that Ramon Chan, the original lessee, died on August 5,
1989. In other words, as the unpaid rentals did not accrue during the lifetime of Ramon Chan, but well after his
death, his estate might not be held liable for them. Hence, there is no indubitable basis to apply Section 5, Rule
86, of the Revised Rules of Court as petitioners urge respondents to do.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
61889 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.