Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Ethics
Ethics
husband and respondent. He also vehemently took exception to the imputation that he was
banking on the influence of his father-in-law and uncle-in-law.
LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,
vs. Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent claims, however,
ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent. is that the nonpayment was justified by the unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have with
respect to the right-of-way of the land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had made assurances that the
RESOLUTION land had a right-of-way required for its development, but respondent later found out that such
road-right-of-way required the consent of four other land owners, and the expense would be
considerably more than he was made to believe. According to respondent, he and Mr. Espino
PUNO, J.: had agreed that the latter would not encash the checks or demand the equivalent of the same
until the right-of-way problem of the land had been resolved. 8 Respondents position is that until
On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint 1 with the then Court the problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the land has been resolved, nothing has yet accrued
Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of the against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be "very unfair and unjust" for them to pay Mr.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for "having employed fraud, Espino when the land could not be developed and sold.9
trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino,
when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00." According to complainant, respondents Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owes Mr. Espino
unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her husband, who died or his heirs from the purchase of the land, the advances he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he
"disillusioned and embittered."2 The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged that incurred when he defended Mr. Espinos son in a criminal case. He later on manifested that he
notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr. Espino and complainant (after the death of has fully paid the portion of the land which had been titled in his name through the same
Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the amount represented by the eight checks which advances and incurred expenses.10
had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquitos refusal to pay may be due
to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge of the RTC
(Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro). In a resolution dated November 26, 1997, 11 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision, and assigned to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced to
complainants late husband, Mr. Virgilio M. Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City, had
sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale of his In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002,12 Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay
piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The discussion found that "the facts and credible evidence made available in this case indubitably establish
between Mr. Espino and the respondent resulted in the sale of the property to respondents failure to live up to the demands of the Lawyers Code of Professional
respondent.3 Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and respondent, 4 the Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics." For having failed to act with candor and
purchase price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by fairness toward complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended
installments.5 Pursuant to the terms of payment in the agreement, respondent issued eight post- from the practice of law for six (6) months, and ordered to immediately account with complainant
dated checks, totaling P736,060.00.6 Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership regarding the sale of the piece of land which had been subdivided in the name of respondent
agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its and his business partner. On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use. 7 The land was Resolution adopting/approving the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Dulay, finding
eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots. that "respondents lack of fairness and candor and honesty [was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility."
Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino
made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that respondent was
December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent the value of the wanting in fairness, candor and honesty demanded of him by the Lawyers Code of Professional
eight checks. When complainants numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. We find, however, the recommended
in June 1997. penalty of six (6) months suspension too light considering respondents gross misconduct.
In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that Complainants testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an agreement
the allegations that he had employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. between respondent and complainants late husband for the sale of the latters land; (2)
Espino were totally false and baseless. The complaint, according to respondent, stemmed from respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these checks
complainants lack of knowledge as to "the real story" of the transaction between complainants were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-right-of-way.
Complainants exhibits were formally offered as early as January 6, 1999, 13 and were admitted
without objections from respondent.14
In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent to prove a legal what is due her. Respondent also alleges and blames the deceased husband of
excuse or defense for nonpayment of the eight checks. complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They are just bare
allegations and remain unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in
Respondent utterly failed in this regard. the business venture and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller cannot
be blamed for any failure in the project. Respondents actuations in the whole
transaction is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded of him as a member of the
From the termination of complainants presentation of evidence on December 1998 until bar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact that he
Commissioner Dulays report on November 12, 2002, the records show that respondent was has unreasonably delayed and failed to account with complainant for a long time and
unable to present evidence - either testimonial or documentary - to prove that he had legal the fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable
cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondents own and censurable behavior for a member of the bar.19 [citations omitted]
statements - which, without corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations - fall
short of testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by opposing counsel or for
clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks, respondents
comment, but only went so far as to mark (without a formal offer) the agreement between him indifference to complainants entreaties for payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of
and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the partnership agreement between him and Mrs. the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other than his own allegations. by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late
husband,20 first by allowing the eight (8) checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the
repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and finally by
Respondents failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics. Considering that the
Responsibility,15especially in the light of the numerous postponements and resettings he property of complainant and her late husband is already in respondent and Mrs. Ares name, the
requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to prepare his injustice of respondents different maneuvers to evade payment of the eight checks - due and
evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.
14, 1998. Two years - five resettings, and three orders submitting the case for resolution - later,
respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary evidence.
It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without
regard to its deleterious effects to public interest and public order. We have already declared,
Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financial difficulties, i.e., most recently in Lao v. Medel,21that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
he could not afford to spend for travel expenses of his witnesses. 16 We are not persuaded. First, misconduct, and puts the erring lawyers moral character in serious doubt, though it is not
it boggles the mind how financial constraints could have prevented respondent from presenting related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. 22 He not only sets himself liable for a
the originals of the documents attached to his comment, proving, among others, the alleged serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code of Professional
advances and costs on Mr. Espinos behalf. The originals of these documents are presumably in Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the
his possession. Second, with respect to the absence of testimony, respondent could have respect for law.
submitted the affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which he could have done himself in
Cagayan de Oro to keep down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this
option.17 But he did neither. It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is
All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondent could not not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
present evidence because there really was none to justify his nonpayment.18 members of the bar.23 A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 24 Thus, the Code of
Even if we were to excuse respondents procedural lapse and consider his written pleadings as Professional Responsibility provides:
testimony, we agree with Commissioner Dulay that respondents problems with respect to the
right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse his nonpayment. As stated in the Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
IBP-CBD report: conduct.
[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of xxx xxx xxx
respondent.We note that respondent has already taken title over the property
together with Guadalupe Ares by making complainants late husband, sign over the
property by way of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondents position vis--vis Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
the widowed complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent has practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
assumed responsibility for the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware of manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
the problem. To [sic] our mind he has used the alleged road-right-of-way problem only
as an afterthought and a reason to delay and in fact deny the complainant payment of
Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued worthless
checks - Lao v. Medel,25 Co v. Bernardino,26 and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,27 - we find respondents
reprehensible conduct warrants suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010 In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that
respondent:
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,
vs. X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent. AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11
DECISION X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION12
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD
1
An Information for Estafa was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
(complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto OPPOSING COUNSEL13
(respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the
involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
court granted.2 Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW14
denied3
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING
of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the COMMUNITY AS WELL15
Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them.4
Despite the Courts grant,16 on respondents motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment,
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should
Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of not be disciplinarily dealt with,18but just the same he failed to comply.19
GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of
Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager.5 The notice was signed by The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
respondent. investigation, report, and recommendation.20
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the
Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current Board, 6 Gerango, following issues:
complainants predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed
others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following:
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its
premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent
letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal 1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from land and promote respect for law and legal [processes].
further discharging the duties of their positions.7
1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)- candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 against opposing counsel.
Special General Assembly.
1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the
questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of 1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
GEMASCOs By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. 8 The RDs Resolution of bounds of the law.
February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.
1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed
oath, particularly the following: to file any and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the duly constituted authorities therein the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondents obstinate refusal
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.21 imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect
to their processes.29 (Citations omitted).
Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of
whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six
respondent.22 months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have
received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position when he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more
papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of severe penalty this time is thus called for.
time, did not file any position paper.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the
25
In her Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously
suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
two years. respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the
complaint, however, for lack of merit.261avvphi1 SO ORDERED.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the
GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides
that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
A.C. No. 7922 October 1, 2013 In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
MARY ANN T.MATTUS, Complainant,
vs. The IBPs Report and Recommendation
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.
In his Report and Recommendation6 dated September 16, 2009,Investigating Commissioner
DECISION Salvador B. Hababag recommended that Atty. Villaseca be suspended for six (6) months from
the practice of law.
PER CURIAM:
Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty. Villasecas reckless and gross negligence deprived his
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty. clients of due process; his actuations in the criminal case showed utter disregard for his clients
Albert T. Villaseca for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case No. 10309- life and liberty. Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty. Villaseca failed to file a demurrer to
02. evidence despite the sufficient length of time that had been given to him by the RTC to submit
this pleading, and waived his right to present evidence for the defense, opting instead to file a
memorandum only. Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty. Villasecas failure to properly
Background Facts attend to the interests of his clients led to their conviction.
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in Criminal In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
Case No. 10309-02 a case for estafa thru falsification of public document filed in the Regional approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, but increased Atty. Villasecas period of
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite. The complainant and her husband, German, suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year.
engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant
maintained that she and German were convicted due to Atty. Villasecas gross and inexcusable
negligence in performing his duties as their counsel. Our Ruling
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support
often absent during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the the IBPs findings. We, however, increase Atty. Villasecas period of suspension from the practice
postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a National Bureau of law from one (1) year to five (5) years.
of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter 2 in
the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite having been We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve
granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of
defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of the dates of the justice."8 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire
indicated the wrong case number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty. devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in maintenance and defense of his clients rights,
Villasecas negligence in handling the case resulted in her own and her husbands conviction. and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld
from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty with
In the Courts Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
complaint. justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.9
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment, 4 refuting the allegations against him.
Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known to the complainant that the testimony of a The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been grossly remiss in handling
handwriting expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to produce the original Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall, Atty. Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to
copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings, as well as evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. In its order 10 of July 1, 2004, the RTC gave
his numerous motions for postponement, were justified and were never intended for delay. He him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes within which to file a demurrer to
denied having collected appearance fees when he did not attend the scheduled hearings, and evidence. Atty. Villaseca, however, did not file a demurrer to evidence, without offering any
maintained that the fees he received were intended to compensate him for his services in the explanation why he failed to do so. As a result, the RTC issued an order 11 stating that Atty.
other cases filed by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately Villaseca "is deemed to have waived his right to file the said pleading."
corrected the case number in the notice of appeal when he discovered this error.
To our mind, Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such omission substitute for testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a criminal case where a
constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his conviction could lead to dire consequences. In saying so, we are not insinuating that the RTC
clients cause. We point out that nine months had lapsed from the time the RTC granted Atty. decision would have tilted in favor of the defense had Atty. Villaseca presented evidence; we
Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled that he was deemed to have waived his simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once counsel agrees to take the
right to file this pleading. Clearly, Atty. Villasecas actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of cudgels for his client's cause.
Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or We again remind members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal
offering an explanation for his failure to do so." profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the
The records further disclosed that after Atty. Villasecas failure to file a demurrer to evidence, the latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and
RTC set the initial presentation of defense evidence on May 9, 2005. However, this hearing was diligence, and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the
postponed thrice: the May 9, 2005 hearing was reset to August 8, 2005 due to Atty. Villasecas interests of his client.19 A lawyers diligence and vigilance is more imperative in criminal cases,
failure to appear;12 the August 8, 2005 hearing was reset to November 17, 2005 upon Atty. where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law
Villasecas motion;13 and the November 17, 2005 hearing was reset to March 1, 2006 because of carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and
Atty. Villasecas manifestation that his intended first witness was unavailable. 14During the March to the public. As we explained in Spouses Bautista v. Atty. Arturo Cefra:20
1, 2006hearing, the respondent manifested that the defense would no longer present any
evidence, and moved that he be given time to file a memorandum.15 The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
We point out that the prosecution rested its case on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca waited until legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform
March 1, 2006 only to manifest that he would no longer present any evidence. We are at a loss their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
why Atty. Villaseca chose not to present any evidence for the defense, considering that the the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
accused wanted and were ready to take the witness stand. As a result, the testimony of the lone Responsibility.
prosecution witness remained uncontroverted. To make matters worse, Atty. Villaseca directed
German to attend the hearing on June 6, 2007without informing him that it was already the date "The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
of the promulgation of judgment.1wphi1 discretion based on the surrounding facts." 21 Under the circumstances, we find that the IBPs
recommended penalty of one years suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his Atty. Villasecas transgressions. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." 16 It further mandates client, the courts and society indicate a high degree of irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the
that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." 17 It also states that "a lawyer legal profession.
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable."18 The present case finds a close forerunner in Santeco v. Atty. Avance, 22 where we suspended
Atty. Luna B. Avance from the practice of law for five(5) years for being grossly remiss in the
Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the performance of her duties as counsel. In this cited case, the civil case entrusted to Atty. Avance
defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During the pendency of her motion for reconsideration
his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his (which she had filed way beyond the reglementary period), she told her client that she would file
clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the presented a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the dismissal of the civil case. She did not file this
prosecution evidence. He could have presented the complainant and/or her husband to the petition, but failed to inform her client of this omission. Moreover, Atty. Avance stopped
witness stand, instead of just opting to file a memorandum. Or, at the very least, the reason for appearing as counsel for her client without notifying the latter.
this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later to the IBP and to this Court.
But no such explanation ever came. We are thus left with the stark reality that Atty. Villaseca Atty. Villasecas negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as the legal
failed to file, despite the promise made to the lower court, a demurrer to evidence. After failing in matter entrusted to him involved not merely money or property, but the very liberty and livelihood
this first line of defense for his clients, it should have been incumbent upon Atty. Villaseca to of his clients. We stress that the moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to handle the complainants
present evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this, leaving the lower criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and to
court with no evidence to appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the detriment of his champion their cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his clients every remedy and
clients cause. defense that is authorized by the law, Atty. Villaseca fell short of what is expected of him as an
officer of the Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity
We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to his clients.
to support his clients cause. A memorandum, no matter how lengthy, should not be made a
All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients cause; his failure to
exercise due diligence in attending to their interest in the criminal case caused them grave
prejudice. Under the circumstances, we find a five-year suspension from the practice of law to
be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against him. The increased penalty serves the purpose
of protecting the interest of the Court, the legal profession and the public.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133090 January 19, 2001 ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, o'clock [in the morning] the subpoena.
vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial ATTY. BUGARING: May we put in on record that as early as
Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent. November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of
Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion,
DE LEON, JR., J.: your Honor please, and the record will bear it
out. Until now they did not file any answer,
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court opposition or pleadings or pleadings with respect
of Appeals1affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, to this motion.
declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.1wphi1.nt
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well I was not informed because I am not the
Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel 2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy
Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala receiving clerk of our office regarding this case.
of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, As a matter of fact I was surprised when I
Cavite. received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record
issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite that the manifestation of the respondent that he
to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register was not informed.
of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran
on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
everything that you say here is recorded.
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On
November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we
a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court.3 want to be specific because we will be [filing] a
case against this receiving clerk who did not
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following [inform] him your Honor please, with this
incident transpired: manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of
Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of
ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready. the official duty of the clerk not to inform the
parties concerned.
ATTY. CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your
Honor. COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this
fellow who is taking the video recording at this
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to proceedings. There is no permission from this
the prosecution of our motion for contempt, your Court that such proceedings should be taken.
Honor. May we know from the record if the
Register of Deeds is properly notified for today's ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to
hearing. take a video he just accompanied me this
morning.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your process and you should secure the permission
Honor. of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor. ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video
tape.
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection
with the order of this Court which directed your COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not
office to register lis pendens of the complaint in give him the go signal that shots should be done.
connection with this case of Royal Becthel
Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor
Beatriz Alvaran, et al. please, we just came from an occasion last night
and I am not yet come home, your Honor please.
I could prove your Honor please, that the ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present
contents of that tape is other matters your Honor my witness but I will just mark our documentary
please. I was just surprised why he took video exhibits which are part of the record of the case
tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology and thereafter your Honor please.
of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor
please. COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a
preparation being done by newly appointed
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is
proceedings but the necessary authority or considered as the privately hired counsel of the
permission should be secured. register of deeds and the respondent of this
contempt proceedings. How much time do you
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor. need to go over the record of this case so that
we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a
video tape. ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal --------------------------------------------------------------
problem your Honor please, that is personal to -----------------------------
that guy your Honor please if this representation
is being . COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi. ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after
reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to noticed that the motion for contempt of Court
mark our documentary evidence as part of our was filed on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph
motion for contempt, your Honor please. 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record
of the case shows up to the filing of this motion,
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with the Register as well as the Deputy Register
this matter? Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well as I have said before, I have not received not comply with the Court Orders dated February
any motion regarding this contempt you are 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.'
talking. I am willing now to testify. However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado
Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming
from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it 18, 1996 addressed to the Register regarding
is not yet the defense. This is a criminal this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT
proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal. Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this
letter request, your Honor for the annotation of
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been
from the Fiscal. already entered in the book of primary entry. We
would like also to invite the attention of the Hon.
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was
of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the
Deeds. annotation of the lis pendens was made by the
counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18,
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but 1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as early
a private counsel, your Honor. as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been
issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows,
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider 'Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of
that you should be amply represented. the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby
ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens
Barzaga if he is willing. annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos.
519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'
ATTY. BARZAGA4: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor,
will first mark our documentary evidence. this is set for hearing for today, your Honor
please.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what
you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they
manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. do not have their comment yet what are we
So let us wait until he is finished and then wait going to receive as evidence.
for the direction of this Court what to do to have
an orderly proceedings in this case. ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please
ATTY. BUGARING: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever
to be a little bit complicated your Honor, you have to do after the submission of the
considering that the order regarding the comment.
annotation of the lis pendens has already been
revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record
request that we be given a period of ten days will show that the motion for contempt was copy
from today your Honor, within which to submit furnished with the Register of Deeds and
our formal written opposition your Honor. Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get
manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in what the Court would want to do. This should be
connection with the refusal of the Register of an orderly proceedings and considering that this
Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of is a Court of record the comment has to be in
certain reasons. According to the manifestation first then in your reply you can submit your
of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier evidence to rebut the argument that is going to
part of the record of this case, the reason for that be put up by the respondent and so we will be
is because there was a pending subdivision able to hear the case smoothly.
plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March,
1996. May 1 have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the
respondent had been long time furnished of this
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion
respect to that matter. they should have filed it in due time in
accordance with the rules and because it is
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our
could already explain this, your Honor. evidence and present to this Court, your Honor
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
manifestation so that this court can be guided
accordingly. Because this Court believes that the ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
root of the matter started from that. After the
submission of the . What are you suppose to COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
submit?
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your
ATTY. BUGARING: Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Honor please, we are all officers of the Court,
Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court. your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we
know also our procedure, your Honor.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and
furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the
for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the procedure of the Court first and then do
counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within whatever you want.
which to submit his reply.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this the antagonistic approach of the Court of this
representation your Honor please, that we will be representation ever since I appeared your Honor
marking first our documentary evidence because please and I put on record that I will be filing an
inhibition to this Hon. Court. ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the
appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel) protecting my client, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is
town. an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning
to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is
COURT: Do that right away. put in jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules. At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact
that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are
appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for
putting the cart ahead of the horse.
the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I've been challenged by this While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so.
Court that I know better than this Court. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the
Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he
been winning in many certiorari cases, your has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the
Honor. Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite discredit of the Court.
you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel)
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the
You call the police and I am going to send this
Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant,
client your Honor please. and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is
sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5
been abusing the discretion of this Court.
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal
Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.6
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for 2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6, the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule
1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers
Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.7 from attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case".
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in 3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the
direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to
respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to
contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the Constitution "maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance
and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8 in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant,
at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and 4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he
sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the
of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, 10 and ordered petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn,
the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of
dispositive portion of which reads: Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the 5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of
modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of
petitioner. Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error: witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty
THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase
IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION. 11 "your honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court
and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he proceedings.12
always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please." Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the
We disagree. extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and
the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
provides: essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of
Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the
of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. 14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim
same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an
deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge of the contempt order on the same day.15
thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court. Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the
case of his client by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the respondent judge's contrary order he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect
trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda
of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts". bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432,
439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes,
in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred
in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It
was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly
ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment
meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to
return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27662 October 29, 1968 prohibition; let temporary restraining order issue, effective immediately and until further orders
from this Court."
MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,
vs. The answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the later
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing pleadings, revealed quite a different story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the offended
Officer of Regional Officer of the Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and party suffering from a legitimate grievance, its right to due process having been summarily
MARIO ABITRIA, respondents. disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law affords to evade the
performance of an obligation, which under the law it must fulfill, namely, to compensate for the
FERNANDO, J.: serious and debilitating ailment of tuberculosis acquired in the course of employment by
respondent Abitria. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition should be, as it is
hereby, denied.
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to give
due course to a certiorari and prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary injunction, a
restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement and earnest protestations of The facts as found by respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, which must be
petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was denied procedural due process. As will be more deemed conclusive, can yield no other conclusion but the undeniable liability for compensation
fully explained, such is not the case at all. to respondent Abitria on the part of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded evidence, it appears
that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a
week and receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for the respondent. He was
More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's assigned in the Research Division which conducted research on rat traps and other matters
Compensation Commission, through its referee, considered a complaint filed against it by the regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects. It was testified to by the claimant and his
other respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for decision after he and a witnesses that in the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the
physician had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of
24, 1967.1 Then came, according to the petition, a motion for reconsideration dated March 7, work was also warm and humid in view of the products being manufactured by the respondent.
1967, petitioner praying that he be allowed to present evidence on his behalf. 2 It was denied in He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the
an order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already been rendered against petitioner, as painting and soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used.
employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability compensation benefit. It was Sometime in July, 1966 while the claimant was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of
also pointed out in such order that there was no plea in such motion for reconsideration for such pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr.
decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an opportunity to cross-examine the Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic,
witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter was looked upon as "moot and academic." 3 It active moderately advanced, right: minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon Institute under
was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon. According to the attending physician, he was admitted in the
aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of any decision hospital ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding from the lungs. When he was
rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its admitted he was prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep injections and other
counsel.4 After a denial of such motion for reconsideration on April 24, 1967, and a plea for anti-TB drugs. His clinical history showed that the claimant was diagnosed with severe coughing
execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was granted on June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff followed by expectoration of fresh blood amounting to two glassful [when] he was brought to the
of Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on petitioner's properties on June 14, 1967, by Philippine General Hospital and given injection and was X-rayed. From that hospital he was
virtue of the above writ of execution.5 transferred to the Quezon Institute where he was subsequently admitted. The attending
physician testified further that the right lung had bronchogenous lesions in the upper lobe with
It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of procedural due honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal space, while the left lung had fibrotic lesion behind the
process, the actuation of respondent Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with anterior rib II. ... He was discharged from the Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but the
grave abuse of discretion. That was the basis for the relief sought, seeking a writ of preliminary illness was not yet arrested although there was stopping of the hemoptysis. The doctor testified
injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at public auction of on cross examination that the nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous physical
petitioner's properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of execution and likewise all exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance in view of the enormous
the proceedings in RO4-WC Case No. 5503, thereafter making the injunction permanent, and inhalation of chemical fumes also brought about the aggravation of the claimant's present
ordering respondent Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00 as attorney'sfees. Thus was condition. According to the claimant the respondent was duly notified of his illness through the
imparted more than just a semblance of plausibility to the petition, deceptive in character, as general manager and in view of the respondent's refusal to pay him disability compensation
subsequent pleadings proved, but nonetheless insufficient to call for its summary dismissal. despite repeated demands, claimant filed this instant claim."6
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662 The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above decision, was "to determine in this case
(Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.) are required to file, ... whether ... there is sufficient or substantial evidence in support of the claim for disability
within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition for compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The evidence on record is
crystal clear that the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all indications point From which it could make the apt observation. "It is indeed sad to note that after the Counsel for
that the illness of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was service connected in view Petitioner refused to receive the copy of said decision, he is now impugning the delivery of said
of his work as laborer involving strenuous physical exertion which brought about the lowering of decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying knowledge of it when in fact and truth the delivery of
his resistance due to the massive inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to the extent that he said decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as evidenced by
was made an easy prey to the contraction of TB bacilli. The fact that there was no evidence on the attached affidavit of Mr. Guzman."12
record that claimant was sick upon entrance to his employment, it is presumed that he was
normal in every respect during the first period of his employment and the disease of pulmonary In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit and the understandable reflection
tuberculosis showed only during the later part of his employment when he was assigned in the on the actuation of counsel for petitioner, there was, as could be expected submitted by
research division of the respondent. The attending physician himself stated that claimant's petitioner's counsel a rejoinder, dated November 26, 1967. He would have this Court believe that
exposure to his work aggravated the illness and we believe that the respondent had failed to the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared in respondents' answer, where it was
dispute the work connection as there is no showing that claimant's ailment was due to the stated that a copy of the decision was received, not by him but by the law office of a certain
lowering of his resistance by causes other than the nature of his work as laborer of the Attorney Camacho. He would then ask why Guzman did not serve a copy of the decision to him.
respondent."7 He would even assume, for argument sake, that there was a refusal on his part to accept a copy
of this decision, but he would argue why did not Guzman, who could be expected to know the
It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be interposed that prompted petitioner to duties of a service officer, fail "to state said refusal in his official return."
rely on the alleged deprivation of due process, a contention, which as will now be shown, is
without basis. Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to credence? That of respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission would appear to be more in accordance with the realities of the
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be heard appeared to have been situation. It is entitled to belief.
disregarded. No further attention should be accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not
introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to blame. No fault could be attributed to respondent This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out of excess of zeal and out of a desire
Workmen's Compensation Commission. There must be such a realization on the part of to rely on every conceivable defense that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an
petitioner for its four-page memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument did not bother to obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel would attempt to put the most favorable light on a
discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such a contention need not detain us further as it ought course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would clear
never to have been raised in the first place. counsel of any further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired. His responsibility
aside, it made evident why, to repeat the effort to evade liability by petitioner by invoking the due
Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as shown in the answer of process guaranty must not be rewarded with success.
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain Attorney
Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz. Petitioner would Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied such
emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel, a constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision;
who was without any connection with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho. It would conclude, that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. True, there was a
therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision which could not thereafter reach the stage denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of truth. There is no
of finality calling for a writ of execution. reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there where no such
misinformation, if there where no such attempt to mislead.
This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Why it happened thus was explained in an affidavit of No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was
one of its employees, a certain Gerardo Guzman, included therein. 9 As set forth in such reply merely performing its official function. Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the law's
memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, on beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by its failure to follow the regular
March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the employee entrusted with serving a copy of the
decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz, instead instructed Mr. decision, in this particular case, and in this particular case alone, would depart so radically from
Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already Atty, Camacho who what the law requires, if there were no such intervening cause that resulted in his going astray.
was handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of How could petitioner escape responsibility?
the case."10In view of such instruction, it was further noted, Guzman "went the office of Atty.
Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around he handed the copy of the decision to the
receiving clerk therein, who received it as evidenced by the stamp pad bearing the name of the Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish such a cause. Who would benefit
Law Office of Camacho, Zapa, Andaya & Associates on the attached true copy of the Notice of thereby? The answer cannot be in doubt. Through such circumstance, wether intended or
Decision, ..."11 otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the fulfillment of a just claim. For it is to be
noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for denying compensation to
respondent Abitria on the facts as found. Considering how great and pressing the laborer's need
for the compensation due him was and the consequent temptation to settle for less if in the
meanwhile, the money he had the right to expect, was not forthcoming, petitioner, as the
employer liable, had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such a turn of events. Even if it
were an honest mistake, the consequences were still deplorable.
It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate how it
could validly avoid its liability under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which disclosed
that the ailment suffered by respondent Abitria while in its employment was indeed
compensable. Neither in its memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 nor rejoinder of
November 21, 1967, did it ever occur to petitioner to allege that if given the opportunity for
hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a valid defense. It did not do so because it
could not do so. Our decisions as to the undeniable liability of an employer similarly situated are
impressive for their number and unanimity.13
It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in itself an assurance and a guaranty of
justice and fairness, would be the very vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant
injustice and unfairness. The law itself would stand in disrepute, if such a gross perversion of its
dictates were allowed. Any other view is unthinkable. Otherwise, there would be a stultification of
all our efforts to promote social justice 14 and a mockery of the constitutional ideal of protection to
labor.15
Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum due
respondent Abitria. The unseemly conduct, under the above circumstances disclosed, of
petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz calls for words of reproof.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite
another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of
events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and
demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-
stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our
countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond the means of our
poverty stricken masses.
The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be
kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in
good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious responsibility of seeing to it
that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is less than fair and
far from honorable. What happens then to the ideal that only he is fit to belong to such a
profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an ideal may be difficult to
approximate. That is true, but let it not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty
standard took place, as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited magnificent
unconcern.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.
With treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.
[A.C. No. 6289. December 16, 2004] 2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
JULIAN MALONSO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE, respondent. i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY;
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from
also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one, not even NAPOCOR.
the Court can deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.[1]
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said
In a Complaint[2] for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of the member executed a special power of attorney[6] in favor of Elfa, which served as the latters
Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed that Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority entered authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In the document, Malonso authorized Elfa in the following
his appearance as Malonsos counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by the National manner:
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally
representing him in the said case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 92
NAPOCOR by way of attorneys fees and, further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co- New York St. Cubao, Q.C., sa pamamagitan nito ay ITINATALAGA at BINIBIGYANG
owner of Malonsos property.[3] KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at
naninirahan sa 038 Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, upang gumanap at umakda
In his Answer,[4] respondent replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano para sa akin/amin upang gumawa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its President, Danilo Elfa, as embodied 1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate) para sa
in the Contract of Legal Services executed on 01 April 1997.[5] The Contract states in part: pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa, sa National Power Corp. (NAPOCOR), na
may Titulo Bilang T-229122, na nasasakupan ng Dulong Bayan, San Jose del
The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows: Monte, Bulacan;
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the 2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O REPRESENTANTE ko/naming saan man at ano
collection, claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its members with the man maging sa hukuman o alin man sa mga opisinang may kinalaman hinggil
NAPOCOR; sa aming nabanggit na pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the 3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga papeles na nauukol sa lupang nabanggit
following conditions: sa Bilang 1;
A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings 4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G. DANILO V. ELFA na nararapat,
and other related activities; matuwid at makabubuti para sa nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison 5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at kapasyahang ito ay binibigyan ng
fees; karapatan at kapangyarihang lumagda sa lahat ng papeles/dokumento si G.
Danilo V. Elfa, ngunit sa isang pasubali na HINDI KAILAN MAN SIYA DAPAT
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY: AT WALA SIYANG KARAPATANG LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN
(ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members;
this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated depending on the volume DITOY AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan naming kinatawan ang lahat ng karapatang kumilos at
of work involved; magsagawa upang isakatuparan ang kapangyarihang magbili sa bisa ng karapatang dito ay
iginagawad sa kanya nang kahalintulad nang kung kami, sa ganang aming sarili ang mismong
nagsasagawa, at ditoy AMING PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng kanyang gawin na nasa aming On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an Opposition to respondents entry of appearance and
naman ang lubos na karapatang siya ay palitan o bawiin ang Gawad na Karapatang ito. motion to separate legal fees.
In his Reply,[7] Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf, On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien claiming 40% of the selling price
considering that while the Contract of Legal Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was of the properties being expropriated by NPC.
dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much later date, 27
November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf since On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of
he already had his own lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza. Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being
expropriated including that of complainant.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into by
SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the
the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property being expropriated.
member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organizations commitments.[8]
On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement submitted
The Court adopts the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating by the lot owners and NPC for court approval.
Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving the
In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp. (NPC for brevity) instituted expropriation compromise agreement between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed.[9]
proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case.
The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA, a corporate
On April 1, 1997, a Contract of Legal Services was entered into between the law firm Principe being, and respondents law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings
Villano and Clemente Law Offices and SANDAMA, Inc. (Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties being expropriated.
Maapektuhan ng National Power Corporation) represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa. Furthermore, the power of attorney was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and not
SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation proceedings. SANDAMA, and that said power of attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered into
Complainant is a member of this organization. the Contract of Legal Services. Thus, the Report concluded that the right of co-ownership could
not be derived from the said documents.[10]
On November 27, 1997, complainant executed a Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan in
favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal representation could not be derived from
of negotiation with the NPC. the above-mentioned documents. A contract for legal services between a lawyer and his client is
personal in nature and cannot be performed through intermediaries. Even Elfa, the attorney-in-
On December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of the fact of Malonso, was never authorized to engage legal counsels to represent the former in the
expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four expropriation proceedings. Moreover, SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the expropriation
Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos(P103,413,200.00). proceedings and thus Atty. Principe has no basis to interfere in the court proceeding involving its
members.
More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while complainant was
represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an Ex- The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both
Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants. parties, Atty. Principe was guilty of misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to have violated
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. [11] In representing himself as
About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed his Malonsos and the other lot owners legal counsel in the face of the latters opposition, Atty.
Notice of Entry of Appearance (dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal Principe was found to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely
counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case. claiming to be the co-owner of properties being expropriated and his filing of several actions to
frustrate the implementation of the decision approving the compromise agreement make his
conduct constitutive of malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years
On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter to suspension from the practice of law. [12]
NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of
the respondents law firm to represent them in the expropriation cases.
In its Resolution[13] dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors ordained:
Atty. Pete Principe The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared
from the wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted out their just due. These
rules cannot be taken lightly.[23]
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification,and issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 which was reached through a mere consensus, and not
considering respondents violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon 3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule through a formal voting, with the required number of votes not secured. As to the issue of the
12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Pedro Principe is protracted investigation without the requisite permission from the Supreme Court to extend the
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. investigation period, we agree with respondent that no such request was made to this Court.
In his Appeal Memorandum,[14] respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:
has no factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and
greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the Rules Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
of Court.[15] According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall
investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
139-B, without any extension granted by the Supreme Court. [16] Moreover, in the subsequent opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and
review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus, counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation
and the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there shall proceed ex parte.
were only five (5) governors present. [17] Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board
were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
President.[18] commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.
We find for the respondent.
...
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior
towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a)
Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation
of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.[19] Despite its duty to police the ranks, the IBP
is not exempt from the duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain
from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court provides in part:
[20]
Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions
of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules formulated for Sec. 6. Board of Governors. the Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
their observance.[21] For the very same reasons, the Court cannot accept the explanation [22] of Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the
Atty. Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. on the non-holding of a formal voting for respondents case that: representation basis of one Governor from each Region.
Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to reduce the recommended penalty from two years The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and at such time and
to one year suspension. Since there was already a consensus, the Board did not hold a formal place as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum
voting. A formal voting became unnecessary inasmuch as it was obvious that the decision of the to do business.
Board became unanimous.
From these provisions, it is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court
of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and and relies, for most part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness
(3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a of the negotiator.
decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the
Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties
in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after subject of the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the
deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally resolved, and in
vote.[24] Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Boards view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for
resolution. Without a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01- a compromise agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president,
848) is void and has no effect. Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear that
respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by which the IBP Board of Governors, with a
fellow lawyer and fellow governors reputation and good name at stake, cavalierly brushed aside Now, on to the merits.
the procedural rules outlined no less by this Court for the discipline and protection of its
members. The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the success of a lawyer in his profession
depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything, which will harm his good name, is to be As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual
deplored.[25] And yet the IBP Board of Governors, despite clear evidence to the contrary, and stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs. [30] The rule
without any remorse, even asserted that due process was observed and the Rules governing is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and
the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied. employees, are its sole liabilities.[31] Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be
attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect
interest in the assets and business of the former. [32] Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator,
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the
case.[26] However, on many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for the members. But things are not as simple as that.
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of
the case, or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial
court had already received all the evidence of the parties. [27] In view of the delay in resolving the A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can
instant complaint against the respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of intervene and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners
cases, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it.[28] into SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondents firm so as to make negotiations with
NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation
aimed towards the promotion of the landowners common interest. It presented a unified front
Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings, which was far easier to manage and represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent
there is need to dwell first on a dimension of expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
own.
Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying SO ORDERED.
the penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorneys fees against the individual
members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that he instituted the
same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all,
SANDAMA procured his firms services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the
same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm rendered legal and
even extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their
properties. They facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations
between the owners, the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several
political personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just
after concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the
compromise agreement for the courts approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of
respondents law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered
legal service for years without having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not
getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members,
respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been
mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the
practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly
compensated for professional services rendered. [33] It is but natural that he protect his interest,
most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.[34]
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees
does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by
law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as
A.C. No. 7062 September 26, 2006 1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355] P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN
BACULBAS, complainants, 1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
vs. P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33 4,053.05
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent.
P263,225.81
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have xxxx
sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice,
violation of Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98,
"Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. 8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) (same as Conos) 263,225.81
and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case
was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma
9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON
Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike.
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
By Decision of August 29, 2001,3 Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike
case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter Total Backwages P2,370,674.38
disposed:
Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for including the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24,
lack of merit. 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's fees of all sums
owing to complainants.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared
guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2,
complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04- 2003 a Writ of Execution.5
03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all the complainants to their
former position with full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27,
computed as follows: 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal
Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter
3. CRISANTO CONOS dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March
9, 2004. 6
Backwages:
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or
Basic Wage: having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at
bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil,
2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos. "frustrated" the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter
P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40 the spurious documents.
10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos. In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against
P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69, 732.00 respondent, together with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of
Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.7
11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos. In his Report and Recommendation 8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B.
P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00 Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended
that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning, in
P239,236.40 light of his following discussion:
13th Month Pay: The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged
1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36 manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein
complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.
SILP A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby
becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of
2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos. assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money of your
litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him client would go to the deserving employee?
damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties
as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and ATTY. SUING:
preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you
[the] aspects of the case. call it before a precedent in February of 1998 when my client directly made
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants, Your
execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex- Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang
Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in their usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a
respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion,
identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded by the complainants when it was we'll let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor,
his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of person executing sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the
Release Waiver with Quitclaim. dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of COMM. HABABAG:
regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005 Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?
clarificatory questioning . . . :
ATTY. SUING:
xxxx
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed one, to witness the signing of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver;
the despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent
circumstances.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) them in that proceedings.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the COMM. HABABAG:
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.
My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you and yet
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP 10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to
Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-22611 filed by respondent. ATTY. SUING:
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition 12 filed before the OBC, I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no
assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to complaints, Your Honor.
assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the Resolution on
February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who COMM. HABABAG:
could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another. Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the a voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean?
present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course. ATTY. SUING:
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those whom Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are talking
he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw and it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your Honor.
before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. 13 He hastens to add though that he was not
familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter COMM. HABABAG:
Santos.14 Complainants15 and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan 16 claim otherwise,
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter
however. And the Minutes17 of the proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation Board
Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt
in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute," which
and Release, it that clear?
minutes bear respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's claim that he had
not met complainants before. ATTY. SUING:
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 Yes, Your Honor.
on the request of his clients who "told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants
w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers ," COMM. HABABAG:
heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended
executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same
for the payment of these workers?
responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients' interest, especially given the
amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers ATTY. SUING:
to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he
discharged such obligation. I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG: That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a
compromise agreement with his clients in which he "did not participate" and from which no
The Quitclaim Receipt and Release? problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor
Arbiter's office "that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter."
ATTY. SUING:
Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998. true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. 20 That should have
COMM. HABABAG: alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients' interest. But he
was not and he did not.
When you say they whom are you referring to?
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
ATTY. SUING: opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that
norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor. the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and
COMM. HABABAG: the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the
Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do client.
recall that I made one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single
document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or
there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila- circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is
sila yong magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [ sic] individual, Your familias. x x x21 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Honor, no longer the document that I prepared when all of the seven And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel
will be signing in one document. Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG: COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes? May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong
ATTY. SUING: may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there MR. RODIL:
are already people there, the seven complainants plus another Sila po.
woman.18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
COMM. HABABAG:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
MR. RODIL:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. Si Atty. Suing po.
xxxx ATTY. SUING:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. ito or what?
To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor COMM. HABABAG:
Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance to Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito
protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang
presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus: nagmakinilya nito?
ATTY. SUING: Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan
ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino
ang nagdala ng mga dokumento? MR. RODIL:
xxxx Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an
apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim
COMM. HABABAG: that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one
presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the
ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim? documents.
MR. RODIL: As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is
Kay attorney po. an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. 23 While the Commission on Bar
COMM. HABABAG: Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a
disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney? or an examination into his character.24
ATTY. SUING: In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong. attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this
Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him
COMM. HABABAG: "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession."
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo. While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case,
not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that
MR. RODIL: respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.
Opo. WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross
COMM. HABABAG: misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo dito.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
MR. RODIL: Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
Opo serious po. SO ORDERED.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
MR. RODIL:
G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932 7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-
1, reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, with the appellant bank.
vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee. 8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the
amount claimed in the complaint with costs.
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for appellee. On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the
Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum
amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount
with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his
VICKERS, J.: failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264
and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the to the payment of the judgment.
defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila
The appellant makes the following assignments of error: sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14,
1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
The trial court erred:
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his
1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same
the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of
Manila. Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the
bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In
2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274 other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold
situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the the two parcels of land.
appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy
Teng Piao. The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with
interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the
balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328. In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to
redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance
promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation. of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint.
5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for
the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not
senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the
judgment. uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct
examination was as follows:
6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of
P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del
discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de
property. recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de
octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted
explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? R. Si, seor. P. Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?
Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo
bien, me haba dicho el seor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.
intereses mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "como puede usted recibir
alquileres y no paga usted intereses?"
Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.
P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? R. Era encargado de estas
transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al seor Pecson. Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
Entonces hable al seor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los
alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado. R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted
esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta. Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije
que queria yo comprar.
TESTIGO. Me dijo el seor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "por que usted cobra When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of
alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked
sus deudas. when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not
remember.
P. El seor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," a que
bienes se referia el ? R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco. One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem
the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested
P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el in buying it.
Exhibit 1? R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing
P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? R. Parece in Manila at the time of the trial.
que Paco.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the
P. No recuerda usted muy bien? R. No recuerdo. law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el seor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, le should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.)
dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? R. Al Banco Nacional. Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el seor Pecson con respecto al saldo When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as
deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? R. No the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the
recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos. case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should
avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the
defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such
agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of
directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that
since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged
agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the
instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the
resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to
redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is
condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per
cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987 On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents. for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were
No. 78791 September 30, 1987 wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under
the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket
was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in
NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner, the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
vs. Independent Labor Union. 2
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA
ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents. Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution
of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court
has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.
RESOLUTION
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents
PER CURIAM: complied with on July 17, 1987.
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of
and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by
Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES
1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30,
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
the use of loud speakers. appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts
as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose embarrass the administration of justice." 3
C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets
might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments.
direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction
the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union prejudice or sympathies." 4
leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-
Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with. personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court,
but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence
the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty.
Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder
to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly
apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to
labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth,
no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one
way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of
any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003] SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two
days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition,
GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the
Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
DECISION On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon
of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board
seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week
TlNGA, J.: of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected Regional
Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
This is a Petition[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony
Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from being The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent
elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) portions of the Resolution read:
Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP
Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent
President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections
for regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP
shall be chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. [13] He cites the last
the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP, paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city,
incumbent EVP will automatically be the National President for the following term. political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located.
In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have
had two (2) National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on
automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership
turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made
assume the post of IBP National President. not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in
IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-
Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency. [8] The transfer of quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the
rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter,
for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.[9] a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision
or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
executive vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera
lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur
the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is
deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for
disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship.[14]
California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the
position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24,
2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.[10] On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to
the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder
law. As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to
Comment [11] on the Petition. practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or
lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in
including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is character similar to the recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses
administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners legal standing, that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he
pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by
members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National
Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
region at the Century Park Hotel.[15] disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply[16] to the Respectful Comment of courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.[17] Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
In a Resolution[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP,
case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General including the election of its officers.
Counsel, filed a Manifestation[19] dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated in
its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that it finds the petition to be premature considering that no The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution.
nomination has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors.[20] Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy; pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub- alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
issues, namely: rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper
remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly
worded provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution [21] through all the years have been the
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit; sources of this Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar refers
to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. [22] Pursuant to this
(3) whether the present Petition is premature; power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on
October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.[23] Not long after, Republic Act No. 6397 [24] was enacted
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.
not premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per curiamResolution of this Court captioned In the Matter of
Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region; the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines, we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in
accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the making power under the 1935 Constitution.
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De
Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP
qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively independence from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of
within the jurisdiction of the IBP. supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 [25] of the IBP By-Laws vests
on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, [26]the Court is
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus: authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section 44 [27] empowers
the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
.... irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No.
491 entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of
of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal the Board of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of
candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws. 28 The the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year.29 The election was a two-
Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than
disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all
in the elections, in order to impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board within the
seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all
viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering. nominee for Governor for each Region. 31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest
number of votes was declared and certified elected by the Chairman.32
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed
direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court
President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the deemed it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The
IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among Court localized the elections, i.e,each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the
themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following
succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of their common two- provisions, to wit:
year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall
be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in the region. governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The
and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy. position of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the
against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the
disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool
days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process
Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, operates.
the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar
Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive. which is non-political33and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the
legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of progress of the Philippine society.34
candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election
protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody. The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees has no firm ground to stand on.
for the position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of
the IBP By-Laws, to wit: Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the
IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that
candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members
Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of
the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of
Governors may be had in accordance with Section 40.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set
nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds forth therein, thus:
therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members
from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership
election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the
rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to
from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not
Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
nominated at the forthcoming election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition. less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes
to transfer.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to
seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to
Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar
post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no wrote a letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and
nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent
Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can De Veras transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records.
always opt to decline the nomination. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as
aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-
member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last
way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Saturday of February of every other year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003,
Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done
rule. more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP morally fit to occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
Section 19. Registration. - provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes
to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the
.... IBP;37 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration
Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he
belongs;38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle; 39 and (4) he is not in the
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or government service.40
area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case
shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates.
lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He Indeed, based on each members standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any
has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another,
when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from
place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering ones his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time. judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged Xxx
sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the
plunder law, is apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if the
Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by rumor turned out to be true.
Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt
of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his
remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty
pertinent portions of the report, with De Veras statements written in italics. must prevail. 43
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said
statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public
confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. 44 He explained that he was merely exercising his
Tuesday, November 6, 2001 constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed
at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder
Plunder Law Law.45
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for
by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness. which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on
insiders. Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to
Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.48 The determination of whether an act involves moral
a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada. turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation
of the statute.49
We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices-
considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest
likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did
the group said.42 not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the
Plunder Law.50 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as
evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was
Monday, November 19, 2001 still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the
California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to
pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary
Xxx proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the
same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects
respondent De Veras moral fitness to run for governor.
People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De Vera
of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the
delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
People Power II. under our Rules of Court.52
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the
position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30
May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern
Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold
said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-12871. July 25, 1959.] involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day
filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, Respondent. petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ
of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by
Baizas & Balderrama for Petitioner. respondent Salva.
MONTEMAYOR, J.: The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that the affidavits and confessions sent
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated
against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel
continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in Monroy.
connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City.
To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of
pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated. People v. Oscar Castelo, Et Al., G. R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before
us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing
and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case
Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent
others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case
would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was
was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence because of the latters oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with
was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court. his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein
presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary,
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he
case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacaang conducted the
investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to
appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had
trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy. been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel
Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said
those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacaang. Fiscal Salva conferred with witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions,
the Solicitor General to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed
Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be
Malacaang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants. postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no
opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with the investigation.
this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those
persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on committee began, ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally,
said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of
In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, had sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided
of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said
was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the
purpose a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct
Herminio A. Avendaio and Ernesto A. Bernabe a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, Et Al.,
testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at that time and one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included in the trial much
place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, Et Al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, less in the judgment for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of
petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the
investigation from September 21, due to the fact that his counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally,
attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of
Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims
appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan
respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case
of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask question to the witness if you want to. We are willing to
case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to adopt the questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right
him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in
evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent,
criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible.
convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor
Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this
Realista. according to the transcript now before us.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
suggested by authorities, the duty and role of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on
secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent. the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took
place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of
"We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and
officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in
such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in the press, and all with the apparent placet and complaisance of Respondent.
appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they
have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as committed what we regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it is being tried in court; but
not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable,
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." (69 United States Law Review, June, end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure,
1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil., 556). even a penalty to the one liable.
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored
the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies
respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
need not be present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason
right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that
Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said in view of petitioners objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may
investigation, if he later changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by
objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so. respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the Respondent. If, In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in
as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby
evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism
Camo and others by questioning them, then he respondent, could well have conducted the that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find
investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity. to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet
with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondents office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wasted to witness the proceeding, including
members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a field day.
Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony, respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the
questions asked will be reproduced as my own" ; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970 each specification each accused was entitled to one such challenge. They later changed their
stand and adopted that of the trial judge advocate that "for each specification jointly tried, all of
EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO, the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory challenge; and that with respect to the
ALBERTO SOTECO, SOLFERINO TITONG, ET AL., petitioners, specifications tried commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge."
vs. They there contended that they were entitled to a total of eleven peremptory challenges. On the
JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ, other hand the court-martial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory
EFRAIN S. MACLANG, ET AL., respondents. challenge as the specifications were being jointly tried.
Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners. The petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of the
court-martial denying their challenges, both peremptory and for cause. They allege that the
adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it
Colonel Manuel V. Reyes (Judge Advocate General, GSC), Major Samuel M. Soriano (JAGS), became an issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly
Major Higinio E. Dacanay, Jr. (JAGS, PC) and Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant influence the members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory challenges, they contend
Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin and Guillermo Nakar, Jr. for that they are entitled to eleven such challenges, one for each specification.
respondents.
On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as
members of the general court-martial to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from
proceeding with the case.
CASTRO, J.:
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality
Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed
officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court. As a
alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando preliminary consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the petition on the
training on the island of Corregidor. Once before the question was raised before this Court ground that it has no power to review the proceedings of the court-martial, "except for the
whether the general court-martial, convened on April 6, 1968 to try the case against the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject
petitioners, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that earlier, on March 23, a matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence
complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City by Jibin Arula pronounced," and that at any rate the petitioners failed to exhaust remedies available to them
(who claimed to have been wounded in the incident) against some of the herein petitioners. The within the military justice system.
proceedings had to be suspended until the jurisdiction issue could be decided. On June 23,
1969 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court. 1 I
The jurisdiction question thus settled, attention once again shifted to the general court-martial, It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
but no sooner had the proceedings resumed than another hitch developed. This came about as proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
the petitioners, the accused in the court-martial proceedings, in turn came to this Court, seeking consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." 2 But it is equally true that in the
relief against certain orders of the general court-martial. exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion
what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the a defect in their jurisdiction.3 This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that nature as one for certiorari and prohibition, namely, whether in overruling the petitioners'
he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case challenges, the general court-martial committed such an abuse of discretion as to call for the
had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was exercise of the corrective powers of this Court. It is thus obvious that no other way is open to this
being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it. Nor will the fact
11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the that there may be available remedies within the system of military justice bar review considering
challenge. that the questions raised are questions of law.4
Thereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president of And so the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners
the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo, Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and Col. was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner Martelino
Malig, as members. With regard to peremptory challenges it was the petitioners' position that for challenged the court-martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts of what had
come to be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the trial of their motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. Rideau's counsel had
case. The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of requested that jurors be excused for cause, having exhausted all of their peremptory challenges,
the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that "coffins are being prepared for the but these challenges for cause had been denied by the trial judge. In reversing his conviction,
President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to Senator Aquino "massacre victims were the Court said:
given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President candidate, had gone
to Corregidor and "found bullet shells." In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila [W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for
Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which states that "The Jabidah [code name of the training a change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed
operations] issue was bound to come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in
could not possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration." The detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For anyone who
petitioners argue that under the circumstances they could not expect a just and fair trial and that, has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this
in overruling their challenge for cause based on this ground, the general court-martial committed spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a
a grave abuse of discretion. In support of their contention they invoke the rulings of the United very real sense was Rideau's trial at which he pleaded guilty to murder.
States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd,5 Rideau vs. Louisiana,6 Estes v. Texas,7 and Shepard v. Any subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed
Maxwell.8 to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. 13
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from this In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a denial of
case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after due process.
the petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed in Vanderburgh County, Indiana,
the prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had
confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and The state ... says that the use of television in the instant case was "without
pictures was unleashed against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." In injustice to the person immediately concerned," basing its position on the
reversing his conviction, the Court said: fact that the petitioner has established no isolate prejudice and that this
must be shown in order to invalidate a conviction in these circumstances.
The State paints too broadly in this contention, for this Court itself has found
Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present instances in which a showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to
throughout the community, ... was clearly reflected in the sum total of reversal. This is such a case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of
the voir dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury due process deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to
box. Eight out of the 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With such an opinion the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State
permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say that each could exclude involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is inherently
this preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in lacking in due process. 14
an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights
detachment from the processes of the average man. ... Where one's life is
at stake and accounting for the frailties of human nature we can only In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder of
say that in the light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court observed a "carnival atmosphere" in which "bedlam reigned
not meet the constitutional standard.9 at the courthouse ... and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of
the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." It observed that "despite the extent and nature
of the publicity to which the jury was exposed during the trial, the judge refused defense
Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of prejudicial counsel's other requests that the jury be asked whether they had read or heard specific
publicity. 10 In the earlier case of Shepherd v. Florida, 11 which involved elements of publicity, prejudicial comment about the case. ... In these circumstances, we assume that some of this
the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial discrimination in the selection of the material reached members of the jury." The Court held:
jury, although to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, "It is hard to
imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with
defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn to, From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news
unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to the jury. 12 comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process
requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in the the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of them, was similarly given "trial trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was taken of him in an weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make
"interview" with the sheriff. The "interview," which lasted approximately 20 minutes, consisted of an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing
interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery, that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the
kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard on television by 24,000 people. Two courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue but their
prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications, "since
the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight
publicity. In addition sequestration of the jury was something the judge specifications." The general court-martial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are
should have sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceeding entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges.
threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we
must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those We thus inescapably confront, and therefore now address, the issue here posed.
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts
must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes
from prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for We are of the view that both the petitioners and the general court-martial misapprehend the true
defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers meaning, intent and scope of Article of War 18. As will hereinafter be demonstrated, each of the
coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its petitioners is entitled as a matter of right to one peremptory challenge. The number of
function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information specifications and/or charges, and whether the accused are being jointly tried or undergoing a
affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is common trial, are of no moment.
highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measure. 15
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful
but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies
Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in
Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically
massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial 16 either by a inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program.
failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the
it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed.
of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September
those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory
challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused. After December
17, 1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial 17 of the Philippine Army became effective, the
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive
petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the
that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific on
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of
been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances
believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility. that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory
challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for
II cause."
Article of War 18 provides that "Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the By its very inherent nature a peremptory challenge does not require any reason or ground
law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause." The general court-martial therefor to exist or to be stated. It may be used before, during, or after challenges for cause, or
originally interpreted this provision to mean that the entire defense was entitled to only against a member of the court-martial unsuccessfully challenged for cause, or against a new
one peremptory challenge. Subsequently, on August 27, 1969, it changed its ruling and held that member if not previously utilized in the trial. A member challenged peremptorily is forthwith
the defense was entitled to eight peremptory challenges, but the petitioners declined to exercise excused from duty with the court-martial.
their right to challenge on the ground that this Court had earlier restrained further proceedings in
the court-martial. The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always
been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury. 18
It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one
peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven charges they are entitled to As was said by Blackstone, and repeated by Mr. Justice Story: 'In criminal
eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents, upon the other hand, argue that "for cases, or at least in capital ones, there is in favorem vitae, allowed to the
each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain
and that with respect to specifications tried commonly each of the accused is entitled to one number of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is called a
peremptory challenge." Although there are actually a total of eleven specifications against the peremptory challenge; a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to
prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous. This is grounded on
two reasons: 1) As every one must be sensible, what sudden impression
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks
and gestures of another; and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put
to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which
might totally disconcert him; the law has conceived a prejudice even without
being able to assign a reason for his dislike. 2) Because, upon challenges
for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the
juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke
a resentment, to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is still
at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.' 19
The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who
remain an impartial military court is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial
is maintained. ... 20
As we have hereinbefore stated, each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general court-
martial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, 21 irrespective of the number of specifications
and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common. Three overriding
reasons compel us to this conclusion.
First, a peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly
feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in judgment over
him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not enough that objectively
the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the
accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because the
petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and
different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily that each of the accused
is entitled to one peremptory challenge.
Second, Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it
make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges a determinant. Reference is made
by the respondents here to US military law, in support of their argument that for each
specification jointly tried all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and
with respect to all specifications tried in common each of the accused is entitled to one
peremptory challenge. We have carefully scrutinized U.S. military law, and it is unmistakable
from our reading thereof that each accused person, whether in a joint or common trial,
unquestionably enjoys the right to one peremptory challenge. 22
Third, a perceptive analysis of the companion articles 23 to Article 18 convinces us that the
word, "each side," as used in the said article in reference to the defense, should be construed to
mean each accused person. Thus, Articles of War 17 (Trial Judge Advocate to Prosecute;
Counsel to Defend), 19 (Oath), 21 (Refusal or Failure to Plead), 28 (Court to Announce Action),
29 (Closed Sessions), 30 (Method of Voting), and 36 (Irregularities Effect of), unequivocally
speak of and refer to the "accused" in the singular.
ACCORDINGLY, subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one
separate peremptory challenge, the present petition is denied. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on August 29, 1969 is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs. .
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001] Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the
public to vital information affecting the nation.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED "The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors. cameras in the courtroom.Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the
question squarely.
DECISION
While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad
VITUG, J.: Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal
Courts of the United States prohibit the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress
the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of
television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be
proceedings. treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which
pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the
country, sent a letter[1] requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial "Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or
of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a
the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full ransparency in the proceedings of an television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring
unprecedented case in our history."[2] The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.
letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo. "In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the 5-4, the Court through 'Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which
instant petition,[3] submitting the following exegesis: might arise from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the
defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the
land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the "'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on
prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are
which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of. subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences which might affect their testimony.Also,
telecasting not only increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human beings also and are
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of subject to the same psychologjcal reactions as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form
public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the
the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings. effective presentation of his defense.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual 'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse accused and his case in the eyes of the public.'
the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived
attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against
the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada."[4] "Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel
a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional
rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally
necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in
due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it
not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the must also be conceded that "television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people
courtroom. it focuses on."[11] Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media
can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact,
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or
and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision
the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt
and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be or innocence to yield to it. [12] It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor
allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.[13]
shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle
the trial proper. threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate
dispensation of justice can create.[14] The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court know it now.[15]
resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated." An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
become an important instrument in the quest for truth. [5] Recent history exemplifies media's not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would soon culminate in EDSA II. public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not
too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally
free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.[16]
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one
hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to
power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. [6] public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence [7] tells us that the right of the consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process [17] which must never be
accused must be preferred to win. allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced,
"while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process."[18]
the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of This Court, in the instance [19] already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas, [20] the United
pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract States Supreme Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent
from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, [8] and decreed by a judge denial of due process rights of an accused, also identified the following as being likely
with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. prejudices:
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is "1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's moment the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The
attention[9] and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or whole community, x x x becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The
influence[10] but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and approaching trial immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused
calm ambiance is demanded. is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him
into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion
every criminal case. x x x regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not
(theretofore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a
witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in
incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to point?
overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of
statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart,[22] the Nebraska State trial judge issued an
televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the order restraining news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the
discovery of the truth. accused or facts strongly implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond
Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia,[23] the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and all
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme
places on the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior
most difficult task requires his undivided attention. x x x Court,[24] the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required trial judges to
exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of
4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is certain sexual offenses.
a form of mental - if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third
degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida,[25] where two police officers charged with
might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the burglary sought to overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that
proceedings before him - sometimes the difference between life and death - dispassionately, the television coverage had infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional
freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific violation perceived by the Estes Court did not stem from the physical disruption that might one
crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The day disappear with technological advances in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the
heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and recording devices might have an effect on
prejudice." the trial participants prejudicial to the accused."[26]
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live
coverage could have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that television and radio coverage of their proceedings.
should always surround the judicial process.[21]
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed its own involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have
concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III
paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited
during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events
and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of
live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the dispensation
themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court
acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of
in the prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of what alone is submitted before them.[27] A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing
mistrial on account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or market of thoughts the known test truth in a courtroom.[28]
disallowing live media coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge. The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to
chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them, even
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly
matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October addressed, is a price too high to pay.
1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its
23rd October resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of court
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 90083. October 4, 1990.] That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable
Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos
PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros
Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and just
Occidental, respondents.
investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle, or
RESOLUTION otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for being maliciously
deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros
Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the VII
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non-payment of P316.50 for the
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally
legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the
created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance
questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration,
of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned
the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
and believed by him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the
for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their
was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision
decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of
motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the your people and the only country which God has given us PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration
VIII
was denied "with FINALITY." 4
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty.
refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in rank
Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President
and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . . 14
of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and or IX
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint
. . . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of
was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money reasons. .
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and
. . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to
intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President,
face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of
which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove,
fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-accused
Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show
(complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in our Judiciary to be heard
cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't be
conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite
reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and
For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8
meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man, regardless of
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices ranks and status in life." 15 (Emphasis ours.)
concerned, as Respondents (sic)." 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and
xxx xxx xxx
jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they
are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no 5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a motion for Reconsideration to
more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the
by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which legally
they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11 hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or
inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds
beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by records of both
the various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
cases mentioned above. 16
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows: xxx xxx xxx
VI D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges
and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no
Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17 BY OTHERS.
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did xxx xxx xxx
so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court
behavior before the courts.
maintains a double standard in dispensing justice one set for the rich and another for the poor
went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter record or have materiality to the case.
of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in
resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous influence as xxx xxx xxx
he disparagingly intimates. We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system the separation of powers
to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty.
disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989, Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the
after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No
original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24
he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief
1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices,
our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and
"no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no
Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in
with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing
be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons." lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism.
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his according to law.
deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT
the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One
the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of
"lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution
observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with
earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be
intimidation, and innuendo." 22 served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
the criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever
mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all SO ORDERED.
such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility that:
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009 Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime
[Formerly CBD 04-1386] or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-
be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 2 which
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant, complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it
vs. and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent. the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer
earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
DECISION
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the
Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place
CARPIO MORALES, J.: paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN 3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. 4 Respondent, who affixed his
"CDO," filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., that he prepared the document.
popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including
Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program
KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking complainant
BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3) to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per
disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors. issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile 6 of the television program KAKAMPI
MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate
cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c)
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows: season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer,
to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and
threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.7
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD).
Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread. On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station
DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted announcement was transcribed as follows:
a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000
as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in "OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio
contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous." ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-
7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan.
Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media. companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g]
contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong
sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light.
Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article
captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, xxxx
2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another
article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10 8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an
investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles: 11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread,"
Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12(b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, 9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them
Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); 14 (d) "Uod sa liver in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their
spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); 16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); 19 (i) "CDO 10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been
guards pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); 20 (j) "May uod na CDO the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with
liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); 21 (k) "Desperado na ang reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past
CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); 22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero,"
Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere
23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).25 staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their
respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the
article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread."26 Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here;30
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo
ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent filed, as
"same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27 counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the xxxx
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending
at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.28 5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick
skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly
Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging: xxxx
xxxx Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several
others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding,
xxxx respondent continued to publish articles against complainant 34 and to malign complainant
through his television shows.
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to
happen? Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report
and Recommendation:35
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his
complaint?
I.
xxxx The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of
the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it
Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads: respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and
[m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist
"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."
instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file
an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in
order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any III.
person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising
and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the
imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products." Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch xxxx
Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10
December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004. In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
"Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media
with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the
16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17
Complaint). December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come
out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he
Professional Responsibilitywhich reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the
II. defects of complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a
baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for
xxxx complainants failure to give in to respondents "request" that complainant advertise in the
tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind
City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval.
Cases To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the following Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned
statements: around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said
agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could
xxxx have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless
against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent
constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted
the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness,
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
program. respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a
lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession." 401avvph!1
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as "she
arouse public opinion for or against a party. was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media
personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an
exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order suspended for six months.
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.
At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and
which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have
respect for law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his affected the sales of complainant.
(respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities." Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration,
took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional charges against the therein complainant.43
Responsibility which mandate, viz:
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his premises, sufficient.
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language. Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. courts.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION VI
PER CURIAM: That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most
Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file
this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and
Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and
was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of just investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such
Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the
the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied
decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and
dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2 most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a VII
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was
remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision,
and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic),
orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering
"with FINALITY." 4 unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by
him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose
common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they
a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice
Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5The complaint was progress of your people and the only country which God has given us.
signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate
language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he
should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the VIII
Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of
March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Justice, yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-
Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8 complainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge
Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices IX
concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction
of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are . . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the
Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was
jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our
mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts
not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11 of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for
the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-
accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in
in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration,
respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for "no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought."
the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance
common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it
Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
any man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
xxx xxx xxx ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately,
Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper.
appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of
the respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a
the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned above. 16 earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo." 22
A.C. No. 6155 respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, that the Court had already issued a Resolution[4] dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late
- versus - filing and non-payment of docket fees.
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants
Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint [1] on 15 August of arrest[5] had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose
2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking
gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. reconsideration from lapsing.
152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M.
Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on In his Comment,[6] respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes
Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case. that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on
above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
prejudice of petitioners therein.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties.
The facts are as follows: But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion
for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the
Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the
as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and
individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.
before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty
and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan [2] found the accused guilty of two counts of As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He
homicide and one count of attempted homicide. stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he
filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,[7] seeking an
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition
accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed
denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent within the reglementary period.
Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion
for Reconsideration.[3] Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the herculean efforts he made in assisting
Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002. the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He
considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of
telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United
complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as
without any forwarding address. counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served
as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the
personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from
accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but
unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter. As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely
fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been
case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though
Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the
find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent.Respondent examination of the pleadings[14] he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the
suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office. same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents
office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew
that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may
complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as
held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return
participate in the IBP proceedings.[8] their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters
between them.
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005,
Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility [9] and recommended the imposition of lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the
penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. [10] On 12 November 2005, the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed
Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his
approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by
recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty. Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the
whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621- Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused
23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality. and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies
credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if
recommended by the IBP proper. such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return
card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that
respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the
property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and latter had filed the ad cautelam petition.He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel
liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:[11] only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.[15]
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules,
ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among
required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x . the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x[12] only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.[16]
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed
of time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File in Aromin v. Boncavil[17] that:
Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he
should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading [13] and it
rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer
did not toll the reglementary period to appeal.Having failed to do so, the accused had already owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
respondent cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care,
the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the
reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute. client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and
the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x [22]
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
respect of the community to the legal profession.[18]
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: the accused
without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and
such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato.[23] Rule 14.01[24] of the Code of
deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of
Portugal with account number 7186509273.[19] Respondent has neither admitted nor denied the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own
having claimed the deposited amount. clients as being the culprits that salvaged the victims. Though he might think of his clients as
that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement not done so.
between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper
consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6)
Atty. Magulta:[20] months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain
why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court
fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension. [25] The Court finds it
attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in fit to impose the same in the case at bar.
which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. [21]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus: for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26868 February 27, 1969 and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable him to examine the
case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966.
On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar.
mimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
This was followed by a third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also for
vs.
fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant.
a special extension of five days. All these motions for extension were granted. The brief was due
on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof
Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task of ascertaining whether certain acts why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite
and conduct of a member of the Bar deserve disciplinary action. the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any explanation.
The problem arose because of facts that follow: For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968,
resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice
with a warning that upon further non-compliance with the said resolution of September 25, 1967
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of Samar, 1 and within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be taken against
sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. His case came up before this Court on review. him." Still, counsel paid no heed.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by this Court as
Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare
Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of this long delay need
notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct not be essayed. We, therefore, find that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he
and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this Court, the resolution was will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge and discretion".
personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.
2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment. courts of justice and judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the
1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a
lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a
authorities." In People vs. Carillo, 8 this Court's pointed observation was that as an officer of the
duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." 2 A lawyer so
court, it is a lawyer's "sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand,
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
"should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's behalf. 3
Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of lawful
No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between
orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus present for suspension or disbarment. 9 Counsel
December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and December 5, 1968, when
has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of its orders. To be
the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time was afforded
recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show
counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. The death sentence below imposed was upon a
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's
plea of guilty. The record of the proceedings leading to the lower court's sentence consists of but
brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. To
31 pages. Counsel had the record since January 19, 1967. In fact, in his third motion for
impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders, on October
extension of time, he manifested that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way
3,1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He
through" and that "additional time is needed to review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put
was in that order also required to file his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more drastic
in final form and print the said brief." In his motion for fourth extension, he intimated that the
disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do either. Still he remained unmoved. Then,
preparation of the brief "is almost through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft and
this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him to show cause
rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the same stencilled and mimeographed
within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for
upon completion of a definitive text." His motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the
gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office. The Court made it certain that this order
excuse that he "suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting and rehashing some
would reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not paid the fine. He has
significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and interrupted his work thereon for
done nothing.
sometime." Finally, in his "Special Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that he needed
only five days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in final form and have the same stencilled and
mimeographed.lawphi1.nt This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the fact that as early as March
27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth extension of time to file his brief de oficio, he represented
to this Court that all that was needed was to redraft and to rehash some significant portions of
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his motions for
the brief which was almost through and to have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon
extension have gone down to the level of empty and meaningless words; at best, have dubious
completion of a definitive text.
claim to veracity.