Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Menandro B. Laureano, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Singapore Airlines Limited, Respondents
Menandro B. Laureano, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Singapore Airlines Limited, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No.
CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion
for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich
Airport, for which plaintiff apologized. (Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant
decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did
not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17
excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve. Jurissc
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp.
1-10, Rec.).
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss
(pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p.
95 ibid)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds
relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is
barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and
that he has no cause of action. (pp. 102-115)" [1]
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED." [2]
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
"...In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination
was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four
(4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
SO ORDERED." [3]
Newmiso
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
"Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to
show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As
substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts
do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden
of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
should be applied." [4]
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court. On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
[5]
In our view, neither Article 1144 nor Article 1146 of the Civil Code is here pertinent.
[7] [8]
"Article 291. Money claims. - All money claims arising from employee-
employer relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.
x x x" Misact
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by
this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a
law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor
Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-
employer relations. [9]
More recently in De Guzman. vs. Court of Appeals, where the money claim was based
[10]
"...The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application
only to 'money claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers
all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations"
(Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). ...
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special
law applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations;
thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general
law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that 'where two statutes are
of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefore should prevail.' (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant." [11]
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1,
1982 has already prescribed.
"In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was
filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4)
years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed."
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on Article 291 of the
Labor Code, which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which governs
under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to
stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "although the
commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in
exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all." [12]
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was
valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for
pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said, Sdjad
"It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties.
From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer
of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such
provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation."
xxx
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was
given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor
grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate
court. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[2]
Id. at 65.
[3]
Id. at 40.
[4]
Id. at 54.
[5]
Id. at 32.
[6]
Id. at 33.
[7]
Article 1144. The Following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
xxx
[8]
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
xxx
[9]
Manuel L. Quezon University Association v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational Institution Inc., 172 SCRA 597, 604
(1989), citing De Joya v. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893 (1967); Lagman v. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579 (1966); Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, 172 SCRA 571, 575 (1967); Barcenas v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 498,
503 (1990); Central Negros Electric Cooperative Inc., v. NLRC, 236 SCRA 108, 114 (1994).
[10]
297 SCRA 743 (1998).
[11]
Id. At 750-751 (1998).
[12]
180 SCRA 353, 363 (1989).
[13]
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[14]
Id. at 37.