CONFLICTS | Jan21| 1

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960 that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as
required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee, refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court
vs. should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant. undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant. the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married
couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the
for appellant. complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee. examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely
appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration
PADILLA, J.: was denied.

In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be
Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who
marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not
before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground answer the complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit
that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration to a medical examination.
of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as
described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply
that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the
pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status
intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically
frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband
and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase
1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
husband would be rendered. attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to
Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and
defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any
reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 2

herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the
The presumption is in favor of potency." 2 The lone testimony of the husband husband had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the
that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear same year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce
asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. proceedings against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery
committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of
pronouncement as to costs. divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff
and the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the
conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal
property had been determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her;
G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913 furthermore, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid
to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000
Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine
CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant,
currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to
vs.
P12,959.90.
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant.

The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of
O'Brien & DeWitt for plaintiff.
Manila, as they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that
Chicote & Miranda for defendant.
both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was
married to Constanza Yaez; he also admitted having executed the document
of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he had undertaken to make an allowance
for the support of his wife in Madrid, but he denied the other paragraphs of
JOHNSON, J.: the complaint. As a special defense with regard to the allowance, he alleged:
"That in or about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff,
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband and
joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In being maintained by him in his own house; that the communication was
February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and ignored by the plaintiff, who against the will of the defendant, continued to
acquired real and personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza live separately from him that from the year 1901, the defendant did not
Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was residing, and here lived with know her address; that since 1900, the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has
him in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of known where her husband resided; that the plaintiff, during all of the time
that month and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by referred to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her
which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such husband, possessed and still possesses property of her own, acquired by her,
separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to in greater amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any case the
Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. action has prescribed by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the
13.) In the same document, the husband undertook to send his wife the sum divorce, he admits that he had by the plaintiff two children that have died. He
of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5 of the complaint, relating to the
month of June of the said year 1899. The husband complied with this charge of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, concerning the
obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make further possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the
payments. statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal
property. As a special defense, he alleged that prior to the year 1899 he
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 3

conferred powers of attorney upon the plaintiff to administer and collect persons of the contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a
property and credits pertaining to him to the value of about 200,000 pesos; resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint.
that the plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of attorney, attached
the property and collected the credits without ever having rendered any The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant
account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that neither the had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which
trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over he manifestly had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the
the subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for date of the complaint. On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to
support, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, the contrary, that during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the
or of any other place in the Philippine Islands, the agreement upon the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in
subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the Philippine March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands, had kept open
Islands; and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be tried house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which
by the ecclesiastical courts. In conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. It is also plainly
the court was without jurisdiction over the two causes of action; that even if shown, without proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in this city of
it had jurisdiction, it could not order the payment of the sum claimed as Manila from the middle of 1896 until April, 1899, at which time she was
arrears of alimony; that, after all, the action with regard to this cause of permitted by him to change her residence. It is affirmed by the defendant in
action has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a decree of divorce, the point five of his answer to the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a
defendant should be acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff should be letter instructing the plaintiff to return to Manila to live with her husband and
required to render to the defendant an accounting, supported by proofs, of to be supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will of
her operations as his attorney and administratrix of his property in Spain. the defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also
affirmed in the said answer, that during all of the time referred to in the
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held complaint, and especially since 1900, the plaintiff knew where her
itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very evident that the contract, by
the plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, virtue of which he authorized his wife to move to Spain and reside there in
directed that the communal property be divided between the parties, with such place as was agreeable to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the
costs against the defendant, and in event that the parties could not agree to city of Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen in the heading of
the division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law. the document. (B. of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that
the record shows him to be a Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate of
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the Treaty of Paris and the
the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded Philippine Bill.
with. These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and
account of the partition to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a
which, also, both parties appealed. Spanish subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code
that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. foreign country, where they may be considered as natives without other
conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required, in order to
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish before the
all other courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard to the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry
fulfillment of the contract to furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and
suspension of life in common between the spouses: lack of jurisdiction over any children they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and
the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation; and over the irrefutable law governing the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile
of the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 4

Paris. Without this supposition of having acquired his domicile and residence divorce between two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both
in these Islands, he could not have required his wife to return to live with him litigants are Spanish subjects and that they contracted a Catholic marriage;
therein because this requirement could only be based on articles 58 of the that in accordance with article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (the same as that
Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is obliged to follow her of these Islands) the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
husband wherever he wishes to establish his residence, or on article 48 of status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although
chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines, which imposes upon they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, "all questions of a civil
the wife the duty of obeying her husband, living in his company, or of nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial
following him to wherever he transfers his domicile or residence. And just bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them,
because he was absent for a month before his wife returned to the the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital
Philippines, he cannot be understood to have surrendered his habitual authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,
domicile of more than seventeen years, without having established any other legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the AUTHORITY to decree it,
afterwards, and without making any declaration in legal form, before he and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the person and
absented himself, of it being his intention to change his domicile, while at the properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the
same time he retains here his house, real property and all manner of means national law of the husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by
of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the virtue of article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The appellant and
election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the one at bar defendant continues his argument, saying: That by the express provision of
either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found, or in that article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and
where the plaintiff resides. nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts," while that
of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action for
The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the
residence (vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant claims that, jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because
born as he says in Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said
marriage, to the rules governing conjugal property, that are in force in the article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction
territories of Spain that are governed by the common law of Castillo (as the over the present cause to the ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no
Philippines in their day), because they are opposed to the Foral Law in force tribunal of these Islands con subrogate itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of
in the said Islands and which is respected by the Civil Code. Even if this a foreign country were of rigorous application in a given case, a North
defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the said Civil American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical court and
Code would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes of this article, therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would have to exercise a
residence (vecindad) will be acquired: By residence of ten years faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp. 13, 14,
in common law provinces or territories, unless before the termination of that and 15.)
time he manifests his will to the contrary; or by a residence of two years, if
the interested person declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the wife will Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning
follow the condition of her husband. . . ." On no occasion had the defendant cannot be upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the
manifested his will to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on
residence of seventeen years, a month before the return of his wife to these appeal, and it is taken for granted that the power to decree it is one of the
Islands. On the contrary, when he inscribed himself in the Spanish consulate, rights included in the personal statute, but appellant does not prove by any
he declared his intention of continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries
and not as a Mallorquin, subject as such to the common law of Spain. with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established by the
law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to
In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these demonstrate.
Islands over the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an action for
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 5

The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme
comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5
because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to Phil. Rep., 325).
everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority
and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of
but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although
other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their
and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All domicile herein.
persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene,
since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and
to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack
the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation.
expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which, although he
won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of the court's The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court
lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho that the defendant had committed adultery with a certain woman in this city
International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same professor, "is a from the year 1899 until 1909; the third was against the finding that the
principle superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered adultery was accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his
without taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants wife; and the fourth for having decreed the divorce, suspension of the
belong. . . . In order to foster their relations and develop their commerce, all married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties.
civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people,
but to those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it
The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are
juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.)
unable to review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court.
Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its
territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction,
There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it
refrain from administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner
were proven would not be a cause for divorce, because no public scandal
gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the territorial
resulted therefrom nor was there contempt displayed for the wife.
one of the nation? This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories
(Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The facts must be accepted by this tribunal as they
regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and
were found by the trial court, since the evidence cannot be reviewed;
domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of
moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary and maintains that it is a proven
private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only
fact, public and notorious, an assertion that the trial court must have found
binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of
to be proven. (Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not necessary that adultery,
the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it
to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and
if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not
contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the
subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain,
Fourth Partida does not require it.
subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said
article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking,
as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of
jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or the trial court that there exists conjugal property, a finding that the appellant
without the territory of their nation.1awphi1.net maintains is without foundation, and that which holds that the property in the
hands of the receiver (that sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a
conclusion which the appellant claims to be contrary to the law which should
be applied to the case and according to which, as alleged in the tenth
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 6

assignment of error, the whole of the property should be adjudicated to the As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in
defendant as being exclusively his. holding in the judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the marriage a
dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars. But the defendant himself adds that the
Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic court made no order or decree regarding the alleged dowry. On the other
Islands and that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff. Law: That hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth assignment of errors, claimed that the court
although the rule of the Civil Code is that which legally governs conjugal erred in not confirming the report of the commissioners which gave to the
property, yet at the same time it admits, as an exception, the laws, usages, said plaintiff the sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say
and customs of the Foral Law, according to which, as applied in the Balearic anything further.
Islands, the law of the family is that of the division of property and that of
conjugal property is not known; so that the property pertains exclusively to The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to
the spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the facts, pay to the plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency, whereas the plaintiff had
appellant cites pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of made no demand in her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears
the law, the doctrinal authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla. of payment are owing for alimony, even though payments had been
stipulated in the contract, unless they are claimed by the person who had
The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent furnished the actual support, and that alimony is due only when it is
one, is but an affidavit filed by the defendant in which, under oath, he necessary; so that, as the plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years, nor
himself testifies as to the Foral Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party has she stated who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the
says with regard to this: "This affidavit was never presented in proof, was amount of the arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed ten years to
never received by the trial judge, and cannot seriously be considered as an elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after
effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 five years.
of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the
method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. We maintain The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint
that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never as to this cause of action, but she considers that in equity such an omission
submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has never can be supplied.
been subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of proving a foreign
law on which the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6 and 7.) Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one
of the requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the relief which the plaintiff
Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral claims." The section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is
Law as the law of his personal status in the matter of the regimen of his demanded, the amount demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as
marriage, and that to allege this he be considered as authorized by article 15 an order for the special restitution of property, etc., the ground of demanding
of the Civil Code, we have said before, in dealing with his law of domicile, such relief must be stated and the special relief prayed for. But there may be
that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of the Civil Code would be entirely adverse added to the statement of the specific relief demanded a general prayer for
to his claim, and if it be advanced that there is a similar Foral Law in the such further or other relief as shall be deemed equitable."
Philippines by virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said,
though there is not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force. The In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said
two findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the property of section 89 [90] are complied with by setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5
the marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as the relation of the cause of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April,
conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband 1899, by which the defendant obligated himself to send to the plaintiff in
or to the wife. No proof has been submitted to this effect. Spain a certain amount of money monthly, for her support, and the failure to
comply with this obligation after the month of August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as
a consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows: "That
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 7

the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the plaintiff the sum of provisions of the law governing conjugal property, because such provision are
36,100 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars, which, reduced at the present totally foreign to the Foral Law of the Balearic Islands.
rate of exchange, amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency."
(B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of default on the part of the defendant "the court The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil
shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and assess the damages Procedure, was in accordance with law. The only question before this court is
or determine the other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled, including the partition of real property. All that referred to in the second decision
the costs of the action, and render final judgment for the plaintiff to recover appealed from, dated September 9, 1911, is urban real estate. Its
such sum or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the facts classification as conjugal property is in accordance with law, as is shown in
warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint. the foregoing reasoning, and that no consideration of the Foral Law enters
into the question has also been demonstrated.
This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly,
are the essential part of a complaint. II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.

It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the
constitutes the first cause of action, but of certain sums stipulated in a plaintiff only P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the judgment be
contract. This contract is a law for the contracting parties, a law which rises reversed and that in its place this court order the defendant to pay to the
superior to those general laws which regulate the nature of the subject plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90, plus the additional sum which the alimony
matter of the contract (in the present case an entirely voluntary one) and amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating from the 1st of August,
which govern judicial action. 1909, until the date of payment, with legal interest upon the said P12,959.90
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and,
An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments due after the
personal ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil Code, after filing of the complaint, and which will continue to become due until the close
fifteen years. But even though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, of this litigation.
by which an action to compel the fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony
prescribes in five years, yet by section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the
"when payment has been made upon any demand founded upon contract . . . alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas; second, that of
an action may be brought . . . after such payment. . . ." And the parties this sum the plaintiff had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the
admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff secured the payment of remainder, that is, 27,834.32, was equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican
6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that from currency; fourth, that the Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine
August, 1908, until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said period of currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency was
five years had not elapsed. equivalent to P5,010 Philippine currency; and finally, as there was no
evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it
The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in was that current at the time and place where the agreement was made,
empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of the property and in which was Mexican pesetas.
appointing commissioners to make the partition and distribution between the
spouses, since the principal question in this action hinges upon the In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that,
classification of the property; that it was erroneously classified as conjugal firstly, the parties had admitted that the pesetas referred to in the contract of
property, whereas all of it pertained to the husband alone and should be the 4th of April, 1899, were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court
adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it reiterated in the tenth was not empowered to define them as being different from the kind admitted
assignment of error, the conjugal partnership was not subject to the by the parties; secondly, if he were so empowered, his interpretation should
be governed by the terms of the law.
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 8

With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her
her complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to pay her a "monthly the 30,000 Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in their report.
pension for her support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars, First she characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife
which, reduced to Philippine currency, amounts to P107.70;" that the delivered to the husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the
defendant had admitted this in hi answer to the complaint, and that by his marriage.
finding in a sense other than that accepted and not refuted in the answer of
the defendant, the court violated the provisions of section 94 of the Code of According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this
Civil Procedure. amount of 30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and with reason.
If, as was claimed, it was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really
The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the constitutes paraphernal property under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is
defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the that which the wife brings to the marriage without being included in the
complaint. The defendant said that he admitted having made the agreement dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the same without being
referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint, and that he stood upon its added thereto." But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife shall have
contents. The contents of the document to which he refers is of the following the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the
tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself to pay to his said wife the sum same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said
of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su cuenta in the city and capital of property. In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the
Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the matter of value of the personal property he may receive, or to secure said property, in
the Spanish pesetas; that does not appear in the contents of the document the manner established for the dowry property." Not even was there offered
the only thing he admitted in his answer. in evidence the public deed of delivery, nor the equally public mortgage deed
that is required by law. So that, therefore, the necessary proof of the
As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does not
contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the exist.lawphil.net
country shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in
contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word " pesetas," not being specific, was The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of
ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret it as being September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.
the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement was made,
Mexican being then the usual and current money in the Philippines. The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special
Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not pronouncement of costs in this instance.
"Spanish pesetas" that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the
agreement had been a specific one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid,
everyone would of course understand that the expense of following the
fluctuations of change and of the differences in value between the money
current in the country, and the Spanish pesetas, would have to be defrayed
by the obligated party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetas was
mentioned, it was necessary to decide which party should pay for the
difference in value so that the 300 pesetas stipulated here should be 300
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the reasons of the court below for his
decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule of interpretation cited
is the one applicable and it supports the reasoning of the decision appealed FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
from. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 9

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the
BELLOSILLO, J.: effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage
Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial
Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were
same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the
she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed
Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February
to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with
and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of marriage to petitioner.
the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened. one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that
the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court
the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27
submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and
documents being submitted. directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 10

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain
the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case
be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely
the parties. address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely
ordinary cases. to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis
to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect.
that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's
of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In
simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the
submitted for resolution. reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as
the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that
raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and
inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to
U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by
such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in
obtained. 12Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should
have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao. bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 11

83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel
to be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be
dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to
exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts
and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject
matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship
while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern
the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties
belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of

Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of
the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The
Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 12

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United

States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter

referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United
States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship

and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,

Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
he visited the Philippines. 7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
Ceferino Llorente.8
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of
the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating
DECISION
that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left
blank.9
PARDO, J.:
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2,
The Case 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the
family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos
The case raises a conflict of laws issue. salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support
would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital
35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since
as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
wife. Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 13

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for "(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my
Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11 Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in disposed of by and among themselves;
Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if
they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or "(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this
cohabitation.14 my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to
act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz "(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute
and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16 should served (sic) without bond;

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will "(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three "(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any
children, to wit: degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein; On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal Administratrix of his estate.18
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court
admitted the will to probate.20
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 14

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo "Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
died.21 deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three
of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
1/2 share in the conjugal property.23 thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and
just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court
IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24 by her to be performed.

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial "On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence
court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25 could not be granted.

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "SO ORDERED."27
"Bicol Star".26
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus: aforequoted decision.28

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were
January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of portion of the estate.30
paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares. cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED."32
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 15

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
reconsideration of the decision.33 whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, 34 denied the motion for lack of
merit. True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
Hence, this petition.35 must be alleged and proved.37

The Issue While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did
not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of
arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the unproven statement that "American law follows the domiciliary theory
deceased. hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. 38

The Applicable Law First, there is no such thing as one American law.1wph!1 The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
(3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore
undisputed. refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed
by foreign law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
The Civil Code clearly provides:
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to
Philippines, even though living abroad.
one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
circumstances here obtaining.
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
 CONFLICTS | Jan21| 16

Validity of the Foreign Divorce The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." 44
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
according to their national law. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him. intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the law.45
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated
that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues
as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law raised.
on the status of persons.
The Fallo
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of
the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
Validity of the Will deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
The Civil Code provides:
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
are executed. with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular Court.
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." No costs.
(underscoring ours)
SO ORDERED.
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