Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Maloles V Philips
Maloles V Philips
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the
Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no
right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases
were consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the
issues raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
[1]
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had
no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the
Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in
the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A
copy of the will was annexed to the petition for probate.
[2]
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the
petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of
which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita
de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 September 1995
attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on the
date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed
and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in
support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the
witness stand and was directly examined by the Court through "free
wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to determine
the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will.
After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound
and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue
influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament
on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor
influenced by any other person in signing it.
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that
petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs.
"A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia
corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and
Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely,
to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-
A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10",
& "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-
14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and
in the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will
and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L.
Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and
Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with
Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This
was granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in
support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his
intervention.[3]
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand,
private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to
Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued
an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De
Santoss estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set
aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that
he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he
came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the
probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was
still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testators estate;
that private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and
that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of
RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on
August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to
the Court of Appeals which, in a decision promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld
[4]
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the
records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending
case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The
order reads:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court,
transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is
related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch
65 with the information that there is no related case involving the
ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this
Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner
under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during
his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already
decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996, Judge Abad Santos appeared firm
[5]
in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the
petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were
commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the
latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case
"to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the
Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon.
Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and
Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial
court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on
February 26, 1997, rendered a decision setting aside the trial courts order on the
[6]
ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is
limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being
of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law.[9]
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so
much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of
such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate
of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills. [10]
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of
the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testators death shall govern.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the
lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the
allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been
explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary
capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of
wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of
testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the
mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death.
Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if
a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the
same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testators life,
therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is
probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may
remain for the courts to decide after the testators death will refer to the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of
course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the
will, he may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are rare
cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does
not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his
death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his
petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such
petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testators death would
be in order.[11]
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will
pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the
ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator
meant merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be
suspended until the latters death. In other words, the petitioner, instead
of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should
have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate
court.[12]
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule
73, 1 which states:
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement
of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held: [13]
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject
matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That
power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply
directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and
justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However,
this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the
person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack
of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in
the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing
to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in
Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. [14]
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition
for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of
the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator
after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote: [15]
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the
Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the
totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is
vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one
branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge
alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this
reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the
Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the
cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the
parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of
the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not
involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and
continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and
the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next
of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In
ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of
RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of
the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the
latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can
inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has
left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his
properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is
annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or
immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been
raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion
to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the
estate or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the
ground cited in the private respondents opposition, that the petitioner has
deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not
relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2,
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the probable
value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.
[16]
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
contingent.[17]
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered
an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one
who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus,
Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitimate of said heirs.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named
an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the
testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson: [19]
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond
may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these
[20]
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when
she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while
the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to
petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two
actions which are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result
in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by
Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the
allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private
respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing
authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the
testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition
terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the
persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor
was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no
forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.